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
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
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WILLIAM PITT, EARL OF CHATHAM



William Pitt (the younger)



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**WILLIAM PITT
EARL OF CHATHAM**

By **ALBERT VON RUVILLE**

TRANSLATED BY
H. J. CHAYTOR, M.A.

ASSISTED BY
MARY MORISON
WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
PROFESSOR HUGH E. EGERTON

IN THREE VOLUMES

Volume III

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NEW YORK: G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS

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ERRATA

Page 281, line 3, *for* 'the House of Commons this bill, on June 17, 1774, came' *read* 'its second reading in both Houses this bill, on June 17, 1774, again came.'

Page 321, line 9, *for* 'the Canadian' *read* 'another.'

Page 326, line 36, *for* 'the whole Canadian army' *read* 'his whole army.'

WILLIAM PITT, EARL OF CHATHAM

INTRODUCTION

It was a strange fatality that Pitt should be constrained by circumstances to relinquish the guidance of the state under the very reign for which he had longed for thirty years, and on which he had set all his hopes. It was not that any serious differences existed between him and the new ruler. On the contrary, the previous friction between himself and the young court, dating from the time before George III.'s accession, had gradually ceased; while upon the questions of the moment, their harmony was all that could be desired. In the matter of the peace negotiations both parties had been mistaken in their calculations; both had overestimated France's desire for peace. The subsequent behaviour of the adversary demonstrated to both that it was imperative to act with decision, and to risk a rupture of the negotiations and a new war with Spain. On the question, too, whether an immediate declaration of war was called for, Pitt and Bute would undoubtedly have come to an agreement, if it had not been Pitt's intention to use this special point to provide a reason for his resignation. The other ministers would not have resisted, since they considered Pitt's services almost indispensable; but his harsh written ultimatum was more than they could submit to. There undoubtedly were, however, deep-seated causes of disagreement between Pitt and the young court. At the present moment these had not yet revealed themselves, but sooner or later they would inevitably become operative. A knowledge of them is absolutely necessary to an understanding of the vicissitudes in the career of our hero during the reign of George III.—the new era, as it may well be called. Some information on the subject has

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already been given, but a more complete and connected account of the situation is demanded.

We have already seen what political principles came into vogue at the court of Frederick, Prince of Wales, how these principles were evolved by Lord Bolingbroke, and how adopted by his friends and disciples. The quintessence of them was, that the king ought to rule in accord with Parliament, and that this accord ought not to arise from a subordination of the one power to the other, but from the harmony existing between them—the king being impelled by his patriotism and intelligence, Parliament by its character as a free assembly representing the whole nation, to act exclusively in the interests of the nation. I endeavoured at the time to prove that these ideas were based upon false premises, and were, consequently, incapable of realisation. All they did was to provide the divergent elements, the groups representing wholly discordant interests, with common aims, and to unite them upon a fixed programme. To a practical statesman, or a ruling sovereign, they were useless. Such an one would inevitably and speedily recognise that for him there were only two alternatives—to lead or to be led. Prince Frederick, if he had come to the throne, would have been obliged either to relinquish the principles in question or to be guided by them only in appearance. The inevitability of one or other of these lines of action, which he never fully realised, became all the more evident to his son. Hence George III. appeared to deviate from his father's principles, and differences of opinion arose between him and many of those who had been loyal friends of Leicester House.

The young king was a capable, careful ruler, who devoted himself with his whole soul to his royal office, and was prepared to undertake the full responsibility for the welfare of his country. He applied himself with extreme assiduity and punctuality to state business, and made every effort to acquire an exact understanding of it. In serious moral purpose and devotion to the general welfare he surpassed his egoistic predecessors and most of his contemporaries, and consequently might well seem to be the suitable person to abolish the numerous existing abuses and the evils arising from the system of party government. This party system was, as a matter of fact, most repugnant to him; he regarded

it as a cancerous growth upon the English constitution. George had a highly developed sense of justice, and hence was imbued with that respect for the law and the constitution which the English people demanded of a ruler whom they were to trust and love. His private life, unlike that of his predecessors, was blameless, and set an admirable example to the upper classes, among whom many forms of depravity flourished. So far, therefore, he resembled the picture which Bolingbroke had drawn of a 'patriot king.'

Unfortunately, however, he had been inspired from his childhood, both by his German mother and by Lord Bute, with a high idea of his royal dignity. 'Be a king, George!' the princess is reported to have said to him at his accession, thereby meaning that he was to take the reins of government into his hand and *rule*, which the last kings had not done. The young monarch's inclination, therefore, was to make himself, without violating the constitution, the predominant power in the state. The Bolingbroke system could not help him to the attainment of this aim, for if he allowed Parliament to retain the powers it possessed, and also freed it from all extraneous influence, he made himself dependent upon a power the expression of whose will he had no means of regulating. Even if its will, that is to say, the will of the majority, were, like his own, bent upon the promotion of the general welfare, this, as already explained, did not entail parallel lines of action, and consequently did not affect his position of subordination.

George III. consequently discarded the Bolingbroke system and adopted a new mode of procedure, more suited to the tendency of the day. Absolutism was still predominant on the Continent. Hitherto it had only succeeded in establishing itself in England under peculiar forms. It was an oligarchic power, subject to frequent change of its component members, which had seized the reins of government. But now monarchy was released from the fetters which had hitherto impeded it, and was strong enough to assume the position which the tendency of the age indicated as belonging to it. But the step must be taken at once, for already new and antagonistic powers were at work. And the monarch's first proceeding must be to make sure of auxiliaries, by means of whose assistance the reins could be taken from the hands of their present possessors; for it was not to be expected that these would willingly surrender them.

It is to be remembered that, even at the time when the oligarchy was most powerful, it had always been forced to reckon with the monarchical power, for even then a gravitation towards the throne was discernible. There had always been members of the ruling Whig party who were ready, for the sake of royal favour, to dissociate themselves from that party. These, among whom Pitt was not the least eminent, must now be rallied round the royal standard and employed in the most important posts. Excellent government officials would thereby be gained, which was of great consequence. But the personages in question were, for the most part, men with few or no adherents; seats in Parliament were not at their command; therefore they alone could not form a foundation for the edifice of monarchical authority.

The second auxiliary force was found in the great Tory party, which in days past had been stronger than all the Whig forces together, but which of late had been much weakened and depressed by means of bribery and corruption. This party had no longer any reason to hold aloof from the reigning dynasty, whose present representative appeared to be a really national king, whereas their former idol, the Pretender, had become estranged from his native land, and showed no inclination whatever to abjure the Roman Catholic faith. Hence the Tories could once more enter the lists as the royalist party pure and simple, and support the monarchical aims of George III. From among them were recruited the 'friends of the king,' as it became the custom to call his most faithful allies; and from the number of seats in their possession, they were a substantial support in Parliament, and consequently a real power. For Parliament was and remained the highest power in the state. Not in opposition to, but only by means of Parliament, could the new monarchical authority be established. The Tory party had, however, undoubtedly lost much of its old character. In it, too, selfish motives prevailed; its members thought more of their own advancement than of the maintenance of principles; and therefore the king could not rely upon it absolutely. He found himself obliged to single out the trustworthy men of both parties, and thus to found a new royalist party. By so doing he returned, to a certain extent, to the Bolingbroke system; for it had been one of Bolingbroke's aims to break down the party walls.

Nor, if the king desired to secure a firm foundation for his commanding position, could he dispense with the means which the Whigs had created for the maintenance of their power, namely, corruption. The whole power of the kingdom, the official power of the ministers, the influence of constituents and friends, must be exerted to procure a majority in Parliament by means of which it would be possible to govern undisturbedly. This was actually done, though it would be a mistake to assume that the monarchy now supported itself exclusively upon this dependent party. The power thus created in Parliament compensated to a certain extent for the want of that constitutional power over Parliament, which exists in true monarchical states. But it would have been most unstable if it had not had other and far stronger supports. Amongst these were, first, the royalist feeling of the nation, which was still very strong, and had just experienced a powerful intensification; secondly, the recognition with which a conscientious, wise rule could not fail to meet; and, lastly, the tendency of people in general to side with those in power, which in itself is a great addition to power. Let there be a nucleus of power, and there will not fail to crystallise round it new factors of power. Owing to the tendency of the period, then, the English monarchy was predestined to become the leading power in the state and entirely to supplant those who had hitherto been in authority.

There was, however, an important influence which counteracted this development. The successful war, the termination of which was now at hand, actually produced a state of national prosperity such as the country had never yet enjoyed. In every department this remarkable fact is to be observed, that, whereas before the great war a certain stagnation prevailed, after it a speedy and great improvement took place, which announced itself in a rapid increase of the population. In the first half of the century agriculture was still in a very backward condition, so much so that it was considered necessary to ensure the food-supply of the country by prohibiting the export of grain. The farmers preferred sheep-breeding to corn-growing. They thereby produced the material for the long-established and flourishing woollen manufacture, and enriched themselves, but impoverished the country. And even in their sheep-breeding they did not follow rational methods,

but clung to those which had been pursued for centuries. There was no improvement until the fifties, when an intelligent Leicestershire farmer, named Bakewell, inaugurated a thorough reform in cattle-breeding, and consequently in farming generally. Skilful breeding, the irrigation of meadow-land, a rational system of manuring and the rotation of crops, soon brought agriculture to a pitch of prosperity hitherto unknown. In the important department of woollen manufacture some notable improvements (Kay's shuttles and Paul's and Wyatt's spinning-machines) had been introduced in the thirties, and these had increased production; but the great advances, which led to an actual revolution in the trade, were not made till 1764, and were due to the inventions of Hargreaves and Arkwright, which tremendously increased the output. The iron industry had never made much progress, because the blast apparatus had been too imperfect, and the necessary coal too dear. From the beginning of the century up to the sixties there had, consequently, been a steady rise in the iron imports. Then, however, steam-power began to be applied in the blast furnaces, and coal was superseded by the much cheaper coke; and these inventions made this industry, also, exceedingly prosperous.

As regards commerce, the chief source of England's wealth, it was not, in the first half of the century, nearly so prosperous as it became during the war and in consequence of it. Inland trade suffered under many hampering legal restrictions, of which the last were not removed until 1772. Another hindrance to its development was the state of the highroads, for the improvement of which very little had as yet been done. It was still, as of old, the duty of the separate parishes to make and repair them, a duty which was but imperfectly fulfilled. The so-called 'turn-pike roads' (the great expense of constructing which was defrayed by tolls) were already in existence in certain parts of the country, but it was not until after the war that this system was so universally adopted as to make any sensible impression on the general welfare of the nation. Foreign commerce was impeded by the monopoly system, which gave to certain companies the exclusive right of trading in certain parts of the world. It was believed that only by means of these wealthy companies, endowed with absolute authority, was it possible to resist the rivalry of

foreign powers and the hostility of the native races. After the defeat of France, however, the government saw its way to the gradual abolition of this arrangement, the pernicious nature of which had become increasingly obvious. And in many other ways the very successful issue of the war furthered England's commerce with the lands beyond the seas. There was an increase of traffic with North America and the West Indies; the East India trade entered on a new period of prosperity; and in the west coast of Africa the slave-trade produced increased gains.

All these causes in combination gradually introduced prosperity into one section after another of the population, and the consequence was that classes which had hitherto taken no part in the political life of the country now desired to do so, and endeavoured to influence by any means in their power the measures of a government in which they had no share. Constitutional means were not at their disposal, and effective demonstrations and riots were only possible on exceptional occasions; but there was a new means by which it was possible to make their opinions known to those in power and at the same time to elicit the support of the general public, namely, the press. It was immediately after the great war that the newspaper press rapidly extended its operations and became a power in the country which its rulers could not afford to neglect. Parliament, in particular, could not completely evade its influence. No serious results would have arisen in consequence if Parliament had been a co-ordinate factor in the government with the monarch, existing for the purpose of making the will of the nation felt by a sovereign reigning in his own right. Such a constituent part of the government would simply have rested thenceforth upon a wider base. The king would have been obliged to consider the wishes of a great number, instead of a small number of his subjects, a fact implying no abatement of his power. Parliament, however, was not merely a restrictive power, but the very foundation on which the king's sovereignty rested. It represented the real governmental power, which, by the nature of its constitution, was at the king's disposal. If other influences gained power in Parliament, its character would be by degrees so altered that the old relation of dependence on the Crown would disappear altogether. The existing free elements would not be

superseded by other free elements, but the influence of the monarch would be superseded by the influence of large sections of the people and their leaders, whereby the Crown would gradually lose all but its constitutional or merely nominal power. A reform of Parliament, that is to say, a legal realisation of the new position by an alteration in the elective system, would then be simply a question of time; for these lower classes would not rest until the House of Commons really became what it was supposed to be, a body representing the whole nation, or at least that part of the nation which desired a share in the work of government.

Thus George III., when endeavouring to break the power of the Whig aristocracy and to put an end to the party system, soon came face to face with a new antagonist, certainly not very powerful as yet, but of importance even now if allied with those who had been in power hitherto. We shall see presently what complications were hereby introduced into home politics. What concerns us now is the attitude assumed by Pitt in the midst of all these conflicting tendencies.

Pitt's whole character made it impossible for him to do anything but take the side which offered him the widest field of activity and allowed him to turn his faculties to the best account. A corrupted Parliament, whether dominated by the king or by a section of the nobility, was as objectionable to him now as ever, because over such an assembly his eloquence would not exert the desired influence. Nor was he at all enamoured of the Tory principles which would make the Crown, by constitutional means, superior or equal to Parliament. This would have been contrary to his Whig principles, and would also, he believed, render his oratory unavailing. The successes which he won in Parliament by means of his reputation, his popularity, and his rhetoric, he desired to be able to regard as accomplished facts, not as still dependent upon the consent of another power, accessible to foreign influence, namely, the sovereign. Hence it would be quite incorrect to assert, because Pitt often showed royalist leanings, that he was a Tory in the Whig camp. He never supported the investiture of the crown with any really independent power. But neither can it be said that a democratic government was his aim. He had a dislike to demagogic intrigues, newspaper attacks, pamphleteering, and all attempts of like nature to

influence the House of Commons, although any direct attempt to put down such things seemed to him incompatible with English liberty. He recognised in them a rival influence to his own—one with which he would have nothing to do. His idea was that the members of Parliament should be the free choice of the people, but that, once elected, they should be perfectly independent and accessible only to such influence as might legally be exerted upon them during the debates in the House. They were to be honest patriots, ready to listen to rational suggestions; and first among such rational suggestions he naturally placed his own. To the state of the franchise he gave only an occasional thought; a real, serious reform of Parliament never occurred to him, since the franchise as it existed suited his purposes, whereas the enfranchisement of large classes would simply have been opening the door to the demagogue.

Pitt certainly had no desire to see the Crown deprived of its power and dignity. It was by the monarch that he hoped to be raised to the post of leader of the government; hence it was of importance to him that the right of appointment should remain no less than before a royal prerogative. Again, the government, generally speaking, was to be a real monarchical government; the king was to exercise supreme authority. But how was such supreme authority to be reconciled with the sovereign power of Parliament? It was in attempting the solution of this difficult problem that Pitt had recourse to the theories evolved by Bolingbroke, which he expanded to suit his own requirements. Harmony between king and Parliament was to be produced as Bolingbroke had desired, by their mutual and disinterested zeal for the welfare of the country; but this could not be achieved without the offices of an intermediary, who would, on the one hand, discover the right plan of action and embark on it in the king's name, and, on the other, convince Parliament of the rightness of his policy, and secure its consent. The office of this intermediary, then, was to guide both sovereign and Parliament to the best way of promoting what they sincerely desired, the welfare of the country, and to restrain them from errors. This was the idea of the prime minister's office as Pitt understood it, though it is not in this form that it has since been realised in England. His prime minister was not to be the

executive instrument of the parliamentary majority, but the leader of the whole body politic, which he would inspire with his will. Nor is the chancellorship of Germany the equivalent of Pitt's premiership, for our chancellor is the executor of the will of the monarch, in whose name he may even at times—within constitutional limits—act against the will of the Parliament, whereas Pitt's ideal minister was answerable to both king and Parliament, and yet, by virtue of his intellectual superiority, capable of leading both. He was, in short, the real ruler, whose power was limited by the sovereign on the one hand, and the Parliament on the other. Without their approval he could do nothing; but their nature and their patriotic spirit would ensure their agreement with the desires of the minister who was able to indicate the right plan of action. It need hardly be said that Pitt felt himself the man best fitted to occupy this post. The question was—Would the other powers be satisfied to play a subordinate part? It was not altogether impossible that they might be so inclined if events took a particularly favourable turn; but this would certainly not happen because a really free Parliament had come into existence, but simply because the prime minister had brought other influences to bear on Parliament besides his eloquence. In an independent House of Commons it would be too easy, during a period of temporary adversity, for opposition agitators to gain the upper hand.

We have now made acquaintance with the forces and tendencies which, in the new era, were to strive together for the mastery. In what manner this happened, and how the destiny of our hero was moulded by the struggle, will be related in the following chapters.

SECTION I

UNDER THE BUTE MINISTRY

CHAPTER I

THE NEW ADMINISTRATION IN ITS FIRST STAGES

WHEN it became known throughout the country that the great Pitt had resigned office, the only possible explanation of the event seemed to be that he had fallen a victim to some court intrigue. Naturally, every one was inclined to blame the Scottish favourite, who had been mistrusted by the nation from the first. It was evident that ambition had led him to exercise his evil influence over the young king to bring about the fall of the saviour of the country. Hence the nation was prepared to give expression to its indignation by ovations and addresses to his supposed victim. In London, where Pitt had always been able to reckon on strong sympathy, it was proposed to interpellate the king on the subject of his dismissal, and to present an address of thanks to the fallen minister; but the idea was abandoned, since there had been no dismissal, but simply a voluntary resignation.¹

The popular enthusiasm was suddenly damped when it became known what attitude Pitt, after his retirement, was assuming towards the court. It was an attitude by no means in harmony with the prevailing conception of the situation. We have seen² how Pitt, when tendering his resignation, commended himself expressly to the favour of the king, thereby showing that he was prepared to accept proofs of that favour, and how he pledged himself to continue his support of the king's designs. There was thus no question of hostility towards the court; on the contrary, Pitt was

¹ Walpole, *Memoirs of the Reign of George III.*, i. 82.

² Vol. ii. chap. xvi.

doing everything in his power to make amends for the step which he had thought necessary, for other reasons. His aim was to keep access to the ministry at some future time open to himself. It was, consequently, imperative that he should plainly announce his good relations with the sovereign, and thereby check the efforts of his friends. Bute had always feared that the king would suffer a loss of popularity by parting with Pitt, and that, as he expressed it, Pitt would walk off with the popularity; so nothing could have been more welcome to him than Pitt's public pronouncement of himself as the king's devoted adherent by accepting tokens of his favour. And Pitt felt that there was nothing to prevent him from accepting, as it was certainly not his intention to go over to the opposition. He must merely be careful not to offend his friends too seriously; for, after all, his adherents gave him much more importance in the estimation of the court than his personal qualities alone would have enabled him to claim.

Employing the offices of a trustworthy intermediary, Mr. Elliot, Bute made very handsome offers to his late colleague.¹ He gave him his choice between the governorship of Canada, with a salary of £5000, and the privilege (to be attached to the post by legislation) of a seat in Parliament, and the chancellorship of the duchy of Lancaster, a sinecure to which the same income was attached. Pitt replied to the favourite, who had sent these proposals in writing, in a letter which gave lavish expression to his veneration for the king and his gratitude.² 'Overwhelmed with the extent of his Majesty's gracious goodness towards me, I desire the favour of your Lordship to lay me at the royal feet, with the humble tribute of the most unfeigned and respectful gratitude. Penetrated with the bounteous favour of the most benign sovereign and master, I am confounded with his condescension in deigning to bestow one thought about any inclination of his servant, with regard to the modes of extending to me his royal beneficence. Any public mark of his Majesty's approbation, flowing from such a spontaneous source of clemency, will be my comfort and my glory,' etc. etc. Even if we ascribe a good deal of this flowery language to the court customs of the period, the fact remains that the offers seemed to him remarkably liberal and that

¹ *Grenville Papers*, i. 413; *Chatham Papers*, ii. 146 ff.

² *Chatham Papers*, ii. 149 f.

he was truly grateful. He was conscious of having offended the king by his abrupt behaviour and his sudden resignation; yet it was the king who was now offering him such considerable favours. (As a matter of fact, the intermediary had had some trouble in persuading the king to give his consent to the offers in question.¹) Nevertheless, Pitt could not make up his mind to accept, as he had no desire to enter upon the duties of a lower office than that which he had just resigned. Instead, he recommended his family, 'those dearer to me than myself,' to the goodwill of the king. Hereupon a peerage was offered to his wife, and to himself a pension of £3000 per annum for three lives, that is to say, for himself and any two of his family whom he chose to indicate.² As a burdening of the Irish civil list with such pensions (the proceeding usually adopted) was contrary to Pitt's principles, the necessary sum was to be obtained from the taxes paid by the West Indian colonies, which, thanks to Pitt's enterprise, were now a much more considerable source of income than formerly.

This token of royal favour Pitt accepted. He chose for Hester (the choice being left to himself) the title of Baroness Chatham, an English title which had been borne by the lately deceased Duke of Argyle.³ By means of this curious arrangement, which was not uncommon in England, the family was raised to the ranks of the nobility (for the eldest son would inherit the title from his mother), and yet the father retained the right to sit in the House of Commons, which was indispensable to the continuation of his political activity. In the case of eminent statesmen, elevation to the House of Lords was regarded almost as a step in the direction of retirement. Again Pitt could not say enough to express his gratitude. 'I have not words,' he wrote to Bute,⁴ 'to express the sentiments of veneration and gratitude with which I receive the unbounded effects of beneficence and grace, which the most benign of sovereigns has condescended to bestow on me, and on those most dear to me. Your Lordship will not wonder if the sensations which possess my whole breast refuse me the power of describing their extent.' He is said, when he thanked the king in person, to have burst into tears and to have

¹ *Grenville Papers*, i. 413.

² Bute to Pitt, October 8, 1762. — *Chatham Papers*, ii. 151.

³ *Dictionary of National Biography*. ⁴ *Chatham Papers*, ii. 152.

exclaimed: 'I confess, Sir, I had but too much reason to expect your Majesty's displeasure. I did not come prepared for this exceeding goodness. Pardon me, Sir, it overpowers, it oppresses me.'¹ It was his innate royalism, in combination with family affection, that produced these ebullitions, which make a somewhat curious impression upon us. One thing which they clearly prove is that he did not consider himself the offended party, but was, on the contrary, conscious of having given offence. The favour shown by the court is, of course, not to be ascribed entirely to goodwill towards Pitt. It was, on the contrary, much rather due to a desire to stop the popular demonstrations in his favour. Hence the gift was made as considerable as possible. But it is incorrect to read into the proceeding, as is often done, a desire to injure Pitt; for he himself did not wish these demonstrations. The court was, in a manner, obliged to adopt defensive measures, to avoid the dangerous consequences which might follow on the undesired retirement of Pitt. Therefore, contrary to custom, there was published in the official newspaper, along with the intimation of the prime minister's resignation, an intimation of the rewards which had been bestowed on him.²

As soon as it became known that Pitt had accepted favours from the king, a complete revulsion of public feeling threatened to take place. His friends were indignant or distressed that he had humiliated himself to such an extent, and by so doing disappointed all the expectations for the fulfilment of which they had looked to him. And his enemies at once set to work to undermine his reputation by satirising his conduct. Numbers of pamphlets were published, which subjected his whole administration to the severest criticism, depreciated his merits, and exaggerated his faults, invariably laying special emphasis upon his late inconsistent and contemptible behaviour.³ Delaval, whom he had once attacked sharply in the House, said sarcastically: 'The man is a fool. If he had gone into the City, told them that he had a poor wife and children unprovided for, and opened a subscription, he would have got £500,000 instead of £3000 a year.'⁴ His wife was nicknamed Lady Cheat'am.⁵ His own sister, Anna, thought of profiting

¹ *Annual Register*, 1761, p. 45.

² Walpole, *George III.*, i. 64.

³ *Ibid.*, i. 64.

⁴ *Chatham Papers*, ii. 159.

⁵ Albemarle, *Memoirs of the Marquis of Rockingham*, i. 75.

by the opportunity to play him a trick. A year previously, when an Irish pension had been granted her, Pitt, in his letter of congratulation, expressed his regret at seeing the name of Pitt on the pension list. The lady copied out this letter with the intention of sending the copy to her brother, as the remark was now applicable to his own position. Fortunately she allowed herself to be dissuaded by sensible friends from carrying out her intention, but she could not resist talking about it, so that the story was soon in every mouth.¹

Most of the attacks upon Pitt's private and official conduct have been placed to the credit of Lord Bute, who was believed capable of everything evil. Horace Walpole, among others (in his *Memoirs*), accuses Bute. To me such an accusation seems most unfounded; no evidence whatever can be brought in support of it. Walpole's own writings enable us to discover the real source of the attacks, for in them Bute always appears in conjunction with Fox,² whose tendencies at the time lay in quite a different direction from his own, and whom he was actually trying to keep out of the government.³ Hence it seems probable that it was Fox, Pitt's old opponent, who was anxious to bring discredit on him. Bute had no reason to injure him, since he had no opposition to fear from him. It was sufficient for Bute that he had averted the popular attack on the new administration. Fox, on the contrary, felt himself to be Pitt's rival, and was therefore anxious to weaken him by undermining his reputation, in order that he himself might in course of time rise to the position of leader.

Pitt recognised the necessity for defending himself and justifying his conduct. He did this in a letter to his friend William Beckford,⁴ which was intended for publication. In it he explains briefly and clearly that his judgment having been overruled in a matter of the highest importance to the honour of the Crown and to the national interest, he had felt obliged to resign the seals, since he could not be responsible for measures which he was no longer allowed to guide. The tokens of approbation which he had received from the king after his resignation he declared to be entirely unsolicited.

¹ Walpole, *George III.*, i. 66, etc.

² *Ibid.*, i. 66.

³ *Grenville Papers*, i. 414.

⁴ October 15, 1761.—*Chatham Papers*, ii. 158.

In conclusion, he affirmed his indifference to the attitude of credulous people, who thought fit, because of ungrounded accusations, hastily to withdraw their good opinion from one who had served his country with fidelity and success.

One assertion made in this letter was not absolutely veracious. The marks of royal favour had not been conferred without some predisposing sign on his part, though it may be allowed that the sign he gave was more in the nature of a permission than of a solicitation. And in assigning the reasons for his resignation, he omitted to mention those which lay more beneath the surface and yet were paramount. What chiefly aroused criticism, however, was his remark that circumstances had rendered it impossible for him to *guide* the measures.¹ His opponents seized upon this statement, and, not without reason, characterised his claim to guide as arrogance. Fox ridiculed it as absurd. According to the constitution, the guidance of measures lay with the king and the cabinet, not with any single minister. But, on the whole, the letter made a good impression. It did much to improve the state of public feeling towards Pitt. A letter to the same purpose, written by Earl Temple to the active agitator, Wilkes, had a similar effect.² The common council of the City of London now determined, by a large majority, to present Pitt with an address thanking him for his administration of affairs; at the same time they instructed the representatives of the City in Parliament to oppose all measures which might lead to the restitution of any of the conquests.³ A number of other English towns, and a noticeably large number of Scottish towns, imitated this proceeding. Dublin, too, sent him an address. But there were also towns where the proposal to present an address was defeated.

That sent him in the month of December by his beloved city of Bath deserves special mention.⁴ Whilst recognising his achievements, it dwelt in a marked manner upon the obligation which the fact that Pitt represented Bath in Parliament laid upon its citizens to address him publicly. But for this they would have rejoiced over these achievements in

¹ Walpole, *George III.*, i. 66.

² *Grenville Papers*, i. 404.

³ Albemarle, *Memoirs of Rockingham*, i. 52.

⁴ Peach, *Life of Allen*, p. 172.

silence. They furthermore characterised their step, in a manner which cannot have been agreeable to Pitt, as an expression of their loyalty to the king, whose example they were following. They had thus been impelled to the demonstration only by the force of circumstances, not by the strength of their feelings. It is evident that though the town councillors were satisfied with his actions while in office, they were not satisfied with the manner of his retirement, and that their displeasure, which was to declare itself much more strongly at a later period, was already in existence. Ralph Allen had softened the mode of expression as much as possible; he refused to sign the address in its original form. He also, in a letter to Pitt, endeavoured to excuse the attitude of his fellow-citizens;¹ they were, according to him, really well disposed towards their member, although they gave expression to their attachment in this unusual style. Pitt, however, was annoyed; his answer was coldly conventional. 'The only person who displayed any fervour on the occasion was a certain T. Atwood, who had several times been mayor of Bath. He sang with more enthusiasm than poetical taste :²—

' Whence does the Gaul exult? Can Broglie boast
At length one battle not entirely lost?
Or has the Spaniard their alliance joined?
Alas! much worse—our Patriot has resigned!'

The man whom Bute at once selected to fill the vacancy left by Pitt's retirement was George Grenville,³ with whom he had always carefully maintained the most friendly relations, and whom he had indeed, after George III.'s accession, introduced into the cabinet. Immediately after the catastrophe of October 2, Grenville was summoned from Wotton. On his way to town he met his brother, Lord Temple, who, as his brother-in-law's (Pitt's) present fate was decided, was returning to Stowe. George got into Lord Temple's chaise and received from him an account of the whole affair. Grenville did not attempt to conceal his disapproval of Pitt's action, but the earl spoke of the measure as one which concerned Mr. Pitt and himself alone, and which did not oblige any other person, certainly not George and James Grenville, to

¹ Allen to Pitt, December 19, 1761.—Chatham MSS.

² Peach, *Life of Allen*, p. 75.

³ *Grenville Correspondence*, i. 409 ff.

resign. Convinced that he and his brother understood each other, George proceeded on his journey to London, and immediately placed himself at the favourite's disposal. Bute offered him the post which Pitt had just resigned, but this Grenville would on no account accept; such action might have represented him as a rival of his brother-in-law. He recommended his wife's brother, the Earl of Egremont, for the position. Egremont was a son of the Wyndham who had been leader of the opposition in Walpole's days and closely allied with Bolingbroke; he was a Tory, and as such acceptable to the king. To him the seals were confided a few days later, whilst Grenville, whose real ambition was the neutral position of speaker, at the king's express desire undertook the leadership of the House of Commons, a post for which he was supposed to possess special qualifications. He continued to be treasurer of the navy. He and Pitt exchanged friendly calls,¹ so that their difference of opinion on the Spanish question did not appear to have produced any unpleasantness.

Lord Temple returned to town on October 8, when he, too, resigned office. James Grenville gave up his appointment of cofferer soon after, although there was no necessity for his resignation; Temple compensated him for the loss of income by settling £100 a year on each of his sons and putting them down in his will for £5000. But discord now began to trouble the Grenville family. Lord Temple and James suddenly began to treat their brother as if he were a renegade. Temple would not receive him at all, and James's behaviour to him was so offensive that he was obliged to break off intercourse with him also. This family dissension, which became still more bitter, lasted for several years, until a change of political conditions brought about a reconciliation. For Pitt and his wife it was the saddest consequence of the resignation episode.

By the resignation of the Grenville brothers two more posts, that of lord privy seal and of cofferer, became vacant, and suitable candidates had to be found. It was long before Bute actually made the new appointments, and he must have had his own special reasons for this delay, as there seems to have been no doubt at all as to the persons who were to receive them. As early as October 10 he approached the Duke

¹ *Grenville Papers*, i. 411.

of Bedford,¹ who had not held office since he lost the lord-lieutenancy of Ireland in consequence of the occurrences of 1760: and on November 25 the privy seal was entrusted to this nobleman. It had, undoubtedly, on the 16th been offered to the Earl of Hardwicke,² and been declined by him with the most ceremonious gratitude; but this offer had evidently been merely an act of courtesy towards the venerable nobleman; the office was not to be filled before he had had the refusal of it. No one could have had the slightest doubt that he would decline. To do him the greater honour, the offer was made by the king in person, in presence of the Duke of Newcastle.

The explanation of the delay is to be sought in the contradictory attitudes assumed towards the great questions of foreign policy by Bute and the Duke of Bedford. Bedford remained faithful to his old peace policy, to which he had resolutely adhered throughout the past year, and his relations with the Duke of Newcastle consequently became closer. Bute, as we shall prove, continued to pursue the path on which he had entered in company with Pitt, only less openly. He could not dispense with Bedford's support, but he dared not invest him with the power attendant on the new office until the progress of events had made a return to the duke's policy impossible. Surprise was naturally aroused by Bute's delay in coming to a decision, and by his complete silence in regard to his intentions;³ but, seen in this light, his behaviour is perfectly intelligible. At last, on November 25, after Parliament had been sitting for some time, and when war with Spain was practically certain, Bedford received the seals. Another brother-in-law of Grenville's, a brother of the Earl of Egremont, Lord Thomond, was appointed cofferer. Other changes were occasioned by the appointment of a new lord-lieutenant of Ireland (the duties of this office had been temporarily discharged by a deputy), and by the resignation of Legge, the chancellor of the exchequer. The Earl of Halifax was made lord-lieutenant, Lord Sandys succeeding him as first lord of trade. Barrington, the secretary for war, took Legge's place, and Charles Townshend was put into Barrington's.

¹ *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 50.

² Harris, *Life of the Earl of Hardwicke*, iii. 269.

³ *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 59, and *passim*.

If we examine this reconstruction of the government, we find that there is a distinct increase in the Tory element. Egremont, Thomond, and Lord Sandys belonged to the Tory section which formerly, leaguings itself with Walpole's enemies, had formed part of the opposition. In George Grenville the Whig section of the Leicester House party was represented, so that there was a mixture of the royalist elements of both parties, of the very kind that suited the king's requirements. But together with this force the old oligarchy maintained its position, which was strengthened by the accession to office of the Duke of Bedford; and it remained an important factor. Pitt had not succeeded in bending it to his wishes, because he either could not, or more probably for definite reasons would not, undertake the necessary manœuvres; but Bute managed, in spite of all opposition, to attain his aim.

His distribution of appointments proves Bute's desire to let the world know that the relations between himself and his late colleague were not unfriendly. We have one proof in the favour shown to the Grenville connection, and another in the appointment of a distant cousin of Pitt's, George Pitt of Strathfieldsaye, to the vacant post of envoy at Turin. It was a post for which the gentleman in question had made application before his cousin's resignation, but Pitt had held out little hope of his success. The appointment at this moment of a man bearing Pitt's name would create the impression, more particularly abroad, that another favour had been shown to the late prime minister. George himself ascribed his success to his cousin's influence, and wrote to thank him; but Pitt, who had no desire that his friends should regard him as the recipient of further court favours, replied peremptorily that he had nothing whatever to do with it.¹

His own adherents, more particularly Lord Temple and William Beckford, eagerly endeavoured to force him into an attitude of decided opposition to the court. The opening of Parliament took place at the beginning of November, and a few days later, on the 9th, which was Lord Mayor's Day, the king, with the young queen and the highest officers of state, intended to dine at the Guildhall.² Beckford succeeded in

¹ *Chatham Papers*, ii. 163 ff.

² For this affair see Walpole, i. 69; and the account given by Nuthall to Lady Chatham.—*Chatham Papers*, ii. 166 ff.

persuading Pitt, against his better judgment, to take part, along with Temple, in the festivities of the day. He then hired people, who were stationed along the streets, to greet Pitt and Temple with loud acclamations. As the carriages, which were not permitted to have any military escort in the City, drove past, the hirelings mistook that in which Bute and Barrington sat for Pitt's, and broke into loud hurrahs. But they soon noticed their mistake, and thereupon began to shout: 'Damn all Scotch rogues! No Bute! No Newcastle salmon! Pitt for ever!' They even attempted personal violence; but Bute also had made his arrangements: he had hired a number of prize-fighters, and these now set upon Beckford's men to such purpose that their leader was obliged to take refuge under the carriage. The mob consequently confined itself to pelting the carriage with mud; but worse might have happened if its destination had not been near at hand. On arriving at the Guildhall the ministers were taken under the protection of the constabulary there posted. But in the hall, again, there was an objectionable scene. The king and queen were rather coldly received, but when Pitt and his brother-in-law made their appearance, all attention was directed to them. In the midst of a storm of applause, also arranged by Beckford, the ex-minister was received by the civic authorities with almost as much ceremony as the king himself,¹ which gave him, very much against his will, the appearance of being the principal guest at the entertainment. There were no untoward occurrences on the return drive, as Bute, to avoid mishaps, took his seat in the lord chancellor's state carriage.

An investigation of the whole affair was ordered by the lord mayor, Sir Samuel Fludyer, and Beckford's share in it was brought to light. His reputation did not gain thereby, although the violence offered to Bute had not entered into his plan. Serious blame fell on Pitt, too, for having given occasion to such scenes. Tact should have forbidden his appearance at a festivity held in honour of royalty. He had, instead, made a concession to the wishes of his friends, but without knowing their aims or foreseeing the consequences of his action. The event at least proved that his popularity was restored.

¹ *Historical MSS. Commission, Sixth Report, part i. p. 316.*

A few weeks previously he had been burned in effigy in the City with great solemnity;¹ now he was once again the idol of the populace.

His parliamentary labours during this winter were not very agreeable to Pitt. His position obliged him to support the government and act towards it with civility. Nor had he any serious objection to Bute's policy except upon the one matter which had led to his resignation; it was, on all main points, a continuation of his own. But Bute could not follow this policy openly, since many of his colleagues differed from him on the most important questions. He was obliged, whilst maintaining an appearance of regard for their wishes, to attempt an arrangement of affairs which should lead them to agree to his. Thus the public policy of the government was not that which the leading minister of state was in reality pursuing. Pitt was thereby compelled to manœuvre also, and to appear tolerably indifferent, whilst in reality abiding firmly by his principles. He adopted as neutral a standpoint on disputed questions as possible, leaving the decision of them to the ministers, who must, he granted, be guided by circumstances; he admitted that he himself might be mistaken, since he was not in possession of all the necessary data. The preservation of this neutral attitude was, however, rendered very difficult for him, both by inconsiderate friends, who urged him to defend his principles boldly, and by his adversaries, who, with Fox at their head, sought to provoke him by violent attacks upon his administration and upon his avowed opinions. In spite of both, however, he kept calm; and consideration for the dangerous position of the country was a motive which not only explained his conduct, but threw a favourable light on it. The parliamentary debates at this time were of a very remarkable character. Pitt's attitude was that of a skilful fencer who confines himself entirely to defence, at most showing himself by an adroit thrust to be quite capable of wounding if he did not choose, for reasons of his own, to refrain from doing so.

The speech which the king read² on November 6 did not seem to indicate any change of policy upon the most important questions. It might equally well have been composed by Pitt. His majesty expressed regret at the failure of the

¹ *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 54.

² *Annual Register*, 1761, p. 264 ff.

peace negotiations, but immediately afterwards declared his firm resolve to carry on the war vigorously; and he also expressly mentioned his intention to remain faithful to his allies. Only to those who examined the speech carefully was a slight change perceptible. It was natural that the impending Spanish war should not be mentioned, for this would have entailed a reference to negotiations which were still hanging in the balance. Pitt himself, as he afterwards averred in a speech, would have considered it wrong to mention it. But as regards the allies, what had been said on a previous occasion was that the war would be continued until a just and honourable peace was ensured for England and for them, whereas the king now announced his determination to adhere firmly to the engagements concluded with his allies, and to prosecute the war in the most effectual manner for the interest and advantage of his kingdoms, until it was productive of such a peace as might reasonably be expected from the English successes. The interests of England alone are mentioned; all that is guaranteed to the allies is strict adherence to the engagements made with them, not an advantageous peace.

In the House of Lords Temple took advantage of the debate on the address to explain once more the motives which had led him to resign. He made some remarks on court favour, and on the necessity for an able prime minister, wishing to provoke Bute to a dispute.¹ But Bute did not allow himself to be provoked; it was absolutely necessary that he should avoid fresh disputes and discord. With the Duke of Bedford, too, Temple attempted to pick a quarrel, accusing him of revealing state secrets to Bussy, a charge which the duke calmly and firmly repudiated.

Pitt behaved very differently on the occasion of the debate on the address in the House of Commons on the 13th.² He found himself obliged to speak, because his administration and his attitude upon the Spanish question were attacked; but he did not, as was generally expected, lead the opposition by making a violent speech. On the contrary, he professed great zeal for his majesty and for the administration when it should

¹ Walpole, *George III.*, i. 88, 89.

² See Burke's account in the *Chatham Papers*, ii. 169 note; and Walpole, *George III.*, i. 74.

be settled. His own justification he desired to leave to his past conduct. To the attacks in the newspapers he was indifferent; he had early contracted an indifference to party papers, and preferred reading Virgil or Horace. He spoke with great moderation of the attitude of the cabinet council on October 2, which had decided him to resign. He had acted from conviction, and he supposed that the great lords who had opposed him had done likewise. He was satisfied, because now unanimity prevailed and vigorous measures were recommended from the throne. It cannot be doubted that he had recognised the significance of the passage relating to the allies; but, to avoid any appearance of opposition to the ministry, he took no notice of it, and only insisted in general terms on the necessity of continuing the German war and supporting the allies, which England was perfectly able to do. 'If we abandoned our allies,' he cried, 'God would abandon us.' The frequently quoted expression, 'America was conquered in Germany,' occurred in this connection. He went on to prove and emphasise his own loyalty to the allies, with the object of leading the public to contrast his conduct favourably with that of his successors, who might very probably find themselves obliged to pursue a different policy. As a matter of fact Pitt, as minister, could not possibly, after the fall of Schweidnitz (October 1) and the Russian successes in Pomerania, have advised the Prussian king to continue the war or have answered for the safety of his dominions. But now, as he was no longer in office, he could make or support irrational proposals, if they were likely to increase his popularity. In order that he might not run the risk of being summoned to carry them out, or of having his policy seriously examined, he was careful to declare his extreme unwillingness ever again to take office—a passage in his speech which, except with this aim in view, would be motiveless. He refused to consider the accusations which his friends had brought against the ministry, in particular that of having estimated the cost of the Spanish war at too high a figure. He advised the House not to be too fastidious in their criticisms of the treasury and the budget, and thereby gave another proof of his desire to avoid friction.

The speech, as a whole, proved that Pitt, on the one hand, desired to appear constant to his old policy, especially to the

continental measures and the Prussian alliance, but that, on the other hand, he had no intention of seriously opposing the ministerial policy, even if, in consequence of the altered situation, it should vary considerably from his own. In both cases the object was the same; he sought to further his chance of being recalled to office by preserving his reputation abroad with England's allies, while at the same time retaining the favour of the court.

But his enemies did not fail to take advantage at the earliest opportunity of his comparative impotence, to punish him severely.¹ On December 9, when the amount to be voted for the war in Germany was under debate, a whole swarm of parliamentary hornets was let loose upon him. One at least of the members who attacked him, namely Mr. Bunbury, was an intimate friend of Fox; and all of them approved of Fox's policy. After Townshend, the war secretary, had declared and proved the necessity for the retention of the English troops in Germany, one after another of Pitt's assailants spoke—Bedford's friend Rigby; a Scotsman named Dempster; Richard or, as he was called from his poem, 'Leonidas' Glover, of whom repeated mention has already been made; and Delaval. They all condemned either Pitt's earlier measures or his personal attitude, and expressed disapproval of the continental policy generally. Delaval said satirically that he recollected to have heard a considerable person, lately retired from a great post, affirm that whoever in this country, of what size or stature soever, should venture to support Hanover measures, would find his proceeding hang about his neck like a millstone, and sink him to the bottom of the sea; but that he saw that person, though not very robust, sitting as it sat light on his shoulders. Grenville, too, spoke against the treaty with Prussia, but considered it necessary, as the nation was so far involved, to go on, though he thought that other and more effectual plans might be proposed. Referring to Pitt's assertion that America had been conquered in Germany, he maintained that it was not the German war which had hampered France in her undertakings in America, but the want of sailors.

On this occasion also Pitt preserved complete serenity. He

¹ See Albemarle, *Memoirs of Rockingham*, i. 71; *Chatham Papers*, ii. 169; Walpole, *George III.*, i. 80.

complimented the proposers of the war budget, congratulated the House on the moderation shown in the debate, and proceeded, in a mild conversational style, which was in marked contrast with his usual energetic eloquence, to deal with the reproaches of his enemies. He had from his youth, he declared, been averse to continental measures; but he had been compelled to take the seals and had been obliged to carry out the plans of his predecessors. He must not be blamed for the conclusion and the breaking of the treaty of Kloster-Zeven and other similar proceedings; but the treaty with Prussia had been an inevitable consequence of these. In this last assertion Pitt's favourite tactics were again discernible—namely, not to take office until a necessary change of policy, but one which did not beseem him and his past career, had been accomplished. He had, at a previous period, left others to make overtures to Prussia and begin the continental war, in order that he might now be able to deny any responsibility for these measures; and now he had again given up office, that he might be able to ascribe to others a possible retirement from the alliance with the King of Prussia and from the Continent, and be in a position afterwards to build upon the new foundation. To Delaval's sarcasm he replied with the effective, but not very logical observation, that as Germany had formerly been managed it had been a millstone about the neck of England; as managed now, it was one about that of France. He herewith changed the whole metaphor; as he had employed it before, it was not the German war that was a millstone dragging England down, it was the counsel to enter into alliance with Prussia that was a millstone round the neck of the counsellor. The refutation was, consequently, illogical; but it was quite sufficient.¹ His brother-in-law, Grenville, Pitt treated with studied contempt, devoting very little attention to his speech, and choosing Rigby's as that worthy of answer. He concluded with eulogies of Frederick the Great and Prince Ferdinand; it suited his plans never to miss an opportunity of praising them.

The debate was continued next day, when a new assailant of Pitt appeared on the scene. This was Colonel Barré, the

¹ In a letter from Mr. Milbanke to Rockingham (Albemarle, *Rockingham*, i. 83) a different retort is given.

adjutant and confidant of General Wolfe, who had taken him to Quebec on the recommendation of a friend.¹ He had there proved himself a capable officer, had been present at the general's death, and had himself been wounded. Lord Shelburne's patronage had procured him an entrance into Parliament as representative of the borough of Wycombe. His enmity to Pitt was, it was said, due to the fact that he had been passed over for promotion after his patron's death. So he was easily induced by Pitt's court enemies to turn his gift of bold eloquence against the ex-minister, in order, as he himself said, to end the shameful and general reluctance to oppose the insolent assailant of the ministerial measures. This utterance in itself sufficiently proves the incapacity of this swash-buckler to appreciate the situation. He saw it exactly as Fox and his associates represented it to him.

He made a most violent attack on Pitt and the late king, abused the treaties and the Hanoverian policy, condemned Pitt's political principles, and declared that his life from beginning to end had been a series of changes and contradictions, that, chameleon-like, he always took the colour of the ground on which he stood. He then proceeded to ridicule Pitt's figure and gestures, saying he was amazed to see the gentleman with solemn looks, with eyes uplift to heaven, one hand beating on his breast, formally disowning and contradicting the principles he had avowed the day before.² Pitt's serenity gave way under this sudden, bitter attack, and he once or twice during the course of it turned to his friend Beckford, asking, 'What's to be done?' At last Beckford rose and called the orator to order for his remarks upon the king; but Fox immediately started up and said that the use which had been made of the king's name was not irregular, and thereupon Barré continued his fulminations. Pitt disdained to defend himself. He only turned to Beckford and asked in an audible voice 'how far the scalping Indians cast their tomahawks?' But the solicitor-general considered it incumbent on him to vindicate the late king by dwelling upon the great sacrifices of money which he had personally made for the continuation of the war. Strangely enough, no real indignation

¹ See vol. ii. p. 257.

² See Doughty, *Siege of Quebec*, vi. 25; Albemarle, *Rockingham*, i. 81; Fitzmaurice, *Life of Shelburne* (London, 1875), i. 126.

was excited in the House by Barré's impudent attacks; it seemed, on the contrary, to cause a certain satisfaction that the great assailant, Pitt, should for once be vigorously assailed.

It was in this manner that Parliament was occupied during the last months of the year 1761. But at the beginning of the new year important changes in foreign politics, which had been gradually preparing, gave its energies a new direction.

Bute had been obliged to refuse Pitt's last demand in the Spanish affair, because it would have been impossible to obtain the consent either of the king or the old oligarchy, and because Pitt had too openly affirmed his intention to resign. But he nevertheless continued to pursue what Pitt had indicated as the correct policy. He *wished* war with Spain, not because he believed it unavoidable, but because it suited Grenville's plans. And Grenville regarded the war as desirable because it would provide England with new enterprises for her enormously enlarged fleet. There is no other possible explanation of the conduct of the government.

Soon after Pitt's retirement a despatch of an entirely pacific tendency arrived from Lord Bristol,¹ affirming the desire of his Catholic majesty for a good understanding with England. About the same time it became known that, though the Spanish silver fleet, bringing the American revenue for two years, had arrived safely at Cadiz, its cargo had been disappointingly small, a fact which had distinctly increased the aversion to war prevailing at court.² The impression began to make way in London that the earlier unfriendly attitude of Spain was to be ascribed entirely to the intrigues of the French party, and was no evidence of the real disposition of the court. In spite of this, however, Bute and Egremont, without consulting Newcastle,³ sent a despatch of a peculiarly peremptory character to Lord Bristol,⁴ which effectually barred the way to peace and at the same time wounded Spanish pride. After plentiful assurances of England's love of peace and desire to settle all disputes amicably, a direct demand (the reasons for which were detailed at length) was made that Spain

¹ Of October 14.—Public Record Office.

² Report of the Prussian ambassador, October 23, 1761.—Berlin Archives.

³ Albemarle, *Rockingham*, i. 56 f.

⁴ October 28, 1761.—Public Record Office.

should communicate to the English court the articles of the treaty which she had lately concluded with France, either in full, or at least in so far as they concerned English interests. France had circulated throughout Europe a report that the treaty was of a hostile tendency towards England, therefore England must insist that this impression, which was injurious to her position, should be dispelled by the publication of the agreements in question. A polite and friendly demeanour was, undoubtedly, enjoined upon Bristol, but he was ordered to be inflexibly firm in his demand. Upon its fulfilment the continuation of the negotiations was to depend. He was also specially enjoined to discourage the idea that the government would adopt a weaker policy after Pitt's resignation. Egremont wrote that, 'on the contrary, this idea, suggested by ill-wishers of the government at home and probably spread industriously on the Continent . . . would merely tend to make the present ministry act more energetically, in order to avoid all possible suspicion of indecision and inactivity.' In a confidential communication which accompanied the official despatch Egremont certainly employed a less imperative tone, stating that a solemn declaration from the King of Spain, that the treaty contained nothing injurious to the interests of England, might be accepted in place of a divulgence of its exact terms; but that if such a proposal were made, to Egremont he was only to accept it for consideration.

Supposing Bute's desire to have been the maintenance of peace, this was not the way to achieve it. What the situation really demanded was, not the settlement of a few disputed questions (which could be accomplished at any time with a little goodwill), but that Spain should be induced to neglect her engagements to France, which, there could be little doubt, were antagonistic to English interests. The proper method of securing this end would, naturally, have been simply to ignore the treaty, and to be satisfied by the non-fulfilment of its conditions, as far as they were detrimental to England. To demand their publication, a demand with which the Spaniards were probably not entitled to comply, even had they desired to do so, was to tear the wounds open instead of healing them. It left Spain no loophole of escape. If she confessed her engagements, her hostile tactics would come to light, and, unless she were prepared to undergo an inconceivable humiliation,

England would be obliged to declare war. If she refused the information demanded, the breach, as Bute's despatch intimated, would be just as complete. The instructions sent to Bristol could, therefore, have no other aim than to provide a sufficient motive for declaring war. It was the continuation of Pitt's policy in a somewhat modified form; the government was endeavouring, before proceeding to action, to prove publicly that Spain was in the wrong.

Newcastle perceived at once that the despatch was certain to produce an unfortunate effect. In notes upon Egremont's letter¹ he remarked that the demand formulated would give the French party at Madrid an opportunity of hindering any amicable settlement, whereas an agreement upon the questions in dispute would have invalidated the treaty with France. The duke, however, did not perceive that a breach was what Bute desired; he imagined that the favourite was merely mistaken in the means he was employing to preserve peace. It was not till a later period that he accused him directly of having intentionally brought about a war with Spain. He dared not place obstacles in the way of the measures in progress, but he privately advised Bute and Grenville against them, and made other proposals,² all to no effect. He found himself without a single supporter in the cabinet council; but he did not follow Pitt's example: he yielded, and remained in office. It is easy to understand why the other ministers made no difficulties. Before Pitt's resignation, and in order to prevent it, they had agreed to the despatch of a no less peremptory message to Spain, and they could not well now declare themselves of a different opinion, especially as the latest news told of no alteration in the cause which dictated their measure, the suspicious *rapprochement* of the Bourbon powers.

And now events moved hurriedly and irresistibly towards war. General Wall, in his turn, reproached England in peremptory language, not, as the majority of historians affirm, because the silver fleet was in safety, but because he saw from Bristol's latest attitude that the London court intended to leave him no means of evasion. On November 19 another

¹ Written on October 26, 1761.—Newcastle Papers.

² Newcastle to Devonshire, January 10, 1762.—*Ibid.*

direct demand was made,¹ and this led to the outbreak of war about the beginning of the new year. Newcastle was completely set aside during the course of the final transactions; his advice was not asked regarding the diplomatic and military measures that were being taken; he was in utter despair, and yet could not make up his mind to resign.² When, in a cabinet council held on January 2, the king announced his intention of beginning war with Spain, Newcastle, Bedford, Hardwicke, and Mansfield declared themselves against such a step; but the majority were in favour of it. After this Hardwicke would attend no more councils.³ In the Spanish note, which was delivered by Fuentes, special mention was made of Pitt; the document has been jocularly called a declaration of war against Pitt. He was declared to be chiefly to blame for the war, because he had refused to yield a single point. In speaking of the fishery rights he had once employed the expression that he would not yield until the Tower was taken by storm; this expression was now repeated as if it had been used in reference to every question under dispute. The aim of the accusation obviously was to place one more obstacle in the way of Pitt's restoration to power. But whatever its aim, it was unjust.

This war crisis has been generally regarded as a proof of Bute's incapacity and a justification of Pitt's conduct; that is to say, the impossibility of maintaining peace with Spain was held to prove that the favourite made a mistake in rejecting Pitt's proposal, and to confirm all the latter's prophecies. But if we look more carefully into the matter, we find this to be a total misapprehension of the facts. If Bute had allowed himself to be guided by Newcastle and Bedford, he would possibly have avoided war; but it was not his desire to avoid it. He brought it about intentionally, in opposition to the wishes of the peace party, by whom he was actually accused of pursuing Pitt's policy from fear of Pitt.⁴

Pitt and his friends of course encouraged the misapprehension. They triumphed over the fulfilment of their predictions. And the popular dislike of Bute afterwards obscured

¹ Egremont to Bristol.—Public Record Office.

² Newcastle to Hardwicke, December 30, 1761.—Albemarle, *Memoirs of Rockingham*, i. 102, etc.; Harris, *Life of Lord Hardwicke*, iii. 273.

³ Walpole, *George III.*, i. 130.

⁴ *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 69.

appreciation of the true state of affairs. Bute's policy was contrasted with Pitt's; and Pitt's, as the cleverest,¹ was declared to be the better. It is from this standpoint that the episode is represented in the histories treating of the period.

The outbreak of the war with Spain produced great depression amongst large sections of the population, which found expression in a fall of the stocks to 66½ per cent.; even at the time of the Rebellion, government securities at least had not fallen below 72 per cent. The belief spread that the rupture had been brought about frivolously and unnecessarily.² Newcastle recalled with apprehension the last war with Spain, which he himself had begun in opposition to Sir Robert Walpole's wishes, and by which so little had been gained; desiring to prove that he could act as boldly as Pitt, but that he had gained wisdom from experience.³ Bedford expressed the opinion that, if Pitt's policy were to be followed, it would have been better to retain him in office and submit to his despotism.⁴ One danger, undoubtedly, attended the new war. It might be expected with tolerable certainty that Spain would turn her arms against Portugal, the trade with which country was of the greatest importance to England.⁵ In the previous year alone the profits derived from it had amounted to £2,000,000. The English were therefore obliged and, besides, bound by treaty, to assist this friendly power, and that with a very considerable number of ships and troops. In the treaty of alliance it was stipulated that in case of an attack by Spain, 20 ships of the line, 10,000 infantry, and 2500 cavalry should be sent. To provide these at this time would be very difficult; it might entail the withdrawal of the English contingent from Germany, or at least the relinquishment of Belleisle.

In spite of this prospect, however, a great naval expedition was immediately undertaken, which had as its object the capture of Havana, one of the most important Spanish fortified towns in the West Indies.

¹ Walpole, i. 130.

² Newcastle to Hardwicke, February 16, 1762.—Newcastle Papers.

³ Albemarle, *Memoirs of Rockingham*, i. 86.

⁴ Report of the Prussian ambassador, January 12, 1762.—Berlin Archives.

⁵ As to the relations with Portugal, see the Prussian ambassador's report, January 15, 1762.—Berlin Archives.

It was Admiral Sir Charles Knowles who had suggested this enterprise.¹ In 1756, on his way from Jamaica, he had visited the town and had been allowed to inspect the fortifications. In the summer of 1761, when the rupture with Spain was threatening, he took advantage of the information thus acquired to prepare a plan of siege, which he laid before Pitt, who approved of it. After Pitt's resignation Knowles went with his plan to the Duke of Cumberland, who, through the intervention of Lord Anson, brought the project under the notice of the cabinet council² on January 6. It met with immediate and unanimous approval. All realised the importance of this fortress, which commanded the Straits of Florida, and must, for reasons connected with the winds and currents, be passed by all mercantile fleets returning from that part of the world. Again, the expense of the expedition, if it were skilfully arranged in connection with that already undertaken against Martinique, would be comparatively slight. To the objection that the fortifications might prove impregnable Admiral Knowles had given a reassuring answer.

It was natural that after the retirement of Pitt, the proved and trusted conductor of war, that personage should come to the front again who had formerly been esteemed the first authority in military matters, namely the Duke of Cumberland. As it was chiefly the late king who, to conceal his own mistakes, had made Cumberland responsible for the failures of the year 1757, a fairer judgment of his actions was now possible, the more so as the jealousy which had existed between him and Leicester House had naturally been ended by the accession of George III. to the throne. We consequently find Cumberland again occupying an important position in the privy council, and find Newcastle, who was always one of the first to recognise any change in the current of public opinion, eager to become reconciled with him.³ The state of his health forbade his acceptance of any command, but he was allowed to choose the chief commanders.⁴ The leadership of the West Indian expedition he confided to his trusted comrade, George Keppel, Earl of Albemarle, whose brothers,

¹ Albemarle, *Rockingham*, i. 93 note.

² *Ibid.*, i. 87.

³ Walpole, *George III.*, i. 129.

⁴ Albemarle, *Rockingham*, i. 87 f.

Augustus and William Keppel, accompanied him in subordinate positions.

At the same time the preliminary arrangements were made for a second enterprise, the execution of which demanded far more time. Colonel William Draper, with whom we have already made acquaintance as a commander of royal troops in the East Indies, had, on his return to England, offered suggestions to the government as to the employment of the troops now free and at its disposal in India. On a voyage to China he had gained much information about the Spanish Philippines, and he was convinced that it would be a comparatively easy matter to conquer them. He proposed to make the Coromandel Coast the base of an attack, which was to be directed chiefly against the capital, Manila. The cabinet council approved of the plan, and gave the colonel authority to take under his command as many of the troops and ships then in India as could there be spared, and as were necessary to his undertaking. His mandate¹ is dated January 21, but it was March before he set sail for India in one of the company's ships.

The renewed influence of the Duke of Cumberland upon these matters brought with it a certain revival of the traditions of his father, George II.; for Cumberland, in alliance with the Countess of Yarmouth, advocated the continuation of the defence of Hanover; and Bute, who had hitherto allowed himself to be guided by the contrary wishes of Bedford, was thereby induced to adhere to the old policy throughout one more campaign—that is to say, to continue the German war. He agreed the more readily as the supplies were already voted.² He and Newcastle were soon confirmed in their adherence to these tactics by receiving information from Joseph Yorke, the English ambassador at the Hague, of great schemes which France was basing on the expected withdrawal of the English troops from the Continent.³ In particular, he wrote, France intended to force Holland to an alliance with her by means of threats; and she had already announced at the Hague, throughout the empire, and at the northern courts, that the English troops were about to be withdrawn. Bedford's endea-

¹ *Historical MSS. Commission, Sixth Report*, part i. p. 316.

² Walpole, *George III.*, i. 129.

³ Yorke to Newcastle, January 19, 1762. — Newcastle Papers.

vours to procure the adoption of his policy were unavailing. The news of Peter III.'s accession provided another argument against it. On February 5 he proposed in the House of Lords that the participation of England in the German war should cease; but in consequence of the attitude assumed by the leading minister, the proposal was rejected by 105 to 16 votes.¹ The inclination to withdraw the troops nevertheless existed, and, sooner or later, was certain to become effective. Pitt himself told the German ambassador that their recall would soon be inevitable on account of the enormous expense and the complications in Portugal.² He had not, however, felt at all disposed to carry this change of policy into effect himself.

But where a real and immediate change took place was in the relations of the country with Frederick the Great; and this also was a change in which Pitt could not well have been instrumental. As early as the end of November, Bute had intimated to the King of Prussia that he was not prepared to renew the subsidy treaty in the old form—that article 3 (in the renewed treaties article 4), which forbade any separate arrangement with the hostile powers, must be cancelled.³ Since then two events had altered the general situation very considerably; the Spanish war had broken out, and another serious misfortune had happened to Prussia, namely, the capture of Kolberg. The news of this latter event had reached London on January 5, the day after the declaration of war with Spain, and had greatly contributed to the general depression. King Frederick's power of resistance, which had superseded all expectation, was now regarded as almost exhausted; the prospect that he could ever reassert himself was regarded as too slight to be worth consideration. Prussia, the fallen power, must now be excluded in as decorous a manner as possible from all combinations, and a new basis must be provided for the English foreign policy.

It cannot be affirmed that this view of the situation was entirely unjustifiable, for Frederick's strength was in fact almost exhausted, and his resources were seriously diminished

¹ Report of the Prussian ambassador, February 5, 1762.—Berlin Archives.

² *Ibid.*, January 22, 1762.

³ Von Ruville, *Auflösung des preuss.-engl. Bündnisses*, 1762, p. 47. Berlin, 1892.

by the occupation of so much of his territory. The actual event cannot be made a counter-argument, for to this much was contributed by Russia's change of front and the surprising attitude of Peter III., neither of which events could have been predicted during the first weeks of the year. We shall see that even after the accession of the new czar it was not considered at all safe to reckon on a change of policy in Russia.

The originator of the new policy of the English court was, as the correspondence of the day sufficiently proves, the Duke of Newcastle,¹ whose long experience had made him more skilful than any of his colleagues in unravelling the tangle of foreign affairs, and who had managed to grasp the intricacies of Italian politics and their influence on Spain and Austria. Bute accepted Newcastle's suggestions, and endeavoured to carry them into effect. The idea was to intensify the friction which persisted between the courts of Vienna and Madrid, and, by employing the bait of possible acquisitions in Italy, to render Austria hostile to the Bourbon family compact. Could this be managed, Austria might then consent to a peace which it would be possible for Russia to accept; she might be satisfied with part of Silesia, and for the part which Prussia retained, might be compensated by the award of other German territories. Newcastle was of opinion that if the two German powers could be brought to consent to a division of Silesia, the game was won. All the rest, including the discovery of suitable means of compensation, was well within the power of skilful diplomacy to accomplish. The troublesome question of Silesia once settled, Austria would have, so the duke believed, no further reason for adhering to her alliances with France and Russia, which had been concluded solely for the purpose of enabling her to regain Silesia. She could employ all her energies in compensating herself for her previous losses in Italy; and by this means Spain would be distracted from the war with England. Rifts in the friendship between Austria and France had become visible during the past year, so that it would not, apparently, be difficult to produce a rupture. Then the situation would become decidedly more favourable to Frederick. He could devote all his energies to attacking Russia in isolation, could reconquer the provinces which she

¹ Von Ruville, *Auflösung*, p. 49 f.

had occupied, and thus extricate himself from the desperate struggle with comparatively trifling loss. In this manner the alliance of Spain with France would be utilised to restore the old grouping of the European states, the old system—a plan which had doubtless also been in Pitt's mind when he exhorted Prussia to show a yielding disposition, though he was then unable to bring adequate pressure to bear upon King Frederick.

Only a few days after the declaration of war the first steps in the new direction were taken.¹ Mitchell, the English ambassador, received a despatch, dated January 8, which directed him to urge upon Frederick the necessity for beginning peace negotiations; he was to impress on him the desperate nature of his situation and the weight of the burden imposed upon England by the new war, and to assure him of the support of the English government in his endeavours to obtain peace. The same day Newcastle wrote a letter to Yorke, the ambassador at the Hague, in which, after stating all the difficulties of the situation, he explained his wish that through the intervention of Prince Louis of Brunswick, the restoration of the old system and the expulsion of the Bourbons from Italy should be suggested to the court of Vienna. He intimated that, in case of the acceptance of such a suggestion, an arrangement satisfactory to Austria with regard to Silesia would undoubtedly be devised. Yorke considered himself entitled to mention the plan to Prince Louis, who received the idea with the greatest enthusiasm. On the 12th Bute sent Yorke the official mandate to question Prince Louis as to the probable result which diplomatic action of this nature would have in Vienna. Prince Louis considered that the occasion required him to open the matter to the Austrian ambassador, Baron Reischach, and went further, in his enthusiasm for the plan, than he was entitled to do. He recounted Frederick's luckless plight, and, on his own responsibility, intimated that England would have no objection to the acquisition of the whole of Silesia by the empress-queen. Nothing to this effect is to be found in the English despatches. On the contrary, in a despatch of the 15th, Newcastle insists upon the necessity of considering the King of Prussia's interests, although it could not be expected that

¹ Von Ruville, *Auflösung*, p. 48 ff.

he should retain the whole of Silesia. Reischach reported the conversation with Prince Louis to Vienna, and to Louis himself merely expressed the opinion that an intimation from the King of Prussia would be a necessary preliminary to success, an utterance which Louis at once communicated to the English ambassador.¹

Hereupon Newcastle and Bute represented to the Prussian ambassador in London² that the present was the most favourable moment for peace negotiations, because Austria was feeling herself threatened by the Bourbon alliance. The ministers employed exactly the same arguments which Pitt had advanced the year before. They declared that the greatest of rulers were often obliged to make sacrifices; that no monarch, however powerful, could resolve that he would never, under any circumstances, do so; that, at all events, King Frederick could not demand that they, his allies, should assent to such a resolve, which circumstances had proved impossible of execution. They concluded by requesting exact information as to the condition of the king's forces and his resources generally, as they desired to be able to form a correct estimate of his capacity for resistance.

Knyphausen and Michel sought advice from Pitt,³ whom they regarded as their master's most faithful friend. Pitt on the present occasion endeavoured to prove his friendship by blaming the ministers for their attitude upon the question of the subsidy treaty, and stigmatising as shameful the idea of recalling the troops from Germany. His positive advice, however, coincided with that given by Bute and Newcastle. As regarded the subsidy, he recommended them to content themselves with what was offered them; he advised them to try to reconcile themselves to that cessation of the continental war, which public opinion would render inevitable sooner or later; and he told them that, in spite of his zealous devotion to the policy hitherto pursued, his advice to the king was to take measures for the restoration of peace as soon as possible, and to make the best arrangement which his ill-fortune would permit. Pitt thus produced the impression that he considered the policy of the present ministers to be ill

¹ See Adolphus, *History of England under George III.*, i. 583, etc.

² Report of the Prussian ambassador, January 15, 1762.—Berlin Archives.

³ *Ibid.*, January 22, 1762.

considered, and that he advised peace because King Frederick was certain not to receive sufficient support from these ministers; but he did not say this directly. The conclusion which we may safely draw is, that he in reality approved of the procedure of the government, though he did not wish to have any share in it.

Bute, while endeavouring to promote the restoration of peace in Germany, was fully determined to continue the naval war until decisive results had been obtained. He gave evidence of this resolve before the news of the Empress Elizabeth's death arrived. Count de Viry, the Sardinian ambassador in London, who was a friend of Newcastle's, opened communications with Choiseul through Bailli Solar, the Sardinian ambassador in Paris; and Choiseul, in a letter to Bailli, expressed his readiness to enter into peace negotiations.¹ This letter was put into the hands of the English ministers, and Newcastle was ready, in spite of a few offensive remarks which it contained, to take advantage of the opportunity thus offered; but Bute maintained that this would be a humiliation, and gave orders that the correspondence should cease.

During the first months of the new year Pitt displayed little activity in Parliament. The only important debates were on January 14, when the government informed the re-assembled Houses of the declaration of war.² In the Upper House Bute made his first speech, which created a very good impression. His admirers were in ecstasies, and his opponents could not find much to blame. He adopted a vigorous, lofty style, so that it seemed as if he had wrenched the thunderbolt out of Mr. Pitt's hands. His fulminations were directed chiefly against Lord Temple. In the Lower House Pitt spoke again with the moderation to which he had of late accustomed his audience.³ Without any special praise of himself or blame of the ministry he found, in the latest turn affairs had taken, a vindication of his attitude on the Spanish question. When

¹ See Albemarle, *Rockingham*, i. 79, etc.

² Walpole, *George III.*, i. 131, etc.

³ The Prussian ambassadors were inclined to attribute it to Pitt's desire to appease the court and efface the impression made by his behaviour after his resignation, that is, on the occasion of the Guildhall festival; this, however, they acknowledged to be only a conjecture. There was something enigmatical to them, therefore, in the moderation.—See report of January 20, 1763, Berlin Archives.

Lord North attacked his ministerial measures, and in particular his inclination to hostilities, he continued in the same panegyric tone. He praised the energy with which the ministry had resented Spain's provoking conduct, and the caution which they had nevertheless exhibited. He would never insist upon it, he said, but he was perfectly agreeable that the Spanish papers should be laid before the House, since they would prove how conciliatory and long-suffering he had been. He concluded by affirming that the augmentation of the military capacity of the country which had resulted from the long war might well be set against the addition to the national debt. 'Forget everything,' he ejaculated, 'but the public! For the public I forget both my wrongs and my infirmities.'

All this happened before the event became known which caused an alteration of the balance of power in the existing system, and, in particular, made it possible for Prussia, now almost crushed to the ground, to rise and reassert herself vigorously. This event was the accession of Czar Peter III., which suddenly either modified or nullified all the premises on which the actions and plans of the English statesmen were based; and even Pitt's most skilfully planned step, his resignation, must have now shown itself to him in a less favourable light.

CHAPTER II

DOWNFALL OF THE DUKE OF NEWCASTLE

JANUARY 26 brought the news of the serious illness of the Empress Elizabeth, the 28th that of her death, which had occurred on the 5th.¹ Throughout England this death was regarded and frankly spoken of as an exceedingly fortunate event; for it was generally understood that the new emperor had always shown himself amicably disposed, not only to the Prussian king, whose fame dazzled him, but also to England. It was chiefly due to him and his consort, Elizabeth, that the tension between the two powers had not developed into hostility, and that there had been no interruption to commercial intercourse. It was, of course, impossible to gauge the extent of Peter's friendship. It was not to be expected that he would sacrifice the interests of his country to his private feelings. But it was not too much to hope that he would abjure the war policy and come to terms with Prussia on admissible conditions—perhaps at the expense of other countries; or, if state reasons did not permit even this, that there would henceforth be at least a certain lukewarmness in the conduct of the war.

Bute at once resolved to take advantage of the new situation, and to turn the czar's leanings to account in the furtherance of his latest plans. This could be done by inducing Peter to grant Prussia an honourable and advantageous peace, stipulating, however, that King Frederick should modify his demands upon Austria, that is to say, should agree to the partition of Silesia, and thereby make peace throughout the whole of Eastern Europe possible. Suppose this to be accomplished, then the project of an alliance of England with Austria against the Bourbon courts might be realised. The difference

¹ Reports of the Prussian ambassador, January 26 and 29.

between the new and the old situation, therefore, lay in the circumstance that formerly England alone was to have persuaded the Prussian king to come to an agreement with the Austrian court, after which Frederick would have had to secure an understanding with isolated Russia; whereas, now, Russia was to be employed in the work of pacification. Here Bute's ideas and Frederick's were in direct opposition; for what Frederick desired above all else was the humiliation of Austria, and his sole motive in seeking peace with Russia was that he might be free to devote his whole strength to the prosecution of the war with his German rival. Pitt, if he had still been in office, would undoubtedly have been determined by the sudden change in Russia to adhere to his previous policy, even if an alteration of it had been suggesting itself as advisable—that is to say, he would have continued, in alliance with Prussia, to oppose Austria and France, deriving considerable benefit from the neutrality or friendship of Russia. Peter's accession would, accordingly, have obviated the necessity for his resignation. Bute, on the contrary, had allowed himself to be involved by Newcastle in the new schemes, and even when the situation changed he did not find it easy to extricate himself; at the present juncture he took steps which were, through a concatenation of circumstances, to make it exceedingly difficult for him to revert to his old policy, when it proved necessary to do so.

The Russian government was represented in London by Prince Galitzin, who was known to be the friend of Austria and France.¹ Not long before her death Elizabeth had appointed Galitzin vice-chancellor,² so that he was now preparing to leave for St. Petersburg. It is not surprising that Bute, knowing nothing as yet of Peter's attitude, and having the probable future leader of the foreign policy of Russia within reach, should have tried to learn from him what was to be expected from the new government. They had a conversation on February 6, during the course of which the English minister received information which was inconsistent with later events. Galitzin admitted that the czar would probably be ready to make peace with Prussia, but maintained that the kingdom of Prussia (East Prussia) would certainly

¹ See Von Ruville, *Auflösung*.

² Report of the Prussian ambassador, December 15, 1761.—Berlin Archives.

be retained by Russia, that she would only give up what formed part of the German Empire, that is to say, Pomerania. This did not suit Bute's plans, for he foresaw that Frederick, if he suffered such a heavy loss in the north, would continue the war with Austria in order to indemnify himself at the expense of that power. He therefore endeavoured to persuade the prince that the King of Prussia would rather carry on the war to the bitter end than cede this territory, and also indicated that England could not consent to the infliction of such severe terms upon her ally. He embraced the opportunity to further his own scheme. He mentioned that he had already urged Frederick to come to terms with Austria, and for this purpose to give up his claim to parts of Silesia; and he recommended that, as Frederick was showing himself very unreasonable in the matter, Russia should lend her support to these endeavours in the interest of peace. All that Bute allowed himself to say on this occasion was based on the false presupposition that Peter would press the claims which his country had won the right to make. After the czar's real intentions became known, it was not unnatural that there should be some misapprehension of Bute's utterances, especially as reported by Galitzin. The prince omitted entirely to mention what he himself had told Bute regarding the probable policy of Russia, and made as much as he could of Bute's utterances on the subject of Silesia. The reader of the report would be justified in believing that the English minister was trying to estrange the czar from the Prussian king, whose friend he was, and attempting to provoke him to hostilities, in order that Prussia might lose Silesia. There was, of course, no thought whatever in Bute's mind of such treachery. He was as anxious as Pitt that Prussia should win every possible advantage; but it was his desire to see peace established between the two German powers.

When Peter III. received his vice-chancellor's despatch he was most indignant; and yet he appears to have gathered from it a fairly correct idea of Bute's intentions.¹ He blamed England severely for desiring to ingratiate herself with Austria at Prussia's expense, but he did not feel that any attempt was being made to incite him against Prussia. Hence he at once made another proposal, that of a triple alliance between

¹ Von Ruville, *Auflösung*, p. 56.

Russia, England, and Prussia. It was Frederick who, on receiving from Peter a copy of the passage in question from Galitzin's despatch, read into it, in his anger, more of evil than it really contained, thereby creating the tradition which has descended to us. The consequence was that, whereas at first he had actually approached Peter through the English ambassador, he henceforward, until the conclusion of peace, concealed his transactions with Russia from the English government, a proceeding which increased the tension between England and Prussia, and finally led to the stoppage of the Prussian subsidy.

In this affair another man was involved, who undoubtedly did not deserve the obloquy he thereby incurred. A short time before Elizabeth's death¹ the consul-general at St. Petersburg, Mr. Wroughton, who was in England for the moment, was appointed resident minister at the Russian court to act as coadjutor of the ambassador, Keith. Wroughton was in favour with the heir-apparent and his wife, was, being himself a merchant, well informed in everything relating to trade, and appeared to be a clever man. Therefore he was chosen to negotiate the renewal of the commercial treaty, which Keith had not succeeded in accomplishing. Undoubtedly Bute had acquainted him with his plans, and charged him to forward them; for, though no commission of this nature is to be found in the copy of his instructions,² this is explained by the fact that a certain number of articles are omitted from it. The omitted articles are, however, unmistakably those which were identical with the corresponding articles in Keith's instructions, and which, consequently, it was unnecessary to recapitulate. To conclude, from the omission, that Wroughton received special instructions of a secret is certainly erroneous. But, as it happened, his departure was mentioned in Galitzin's despatch—which was very natural, seeing that he was to leave a few days after Galitzin wrote—and this fact aroused in both Peter and Frederick the suspicion that Wroughton was the executant of Bute's perfidious policy, and that his mission was to intrigue. Hence the poor man, without an idea of the cause, met with such repellent treatment that his recall became a matter of necessity.

¹ Despatch of the Prussian ambassador, December 15, 1761.—Berlin Archives.

² See Appendix, ii. 15.

The conclusion derived from an impartial investigation of the whole affair is that, though Bute was not guilty of perfidy—for he was entitled to change his policy at any moment—he certainly made a terrible mistake, a blunder of which Pitt would never have been guilty. After such an important event as a change of ruler in Russia, he should most certainly have reserved any positive declaration of his views until he knew with certainty what the attitude of the new sovereign was. Instead of this, he allowed his plans to be drawn from him by Galitzin, whom he foolishly regarded and treated as the representative of the new Russian policy; and Galitzin, undoubtedly with the intention of estranging Peter from England, reported these plans in as offensive a manner as possible. Galitzin tried to induce Bute to expose himself even more. He wished him to formulate in his despatch to Keith, which gave occasion to the whole conversation, the desired conditions of peace.¹ This, however, the minister declined to do until he had heard the ideas of the new czar upon the subject.

Bute's misfortune was that all the endeavours to facilitate a kind of defection from the alliance with Prussia, endeavours which had had a certain justification before Peter's accession, not only failed, but came to the ally's knowledge, and that at a time when the attitude of the czar had unmistakably declared itself and deprived them of all justification. To the inquiry made of the court of Vienna through Prince Louis of Brunswick a curt negative was returned² on March 3, which destroyed every prospect of a separation of the antagonists; and presently the Prussian ambassadors in London got wind of the transaction, upon which they ventured openly to accuse the ministry of intriguing with Austria. The ministers eventually sent them a copy of the correspondence in question, in which the only thing omitted was Prince Louis's name. There was nothing in it which directly proved the accusation, for Bute's despatch contained nothing regarding the relation of Austria to Prussia; but it was impossible to prevent the suspicion that the offensive passages had been suppressed. As a matter of fact it was an unjust suspicion, but King Frederick

¹ Von Ruville, *Auflösung*, p. 52 ff.

² *Ibid.*, p. 35 ff. Adolphus, *History of England under George III.*, i. 583.

could not divest himself of it; for not only had Galitzin's despatch quite lately put Bute's policy before him in the most unfavourable light, but he had also been informed by his agents in Vienna that the English indirect inquiry *had* contained propositions regarding Silesia. The report that this was so had arisen from Prince Louis's observations to Reischach on his own responsibility of the possible agreement between Austria and Prussia, and his action was, of course, quite in the spirit of the English minister's commission to him. It was naturally difficult to distinguish between what Louis had said as the messenger of England and what he had said of his own accord.

If Peter III. and Frederick of Prussia had sufficient reason to be indignant with Bute, whom they regarded as alone to blame for everything, Bute had more than one reason to be displeased with Frederick. To his inquiry as to what resources were at the king's disposal for the next campaign, he received on February 22 a perfectly general and unsatisfactory answer,¹ containing fine phrases but nothing definite, which showed that Frederick did not choose to enter into particulars on the subject. And there fell into Bute's hands a letter written by the king to his ambassadors on January 29, in which, in his own drastic style, he pronounced the English ministers to be fit for a madhouse.² There was thus little prospect of a restoration of friendly relations between the leaders of the two powers.

These circumstances deprived Bute of all desire to continue the war of which, in the beginning, he had been an energetic champion. By the end of February he recognised that his expectations were not being fulfilled. No answer had come from Vienna; Frederick's attitude was one of reserve and of personal enmity; Peter III. appeared to be entirely in the hands of the King of Prussia, with whom he was carrying on secret negotiations. It was known that Peter, in his capacity of Duke of Holstein, had hostile intentions towards Denmark, from which country he hoped to wrest Schleswig, a project which could not but be displeasing to England. There could be no immediate hope of peace in Germany, as Frederick now had the czar to rely on; and it seemed, more-

¹ Report of the Prussian ambassador, February 23, 1762.—Berlin Archives.

² Von Ruville, *Auflösung*, p. 51.

over, as if England were financially incapable of supporting the continental war for another year, especially now that the rupture between Spain and Portugal appeared imminent. On February 22 Bute put to the Duke of Newcastle, as first lord of the treasury, the pointed question:¹ 'Duke, do you think that you can pay and support an army of 70,000 men?'—meaning Prince Ferdinand's army. The duke replied: 'My Lord, if the expense of the support of Portugal does not go beyond what appears at present, and there are no other new expenses, I am of opinion I can support them for this present year.' Bute again questioned: 'But can you another year?' And Newcastle replied: 'That I cannot answer; I answer for no more than this year.' This decided the matter. That same day the King of France received the first sign of a friendly attitude on the part of England; the Count d'Estaing, the leader of some bold naval undertakings on the coast of India, who had been taken prisoner off Madras, was released and sent home to France. Choiseul understood the hint, and wrote a letter of thanks to state secretary Egremont,² in which the King of England was informed of the great desire of his majesty Louis xv. that, in spite of the bad relations existing, contrary to his will, between the two nations, his British majesty would count upon his friendship and place him in a position to effect a reconciliation. Hereupon Bute, now acting once again in harmony with Newcastle, to whom this change of policy was agreeable, prepared a draft of peace terms, in which the demands which had led to the failure of the negotiations the year before were modified as much as possible. In the Westphalian provinces of Prussia, for instance, neutral garrisons were to be maintained until Austria and Prussia had come to terms. These ideas Bute communicated in confidence to the Sardinian ambassador on March 7.³

But now again there was a delay in the proceedings. Grenville and Egremont objected, and their influence counterbalanced Newcastle's. Presently, however, there arrived from France news which revived Bute's hopes. Through a certain

¹ Von Ruville, *Auflösung*, p. 55.

² Dated March 7, 1762.—Newcastle Papers, British Museum.

³ Newcastle to Hardwicke, March 8, 1762 ('very secret'). Tells him of Bute's terms and also of Viry's assertion that he has heard of them from Bute.—Newcastle Papers.

Mr. Cressener intelligence was received¹ of measures taken by France for asserting herself in the Austrian Netherlands in case of the empress-queen's defection from the alliance with France and reconciliation with Prussia. Cressener reported that the ambassadors of the German states at the court of Vienna were, in their apprehension of the consequences of the Bourbon family compact, bringing pressure to bear upon that court in the direction of such a defection, the probability of which was increased by Austria's serious lack of funds. As a matter of fact, Kaunitz was for a time in doubt how he should receive and answer the English suggestion. Bute naturally waited to see what turn matters would take, and, in particular, what answer would come from Vienna before committing himself to any decisive line of action.

It happened on this occasion, as more than once during the course of this war, that several important events occurred, or the news of them arrived, within the space of a few days. On March 16 Colonel Draper set sail for India,² thence to undertake, with all the available forces, his expedition against the Philippines—a proceeding which might quite probably influence the peace negotiations. On the 19th there arrived from Yorke the answer of the Austrian government, which put an end to all hope of a dissolution of the hostile alliance.³ On the evening of the 21st the news came from Martinique that Fort Royal and part of the island had fallen into the hands of the English.⁴ On the 23rd the Prussian ambassadors obliged Bute to confess that he had been intriguing with the Austrian court.⁵ All this contributed to mature Bute's resolve to enter into peace negotiations; but it was not till the beginning of April that the decisive step was taken. The news of the capitulation of St. Pierre,⁶ the other important town in the island of Martinique, seems to have brought him to the point; it arrived on the 1st, and on the 8th Choiseul's letter of March 7 was answered by

¹ Intelligence of March 1, contained in Mr. Cressener's letter of March 8, from Versailles.—Newcastle Papers.

² Report of the Prussian ambassador, March 16, 1762.

³ Yorke to Bute, March 16, 1762.—Public Record Office.

⁴ Report of the Prussian ambassador, March 23, 1762.—Berlin Archives.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Arrived on the 1st of April: Prussian ambassador's report, April 2.—Berlin Archives.

Lord Egremont.¹ Before investigating the new domestic dissensions which arose exactly at this time, we must turn our attention to the manner in which the conquest of Martinique was accomplished,² a great undertaking which Pitt had planned and initiated. This is the success during the last year of the war, of which the credit is most unmistakably due to our hero.

We have already referred to the extremely careful arrangements which Pitt had made for the expedition. Amherst was to collect 8000 regular troops in North America and send them, in transport ships provided by England, to the West Indies. The time of their departure was to be chosen with the object of beginning operations as soon as possible after the early autumn gales had ceased. The corps was to be reinforced at Guadeloupe by 1000 men from the garrison there. Amherst had received special authorisation to appoint as commander General Monckton, an experienced officer, who had fought and been wounded at Quebec. Pitt's intention, of course, was to send, as in other years, a strong fleet from England to the scene of the proposed encounter.

These arrangements were, generally speaking, adhered to; but Barbadoes was chosen as the rendezvous of the forces, and the troops left New York much later than Pitt had desired that they should. They embarked on November 19, instead of sailing in August or September. The levying of irregular troops to relieve the regulars in the different garrisons had no doubt, as usual, proved a very lengthy process. The delay can hardly have been due to the non-appearance of the transport ships from England, as these were despatched with great promptitude in June, immediately after the fall of Bellisle. The fleet which sailed direct from Portsmouth to the West Indies consisted of eighteen ships of the line and several other vessels, and was commanded by Admiral Rodney, of whom repeated mention has been already made. It put to sea in the middle of October, followed by two transport ships containing troops from Bellisle. A few days after leaving the Channel it encountered a violent storm, which completely dispersed it, so that the rest of the crossing was accomplished by the

¹ A copy exists among the Newcastle Papers.

² The account is compiled from official reports, the reports of the Prussian ambassador, and the *Annual Register*.

ships in separate groups. Rodney himself anchored off Barbadoes on November 22; but it was December 9 before all the ships of war were assembled there; and the two transports did not arrive till the 14th. The transport fleet with the American troops appeared ten days later, and the new year was close at hand before the united fleet set sail for Martinique, which is about 160 miles to the north-west. The attacking force numbered about 12,000 white men, with 1500 negroes at their service.

And this great force was necessary; for the island, under the administration of the energetic governor, De la Touche, had been placed in a far better posture of defence than under Beauharnais. Even now there were few regular troops; but the militia, who had saved Fort Royal in 1759, had since then been better trained and armed. De la Touche had succeeded in enlisting numbers of the negroes in his service, not only by repeating former offers of freedom, which did not seem to have any overpowering attraction for the negro, but also by promising small pieces of land. He was consequently able to fortify and occupy the most important points on the island, namely, the heights commanding the bays and the sides of the long ravine-like inlets: the task of landing, apart from any advance into the interior, was thus rendered very difficult.

The English fleet arrived off the south-west coast of the island on January 7, 1762, and at once attempted, by bombarding the batteries, to secure an anchorage in the bay, on the shore of which lay Fort Royal. The attempt was successful, and Monckton now detached squadrons to occupy the small bays near the town. A detachment of marines landed and stormed a small fort; and a general landing-place was soon found. It lay between the Pointe de Nègres and the little river Cas de Pilote, and was protected by batteries, which made it, after these were captured, a good base for further operations. On the 14th the whole fleet attacked; one battery after another was silenced; and on the night between the 16th and 17th the landing was effected in flat-bottomed boats. Monckton immediately proceeded to the attack of Fort Royal; by the 19th his men were throwing up their entrenchments.

The town is surrounded by heights. Chief among these are the Morne Tartenson and the Morne Garnier, the former of

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which was noticed in recounting the expedition of 1759. These eminences completely commanded the town, and therefore were strongly fortified and provided with cannon. Their capture would secure the fall of Fort Royal. Therefore Monckton towards the end of January began by making a well-prepared attack upon the Morne Tartenson. Whilst bodies of skirmishers were employed to prevent reinforcements from arriving by land or sea, the main troop stormed the height and carried it by sheer superiority of force. The English occupied the position, and their enemies fled either into the town or to the Morne Garnier. The storming of this still higher and better fortified position presented a more difficult task. Considerable preparations were necessary before it could be attempted. But fortune favoured the undertaking. Three days later the Morne Garnier garrison made an attack on the English camp. It was repulsed, and the defending party at once assumed the offensive; the English pursued the retreating French and captured their position, on which batteries were immediately erected. The French regular troops retired into the town, whilst the militia, despairing of the safety of the island, dispersed to their farms. As soon as the English had completed their preparations for the bombardment of Fort Royal, the town capitulated on February 4.

The French might have continued the contest longer; for their other town, St. Pierre, was also well fortified, and there were various strong positions on the island. But the inhabitants feared the consequences of a longer resistance—the devastation of their plantations, and the possible confiscation of their property. Moreover, Monckton received from the North American colony of Carolina a reinforcement of 1400 troops, who had become available by the conclusion of peace with the Cherokees. Hence, when he was on the point of embarking for St. Pierre, a deputation arrived to make terms of surrender. These came into effect on February 12. The island was surrendered to England, but the owners of private property were confirmed in their rights.

After the fall of Martinique the smaller neighbouring islands which were under the same government—Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent—surrendered without resistance, one after the other.

Thus the great exploit with which Pitt had intended to complete the series of conquests in America was successfully accomplished under his successors. The whole chain of the Lesser Antilles, with a few unimportant exceptions, now belonged to England. It was not unjustifiable that Pitt's friends should give the credit of the success to him. From many of them, among the number Bishop Warburton and Richard Lyttelton (who was in Rome at the time), he received warm congratulations.¹ The latter told him that Pope Clement XIII., in conversation with an English Catholic, had spoken with the greatest admiration of this successful military exploit, declaring that it made him feel it an honour to have been born an Englishman. The English victory created the more surprise in Rome because the French and Spanish party there had ridiculed the undertaking as hopeless.

The capture of Martinique, in conjunction with other factors of importance, brought about great political changes in England, owing to the different attitudes which the new circumstances induced in the different statesmen and parties. These new circumstances were as follows: 1. The czar desired to ally himself with Prussia and England, but was under the influence of King Frederick,² who had contracted a strong antipathy to the English government of the day, and particularly to Bute. It is also to be remembered that Peter III. was planning war with Denmark. 2. There was no longer any hope of a reconciliation of Austria or of an early peace in Germany. 3. A new war in Portugal, against Spain, had become inevitable. 4. France had suffered a new and severe defeat, and was showing herself sincerely desirous of peace.

The position thus created induced Bute to adopt the following policy. He decided to dispense with the Russian alliance, which would not improbably have had its inconveniences, and to withdraw the country as soon as possible from the continental complications, so that all its forces might be available for the colonial war and the defence of Portugal. The Prussian subsidy of £670,000 he intended to stop, by making its payment conditional on King Frederick's promise to employ the money in bringing about peace; he foresaw that Frederick, in his improved position, would not agree to such a

¹ *Chatham Correspondence*, i. 172 ff.

² See *Grenville Memoirs*, i. 420 f.

condition. Prince Ferdinand's army was not to be disbanded, but it was to receive no further reinforcements, so that no further outlay in this direction would be required. A properly qualified commander and the number of troops stipulated in the treaty would be sent to Portugal; but the burden of defending that country was not to fall upon England; its defences were only to be stiffened so far as would render it capable of action. Peace negotiations with France were to be opened; but the contest with the Bourbon powers in the colonies was not meanwhile to be interrupted.

This policy made it possible to fulfil a wish the king and his favourite had undoubtedly long cherished, namely, to remove the Duke of Newcastle from the leadership of the government. We observed how eager the court was in 1761 to secure as large a share of credit as possible for the conclusion of peace, so that it might also share in the popularity which resulted from that measure. As soon as the reconciliation with France came within measurable distance, Bute succeeded in insinuating himself into the management of foreign affairs. There was a danger, if the negotiations proved successful, that the nation might once again feel indebted to the Duke of Newcastle; for he had always shown himself the friend of peace, whilst Bute had long pursued a warlike policy. It was necessary, therefore, at least to deprive the duke of the leadership of affairs; and this object was, for two reasons, possible at the moment. In the first place, Bute, as soon as he began to plan peace, could count upon the undivided support of the Duke of Bedford and his friends, which made the oligarchy less indispensable to him; secondly, the abatement in the demands for money made the Duke of Newcastle less indispensable as chancellor of the exchequer. Bute's immediate aim was not so much to extort large subsidies from Parliament as to prevent Parliament from insisting on an increase of the subsidies. To this task the favourite considered himself quite equal. The question was—Would it be possible to induce the duke, who had shown himself most tenacious in this respect, to resign his office? It could not be taken away from him; such action would provoke the whole Whig party to hostility.

This, then, was the general plan according to which Bute now proceeded to act. He picked up the thread of the negotia-

tions with France by sending a reply, through Egremont, to Choiseul's letter; and he demanded of Frederick the Great that he also should come forward with a peace project, in order to secure the grant of his customary subsidies. This demand reached Frederick in the shape of an autograph letter from King George, answering two of his own. The reproaches of the Prussian ambassadors on the subject of the intrigues with Vienna, Bute met with as great a show of innocent indignation as he could assume—they had not been intrigues against Prussia.¹ As regarded the war operations in the colonies, there was nothing left for him to do. Since Pitt's resignation the entire direction of them, after they had been decreed by the cabinet, had been in the hands of the admiralty and the commanders of the different expeditions. The time for action in the Portuguese complication had not yet arrived, as the Bourbon powers had not declared war; but calculations as to the probable cost of England's share in the war had already been made, in order that the necessary supplies might be voted before the close of the parliamentary session.

A difference of opinion very soon declared itself between the favourite and the chancellor of the exchequer, to the satisfaction of the former. The Duke of Newcastle was excessively unwilling to relinquish the traditional continental policy, which he had now supported throughout two wars, least of all at a moment when there was an opportunity of forming a new and powerful alliance. The friendship of the czar seemed to him so valuable, his antagonism so dangerous, that he was prepared to accept all the disadvantages connected with the alliance.² Hence he could not give his consent to the withholding of the promised subsidies from the Prussian king, of whom Peter III. was proving himself an enthusiastic admirer and friend. He feared that such a proceeding would bring about a quarrel with the court of St. Petersburg. He was also of opinion that neglect or abandonment of the German war would be exceedingly dangerous. He painted to himself in the darkest colours³ the possibility that France might seize the right bank of the Rhine, compel Holland to an alliance,

¹ Instructions to Mitchell, the English ambassador.—Public Record Office.

² Letter to Bedford, April 12, 1762.—*Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 74.

³ Newcastle to Yorke, January 8, 1762.

and even send an army across the Channel to annihilate the power of England.

Fear, therefore, impelled the duke to oppose the plans of the favourite with unusual decision, when these matters came to be discussed in the cabinet council of April 27.¹ He thereby produced a dissension which was to be fatal to his party. Bute, Egremont, George Grenville, and Lord Granville declared against the subsidies; the Dukes of Newcastle and Devonshire and Lord Hardwicke were in favour of them. But this was not sufficient to decide the matter. The duke still believed that his administration would survive this crisis also, and he took all Bute's other slights patiently, and supported his policy in the questions relating to the peace negotiations.² Then, when the supplies bill was being drafted for the House of Commons, he quietly inserted the Prussian subsidy and £300,000 for the German war, which, along with the sums required for Portugal and the other items, brought the total to £2,000,000.³ But Bute was not to be duped. He immediately procured royal instructions that only one million was to be asked for. The duke was so much annoyed that he went to the king and declared that he could not carry out this measure.⁴ The king's refusal to yield, and various other slights received from Bute, made it impossible for Newcastle to remain in office. Yet he made attempt after attempt to arrange matters. He wrote of his plight to the Duke of Bedford;⁵ but Bedford was at Bath, and even on returning to town did not come to him. He induced Lord Mansfield to try to arrange a compromise;⁶ and very slight concessions would have contented him; but his opponents would not take a single step to meet him, and his friends urged him to put an end to the matter. On May 19 he found himself obliged to send in his resignation.⁷ He probably still hoped that he would be urged to retain office; but George III. was too cautious to let a word of regret escape him. Not until

¹ Report of the Prussian ambassador, April 30, 1762.—Berlin Archives.

² *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 76.

³ *Grenville Papers*, i. 449: Grenville's Narrative.

⁴ *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 78, etc.

⁵ Newcastle to Hardwicke, May 3, 1762.

⁶ Fitzmaurice, *Life of Shelburne*, i. 135.

⁷ Report of the Prussian ambassador.—Berlin Archives. Albemarle, *Rockingham*, i. 111, etc.

the duke delivered up the seals on the 26th, when redress was no longer possible, did he give utterance to some expressions of gratitude.

Newcastle's policy had, however, won him powerful friends, both abroad and at home. Abroad there was the King of Prussia, in whose cause he had, as it seemed, sacrificed himself; at home there was the Duke of Cumberland, who approved of his continental policy. It was Cumberland who induced him to refuse, in contrast to Pitt's action, the offer of a pension or reward of any kind,¹ a refusal which greatly enhanced his reputation, especially as he had already spent most of his fortune in the service of the state. Thus the foundation of a new opposition was laid at once; and it was considered not improbable that Pitt, too, might be driven by Bute's new peace policy into the opposition camp.

The only source from which any information as to Pitt's attitude during all these occurrences is to be derived is the speech which he made in the House during the debate on the subsidies,² and in it we must, of course, read between the lines if we wish to discover his real feeling in the matter. The debate took place on May 13, when the disagreement between the principal members of the cabinet was already known to the public, but nothing decisive had as yet happened. Great uncertainty prevailed as to who would be the duke's successor, if he did resign. Many were of opinion that, after the resignation of both Pitt and Newcastle, there was no course open to the favourite but to ally himself with Fox and make him prime minister. This uncertainty as to the future made it impossible for Pitt to adopt a definite attitude. Hence, though he expressed himself warmly in favour of Newcastle's policy, the payment of the subsidies and the continuation of the German war, he also praised Bute's proposals, and declared, in answer to the objections raised by the opposition, that the defence of Portugal was not only permissible but imperative. His words were aimed more particularly at Glover, who had said that Portugal should be left to its fate because it had not always behaved loyally to

¹ See Newcastle's correspondence with Cumberland in *Rockingham*, i. 114 ff. Fitzmaurice, i. 136.

² Thackeray, *Life of Pitt*, ii. 5 ff. Walpole, *George III.*, iii. 127 ff., where an outline of the whole debate is given.

England, and who had declared that the burden of the German war was too heavy. Pitt maintained that the differences between England and Portugal were too slight to justify a desertion of that ally in her difficulties; then, reminding his hearers that, in spite of all prophecies to the contrary, the money required for the German army had always been forthcoming, he recommended them strongly to vote the small sum which would probably be all that was needed to end the war satisfactorily. He bade them remember how much more heavily the war had weighed on the enemy than on themselves, which fact they ought to reckon as an advantage gained by England. He painted in glaring colours the dangers which a weak policy would evoke. 'If you,' he said, 'as a maritime power, cannot protect Portugal, Genoa will next be shut against you; and then the ports of Sardinia:—what! ports shut against the first maritime power in the world!' And the withdrawal of the English troops from Germany would, he asserted, 'be turning loose 140,000 French to overrun the Low Countries and Portugal.' Lord George Sackville had complained of the extravagant outlay upon the war in West Germany, and reminded the House how much less the German war in Queen Anne's time had cost. From his speech it was plain that he wished to cast some doubt on the integrity of the financial operations. Pitt took up the cudgels for the treasury and the administration of the Duke of Newcastle; he owned that he 'thought some little might have been saved,' but declared that he suspected no dishonesty. As to himself, he declared, stretching out his hand, that it was clean—nothing was sticking to his fingers. Yet if an inquiry were moved, he would second it. He urged the wisdom of giving money to the King of Prussia at this time of all others, when he was in a better situation and could make a much more profitable use of it.

The tone of the whole speech showed that Pitt was attempting to reconcile the opposing tendencies by declaring both parties to be right, and the execution of the plans of both to be practicable. To this intention he gave very plain expression in the following words: 'You who are for continental measures, I am with you; and you who are for assisting the King of Portugal, I am with you; and you who are for putting an end to the war, I am with you also; in short, I am the

only man to be found that am with you all.' At the same time he made it evident that if the crisis were not met in a manner which satisfied him, he might go over to the opposition. He declared that he approved of the annihilation of party, and had himself helped to bring it about, but his intention had not been to pave the way for those who only intended to substitute one party for another. This remark was aimed at Fox, whom Pitt had previously indicated as the probable successor of the Duke of Newcastle, and was intended as a warning to Bute not to seek his salvation in an alliance with this man. Thus, though Pitt expressly denied any intention of opposition, he left the possibility of it open; and the way in which he defended the character and policy of the Duke of Newcastle showed that he was entertaining this possibility. Hence, after the duke's resignation, the Prussian ambassadors repeatedly announced their conviction that Pitt would unite with Newcastle in forming an opposition party. For the moment this would not be an event of importance, since Parliament broke up at the end of May; but a dangerous attack was to be expected in the autumn, for the repulse of which the ministry must in the interval make all possible preparations.

The necessary changes in the cabinet brought Bute, as had been intended from the outset, to the post of first lord of the treasury. The next matter of importance was the choice of his successor as secretary of state. The post was accepted by Pitt's brother-in-law, George Grenville, as his former scruples did not hold good in this case; he was not superseding a relative. But Bute's objection to this arrangement was that the two state secretaryships were now in the hands of near relatives, Grenville and Egremont, whom he must expect to unite in opposition to himself, should any difference of opinion arise. He therefore proposed to make Egremont lord-lieutenant of Ireland, and to give his secretaryship to Lord Halifax, from whom less obstruction was to be expected. The king was employed to persuade Egremont to surrender his appointment; but Grenville indignantly opposed such a step, declaring that if Egremont resigned, he would do so also, as he would not be the cause of his brother-in-law's dismissal. Bute was obliged to yield and content himself with the less advantageous combination. Halifax was appointed first lord

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of the admiralty, a post which just then became vacant by the death of Lord Anson. Only one other change deserves notice. Lord Barrington, who took Grenville's post, was succeeded as chancellor of the exchequer by Sir Francis Dashwood, one of the most frivolous characters of the period. Such was the constitution of the cabinet that was selected to give the country the peace which it had so long desired. For this purpose now the favourite set himself with almost precipitate zeal to take every possible advantage of the respite allowed him and of the goodwill of his associates.

CHAPTER III

FINAL CONFLICTS AND NEGOTIATIONS

ALTHOUGH Pitt was only slightly and indirectly concerned with the peace negotiations and their result, the peace of Paris, an account of both is necessary, not merely because they were to a very large extent based upon his successes, but also and chiefly because some knowledge of the subject is requisite to an understanding of his subsequent attitude. He took the keenest interest in the proceedings, and did his best, though without hope of success, to secure a rejection of the compact; and in entering into new political alliances he allowed the fact of a man's action for or against this peace to influence him very strongly. But a comprehension of the negotiations, again, is not attainable without some acquaintance with the military events which took place while they were in progress, for the reason that the military events had a very great influence on the negotiations. To maintain, as has often been done, that the honour even of the final successes of the English in the East and West Indies is due to Pitt, who had planned and prepared for them, is certainly incorrect. The facts, so far as we are acquainted with them, show that the credit was due entirely to the Duke of Cumberland and to the commanders chosen by him. All that can be justly said is that Pitt had shown his successors how such a world-wide war should be conducted, how the different enterprises should be arranged, and how the orders communicated. It is hardly probable that, without his example before them, they would have displayed such audacity and energy.

The brevity with which these final events are treated in the most popular works upon the Seven Years' War produces the impression that the power of Spain collapsed helplessly at

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the first English onslaught, much as it did in our own days, when attacked by the United States. The objects of the contest happened to be almost the same on both occasions—Cuba and the Philippines. The general opinion of historians, exclusive of the Spanish writers, appears to be that the Spain of those days was almost a negligible quantity, that its hostility was more advantageous than injurious to England, and that consequently Pitt was indubitably right in wishing to pick a quarrel. But if we have recourse to original sources on both sides and follow the fighting in detail, we are bound to come to a different conclusion. We find that it was at the cost of a severe struggle that the English won their two great successes, that unexpected good luck of various kinds fell to their share, and that the two great successes in question by no means finally decided the issue of the war, even in those parts of the world where they were obtained. Though it might be advisable, for the sake of inspiring courage, to prophesy great results, to predict such victories was impossible, even for Pitt.

We have already learned¹ that the English cabinet decided in January 1762 to attack Havana, and that the task was entrusted to the Duke of Cumberland's friend, Lord Albemarle.² A squadron, consisting of five men-of-war and thirty-seven transport ships, left Portsmouth on March 5 (under the command of Sir George Pocock, already known to us as a victorious admiral in the East Indies), conveying the commander-in-chief and his troops to the scene of action. It was the end of April before the ships, which had been scattered and much injured by storms, were collected off the little West Indian island of Barbuda. There Albemarle received the joyful news of the fall of Martinique. He immediately sailed for that island and united his forces with those there operating. Any difficulty regarding the right to command was obviated by General Monckton's health, which obliged him to leave at once for New York. Having provided itself with the necessary stores and with negro sappers, the fleet set sail on May 5, and made its way by the Mona Passage and

¹ *Supra*, p. 33.

² For the capture of Havana see Don Antonio Baldes, *Hist. de la Isla de Cuba y en especial de la Habana*, 1780. This book also contains an English account of the siege. See also *Annual Register*, 1762.

the north coasts of St. Domingo and Cuba to its destination. It was a dangerous voyage for so large a fleet, the Bahama Channel, the passage to the north of the Greater Antilles, being notorious for its reefs; but time did not permit the choice of the longer southern route, for it was imperative that the enterprise should be accomplished by the middle of August, before the autumn gales set in. If the war had been begun as Pitt advised, in the autumn of 1761, there would have been less hurry and more prospect of success. However, no accidents occurred in the channel, and Albemarle's fleet was reinforced by the other West Indian squadrons, under Captain Hervey and Sir James Douglas, so that it finally consisted of 19 ships of the line, 18 smaller warships, and about 150 transports—such a force as had never yet been seen in the West Indies.

Havana had not yet become the capital of Cuba, the seat of government being the older town of Santiago de Cuba, in the south-east of the island; but it was a place of great importance, because it commanded the Florida Channel, through which all fleets bound for Europe were obliged to pass. It was a regular station for Spanish ships. Its position was excellent,¹ the town lying on one side of a bay which stretches far into the land, and the narrow entrance to which was protected by strong fortifications. At the eastern point, opposite the town, lay then, as to-day, the huge Fort Morro, at the western the Fort de la Punta. Round the town there was a strong entrenchment with several smaller forts.

The Spaniards were not prepared for an attack. The commander, Don Juan de Prado, had not believed that the English would venture to assault a position considered impregnable, and had therefore neglected to take proper precautions. Not till the English fleet appeared were the militia and volunteers armed and summoned to reinforce the regular troops. Thus the English were able to disembark their forces in the neighbourhood of the town, though the landing might otherwise have been prevented, at least for a time. The fleet arrived at Havana on June 6, and by the evening of the 7th the landing had been accomplished, to the east of the bay, in the face of no great opposition. At the same time the English succeeded

¹ I can describe it from personal inspection.

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in landing a few troops to the west of the bay, from which side only a feigned attack was contemplated, and in gaining a secure position there. At the very beginning of the operations, from fear lest the English ships should penetrate into the harbour, Prado made the mistake of blocking the entrance to it by sinking ships. The Spanish men-of-war were thereby rendered practically useless during the siege, while the English could maintain perfectly undisturbed communication between the different points on the coast which they had occupied, shipping troops hither and thither as the situation required.

Albemarle immediately advanced his principal force in the direction of the bay, and occupied La Cabaña, a height to the south of Fort Morro, which Prado had not considered it necessary to fortify, although it was proverbially declared to be the key of Havana. 'Será la Habana de quien fuere la Cabaña' (Havana belongs to the possessor of la Cabaña) was the saying. La Cabaña now became the main English position, whence the regular assault was to be made upon Fort Morro, the possession of which seemed indispensable to the capture of the town. But now difficulties began and accumulated to such an extent that success sometimes appeared to the English to be almost impossible. The fortifications against which their attacks were directed were excellent; and the commander of Fort Morro, Don Diego Velasco, was a peculiarly able and resolute officer, who succeeded in disciplining his imperfectly trained troops and inspiring them with courage. The construction of trenches on the rocky height of La Cabaña was a task of extreme difficulty. They had to be made with mounds of earth and basket-work, and the earth was difficult to procure. The troops suffered severely from the heat, which produced various diseases and thereby rendered a great proportion of them unfit for service. The reinforcements ordered from New York did not arrive. They had been stranded on a sandbank in the Bahamas, and it was a considerable time before they were discovered and brought in by the ships despatched to seek them.

At last, on July 1, the cannonade could begin, after three English men-of-war, detailed to engage in unequal combat with the cannon of Fort Morro, in order to distract attention from the completion of the batteries, had allowed themselves to be shattered to pieces. The troubles of the English culminated

on the 2nd, when the fascines of their fortifications took fire and were, owing to their extreme dryness, completely destroyed. Several days were occupied in repairing the damage, and it was not until July 9 that the bombardment could proceed satisfactorily. A wound obliged Velasco to give up the command and retire to the town from the 16th to the 24th, whereby the defence was much impaired. During his absence the English succeeded in advancing to the glacis and in carrying their mines under the escarpment of the fort on the side next the sea. On the 21st Don Prado put forth all his strength in an attack on La Cabaña, transporting troops in boats across the bay from the harbour. With the repulse of this attack vanished the last hope of the defenders of Fort Morro. On July 30, Velasco having refused a summons to capitulate, the undermined escarpment was blown up, and through the breach thus made the English storming detachment, aided by a simultaneous attack from the south side, forced its way into the fort. The commander still attempted to hold the redoubt, but the disheartened troops refused obedience; they escaped in boats across the bay or surrendered to the enemy. Velasco himself received a mortal wound and was conveyed to the town, where he died on the following day, while the British flag was hoisted on the captured fort.

But the task of the English was by no means accomplished. The town was still in a position to hold out, particularly as the English had not yet captured even the smaller places in the neighbourhood or succeeded in cutting off supplies. Capable militia officers, chief among them Colonel Don Luis de Aguiar, maintained the lines of communication with the country. The hurricane period was rapidly approaching, and it was still possible that the English fleet might be thereby compelled to take its departure. But now Albemarle adopted extremely energetic measures to overcome the last resistance without delay, and his efforts were greatly facilitated by the arrival of the American reinforcements about this time. Batteries commanding the town on every side were erected, and mounted with all the available guns. Positions were secured even on the sea side of the town, near Fort de la Punta. When all was ready Havana was summoned to surrender. But Prado's proud Spanish blood was roused, and

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he refused to capitulate. Consequently, on August 11, Albemarle ordered the batteries to open fire on the town and the ships to bombard Fort de la Punta. The result was most decisive. By one o'clock the fort was demolished, the greater part of the town was in ruins, and its batteries were silenced. Prado was now compelled to hoist the white flag. On the following day the capitulation treaty was signed. It allowed the garrison to return to Spain, and secured for the inhabitants certain privileges, mainly of a religious nature. The English claimed and received all royal property, including the uninjured warships in the harbour, the large sums of government money, and the stores in hand. The value of their captures on this occasion was about £3,000,000.

The territory made over to England by the treaty extended about one hundred and eighty leagues westward from Havana, where the best tobacco plantations were; but the rest of the island remained under Spanish rule, and was governed from Santiago. Albemarle was unable to push his success further, as he was obliged to despatch a number of his troops to New York. The North American colonies had refused to provide fresh levies,¹ and the regulars were consequently much needed. This one success, brilliant as it was, was certainly not of a nature to endanger the great Spanish colonial empire. It was, on the contrary, doubtful if England would be able to keep what she had succeeded in taking.

But a severe loss was suffered in another and more distant part of that empire; the contest there must also be briefly described,² although it occurred too late to have any influence on the peace conditions. A little reliable information regarding its details assists us to a more correct impression of the military position at the time of the conclusion of peace. Some of its events, moreover, had an influence on Pitt's future administration.

We already know that Colonel Sir William Draper, at whose suggestion the expedition to the Philippines was undertaken, left for the East Indies on March 16. By July, only four months after his departure from England, he had collected on the Coromandel Coast thirteen men-of-war and 1720 troops,

¹ H. Hall, 'Chatham's Colonial Policy,' *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, v. 672.

² For the war in the Philippines see Don José Montero y Vidal, *Historia general de Filipinas* (Madrid, 1887); and *Annual Register*, 1763.

partly European, partly Indian, and was ready to sail—a performance of positively unexampled energy and celerity. The fleet was placed under the command of Admiral Samuel Cornish. Its voyage was successful, and by September 22 it arrived off Manila, whose inhabitants had only just heard of the outbreak of the war, and had consequently made no preparations for an attack.

The government of the Philippines was provisionally in the hands of the Archbishop of Manila, Antonio de Roja, who was incompetent to deal with the situation. He had at his disposal only 550 regular troops and 80 native artillerymen; but the garrison was immediately reinforced by calling out four companies of militia, each consisting of 60 men, and by summoning large troops of primitively armed Indians. The defective fortifications were rapidly made as effective as circumstances permitted; but it was not found possible to destroy the many buildings which had been erected outside of the town, and which provided the enemy with excellent bases of attack. Fortunately the natives, who were completely under the influence of the priests and the numerous monastic orders, adhered firmly to the Spanish cause, so that there was no anxiety regarding supplies from the interior.

The Spaniards were unable to prevent the disembarkation of the English troops in the neighbourhood of the town on September 23. The English were soon in possession of the surrounding territory, and Draper was able to begin the actual siege. A complete investment was impossible, owing to the size of the place and the small number of troops at his disposal. The traffic on the Pasig river, which connects the great inner lagoon with the sea, remained uninterrupted; and consequently communication with the important settlements on the lagoon could be maintained. Thus, in spite of the superior force of the English and the many circumstances unfavourable to the Spaniards, the siege was protracted until October 5. On the morning of that day a troop of English soldiers succeeded in entering the town through a breach in the rampart on the side next the sea, made by the cannonade from the ships. The French officer posted at this particular place drew off his troops without offering resistance—possibly with treasonable designs—and his retirement enabled the Englishmen to reach the chief gate and open it to the besiegers. The archbishop now

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abandoned the town to the enemy and retired to the citadel, which he might quite well have defended for some time. But as Draper, who desired to avoid more fighting, offered very favourable terms, he accepted them, and gave up the keys of the citadel on receiving a verbal assurance from the Englishman that the terms would be observed. Freedom in religious matters and security of private property were two of the principal concessions. No sooner, however, was Draper master of the citadel than he changed his tone, and modified and interpreted his pledges to suit his convenience. Contrary to his promise, he ordered a two hours' sack of the town, which actually became a forty hours' sack and in which a rabble of all races participated. The archbishop, who remained a prisoner, and supported with his authority all the demands of the English, was ordered to produce a sum of 4,000,000 pesos; but he only succeeded for the time being in procuring 546,000. Draper finally prevailed on him to sign, contrary to the express decision of the assembled Junta, a deed which made over the Philippine Islands to England, and an order on the Spanish treasury for 2,000,000 pesos. This is the so-called Manila debt, which Spain obstinately refused to pay, and which reappeared periodically for years in the diplomatic communications between the two powers until at last an arrangement was arrived at.

Spain was perfectly justified in disputing the competency of the archbishop to contract debts; for the governorship had legally passed, when he was taken prisoner, into other hands. On October 1 it had been determined by the great council that, in case of a capitulation, Don Simon de Anda y Salazar should become acting governor. Salazar, a resolute and patriotic officer, succeeded in escaping from the town on October 4 to Bulacán, where he at once convoked a Junta, which conferred full powers on him. As absolute ruler for the time being, he organised fresh resistance, having at his disposal all the money contained in the government treasure-chest, which had been rescued from Manila, and the bullion and wares forming the cargo of a ship which happened to arrive from Mexico. A lengthy guerilla war now began, which made the English supremacy more uncertain month by month. Draper could only hold Manila itself and the immediate neighbourhood, and there the difficulty of procuring

food-supplies harassed him greatly. The difficulty of the task he had undertaken only became fully apparent when the Spaniards recovered from the first heavy blow. The attempt to reduce the rebels to subjection by an order of the archbishop was quite unsuccessful. And when, on July 3, 1763, the news arrived of the peace of Paris, by which Manila was guaranteed to Spain, Salazar was by no means inclined to lay down his arms and renounce the glory of recapturing the town. Draper had already returned to India, that he might not be a witness of the fiasco of his expedition. His representative, Major Felt, sent Salazar an intimation of the conclusion of peace, but the latter refused to receive the letter, as the address did not bear his title of captain-general; and the fighting continued until February 1764, when the insurgent received the news of the peace direct from Spain by way of China. Those who rejoiced most were the English, whose plight was by this time very serious. A mixed Junta arranged the surrender of the town to the Spaniards, who in the meantime had received a new governor, Don Francisco della Torre. On the day of the surrender Della Torre feigned illness, and the keys were delivered to Salazar, who made a triumphal entrance into the town. It is plain that the capture of Manila was a blow even less decisive than that of Havana; it was only a partial success, which soon proved almost entirely illusory.

But neither were any lasting results obtained where the Spaniards had the advantage. In May 1762 the war with Portugal broke out,¹ a war for which the court of Madrid had no very sound reasons to advance, but which, nevertheless, was a necessity on account of Portugal's position of dependence upon England. Fortunately for the Portuguese, the Spanish preparations were very incomplete, so that the speedy capture of the most important positions before help could arrive from England was impossible. The Marquis de Sarria, indeed, marched his forces in May into the province of Tras os Montes, the north-eastern corner of Portugal, and captured one after another of the strong positions there; but any advance upon Oporto was prevented by the mountaineers, who blocked the passes. The Spanish main force was employed in attacking the fortified town of Almeida, south of the Douro; and a third corps

¹ See Schäfer, *Geschichte des siebenjährigen Krieges*, ii. b. 587 ff.

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was stationed at Valencia, south of the Tagus. Before fighting could begin in this quarter, the officer who had been chosen as commander-in-chief of the Portuguese army, Count Wilhelm of Schaumburg-Lippe, late commander of artillery under Prince Ferdinand, had arrived with the English auxiliary force of 8000 men, and Pombal, the energetic Portuguese minister, had mobilised an imperfectly disciplined army of 50,000. The English were under the command of the Earl of Loudoun, the officer whom Pitt had recalled from America because of his want of success there; but in the present case he was supported by able men like George Townshend and Burgoyne.

In August Count Wilhelm, from his post at Abrantes on the Tagus, invaded the Spanish province of Estremadura; he scattered the Spanish corps stationed at Valencia, and sent assistance to the garrison of Almeida. This, however, came too late; the commander had capitulated on August 25. The next necessary measure was to prevent the Spanish main army from crossing the Tagus and making its way through the mountains to Lisbon; and this was accomplished. Its commander, Count Aranda, drew off his troops to the north in the middle of October; and about the same time an incursion on Portuguese territory, made from Valencia, was repulsed. The Spanish army retired across the frontier to its winter quarters in the middle of November. The sole result of the campaign was the acquisition of the province of Trás os Montes and the town of Almeida.

There still remains to be noticed a small Anglo-Portuguese expedition,¹ undertaken at the expense of private persons against Buenos Ayres. A squadron, under the command of Captain Macnamara, entered the estuary of the La Plata, but was so severely handled by the Spanish coast batteries, on January 1, 1763, that it was forced to retreat to Rio de Janeiro.

As regards hostilities with France, there was one more small contest in North America,² where the initial success of the French occasioned great consternation in England. In the beginning of May a small fleet, with 900 troops, under De Terney and D'Haussonville, was despatched to Newfoundland,

¹ Schäfer, *Geschichte des siebenjährigen Krieges*, ii. 596 f.

² *Ibid.*, ii. 597.

for the purpose of securing a position there and establishing France's right to the coast fishery. On June 18 this expedition succeeded in capturing St. John's, the capital of the island, and making prisoners of a company of English soldiers. General Amherst, however, immediately prepared and despatched a superior force of ships and troops, which recaptured the town on September 18. D'Haussonville and his troops were obliged to surrender; Terney escaped with the ships. From England also a squadron had been despatched immediately after receipt of the news; but the task was accomplished before it arrived.

At the German seat of war the French commanders (Broglie having fallen into disgrace) were Marshals D'Estrées and Soubise. These officers at the beginning of June took up their position with the main army in the neighbourhood of Cassel. A second army, under Condé, was on the Lower Rhine. The tactics of the French were chiefly defensive, whilst Prince Ferdinand attempted, by constant advances and flank movements, to drive the enemy out of Hesse-Cassel. On June 24 General de Castries was defeated at Wilhelms-thal, close to Cassel. In this action almost the whole Stainville brigade were made prisoners. The French army took up a position between the rivers Werra and Fulda, but its rear was so seriously threatened that D'Estrées ordered a retreat and the evacuation of Göttingen. In the middle of July, however, peremptory orders arrived from Paris that the old position, including the towns of Cassel and Göttingen, was to be maintained at all costs. These orders were issued in connection with the peace negotiations which were proceeding at the time, and were to be explained later. Göttingen was, therefore, reoccupied by the French as speedily as possible and the fighting in Hesse-Cassel continued, the Westphalian armies of both belligerent powers being summoned thither. In Westphalia the Brunswick heir-apparent had been unfortunate. He was induced to execute a retiring movement which exposed the whole Ems district, East Friesland, and the Osnabrück district to the ravages of the French. On July 25 both he and Condé set out on the march to Hesse-Cassel, where they assisted in various tolerably ineffective manœuvres. On August 14 the marshals received authority from Choiseul to evacuate Göttingen, and, under certain

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circumstances, Cassel also, the peace negotiations being so far advanced that no further events would affect them. Göttingen was, therefore, given up to the allies, and the French set out on their return march to the Main, which they did not achieve without several encounters with the enemy. On November 1 Cassel capitulated after a siege, on the 15th hostilities were suspended, and the six years' war on German soil came to an end. The interest taken in it by the English court, and consequently by the French court also, had markedly declined since Pitt's resignation.

Whilst all these military events were taking place, negotiations between the three courts had been in progress for the purpose of arranging a separate peace between the naval powers. The main impulse this time came from the Earl of Bute, and it is consequently desirable that we should understand exactly what his attitude in the peace question was, the more so as very vague ideas upon this subject have hitherto prevailed.

It may safely be assumed that from the very beginning of the new reign Bute desired peace in the interests of his master; but there was at first no sign of any zealous, active endeavour to secure it. All he really wished was that, if peace were brought about, he, the favourite, should play a conspicuous part in the proceedings, so that the whole transaction should appear to be the work of the king. Hence he showed no particular displeasure with Pitt's high-handed behaviour, which led to the rupture of the negotiations of 1761; and he also allowed himself to be involved by Grenville and Egremont in the new aggressive policy which rendered the Spanish war inevitable. Certain steps towards peace taken in the winter of 1761-2 were only feints, intended to delude the peace party at the English court. Not until the hope of creating a new system of alliances was destroyed by the immovable attitude of Austria, and various other reasons—Russia's change of front, the coolness with Prussia, the capture of Martinique—were conspiring to make the continuation of war seem inadvisable and peace with France possible, did Bute come forward and take an active part in the work of reconciliation. As soon, however, as he had resolved on this line of action, promptness was indispensable, for unless he was in a position to lay the signed preliminaries before Parlia-

ment when it met in the autumn, there would be such disputes over the several articles as would make it impossible for his or any other ministry to conclude a peace.¹ It was not his personal inclination, but the political and party situation, which compelled him to act in a hasty and possibly precipitate manner; while only persons ignorant of the circumstances, or political opponents or personal enemies, could make his action a cause of reproach. It was, of course, easy for his antagonists to condemn his measures, if they, either in ignorance or intentionally, left these and many other reasons out of consideration; but he, as the responsible leader, could not allow himself to be turned from his purpose by such criticism, but was bound to do exactly what seemed to him most likely to conduce to the welfare of the country.

It may be maintained that England did not require peace, that great results might have been attained by the continuation of the war; and this was the standpoint adopted by Pitt, at least in his public utterances. But all the records of that time make it plain that the nation at large was longing for peace, that it desired to be released from its heavy burdens, and to stop the increase of the national debt. The burdens fell chiefly upon those who derived no advantage from the new acquisitions. As to the important results to be expected, their attainment was by no means so certain as England's great military power inclined many to believe. We have seen how doubtful her ultimate success in the Philippines was. There alone she might have exhausted her strength if she had been obstinately determined on conquest. And what misfortunes might she not have encountered in attacking other Spanish colonies, where the forces of nature, tropical diseases, etc., often interfered seriously with the best laid plans. If, on the other hand, she avoided taking the offensive, there was no object in the war at all. It was also to be remembered that the transfer of the land war from Germany to Portugal might very possibly prove of great disadvantage to England. Everything considered, it was wiser to put a stop to the objectless struggle and to secure the country's valuable gains, even if something had to be subtracted from them.

If we examine Bute's measures we cannot but acknowledge

¹ Bute to Bedford, October 24, 1762.—*Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 138.

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that they were a very natural result of existing circumstances. He recognised, what was perfectly true, that vigorous Spain was the real moving power in the new war; France, the fatigued, exhausted country, being dragged into it by her. Spain, having once begun the war, desired to reap real advantage from it, and, in particular, to settle the three questions in dispute in her own fashion, whereas France only desired to safeguard certain vital interests. This was the idea which suggested his policy to the English minister—a policy which consisted in at once securing so good an understanding with France as to win her support against her obstinate ally. The diplomacy of Bute and his advisers was in this case superior to Pitt's; for, in 1761, Pitt had wished to restrain Spain from war by meeting her, though he could not offer her anything positive, with as much friendliness as possible, in order to be able to extort extreme concessions from France. He experienced a complete defeat, whereas Bute attained his aim, and even, thanks to the capture of Havana, indemnified the country for the sacrifices made.

After the exchange (in April) of the introductory declarations,¹ on which occasion Choiseul at once informed the English cabinet that he would enter into no agreement without the consent of Spain, Bute induced the cabinet council to consent to the restoration of Martinique and Guadeloupe to France.² Even Bedford considered that this, as a first offer, was too much; he feared that it might induce France to bargain for more; but Bute was determined. On May 1 the English proposals, which were made in connection with the ultimatum of the previous year, were despatched. They conceded to France the much-disputed right of fishing off the coast of Newfoundland and the possession of the little islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon and also of Goree; England laid claim to nothing in the West Indies but the neutral islands; and Bellisle was to be exchanged for Minorca. In the North American continent the Mississippi was to form the boundary between the English and French possessions; in India the position existing in 1749 was to be restored, which meant the

¹ Upon the negotiations see especially Schäfer, *Geschichte des siebenjährigen Krieges*, II. bk. viii. chap. v.

² Correspondence between Bute and Bedford.—*Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 75-8.

recovery by France of its old trading settlements, but not of Dupleix's conquests. As regarded the evacuation of Germany, the restoration of the Prussian territories to their lord was not expressly insisted on; but all due recognition of the obligations to her allies entered into by France was promised, of course in the expectation that the court of Versailles would observe the same attitude towards England—that is to say, that it would recognise England's obligations towards *her* ally. In this difficult matter, too, Bute was evidently desirous to meet France half-way, by refraining, as far as the still valid treaty of Westminster would allow, from disturbing the good relations with Austria by which the French government set such store. The subsidy treaty with Prussia concluded in 1758 had not been renewed, hence it was no longer valid. The Westminster treaty merely stipulated for the exclusion of foreign troops from German soil; and the English proposal made it plain that Bute would be satisfied with the evacuation of Westphalia, and would not demand any restitution to Prussia.

If we examine the proposals we see that in three matters Bute went beyond Pitt's utmost concessions. He conceded a second island at the mouth of the St. Lawrence, restored Goree, and indicated possible concessions relative to the evacuation of Westphalia. But, on the other hand, the influence of England's latest successes made itself felt in the demand for all neutral islands and a part of Louisiana, including New Orleans. The idea evidently was to demand only what it would be easy to obtain, and to yield where the weightiest interests of the adversary were in question.

Choiseul displayed great satisfaction with the really friendly proposals of the English ministers,¹ in the sincerity of whose pacific intentions he could no longer doubt; and, although hoping to obtain more, he saw in the proposals an excellent basis for negotiations. His one fear was that, at the ministerial crisis impending in England, Pitt might once again assume the leadership. He affirmed distinctly to the Sardinian ambassador, Bailli de Solar, through whom the correspondence was carried on, that he would treat only with Bute and Egremont, and would infallibly retire from his position if the King

¹ Choiseul to Bailli de Solar, May 13, 1762.—*Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 81, etc.

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of England chose other instruments to bring about the restoration of peace. Before returning an answer to the proposals, he procured the assent of the Austrian court, which, with the understanding that the interests of Austria would be carefully respected, was willingly given. He also requested from the court of Madrid a statement of its wishes, which he forwarded to the English ministry together with the French proposals.

In these counter-proposals, which were despatched June 28, Choiseul further demanded the restitution of the island of St. Lucia, the excellent harbour of which was of importance to France, and the inclusion in the French sphere of the city of New Orleans, which lay on the left bank of the Mississippi. He also expressed his desire that the French occupation of the Prussian territories should be continued until the general peace, when they would be assigned to the rightful owner. And he proposed that so-called neutral armies should be left, by both sides, in certain parts of Germany, to maintain the *status quo* in the west. The demands of Spain were far more arrogant, and showed that that country was by no means anxious for peace as yet, an attitude which was due to her first successes in Portugal. She demanded full compensation for the Spanish ships which had been captured in time of peace, the right of fishing off the shores of Newfoundland, and the evacuation of all English settlements in the Spanish colonies. No reference was made to the right of felling timber in Honduras or to the evacuation of Portugal. The main point at issue, however, was the fact that the court of Madrid would not permit an extension of English territory to the Gulf of Mexico, or grant England full right of traffic on the Mississippi waters. The territory of Mobile was not to be ceded to her, and her vessels might ply only as far south on the river as Lake Maurepas. A clause with these Spanish demands was added to the French proposals.

Bute now found himself in a difficult situation. He stood in need of France, to help him to compel Spain to yield, and was consequently inclined to make the concessions demanded by Choiseul; but he could not persuade his colleagues, in particular Grenville and Egremont, to give their consent. The news of the victory at Wilhelmsthal arrived just at this time, and seemed to justify a prouder attitude. Bute's motion in the cabinet council was defeated. In the reply to Choiseul

the original demands were reasserted. All Bute could do was to attempt to influence Spain by threats, in order to make the support of France less necessary. But of what avail was it to remind her of the possible fate of Havana when she was firmly persuaded that the place was impregnable?

The English minister now took a step for which he has been bitterly reproached by those who have written the history of the period, some authors plainly calling it treason,¹ whereas, regarded rightly, it was nothing but a diplomatic move, the unusual nature of which was attributable to the complicated home and foreign situation. He wrote a confidential letter to Choiseul, in which he explained to him, as if he were an ally, the difficult situation which the battle of Wilhelmsthal had produced, and urged him to offer a more vigorous opposition to Prince Ferdinand; Bute stated that his position with reference to the King of Prussia forbade him to order a cessation of hostilities, while a farther advance by the prince would strengthen the Prussian party in London, which was planning his downfall. Judged merely by outward appearances such a step was, undoubtedly, treasonable; for England was at war with France, and Ferdinand was commanding the English army. But apart from the fact that the king probably knew what was being done, it may safely be asserted that Bute really had the welfare of the country in view. His measure was directed against a party which short-sightedly and selfishly desired to plunge the country into new broils, and against an ally who was interfering unwarrantably with English home politics. Choiseul was even then rather an ally than an enemy, for he was himself almost satisfied, and was forwarding England's endeavours for peace; Prussia, on the other hand, was rather an enemy than an ally, for she was injuring English interests by thwarting the prospects of peace; and Ferdinand was no longer purely an English commander, for he was under the influence of the Prussian king, who was now the ally of England only in name. None the less, it was an extremely hazardous and audacious step, calculated, if it came to light, to prove the ruin of the minister who took it.

¹ See Schäfer, *Geschichte des siebenjährigen Krieges*, ii. 552. Pitt is here put forward as the representative of the Prussian party, which, in the sense indicated, he was not.

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But its object was attained. Choiseul, as we learned when following the course of the conflict in Germany, stopped the retiring movement of the French army; and soon afterwards Bute, assisted by the news of Terney's successes in Newfoundland, which arrived¹ on July 23, induced the cabinet to agree to the French demands. To gain his purpose, he had even attempted to secure the support of the Duke of Newcastle, by offering him and his friends comparatively unimportant posts; but here he had met with a rebuff.² On July 31 the announcement was sent to Choiseul that England recognised St. Lucia and New Orleans as French property, and agreed to the proposal that the occupied Prussian territories should merely be evacuated, instead of being surrendered to King Frederick. As regarded the Spanish clause, however, a decided refusal was returned.

It now became Choiseul's task to induce Spain to yield; and he honourably exerted himself for this purpose; but the results were far from satisfactory. The court of Madrid gave its consent to an exchange of negotiators between England and France, and authorised Grimaldi, its ambassador in Paris, to come, if possible, to an agreement regarding the questions at issue. But this authorisation by no means implied that he had really been ordered to pursue a conciliatory policy.

In the beginning of September the Duke of Nivernais proceeded to London and the Duke of Bedford to Paris, to settle the preliminaries on the basis of the agreements already established. It immediately became apparent that Spain's opposition was as yet by no means overcome. Grimaldi would not retract any of his demands, and his obstinacy was increased by the arrival of news which proved incorrect, namely, that the North American troops had been captured on their way to Havana.³ The report had originated in their non-appearance there; they had, as we know, been stranded on a sandbank. It is, nevertheless, quite possible that the Duke of Bedford might at a favourable moment, with Choiseul's assistance, have induced the Spanish ambassador to sign admissible conditions, if he himself had been empowered to conclude the matter unconditionally. The news from Havana soon became less favour-

¹ Report of the Prussian ambassador.—Berlin Archives.

² Harris, *Life of Lord Hardwicke*, iii. 286 ff.

³ Report of the Prussian ambassador, September 17, 1762.—Berlin Archives.

able, while affairs in Portugal were far from satisfactory to the Spaniards. But Nivernais' craftiness had aroused Bute's suspicions of the sincerity of France, and induced him to withhold full powers from the English ambassador.¹ This fact, again, was used as an argument by the opponents of peace at the French court, who advanced it as a proof that the English minister's intentions were not serious; and the success of the whole undertaking was for a moment very doubtful.

At this particular juncture the news of the fall of Havana arrived. The Spanish court, which to the last had hoped for a complete defeat of the English enterprise, was completely overwhelmed, and at once became much more amenable. Bute could now, without doubt, have obtained what he had hitherto striven for in vain; and if he had contented himself with this, some advantage would have been derived from the great victory. As a matter of fact, he himself was strongly inclined to complete the work quickly in this manner;² but, as his colleagues, one and all, insisted on compensation for the restitution of Havana, he yielded to their wishes. The question was decided in the cabinet council of October 14.³

And now a lengthy pause in the negotiations occurred, for the reason that Bute found himself again obliged to make changes in the cabinet. Between himself and the two home secretaries differences had frequently arisen, more especially with Grenville,⁴ who would not confine his actions within the limits prescribed by Bute's policy. He was always in favour of a more resolute attitude and of higher demands; and he disliked Bedford, whose moderation was antipathetic to him. Hitherto the cabinet had managed to agree, since Bute also was prepared on occasion to yield, as, for instance, in the Havana question. But now there came up for decision a question of the first importance, in which the favourite was obliged to adhere firmly to his own opinion. Grenville demanded that the peace preliminaries should be laid before Parliament before they were signed.⁵ He doubtless hoped that, with the assistance of Parliament, some portion of his sacrifices to ministerial

¹ *Bedford Correspondence*, ii. 101 ff., 114 ff., 129.

² Albemarle, *Rockingham*, i. 133.

³ *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 133.

⁴ *Grenville Papers*, i. 480; *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 128.

⁵ Bute to Bedford, October 14, 1762.—*Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 135 f.

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concord might still be rescued. To this proceeding Bute could not give his consent; and he, moreover, now came to the conclusion that, to ensure the completion of the almost accomplished work, a change in the cabinet must be effected. Having no desire to quarrel with Grenville, he communicated to him privately his intention of taking the secretaryship from him, at the same time offering him the post of first lord of the admiralty.¹ Grenville would undoubtedly have refused to make this exchange of office, if a great inducement had not been held out to him. The favourite gave him a distinct promise that after the conclusion of peace he should be made first lord of the treasury, that is to say, head of the government. It was his own future, his own office, which Bute thus threw into the scale to turn the balance in favour of a speedy conclusion of peace; for Grenville's removal was the removal of the last hindrance to this object.

But it was not the new secretary, the Earl of Halifax, who was to be the chief promoter of the favourite's plans, but a politician who was always in request when any task of particular difficulty awaited accomplishment. Bute succeeded in enlisting the services of Henry Fox, who was now given a seat in the cabinet and entrusted with the leadership of the House of Commons. He was the very man to compose all the difficulties which were threatening from the latter quarter.²

After the question of the cabinet posts was settled, the new peace conditions were put into the shape of an ultimatum, which was despatched to the Duke of Bedford on October 26. In the conditions regarding France no alteration had been made, but from Spain considerable sacrifices were demanded. She was to concede the claim of England to fell timber, and to erect settlements in connection with the timber trade, in certain of her territories, on the understanding that no fortifications were to be built; she was to surrender her claim to the Newfoundland fisheries in their entirety; the prize claims were to be decided in the English courts of law; either Florida or Porto Rico was to be ceded in return for Havana; but any conquests which came to the knowledge of the governments after the delivery of the ultimatum were to be restored

¹ Grenville's notes: *Grenville Papers*, i. 482 ff.

² *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 133 ff.

without compensation. This time, under the pressure of the severe defeat and the influence of the French minister, the Spanish court resigned itself to the inevitable, and authorised its delegate to sign. Florida was the possession which it decided to cede. At last, on December 3, the preliminary peace was concluded.

We observe, then, that the peace negotiations, throughout their course, were a diplomatic struggle with Spain, in which Bute had the advantage of the support of France, which he gained by some concessions, and of success in war. The struggle ended in a complete victory for England. It was a heavy price which Spain had to pay for the recovery of Havana; and it was hard for her to renounce the different rights which she had so long claimed. Florida, which at that time included not only the peninsula but considerable continental tracts and St. Augustine, a place of much importance, was by no means such a valueless possession as the opponents of the peace declared. One day in London, before the preliminary articles were actually signed, the report spread that Porto Rico had been ceded, whereupon it was asserted that Florida would have been infinitely better, as Porto Rico was a barren island; but as soon as the opposite proved to be the real arrangement, the same people immediately disparaged Florida.¹ The clause especially censured at a later period was that which ensured the gratuitous restitution of all future conquests, as under it England received no indemnification for Manila. It is, however, very doubtful if Spain, supposing her to have known of this capture, would have agreed to any exchange; for the general state of affairs in the Philippines was much better understood in Madrid than in London; the Spanish statesmen knew what difficulty a foreign power, and more especially a Protestant foreign power, would have to maintain itself there. Further, it was not Spain that eventually bore the chief expenses of the war. France had not persuaded Spain to accept the English conditions simply by entreaties and threats; a more weighty inducement had been required. She had been obliged to cede to her ally her old colony of Louisiana, with all the claims attaching to its possession. Nor was the Louisiana of those days, like that of to-day, merely the region of the Mississippi delta; it was supposed

¹ Bute to Bedford, November 10, 1762.—*Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 152.

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to extend across the continent to the Pacific Ocean—a dimension which it was also understood to possess when the United States at a later period acquired it by purchase. Thus Spanish North America, which at that time still included Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California, gained territory in the north and north-east which more than compensated for its loss in the east. France regarded it as more advantageous to her interests to make over her continental possession to a friendly and weaker country than to make any further cessions in the West Indies to her dangerous rival, England.

To the question whether and how far Pitt influenced these events, the only answer to be found is contained in a notice that he was in correspondence with Egremont on the peace question.¹ It is, therefore, probable that Egremont took Pitt's advice upon details in the negotiations. This would be a very natural proceeding, since Pitt had a thorough knowledge of all that had passed during the previous year. Many of the objections offered by the state secretaries to Bute's arrangements may have been suggested by him. His correspondence with Egremont instead of Grenville originated in the coolness that had arisen between the brothers-in-law. But what he wrote was certainly intended first and foremost for Grenville, between whom and the prime minister he hoped that the peace question might induce an antagonism which would drive the former into the ranks of the opposition. This would certainly have happened if Bute had not retained Grenville on his side by gratifying his ambition. Pitt waited to give public expression to his disapproval of the favourite's arrangements until Parliament met, when the representatives of the nation would be asked to approve the results of the negotiations.

¹ *Historical MSS. Commission, Sixth Report*, i. 287. I hope to be allowed to consult these papers again, and shall then publish the result of my investigations.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION OF PEACE AND RETIREMENT OF BUTE

ALTHOUGH Pitt was not at this time in a position to take much share in the political activity of the moment, and was spending his days quietly at his country seat of Hayes, he was nevertheless, in a manner, still at the centre of all that was happening. The nation regarded him as the real victor, whose energy had turned the tide of war, and produced decisive results. Hence his influence upon public opinion was too real a force to be neglected by the government. Moreover, the power of his eloquence was still in all men's minds, long though it was since he had fully exerted it, and might seriously embarrass the ministry in Parliament. But both in the case of the general public and of Parliament support was necessary to Pitt if anything definite was to be achieved. His views must be conveyed and rendered intelligible to the public; and this could be satisfactorily done only by means of the press. Hence we find his brother-in-law, Lord Temple, in close communication with the clever journalist, John Wilkes,¹ who had just started his violent opposition newspaper, the *North Briton*, and was boldly attacking the government. In Parliament the assistance of men of high and influential position was essential; and here Pitt naturally sought an ally in the dissatisfied Duke of Newcastle, who could give him very powerful support.

That he might be in a position to defy these dangers, Bute had called Fox to his assistance. Fox was to be his instrument for ensuring peace, and, until this was safely accomplished, was to be allowed a free hand in everything. All means were permissible to secure this one result. Excess of scruple might lead to failure. Bute's last idea, however, was of a

¹ *Granville Papers*, ii. 3 ff.

very different nature from those which engrossed his new friend. His intention was to make peace at all costs and then retire from office. Grenville had already, as we know, been promised the post of first lord of the treasury. Fox, on the other hand, was planning the establishment of a permanent system. With the support of Bute, favourite of the king and first lord of the treasury, he hoped to exercise a kind of unlimited power, employing the agency of corruption in the most profitable manner. It was to be a second Walpole administration, with still looser ideas of political morality. Such was Fox's aim in entering the cabinet; it was for this that he had deserted his former friends and patrons. Had he known of Bute's intention to retire he would never have come to terms with him; but that intention Bute prudently concealed.¹ Hence, when the retirement took place, Fox felt that he had been deceived.

Fox had entertained great hopes of inducing the Duke of Cumberland, with whom he had always been closely allied, to go over with him to the ministerial side; but the duke would have nothing to do with so shaky a government.² He next tried to win the support of Newcastle and his friends, but in their case, too, was unsuccessful. They did not wish to give up their new alliance with Cumberland, who instigated them to opposition. Repulsed everywhere, Fox now began to adopt harsh methods with his opponents, expelling them from all the offices which they still held, even from those of no political importance. He seems to have won the king's approval of these methods by representing himself as the bold defender of the royal prerogative. At the end of October the post of chamberlain was taken from the Duke of Devonshire in a manner very insulting to that nobleman's dignity, simply because the king was displeased with his intimacy with Newcastle. George would not even receive him in audience, and, with his own hand, erased his name from the list of members of the privy council.³ The bribery of members of Parliament was conducted upon a large scale and quite openly. The payments were made in a kind of office.

Bute evidently objected to these violent and shameless

¹ Walpole, *George III.*, i. 203.

² Albemarle, *Rockingham*, i. 133 f.

³ Walpole, *George III.*, i. 158 f.

measures,¹ which brought obloquy upon the government, and were unnecessarily comprehensive. Fox was not merely ensuring the passing of the peace proposal, but was at the same time preparing a foundation for his own future supremacy. But the favourite was obliged to acquiesce, so long as the peace was unsigned. The more independent members of the government, however, disapproved openly, declaring that they would vote in Parliament not according to order, but according to their own opinions.² The nation, too, again became much excited, not only about the conditions of peace, but also, and even more, on account of the domestic policy. The popular displeasure naturally vented itself on the Scotsman, Bute, who was once more insulted by the mob on Lord Mayor's Day,³ an outcome of the irritation fomented by the press.

If we examine the situation of the opposition, we find that its menaces were not nearly so serious as Bute had supposed, and that in the very matter which called for decisive action it was impossible for its members to come to an agreement,⁴ so that Bute might have attained his aim without Fox's violent measures. Newcastle and his friends could not well oppose the conclusion of peace, as they had previously championed the speediest possible ending to the war, and had declared that conditions much less favourable were satisfactory to them. The most they could do was to criticise the prime minister's measures, and to undermine his position by proposing votes of censure, the institution of an inquiry, etc. Pitt, on the other hand, condemned the preliminary proposals as not claiming for England the advantages to which her military successes entitled her; but he was not inclined to make a personal enemy of the favourite, as he did not wish to bar his own way to a return to power. His enemy was Fox, not Bute; but Fox had had no share in the peace negotiations. Under these circumstances united action by the two opposition groups was impossible, and any real result was precluded from the outset. The one subject upon

¹ The Prussian ambassadors' report on the 19th of October that Fox was disagreeing with Bute and refusing to subordinate himself to him.—Berlin Archives.

² Report of the Prussian ambassador, October 22, 1762.—*Ibid.*

³ Harris, *Life of Lord Hardwicke*, iii. 291.

⁴ See Von Ruville, *W. Pitt und Graf Bute*, p. 56 f.

which they were in accord was the government's treatment of Frederick the Great. This Newcastle, too, could oppose, since he, as minister, had advocated fidelity to the ally, and had lost his post in consequence. But this matter was not of such importance as to be the undoing of the peace.

Parliament was to have met on November 9, but as the exchange of ratifications had not taken place by this date, the opening was postponed to the 25th. On that day the chief combatants, Temple, Pitt, and Fox, were all absent.¹ Pitt was confined to bed with such a severe attack of gout that it seemed doubtful if he would be able to take any part in the approaching debate; his opponents took advantage of this circumstance to spread the report that he was satisfied with the peace preliminaries.² The opposition did not intend to come forward before the debate which would ensue when the treaty was laid before Parliament. This was done on November 29, and on December 9 the struggle was to begin. A proposal, made by a member named Calvert, that the debate should be postponed for six days on account of Pitt's illness, was rejected by a large majority, which boded ill for Pitt's cause. Newcastle made one more attempt, through the intervention of the Bishop of Gloucester,³ to induce Pitt to act in unison with him, but no result of this attempt is observable.

The important day arrived which was to determine the fate of the peace project, and at the same time to gauge the relative strength of the different parties.⁴ Pitt still lay ill, and no one knew whether he would appear or not. In the Upper House the debate ran a comparatively peaceful course. It was begun by the young Duke of Grafton, with an attack upon the peace preliminaries and on the arts of the prime minister, an attack in which he was supported by Lord Temple. Then Bute rose and defended his achievement in a long and evidently successful speech. Even an opponent, the

¹ *Chatham Correspondence*, ii. 194.

² *Grenville Papers*, ii. 4.

³ Dr. Warburton, a son-in-law of Ralph Allen. Pitt, at Allen's request, had procured the bishopric for him, although he was in disfavour with the clergy. His letter to Pitt, dated December 3, is to be found in the *Chatham Correspondence*, ii. 195.

⁴ For the events and speeches of December 9, see Schäfer, ii. 642 ff.; Walpole, i. 175 ff.; *Chatham Correspondence*, ii. 198 ff.; Thackeray, ii. 13; *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 165-70.

Duke of Cumberland, was obliged to confess that it was one of the finest he had heard in his life. He brought out his periods slowly, like minute-guns, with excellent effect. In concluding he affirmed, with emotion, that he desired to have written on his tomb: 'Here lies the Earl of Bute, who, in concert with the King's ministers, made the Peace'—a much ridiculed utterance, which, nevertheless, was the expression of confidence entirely justifiable. The Duke of Newcastle and Lord Hardwicke spoke next, asserting that the conditions which could have been obtained the year before were better, and reflecting on the assiduity with which the royal prerogative had been employed; but Lord Mansfield, with his usual acuteness, and with strict legal accuracy, confuted their arguments.

Of more importance, and awaited with more eagerness, were the proceedings in the Lower House. The question on all lips was: Would Pitt be able to attend? The probability of his absence increased when his friend Beckford, who had just become Lord Mayor of London, proposed, supported by James Grenville, to refer the preliminaries to a committee of the whole House. This would have delayed the decision. But now the doors opened, and at the head of a large acclaiming concourse was seen Pitt, borne in the arms of his servants, in invalid attire, his legs swathed in flannel. He was set down within the bar, but with the assistance of some friends and of a crutch, reached his seat. It was a theatrical scene, at which Fox and his friends sneered, but which, nevertheless, made an impression on the House. It is, of course, impossible to say whether or not Pitt had gone beyond what was necessary in the matter of accessories; but that he should have feigned illness, or even seriously exaggerated it, is almost out of the question. Such an artifice would have entailed long preparation and the assistance of his friends, and would not have sufficiently repaid the trouble.

As soon as he was sufficiently recovered, Pitt began his great speech by saying a few words in support of the motion for sending the preliminaries to a committee. During parts of this speech, which lasted for nearly three and a half hours, he was obliged to ask the permission of the House to speak seated; but he always rose again, to observe the rule when it was possible. His allies complained afterwards that he had

not spoken with sufficient warmth and energy,¹ a defect probably attributable in part to his suffering condition, in part to his conviction that he could not succeed. The speech, like all Pitt's speeches, has not been transmitted to us *verbatim*; but the report of it which we have is quite sufficient to enable us to form a good idea of it. I give as much of that report as is of interest to us.²

'Mr. Pitt began with lamenting his ill state of health, which had confined him to his chamber; but although he was at this instant suffering under the most excruciating torture, yet he determined, at the hazard of his life, to attend this day, to raise up his voice, his hand, and his arm against the preliminary articles of a treaty that obscured all the glories of the war, surrendered the dearest interests of the nation, and sacrificed the public faith by an abandonment of our allies. He owned that the terms upon which he had consented to conclude a peace had not been satisfactory to all persons; it was impossible to reconcile every interest; but he had not, he said, for the mere attainment of peace, made a sacrifice of any conquest; he had neither broken the national faith, nor betrayed the allies of the crown. He called for the most able casuist amongst the Minister's friends, who, he saw, were all mustered and marshalled for duty to refute him.' No answer was made to this reference to the corruption prevalent in Fox's party, and Pitt proceeded to criticise the separate articles.

'The first important article was the fishery. The terms in which this article was written appeared to him to give to France a grant of the whole fishery. There was an absolute unconditional surrender of the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, which, if France continued to be as attentive to her own interest as we have hitherto found her, would enable her to recover her marine. He considered this to be a most dangerous article to the maritime strength and future power of Great Britain. In the negotiation he had with M. de Bussy, he had acquiesced in the cession of St. Pierre only; after having, he said, several times in vain contended for the whole exclusive fishery; but he was over-ruled; he repeated he was over-ruled, not by the foreign enemy, but by another enemy.

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² Quoted in Thackeray's *History of Chatham*, ii. 14 ff.; from Almon, *Anecdotes of Chatham*.

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² Quoted in Thackeray's *History of Chatham*, ii. 14 ff.; from Almon, *Anecdotes of Chatham*.

After many struggles he obtained four limitations to the island of St. Pierre; they were indispensable conditions, but they were omitted in the present treaty. If they were necessary in the surrender of one island, they were doubly necessary in the surrender of two. . . . Of Dunkirk he said but little. The French were more favoured in this article of the present preliminaries than they had been by any former treaty. He had made the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle his guide on this point; but in the present treaty even that requisition was disregarded.

‘Of the dereliction of North America by the French he entirely approved. But the negotiators had no trouble in obtaining this acquisition. It had been the *uti possidetis* in his own negotiation, to which the French had readily consented. But Florida, he said, was no compensation for the Havannah; the Havannah was an important conquest. He had designed to make it, and would have done it some months earlier, had he been permitted to execute his own plans. From the moment the Havannah was taken, all the Spanish treasures and riches in America lay at our mercy. Spain had purchased the security of all these, and the restoration of Cuba also, with the cession of Florida only. It was no equivalent. There had been a bargain, but the terms were inadequate. They were inadequate in every point where the principle of reciprocity was affected to be introduced.

‘He had been blamed for consenting to give up Guadaloupe. . . . He wished to have kept the island; he had been over-ruled in that point also—he could not help it; he had been over-ruled many times—on many occasions; he had acquiesced—he had submitted; but at length he saw all his measures, all his sentiments were inimical to the new system—to those persons to whom his Majesty had given his confidence. But to Guadaloupe these persons had added the cession of Martinique. Why did they permit the forces to conquer Martinique if they were resolved to restore it? Was it because the preparations for that conquest were so far advanced, they were afraid to countermand them? And to the cession of the islands of Cuba, Guadaloupe, and Martinique, there is added the island of St. Lucia, the only valuable one of the neutral islands. It is impossible, said he, to form any judgment of the motives which can have influenced his

Majesty's servants to make these important sacrifices. They seem to have lost sight of the great fundamental principle, that France is chiefly, if not solely, to be dreaded by us in the light of a maritime and commercial power; and therefore, by restoring to her all the valuable West India islands, and by our concessions in the Newfoundland fishery, we have given to her the means of recovering her prodigious losses, and of becoming once more formidable to us at sea. The fishery trained up an innumerable multitude of young seamen, and the West India trade employed them when they were trained.'

Pitt then pointed out that in the West Indies France had gained a decided superiority over England in commerce, and that the balance could not be restored by conquests in North America, but only by the acquisition of the West Indian islands. To leave these in the possession of France would be to deprive England of a large proportion of the North American and African trade.

'Goree, he said, is also surrendered, without the least apparent necessity, notwithstanding it had been agreed, in the negotiation with M. de Bussy, that it should remain with the British crown, because it was essential to the security of Senegal.

'In the East Indies there was an engagement for mutual restitution of conquests.—He asked, what were the conquests which France had to restore? He declared that she had none. All the conquests which France had made had been retaken, and were in our own possession; as were likewise all the French settlements and factories. Therefore the restitution was all from one side. We retained nothing, although we had conquered everything.

'Of the restitution of Minorca he approved; and that, he said, was the only conquest which France had to restore; and for this island we had given the East Indies, the West Indies, and Africa. The purchase was made at a price that was fifty times more than it was worth. Belleisle alone, he affirmed, was a sufficient equivalent for Minorca.'

After thus criticising the conditions of peace, Pitt proceeded to vindicate his own policy, which had so often been attacked since his resignation. In justifying the war in Germany he re-enumerated the reasons for it with which we are already familiar, employing once again the old catchword,

that America had been conquered in Germany. To justify his subsidy policy, he compared the sums which France had paid to neutrals as well as to allies, with England's gifts to her friends; but he did not forget to mention that the subsidy to Hesse had been granted before his accession to office, and that, consequently, the blame for it ought not to fall on him. Finally, he endeavoured to free himself, and England generally, from the responsibility of the fundamental transformation in the European alliance system—the change which had chained Austria to France, and Prussia to England—declaring that this was entirely the result of circumstances. His utterances on this subject are of sufficient interest for quotation.

‘Since the time that the grand confederacy against France took place, the military power of the Dutch by sea and land has been in a manner extinguished, while another power, then scarcely thought of in Europe, has started up—that of Russia, and moves in its own orbit extrinsically of all other systems; but gravitating to each according to the mass of attracting interests it contains. Another power, against all human expectation, was raised in Europe in the House of Brandenburg, and the rapid successes of his Prussian Majesty prove him to be born to be the natural asserter of Germanic liberties against the House of Austria. We have been accustomed to look up with reverence to that House, and the phenomenon of another great power in Germany was so very new to us that for some time he [the King of Prussia] was obliged to attach himself to France. France and Austria united, and Great Britain and Prussia coalesced. Such are the great events by which the balance of power in Europe has been entirely altered since the time of the grand alliance against France.

‘His late Majesty so passionately endeavoured to maintain or revive the ancient balance, that he encountered at home, on that account, opposition to his government, and, abroad, danger to his person, but he could not re-animate the Dutch with the love of liberty, nor inspire the Empress-Queen with sentiments of moderation. They talk at random, therefore, who impute the present situation of Germany to the conduct of Great Britain. Great Britain was out of the question; nor could she have interposed in it without taking a much greater share than she did. To represent France as an object of

terror, not only to Great Britain but Europe, and that we had mistaken our interest in not reviving the grand alliance against her, was mere declamation.'

Pitt next defended himself against the charge that, after defeating Conflans, he had unnecessarily continued the expense of keeping up a great navy. He reminded the House that the possible interference of Spain in the conflict could not be neglected, as also the possibility that the Swedes, the Genoese, even the Dutch might lend their ships to France for hire.

The last part of the speech consisted of severe remarks on England's treatment of Frederick the Great. 'The desertion of the King of Prussia, whom he styled the most magnanimous ally this country ever had, in the preliminary articles on the table, he reprobated in the strongest terms. He called it insidious, tricking, base, and treacherous. After amusing that great and wonderful Prince during four months, with promises of the subsidy, he had been deceived and disappointed. But to mark the inveteracy and treachery of the Cabinet still stronger, he is selected from our other allies, by a malicious and scandalous distinction in the present articles. . . . Thus the French might keep those places until the Austrian troops were ready to take possession of them. All the places which the French possessed belonging to the Elector of Hanover, the Duke of Brunswick, the Landgrave of Hesse, etc., did not amount to more than ten villages, or about an hundred acres of land; but the places belonging to the King of Prussia they were in possession of were Cleves, Wesel, Guelders, etc. Upon the whole, the terms of the proposed treaty met with his most hearty disapprobation. He saw in them the seeds of a future war. The peace was insecure, because it restored the enemy to her former greatness. The peace was inadequate, because the places gained were no equivalent for the places surrendered.'

On reflection, we cannot admit that all the objections which Pitt advanced in this speech to the articles of peace were well founded. The general inclination to cavil and blame leads to evident exaggerations and to continual neglect of the reasons which led to certain arrangements. Once it had been agreed that the French fishermen were to have a place for curing their fish, the cession of Miquelon to France became a matter

of no importance; any additional danger that the fishery-treaty might be broken or evaded was most trifling; that danger existed even if nothing were ceded. As to the limitations to the French possession, which consisted chiefly in a periodic visitation and control by English officials, Bedford, on his own responsibility, had yielded on this point, because Louis xv., considering assent to such a proceeding derogatory to his royal dignity, had absolutely refused to give it. In place of the right of control a promise was accepted from the French king that no fortifications would be erected on the island, etc. To have allowed the conclusion of peace to be shipwrecked upon this point would have been folly. It would also have been folly to demand more than Florida in exchange for Havana and the portion of Cuba, in the possession of which the English were by no means securely established. The exchange arranged gave each country what was of most use to it; England rounded off her territory on the northern continent, and Spain regained the most important part of the Cuban colony. To maintain that the gain in this case was not equivalent to the loss, was empty rhetoric. We know, also, that in reality much more was gained by the capture of Havana than the territory received in equivalent; to this success were due Spain's readiness to make peace and the favourable settlement of the three points in dispute. Nor were Guadeloupe and Martinique sacrificed without compensation to the peace mania, as Pitt declared they were. Not only did their cession induce France to stop the German war, which might, at this particular juncture, if the peace negotiations had not come in the way, have proved very profitable to her; it also induced her, in her turn, to cede much more important territories in North America than she had been inclined to do the year before. Pitt contradicted himself when he declared in one part of his speech that the negotiators had had no trouble in obtaining this extension of territory, that it had been the *uti possidetis* in his own negotiation, which is as much as to say that it was regarded as a compensation for Martinique; while in another part he maintained that Martinique had been given away without any compensation. The restitution of all the conquests in India certainly seems a curious proceeding. But even in 1761 the English government had shown itself very accom-

modating in this matter, and had delegated the arrangement of it to the two companies, which step in itself implied that the continued existence of the French company in India was to be permitted. Now, as a natural consequence, the restitution of the old possessions was stipulated. Indignation upon this point was superfluous, for the influence of France in India would always remain infinitesimal after the native peoples had once witnessed the complete collapse of her colonial power there. Gorea and St. Lucia were also in appearance uselessly sacrificed. In reality they were the bait which was to gain France's support against the bellicose designs of Spain.

The most questionable arrangement in the preliminaries was that which regarded Prussia. Bute's endeavour here also had been to make the conclusion of peace easier for France by imposing no condition, the fulfilment of which could lead to a quarrel with Austria. France must at least be in a position to inform the court of Vienna that the provinces in question had not been surrendered to the King of Prussia, and that, if circumstances permitted, they might be held by French troops until the arrival of the Austrians; for they had always been regarded and treated as belonging to the empress-queen. Hence the passage relating to the evacuation received the suggestive additional clause, '*aussitôt que faire se pourra,*' which seemed to hold out the possibility of longer occupation, and yet did not make England appear too plainly false to her engagements. It is to be noted, however, that this was not so much a ruse of France for the purpose of actually transferring the provinces to Austria, as an artifice employed to secure Austria's consent to the peace. To deceive that power still further, Choiseul, on November 2, 1762, that is to say, one day before the preliminaries were signed, concluded a convention with the Austrian ambassador, in the second article of which it was stipulated that, when Wesel came to be evacuated, all the guns, even those which had been transported there by the French, were to be left behind, an arrangement which assumed the occupation of the fortress by imperial troops. As soon, however, as the preliminaries were signed, France acted in collusion with England; she placed no real hindrances in the way of the Prussian occupation of the place, and evacuated it at a particularly early date. Then, on January 15, an agreement was actually concluded between

the state secretary Halifax and the French and the Prussian ambassador, that the Austrian Netherlands and the Prussian provinces were both to become, for the time being, neutral ground, and the latter, subject to this condition, were to be delivered to King Frederick. Frederick was thus to regain his possessions if he would agree not to carry the war into the west. This he gladly did, with expressions of lively gratitude to the English king. The most serious cause of offence was herewith removed, and a powerful weapon taken out of the hands of the parliamentary opposition. On December 9 nothing, of course, was known of this; nevertheless, it was unfair of Pitt to brand as faithless and treacherous the particular article of the preliminaries which, without doing any real injury to England's ally, rendered their settlement possible. Even supposing the article to have had the aim which he imputed to it, there would have been no formal breach of treaty, for all that the only treaty still valid, that of Westminster, bound England to do, was to remove the French from German soil. With the history of the stopping of the subsidies we are already acquainted. Pitt was not in a position to judge this step fairly, as he knew nothing of the disagreements and misunderstandings which had led to its adoption.

The criticism to which Pitt subjected the conditions of peace was, therefore, to a great extent beside the mark. But even where these conditions were really not in accordance with the principle of *uti possidetis*, they were not on that account to be condemned, for without such concessions peace would have been unattainable. Pitt was not wrong when he maintained that his last conditions in 1761 had been in some respects more favourable than those under consideration; but for that very reason he had been unsuccessful; peace had not been obtained; whereas now, by yielding a very little, the secure possession of great gains was attained and the endless continuation of a costly war was prevented. Pitt made demands upon the English negotiators which might have been just if they had been in a position to dictate the peace. What he wanted was, of course, very good and very desirable; what was arranged between the contracting parties was doubtless in certain respects disadvantageous to England; but the situation simply did not admit a more advantageous arrangement.

And this situation was rendered more unfavourable by the danger of opposition in Parliament—that is, to a certain and very considerable extent, by Pitt himself; for this danger made a speedier settlement imperative, and, consequently, imposed greater compliance than would otherwise have been necessary. Thus it came about that Pitt's utterances were regarded, not as real criticism of the preliminaries, but simply as an exhortation to continue the war. This, however, deprived them of effect; for the number of those who did not yet desire peace was quite insignificant; Pitt was himself severely blamed by the opposition for his display of such a tendency.¹

It may be maintained that Pitt's wish to profit by the favourable military situation for the annihilation of the maritime and commercial power of France was justifiable, and that the next war might thereby have been avoided. It is my opinion, however, that even the greatly superior naval force which England at that time possessed would not have been equal to the task. Possibly still greater losses might have been inflicted on the enemy; the last islands might have been taken from her; but to prevent, either altogether or for a long period, a nation like France with her great resources from recuperating her naval power, to exclude her from the colonising movement, was at that time an impossible undertaking. It did not enter the range of possibility until England had made considerable strides in development, and until France, during the Revolution, had herself destroyed the very basis of her naval power, which consisted in her excellent staff of naval officers. The satisfaction of Pitt's demands would not have sufficed to secure this result.

But it is, moreover, questionable if Pitt was really in earnest in his desire to continue the war. I am much inclined to doubt it. In 1761 he desired peace; but he overestimated the pacific intentions of France, and consequently offered conditions too disadvantageous. He promptly detected the French court's change of mood and her intrigues with Spain, which seemed to make war with both powers a necessity, as his few overtures had proved ineffectual. A prompt commencement of such a war would, he hoped, check Spain's arrogance and make peace possible before a change in the continental policy became necessary, that is to say, before

¹ Report of the Prussian ambassador, December 14, 1762.—Berlin Archives.

Frederick the Great was alienated or the English troops withdrawn from Germany. When he was not allowed to carry out his plan, he resigned office, undoubtedly in the hope that his successors would not show themselves equal to the difficulties of the situation. He expected that, after the necessary explanations with Prussia, he would be recalled to his post of leader and entrusted with the conclusion of the war. But these hopes were not fulfilled. Prussia, now supported by Russia, would not be forced to make peace; the German war was not given up; the conflicts in the colonies ended most successfully for England; and Bute's skilful tactics brought about a very satisfactory peace in an astonishingly short time. This placed Pitt in a very unpleasant situation. Where he had failed, his successors had achieved results without difficulty; and his prophecies of the evil that would result from a postponement of the war with Spain had not come to pass. It might seem that, though he had been capable of defeating France, he had not been able to deal, either in diplomacy or in war, with two powers, without committing a breach of international law. Not until we have given due consideration to this unfortunate position of Pitt's can we really understand his speech.

It was, almost from beginning to end, a defensive speech, a speech in which he endeavoured to disparage the notable success of his opponent and to extenuate his own failure, with the object of saving his popularity. He tried to prove that although, in spite of the deviations from his principles, peace had been brought about, it was a peace concluded upon such a defective basis that it was not likely to last. In the course of this attempt he cavilled at all its articles, almost comically exaggerated its disadvantages, and unduly magnified the evil results likely to arise from it. For such a result as the repudiation of the treaty and a recommencement of the war, he could not and did not hope. This would have seemed ridiculous even to him, and he made no such demand. But the fact that, in vindicating himself, he represented the actual articles of peace to be most unsatisfactory, could not but lead every one who knew anything about the negotiations to the belief that Pitt wished to gain more advantageous conditions by a new conflict, a circumstance which drew down upon him the disapproval of all intelligent persons unbiased by party con-

siderations. Nevertheless, his speech and his vigorous condemnatory attitude gave rise to the tradition that Pitt's continuance in office would have procured for the nation a far more advantageous peace, and that Bute had cheated England of a great part of her gains. This tradition has also found its way into German historical works, the more easily because of Pitt's warm defence of the interests of Frederick the Great.

Another point to be noticed is that Pitt carefully avoided any personal attack on the favourite. He never mentioned him by name, but only spoke in general terms of the ministers to whom the king had entrusted the task of making peace. His object was, in fact, merely to justify himself, not to condemn others, least of all those on whom his political future depended. Hence the greater part of the speech was occupied with a vindication of the policy which he had pursued during his term of office.

Pitt had naturally little interest in the remainder of the debate. He knew the result beforehand. He withdrew at once after finishing his speech, to seek at home alleviation of the suffering which had been increased by his exertions. The vote of approval of the preliminary treaty was carried by a majority of 319 to 65—a result to which Fox's bribery had, no doubt, contributed, but which was certainly not, as the opponents of the measure asserted, entirely produced by this unfair means. Horace Walpole's assertion that the 65 were the only unbribed members of the House is an absurdity.

Fox at once attempted to make capital out of the brilliant victory of the government and to establish his system still more firmly. Of the king's ill-will towards all who had opposed the beneficial work of peace, advantage was taken to deprive a further number of opponents, including some of quite inferior rank, of their posts; from the great nobles of the old oligarchy even their county appointments were taken.¹ Newcastle, Devonshire, Rockingham, and others were obliged to resign their lord-lieutenancies, a step which aroused great indignation. Bute tried to alleviate hardships and to compensate losses; but he was not yet in a position to oppose such steps, as the final treaty of peace, which was negotiated by Bedford in January and February, had not yet received the approval of Parliament.

¹ Albemarle, *Rockingham*, i. 152 ff.

Regarding this last negotiation there was nothing to be feared so long as the ministry remained of one mind.¹ In the first place, the peace was so advantageous that even Wilkes was obliged to confess that 'it was the damn'dest peace for the Opposition that ever was made.'² In the second place, there had been concluded in the interval that agreement with Prussia which removed the chief cause of offence. In the third, France had ceded the colony of Louisiana to Spain, which relieved the English North American colonies from all fear of French attacks. And lastly, negotiations between Austria and Prussia were already in progress, and an arrangement between these countries might be concluded at any moment; the peace of Hubertusburg was, as we know, signed on February 15. Under these circumstances another attempt at opposition to the peace would have been worse than useless. Hence when, after its signature on February 10, the treaty document was laid before Parliament, not a voice was raised in expostulation. Pitt, amongst the rest, saw no reason for beginning another vain struggle.

But though this last act of the great drama produced little excitement, it had a great effect upon the workings of home politics. It removed the obstacle which had prevented a union of the different opposition groups. They had not been able to agree upon the attitude to be assumed towards the peace negotiations, and had not, consequently, been dangerous to the ministry hitherto; but now this question was disposed of, and therefore they were in a position to draw up a joint opposition programme. Pitt, too, could join, for though he did not wish to quarrel with Bute, he could safely oppose the measures of the government, which very evidently proceeded, not from the favourite, but from Fox. Bute's disapproval of the arbitrary proceedings of his colleague could not remain a secret. And to Pitt, although they were in no way injurious to himself, these proceedings were peculiarly repugnant, because he saw in them an attempt to push the royal prerogative to unconstitutional lengths. And they were in reality a first attempt to introduce the system of government which George III. at a much later period, and by the advice of the same man,

¹ Bute to Sir James Lowther, February 3, 1763.—*Historical MSS. Commission, Thirteenth Report*, App., part vii. p. 132.

² *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 202.

successfully carried into effect, though the success was of short duration. Hence we now find Pitt inclining towards the party of the old oligarchy, which had allied itself with the Duke of Cumberland.

Nothing of very particular importance came before Parliament after the peace question had been settled. A committee was appointed to investigate the war expenditure;¹ and after this it was necessary to determine the peace strength of the army. In this matter Pitt, on March 4, opposed Temple and his friends; he supported the government proposal, and declared that he himself would have made the figure higher still, as there was no likelihood of peace lasting longer than ten years.² He urged specially the continued employment of Highland soldiers, of whom he spoke in terms of the warmest praise. It is worthy of remark that he also advocated the idea that the American colonies should pay the troops required for their defence, a demand in which lay the germ of future disagreements with the colonies. Pitt's attitude prevented the intended attack by the opposition, and it again seemed as if concord on that side of the House had not even yet been attained. But a few days later, on March 7, the scene was changed.³ During a discussion on the war expenditure Pitt was attacked by George Grenville on the subject of his financial principles and measures. He replied in a speech full of wit and biting satire. A violent altercation ensued, which Pitt ended by making a low bow to the Speaker and leaving the House slowly, with a contemptuous glance at Grenville.

This was equivalent to a break with the government. A day or two later Pitt was in negotiation with the Duke of Newcastle, the intermediary being Thomas Walpole, a nephew of Sir Robert.⁴ In his concessions to the duke, Pitt went so far as to agree that the Earl of Bute might be made the object of the attacks of the opposition. He endeavoured to show, from earlier utterances of his own, that he had objected to Bute's entrance into the cabinet; and it was not difficult to prove, for he had, in fact, attempted to prevent Bute's appointment as secretary of state; but the argument lost its value from the fact that, on the grant of certain concessions, he

¹ *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 208.

² *Ibid.*, iii. 218 ff.; Walpole, i. 195.

³ Albemarle, *Rockingham*, i. 149 ff.

⁴ *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 219.

had yielded, and had thenceforward left Bute's position of authority unchallenged.

He now, with unusual vehemence, asserted his Whig principles. In the altercation with Grenville he had already brought accusations against the Tories, and he now again declared that he would have nothing to do with them. He undoubtedly, as he said, owed a debt of gratitude to many gentlemen who called themselves Tories, but during his share of the administration these gentlemen had supported his government upon the principles of Whiggism and of the Revolution. He would invariably support these principles and would die a Whig. He refused, however, to give the duke his support to the extent desired. He did not desire a new party government, and therefore opposed proscription, that is to say, the exclusion of useful men from office because of their party principles. Tories, too, were to be possible office-holders. Moreover, although he was agreeable to Bute's expulsion, he had no desire to see the Duke of Newcastle take Bute's place. As far as he himself was concerned, he characteristically declared that he had no desire for office so long as the king had so unfavourable an opinion of him as he (Pitt) was informed that his majesty had. It was evident, therefore, that he had no intention of forcing himself on the king, in concert with the oligarchy, as had happened in George II.'s time. All he desired was to avert the danger threatening from the Fox-Bute alliance, with its Tory basis. This government he intended if possible to overthrow, leaving all the rest to the sagacity of the monarch—of course with the idea that, sooner or later, the young king would apply to him, the most famous and popular man in England, and a man who had, moreover, always displayed sincere royalist convictions.

In spite of these limitations Newcastle showed himself desirous of an alliance, and on March 8 there was a great 'coalition dinner' at the Duke of Devonshire's house, where Pitt and Temple met the Dukes of Newcastle, Grafton, and Portland, the Marquis of Rockingham, Lord Hardwicke, and others. The new alliance against the government was put under Pitt's management, and operations were begun at once. Bute, with the intention of improving the very unsatisfactory state of the finances, imposed at Dashwood's suggestion a

duty on cider, a beverage chiefly prepared in the fruit-producing western counties. It was a very small duty—10s. per hogshead, calculated to add £70,000 to the public revenue—and hardly justified the clamour raised against it.¹ The opposition, however, wished to try their strength; and in the debate of March 27 Pitt spoke against it,² exaggerating the inconveniences which it would cause both to dealers and to the public, and more particularly asserting that the invasion of private houses by the excise officers would be an intolerable burden. Grenville defended the tax with warmth, contending that it was unavoidable, because the government did not know where else to find the money; proposals to take it from the sinking fund had been opposed. Saying, '*Tell me where you can lay another tax; let the Honourable Gentleman, I say, tell me where!*' he sat down. Pitt, who was sitting opposite him, hummed the refrain of a popular song: '*Gentle shepherd, tell me where.*' General hilarity was the result, and Grenville long went by the name of '*the gentle shepherd.*'³ But the jest was not enough for Pitt; he rose and made a violent attack on Grenville.

These attacks in Parliament, which could not prevent the passing of the bill, were supplemented by a popular movement against the measure in the western counties. The agitation was transplanted thence to the metropolis, but there it was evidently directed less against the bill itself than against the Scottish favourite, whom the public desired to intimidate into resignation.

Apparently the attempt was successful; but if we look more closely into the matter we find the attack to have been a mere tilting at windmills. Bute resigned; but his resignation was due to other and very different causes, with which we are already acquainted.

Immediately after the signing and ratification of the definite treaty of peace (the ratification took place on March 18) we find Bute holding consultations with Grenville on the subject of the new ministry, of which, according to Bute's promise, Grenville was to be the leader. The cider question can have had no influence on the negotiations thereafter begun, for they

¹ *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 222.

² Thackeray, *History of Chatham*, ii. 29.

³ Walpole, *George III.*, i. 251.

were in progress on March 25,¹ and the debate on the bill did not take place till the 27th. Moreover, Fox had given his consent on March 11 to Bute's retirement,² which proves that Bute had only been waiting for the conclusion of peace to make a change in the cabinet. It would have been easy for him to come to an understanding with Grenville had he not desired to find a place in the cabinet for his friend, the Earl of Shelburne, whom he proposed to appoint secretary of state in the room of Grenville's brother-in-law, Egremont. To this Grenville would not agree, unless Egremont showed himself willing to retire. Besides, he did not consider Shelburne suited for the post. However, the only other office that could be found for Shelburne was that of paymaster of the forces, and this Fox himself wished to keep.

It was a difficult task to reconcile the conflicting interests. The intimation of Bute's intention to resign was in itself sufficient to arouse Fox's indignation; it signified the collapse of all his plans. Bute undoubtedly made him an offer of the post of first lord of the treasury; but this was no more than an empty compliment, for the favourite knew perfectly well that Fox would not undertake the sole responsibility of leadership. All he could do to console him was to take his advice in the construction of the new ministry; in other words, to do well by his friends. And now it was necessary to induce Fox to resign his lucrative appointment, in exchange for a peerage of which his wife, Lady Holland, was already in possession. Shelburne himself undertook to negotiate with him, and in doing so made the assertion that Fox had at one time declared his intention of retiring from the post of paymaster if he were raised to the peerage. Fox denied this most emphatically, charged Shelburne with deception because he had led the king to believe a falsehood of this kind, and refused to come to any agreement. He finally went so far as to demand the treasury, or at least the privy seal, and intimated his desire to be made, not a baron, but a viscount, so that his family might be superior in rank to Pitt's (Hester Pitt was only Baroness Chatham). All this was refused by the king, as the arrangements made could not

¹ *Grenville Papers*, ii. 32.

² For the negotiations regarding the changes in the ministry, see the detailed account given in Fitzmaurice's *Life of Shelburne*, i. chap. iii.

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Lord Lansdowne.

be altered; but in the end Fox was left in his post of paymaster; Shelburne was made first lord of trade, with the special privilege of direct official communication with the king.

The negotiations were finally concluded in the first week of April, and Bute at once took the step which he had long been meditating. On the 8th the news spread like wildfire that the favourite had resigned. It excited extreme surprise everywhere.¹ Some were astonished at the rapid success of the new opposition: it had hardly begun operations, and had won no single victory; and yet it had frightened the minister out of office. Others suspected an artifice, and imagined that Bute had simply relieved himself of responsibility by resigning, and would still continue to direct the government concealed behind others. But the favourite had no desire whatever to conceal the real position of matters. Although he did not mention his agreement with Grenville, he frankly declared that he had intended from the outset only to hold the reins of government until he had brought about peace, and then to resign them to others, an explanation which few believed, since few could understand such an absence of ambition. Since no questions of any difficulty remained for settlement, Bute might, undoubtedly, have retained undisputed power throughout the summer. But he desired to hold office only exactly so long as he was necessary and useful to the king. He believed his guidance of affairs to be indispensable to the conclusion of peace, since he alone regarded the position generally from the right point of view. Therefore, the dislike of the people to himself, the Scotsman and favourite, must be endured for the time being. As soon, however, as the peace was an accomplished fact, he became, as minister, only injurious to his master, since his personality made the royal measures unpopular, and called a dangerous opposition into existence. Therefore he resigned.

For Pitt personally there was something slighting in the new arrangements,² which placed at the head of the govern-

¹ See Von Ruville, *W. Pitt und Graf Bute*, p. 62 f.

² The Duke of Newcastle to the Duke of Devonshire, April 8, 1763: 'I can't doubt but Mr. Pitt will be highly provoked at this new arrangement; his hatred and contempt of George Grenville and the disregard which M. L. Bute has shew'd to him by forming a new administr., wherein the active part of ministry is in G. Grenville, and no notice is taken of Mr. Pitt, will enrage him. . . .'
Newcastle Papers.

ment the man whom he regarded as a renegade, and whom, though he was his own brother-in-law, he had quite lately treated with the greatest contempt. It had certainly not been Bute's intention to offer Pitt any slight. Circumstances had, for the time being, allowed of no other arrangement; it was an after-effect of the imperative necessity for concluding peace; for it was, as we know, that necessity which had induced the favourite to promise George Grenville the post of first lord of the treasury. Not until the new cabinet proved a failure did it become possible for him again to ask the assistance of Pitt, the man whom he at bottom recognised as the most capable director of the affairs of the nation. The distant and unaccommodating attitude which the Duke of Bedford assumed, and which was ascribed to thwarted ambition,¹ opened some prospect of such a turn of affairs.

¹ The Duke of Newcastle to the Duke of Devonshire, April 8, 1763: 'He [Bedford] is also generally supposed in town to come over displeased with M^yl. Bute.'—Newcastle Papers. See also Prussian ambassador's report of April 5, 1763. Walpole, i. 206 f, gives the reasons.

SECTION II

DOMESTIC COMPLICATIONS

CHAPTER V

IN ALLIANCE WITH THE OLIGARCHY

WE have seen, and we shall continue to see, that the Crown played a much more important part in this reign than in that of George II. It had once again become the constitutional centre of gravity. The reasons for this fact have already been given. We must not, however, forget that its occupant was still a young man of twenty-four, who, with every desire to take independent, energetic action, was as yet quite incapable of doing so. Of instruction he had had abundance; but his experience of life, private or public, was as yet of the slightest. Hence for a long time to come he was, if not completely, yet to a great extent, under the influence of his environment. His actions may almost be forecast from the different influences to which he was exposed. There is little trace in any of them of independent exercise of his own judgment. Hence the anxiety that we observe in all the leading statesmen to stand well personally with the king and to keep their opponents from approaching him. The same fact was observable in the reign of George II.; but, in the first place, that king knew very well what he wanted, so that, in order to persuade him, compulsory methods were necessary; in the second place, the consent of the monarch was now a matter of much greater, indeed of almost decisive, importance.

We observed that Pitt, during the last part of his administration, considered direct intercourse with the sovereign of great importance, and made the assurance of it for himself the condition of his consent to Bute's promotion; the succeeding

prime ministers followed his example. Bute was the only minister whose case was somewhat different. The possession of the king's ear had been from of old almost his right; and, for the very reason that he did not solicit it, the confidence of his master was bestowed on him in specially ample measure. George III. knew that his favourite's aspirations were entirely unselfish, and that he took office only because he found himself obliged to do so if his one great aim, peace, was to be attained. Hence the readiness with which the king listened to and accepted his advice. The new ministers, on the other hand, who did not enjoy the same advantage, were forced to begin by acquiring some influence over the sovereign; and they therefore jealously guarded all avenues of approach to him. They hoped by keeping the favourite and other dangerous people away from the king to convert him to their ideas, and to lead him into their paths. Their distrust of Bute was not altogether unfounded, for his aspiration undoubtedly was the establishment of a more secure system than it had been possible to organise under the compulsion of stern necessity.

Their endeavours were by no means fruitless. Bute, although still popularly supposed to be secretly controlling the government of the country, was obliged to abstain from all intercourse with the king, this being one of the conditions upon which the new ministers had accepted office. Consequently George began to see both persons and things with other eyes. Grenville, flattering his autocratic tendencies, which were due chiefly to the suggestions of his mother, the Princess of Wales, taught him to regard the former ministers as men who had imposed their will upon his grandfather and who had endeavoured to frustrate his own meritorious achievement, the conclusion of peace. It was not difficult to instil suspicion of Pitt's intentions, for the king very well remembered his despotic action at the time of the war, and probably had little remembrance of his former friendly relations with Leicester House. Nor had Pitt ever tried to conceal his antagonism to the peace. And that Newcastle and his friends had represented a power to which even the king had sometimes been obliged to bow, was a fact too well known to leave the young ruler in doubt of their dangerous character.

Bute's purpose, however, was in no way furthered by the fact that the opposition as a whole had incurred the personal

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displeasure of the sovereign. He had found Grenville's promotion inevitable; but now that the troublesome peace question had been satisfactorily settled, he considered that it would be distinctly advantageous if the old Newcastle-Pitt government, which had proved itself so efficient during the war, could, with some few changes, return to power; for this was the only government he considered at all likely to be stable. The dominating influence of the throne would of course have to be secured; but Pitt's well-known royalist leanings and the duke's pliancy were in themselves sufficient guarantee. Now, for the first time, there was a difference of opinion, due to Grenville's influence, between the king and his favourite. It was not very serious, and the probability was that it would soon cease to exist if the two were in a position to talk things over. It must, in any case, be Bute's endeavour to put an end to the present unsatisfactory position. He resolved to seize the first opportunity of doing so.

The nucleus of the new ministry was formed by three men, who were nicknamed the Triumvirate.¹ The first lord of the treasury was George Grenville, of whom mention has frequently been made, but regarding whose qualities and character no information has yet been given. His chief characteristics were moderation and exactitude. He was a painfully conscientious worker animated by dutifulness and by ambition, but narrow in his views and aims. His conceit led him to regard himself, by reason of his knowledge of affairs and of business routine, as much superior to his colleagues, and he was consequently unwilling to accept suggestions. All this might have qualified him to serve successfully as the king's instructor in the business of the state, if he had possessed a little more animation and humour. But his endless, monotonous orations bored the young sovereign, as they had often wearied Parliament. The financial affairs of the state were what interested Grenville most, and the treasury was probably the right place for him. His exactitude was useful here; and his economy, which in private life bordered on parsimony and rapacity, was welcome to the country in the present wretched condition of its finances. But there was always a danger that he might, in his desire to better the finances, commit some grave indiscretion, for he was not to be persuaded

¹ Walpole, *George III.*, i. 214 ff.

to abandon an idea when once it had taken hold of his mind. That want of political principle with which he has frequently been charged and which made it easy for him to change his party, to me seems hardly deserving of blame. A Whig and a faithful defender of the constitution he always remained; the different party-sections from one to the other of which he changed were not divided by any fixed principles: their programme was exactly what self-interest at the moment demanded.

The Earl of Egremont, the first secretary of state, with whom we have also been long acquainted, was a much weaker character. He had little knowledge of business and no parliamentary abilities; but he was not wanting in sense; and his humour made him a more agreeable man than his brother-in-law. His weakness, however, as often happens, involved a certain want of truthfulness.

The third member of the alliance, the second secretary of state, Lord Halifax, was also an amiable character, and moreover possessed of considerable oratorical talent; but he was not sufficiently well informed or clear-sighted. Pleasure in the good things of life led in his case to dissolute conduct, but also to a keen interest in architecture and art in general.

Such were the men to whom the fate of England was now entrusted. It was undeniably a weak ministry, and of this the opposition was perfectly well aware. It lacked members of distinguished ability; it had not sufficient influence in Parliament; it was kept in office by the power of the Crown alone; and this power it consequently strove to increase as much as possible. For the moment, however, there was no danger, as the parliamentary session came to an end very soon after the changes in the cabinet were made, and the ministry had the whole summer at its disposal in which to strengthen itself by the acquisition of new forces. The opposition which it had to confront was a much more powerful association than had existed for some time. It was composed of almost the whole of the old oligarchy, of Pitt and Temple and their friends, and the Duke of Cumberland. If it held together, the danger would be great; but its elements were so heterogeneous that it did not seem as if it would be very difficult to produce disagreement or even complete disruption.

An event now occurred which excited anew the minds that

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had just been calmed by the conclusion of peace, and which threatened to shatter the several political parties into atoms. This was the appearance of a fulminating article by Wilkes in his newspaper the *North Briton*, directed against the king's speech with which Parliament had been prorogued on April 29, an article which exceeded in violence anything of the kind ever published before. In view of the influence which this famous 'No. 45' exercised on the political development of England, and more especially on the career of Pitt, I propose to quote its most important passages.

After expressing his gratification at the conclusion of peace, the king had said: 'My expectations have been fully answered by the happy effects which the several allies of my Crown have derived from the salutary measure of the definitive treaty. The powers at war with my good brother the King of Prussia have been induced to agree to such terms of accommodation as that great Prince has approved, and the success which has attended my negotiation has necessarily and immediately diffused the blessings of peace throughout Europe.' These were unfortunate sentences; they lent themselves to attack, because the German peace had been concluded altogether independently of the peace between England and France, and in making it King Frederick had received no support whatever from England. It was, however, possible to defend them in so far as the incorrect impression was not conveyed in words, but only by implication. Nor could it well be denied that the peace of Paris had prepared and facilitated the German peace. Hence no one had discovered anything particularly bad in these panegyric utterances of the ministry until 'No. 45' fell like a bolt from the blue between the parties.

After referring to the fact that the king's speech has always been regarded as the speech, not of the king, but of the ministry, and as such been freely criticised, the writer continued: 'This week has given the public the most abandoned instance of ministerial effrontery ever attempted to be imposed on mankind. The *minister's speech* of last Tuesday is not to be paralleled in the annals of this country. I am in doubt whether the imposition is greater on the sovereign or on the nation. Every friend of his country must lament that a prince of so many and amiable qualities, whom England truly reveres,

can be brought to give the sanction of his sacred name to the most odious measures, and to the most unjustifiable public declarations, from a throne ever renowned for truth, honour, and unsullied virtue. I am sure all foreigners, especially the King of Prussia, will hold the minister in contempt and abhorrence. He has made our sovereign declare: [Here follows the passage already quoted from the speech]. The infamous fallacy of this sentence is apparent to all mankind, for it is known that the King of Prussia did not barely *approve*, but absolutely *dictated*, as conqueror, every article of the terms of peace. No advantage of any kind has accrued to that magnanimous prince from *our negociation*, but he was basely deserted by the *Scottish* prime-minister of *England*. He was known by every court in Europe to be scarcely on better terms of friendship *here* than at *Vienna*; and he was betrayed by us in the *treaty of peace*. What a strain of insolence is it, therefore, in a minister to lay claim to what he is conscious all his efforts tended to prevent, and meanly to arrogate to himself a share in the fame and glory of one of the greatest princes the world has ever seen? The King of *Prussia*, however, has gloriously kept *all* his former *conquests*, and stipulated security for all his allies, even for the *Elector of Hanover*. I know in what light this great prince is considered in Europe, and in what manner he has been treated here; among other reasons, perhaps, from some contemptuous expressions he may have used of the *Scot*: expressions which are every day echoed by the whole body of *Englishmen* throughout the southern part of this island.'

The articles of peace, the financial position, and the cider duty were criticised in the same tone, the ministry being invariably completely identified with Bute. The whole attack was based on the incorrect supposition that Bute was still secretly directing the affairs of the nation.

The article, of course, caused a tremendous sensation. The great body of the people exulted over it as an attack upon the detested Scotsman; but in the upper and educated classes generally it produced a feeling of displeasure. Neither government nor opposition would countenance such brutal abuse, more especially as they had approved of by far the larger proportion of the measures thus stigmatised. Even Pitt, who on the occasion of the debate on the preliminaries had

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expressed almost the same opinions, and upon whose ideas the article was evidently based, could not approve this style of attack. The disparagement of the Scottish nation, with which his relations had always been friendly, and of the favourite, with whom he had always avoided any personal friction, was especially disagreeable to him. The only person who took Wilkes's part was Lord Temple, who saw in him a useful instrument for winning the favour of the public, and who had very probably helped to write the article. But the agitator presently went too far even for Temple, who was obliged to caution him to be more moderate. Had not the ministers been guilty of a blunder, the incident would probably have passed with no more important result than a lawful correction of the journalist, of which no one could have disapproved.

The person who felt himself most injured was the king,¹ and this not only because his trusted counsellor had been insolently reviled, and the peace abused which had completely secured his royal approval, but also and more especially because his royal dignity had been insulted. He felt that he was accused of a lie; but what enraged him most was the fact that the responsibility for his words was taken from him, as if he were a mere puppet in the hands of his ministers, giving his sanction blindly to their actions. Latter-day ideas upon the relative position and powers of sovereign and Parliament, were then barely in existence, and were inconceivable to George. As it was of the greatest importance to the triumvirate to retain the good graces of the monarch, they eagerly seized the opportunity to do him a service by undertaking the punishment of the journalist. They had almost no personal feeling about the article, as they did not identify themselves with Bute, and as they had played only a very secondary part in bringing about the peace.

Lord Halifax issued a 'general warrant' not for the apprehension of Wilkes, as the article had appeared anonymously, but for the arrest of the authors, publishers, and printers of the number of the *North Briton* in question. The executive officials were left to determine who these were. This was a proceeding against which legal objections could be raised, and which consequently gave the opposition a chance of attack-

¹ Newcastle to Devonshire, June 23, 1763.—Newcastle Papers.

ing the ministers without denying Wilkes's guilt. Wilkes was proved to be the author, was arrested, and imprisoned in the Tower.

But now another difficulty presented itself, which the ministers had simply disregarded. Wilkes was a member of Parliament, and as such could be imprisoned only for certain offences—treason, a capital crime, or a breach of the peace. It was for the last that he was understood to have been arrested; but, according to the Habeas Corpus Act, it was the province of the judge to determine whether or not the arrest and imprisonment were legal; and it was doubtful if a judge's opinion would coincide with that of the ministers. Earl Temple applied for a writ of *habeas corpus*, and Wilkes was brought before Lord Chief Justice Pratt, of the Common Pleas; he was no other than Charles Pratt, Pitt's friend and legal adviser, who, after Pitt's resignation, had been relegated to this non-political post. Now he was suddenly called in this post to decide an important question, which was profoundly agitating the whole nation; and he had the opportunity, if he could frame a verdict favourable to Wilkes, of making himself a most popular man.

This was indeed what happened. When the prisoner was brought before Pratt, he received permission to speak freely of things which had no direct connection with the case in point.¹ This enabled him to deal fresh blows at the ministers. A great impression was made by his assertion that a vain attempt had been made to bribe him. Pratt's decision was to the effect that, though the article tended towards a breach of the peace, it could not in itself be regarded as a breach of the peace—a decision which, if it were recognised as valid, ensured to the members of Parliament complete liberty to print and publish what they chose. Wilkes was immediately set at liberty, and promptly proceeded to write new articles, whilst the ministers were obliged to acknowledge themselves defeated for the time being. A series of law-suits, which their opponent now brought against them in his turn, were the unpleasant consequences of the defeat.

If we subject Pitt's attitude at this time to careful examination, we observe in it one feature for which public events and his own aims and characteristics do not provide a sufficient

¹ Notes of his speech in the Newcastle Papers, British Museum.

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explanation—for which, therefore, there must have been a secret reason. This was the constant, deliberate exhibition of his disapproval of the peace. He had no desire to bring about a new war, for he had himself declared that he would abide by the peace and defend its articles;¹ therefore it would have been natural that, after once giving full and complete expression to his views and vindicating his own different policy, he should have let the subject drop and should have proceeded to build upon the foundation that had been laid, such as it was. Instead of this, he let no opportunity pass of reiterating his disapproval and consequently producing fresh disagreements. He constantly and frequently reiterated his resolve never again to collaborate with the men to whom the conclusion of peace was due. We ask with surprise, what there can have been so objectionable in this the most glorious peace ever concluded by England, as to prevent an able statesman like Pitt from becoming reconciled to it or to keep him continually wrangling about it. It was surely of much greater importance that he should recover his place and power, so as to repair as far as possible the injuries which he declared to have been sustained. But this was exactly what he was preventing by his behaviour. He had shown great readiness to yield on other occasions, when office was his aim. Then, instead of displaying such severity, he had winked at things which had roused his deep indignation but a short time previously.

It is evident that some disturbing force must have been at work, which diverted our hero slightly from his natural path; and this I cannot help imagining to have been the prospect of a legacy, very much larger than that which he had received from the Duchess of Marlborough.

On his large estate in Somersetshire there lived at this time a certain Sir William Pynsent,² a man over eighty years of age, a highly eccentric person, noted for his peculiarly rigid political opinions. The husband of this gentleman's next heiress was Frederick, Lord North, of future celebrity. Lord North voted for the cider bill, which so enraged Sir William that he incited the mob to burn him in effigy. Henceforward he bestowed all his affection upon Pitt; and his particular reason

¹ *Grenville Papers*, ii. 198 ff.

² Concerning this affair see Thackeray, ii. 50 ff., and Walpole, ii. 32, ff.

for so doing was that Pitt had stoutly opposed the peace. In his youth Sir William had uplifted his voice against the peace of Utrecht, which was objectionable to his ardent Whig views as being a Tory measure. Now the same occurrence seemed to have repeated itself; again a cabinet consisting partly of Tories had in his opinion surrendered the fruits of many victories and concluded a premature peace. The old enthusiasm and the old indignation awoke, and impelled him to reward the conductor of the war and opponent of the peace-maker with the bequest of his valuable estate. We are, indeed, told that Pitt had no acquaintance with Sir William, and that he was completely surprised to learn in 1765 that he was heir to the property; but we cannot accept this statement as a sufficient proof that the anticipation of the inheritance had exercised no influence. Even if he had received secret information long before, he would have pretended to be surprised; and his want of personal acquaintance with Sir William did not exclude the possibility that he might have learned the old gentleman's benevolent intentions; in fact it is hardly possible to imagine that he was ignorant of them, for Sir William does not seem to have been in the habit of keeping his feelings and schemes to himself. Such secrecy was incompatible with his choleric temperament.

Only on the supposition that Pitt had some idea of Pynsent's intention can his behaviour during the time when he was out of office be satisfactorily explained. In May there was forwarded to him an address to the king voted by the corporation of Bath, under the presidency of Ralph Allen.¹ As member for that city, Pitt, in company with his colleague, was expected to present it. It was an address of congratulation on the conclusion of the peace, which it styled *adequate and advantageous*. Pitt could not consent to present a document conceived in terms which contradicted his publicly avowed opinions; and he not only refused, but imparted peculiar bitterness to the dispute which ensued by allowing it to be clearly seen that he intended to retire from the representation of the town. This was a great blow to poor Allen, who had also to endure persecution by the enemies of the government in the shape of

¹ Peach, *Life of Ralph Allen*, p. 175 ff.; Walpole, *George III.*, i. 222 ff.; Correspondence with Allen in *Correspondence of the Earl of Chatham*, ii. 223 ff.

doggerel rhymes and caricatures. His old friendly intimacy with Pitt had not been resumed before his death, which happened not long after the events just related.¹ Consideration for the opinions of Sir William Pynsent, who lived in the neighbourhood of Bath, may not impossibly have influenced Pitt to some extent in this matter. The same consideration would also explain the very marked manner in which he now begins to assert his Whig principles, and also his surprisingly steady adherence to Newcastle, after a previous long period of estrangement. This alliance with Newcastle, however, was one of the chief obstacles in the way of a reconciliation between Pitt and the court.

The repulse of the ministers in the Wilkes affair was a severe blow, and seriously impaired the king's confidence in them. In their eagerness to serve him they had committed an imprudence which led him to suspect their intelligence. The immediate result was that Bute's influence waxed again and theirs waned. We suddenly find the favourite once more in constant communication with the sovereign.² They meet at the house of the Princess of Wales and at Kew, and Bute is invited to play cards at Buckingham House. In the beginning of August the opposition discovered that messages were passing between him and the king. Bute tried first to secure the support of Newcastle's friends, but, finding himself personally objectionable to them, he gave up this plan³ to pursue others which he expected to be more successful. His new idea was to entice Pitt and Temple from their allegiance to the opposition, to reconcile them with the Bedford section, and in this manner to form a serviceable government. But in this case, too, there were insurmountable difficulties. He seems to have succeeded in modifying the unfavourable opinion of Pitt and Temple with which the ministers had inspired the king; while Pitt, to whom, in the beginning of August, Bute made overtures through Lord Shelburne, did not show himself altogether unapproachable; but as he refused any connection with Bedford or any of those persons who had had a share in the conclusion of peace, the negotiations led to no

¹ He nevertheless left Pitt a legacy of £1000.—Thackeray, ii. 50.

² Newcastle to Devonshire, June 23; Devonshire to Newcastle, August 2, 1763.—Newcastle Papers.

³ Newcastle to Hardwicke, June 9, 1763.—*Ibid.*

result.¹ The king felt insulted by the proposal to exclude the men to whom he considered himself indebted.²

The ministers, meanwhile, were aware of the favourite's intrigues, and were endeavouring to secure their position. On August 1 they made a private offer to Lord Hardwicke of the post of president of the privy council, which had become vacant by the death of the Lord Granville.³ But as Hardwicke would not be separated from his friends, the proposal came to nothing. Halifax and Egremont now requested the king to tell them plainly whether it was his intention to keep and support them in office or to form a new government consisting of members of the opposition.⁴ But George was not at all inclined to speak plainly, as he did not yet know what the result of Bute's machinations was to be; so he met their insistence with obstinate silence; he refrained even from making polite speeches, which the ministers might have interpreted favourably for themselves. They then determined to await further developments for ten days or a fortnight before taking any decisive step.⁵

As no agreement with Pitt could be secured, things would probably have remained as they were, if the whole situation had not been changed by an unexpected event, the death of Lord Egremont, which occurred on August 21. This broke up the triumvirate and left one of the state secretaryships vacant, thus producing a favourable opportunity for extensive changes. Suggestions regarding these at once came from various quarters.

The first to submit a proposal was the Duke of Bedford, who, by the advice of his friends, had returned to London from Paris at that moment. He went to the king and suggested, as the best solution of the difficulty, that the vacant post should be given to Pitt, averring, as his reason for offering this suggestion, that, having helped to make peace abroad, he was desirous also to make it at home.⁶ This was a somewhat

¹ Such was the information regarding the affair afterwards received by Grenville.—*Grenville Papers*, ii. 204.

² Bute to Shelburne on the reception with which his report met from the king. Letter of August 16.—Fitzmaurice, *Life of Lord Shelburne*, i. 288.

³ Harris, *Life of Lord Hardwicke*, iii. 369 ff.; Albemarle, *Rockingham*, i. 170.

⁴ *Grenville Papers*, ii. 83.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 85 ff.

⁶ Walpole, *George III.*, i. 227.

remarkable, but very skilfully calculated proceeding; for such conciliatory action on the duke's part would surely induce Pitt to overlook the differences which had hitherto separated them. If they could come to an understanding, a strong government might be the result, which would in all probability contain several additional recruits from the ranks of the opposition. Bute, who at once recognised the importance of the step, felt encouraged to take a share in the negotiation. No such attempt had as yet succeeded, because of Pitt's refusal to have any dealings with the originators of the peace. But now there was every hope that he would abandon his obstinate attitude, for he could not possibly repulse the man who had given him such a proof of confidence. Bute, employing the good offices of Beckford, now lord mayor, succeeded in arranging a conference with Pitt, which took place in the latter's own house on August 25.¹

The accounts extant of this and the following conferences are very conflicting; but if, in comparing them, we take into consideration the respective positions of their authors, we are able to construct a consistent narrative of events. But we can certainly find no satisfactory explanation for these events without including in our calculations the secret motive of Pitt's action, which I believe I have discovered, his hope of inheriting a great estate. There is practically no doubt that he would most willingly have accepted his old post; and the intention certainly was that, even if some of the present ministers remained in office, he should be the virtual leader of the government; but he was unable to accept the terms, because he was obliged to prove himself the irreconcilable opponent of the peace-makers and the Tories, and the faithful friend of those Whigs whose party ancestors had opposed the peace of Utrecht. If he could bring the Whigs, as a party, into office, he was ready to accept; if not, he found himself obliged to refuse. He can hardly have disguised the fact from himself that, in these circumstances, his prospects were by no means favourable; for he could not expect that the king would dismiss his most devoted adherents and defame their most valuable achievement, the peace. There was, however, a reason for Pitt's entering, in spite of all this, into negotiations and spending so much time on them. It was of the greatest

¹ Thackeray, ii. 35; *Chatham Correspondence*, ii. 235 f.

importance to him to come into personal communication with the young sovereign, as he was thus enabled to explain away all the charges which the ministers and other calumniators had secretly brought against him, and to display himself in his true character as a loyal, moderate, skilful statesman, with no strong party leanings. Even if no arrangement could be made at the moment, he trusted that his eloquence would secure him the king's lasting favour, and that thus a foundation would be laid for his future power.

Bute, whose intention it was to introduce Pitt and some of his friends into the cabinet without making any complete transformation of the government,¹ seems not to have touched on the delicate personal question in the interview with Pitt.² He requested the latter to explain his views on home and foreign affairs, and testified his general approval by recommending him to set them forth in the same manner to the king, on whom he would presently be commanded to wait. It was thus impressed on him at the outset that in certain matters he was already in agreement with the king and his favourite, who were prepared to be guided in public measures by the intelligence of the experienced minister. The matters in which discord existed were left for discussion during the interview with the king; and Pitt received the impression that his views would be fully accepted. In this, however, he was mistaken, for the very next day the king told George Grenville of his intention to offer Pitt a seat in the cabinet,³ but added that he meant to make as few changes as possible—that is to say, that there was to be no general change of government. Grenville advised the king very strongly against the intended step, and reminded him how violently he (the king) had formerly protested—of course under the influence of the ministers—against the idea of Pitt's resumption of cabinet office. He also informed his majesty that he himself would under no circumstances co-operate with such persons. But George would not be led astray; he doubtless hoped that Grenville would yield when brought face to face with the accomplished fact.

¹ Bute to Shelburne, September 4, 1763.—Fitmaurice, *Life of Lord Shelburne*, i. 293 ff.

² Regarding this interview see Hardwicke's report to his son, Lord Royston, September 4, 1763, from accounts given by Newcastle and Pitt.—Thackeray, ii. 35 f.

³ *Grenville Papers*, ii. 195.

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At midday on Saturday, August 27, having received the royal command, Pitt was wheeled in the well-known Bath chair, and in full publicity, to Queen's House, where the king was residing at the time.¹ The audience lasted, as Newcastle immediately learned, exactly three hours; and the conversation turned at first upon the subjects to which the conference with Bute had been exclusively devoted. Pitt explained his ideas and aims more fully to the king, and actually succeeded in effecting a complete change in the unfavourable opinion which George had conceived of him. No report of the conversation exists, but Pitt always maintained that he had 'made an impression';² even after the failure of the negotiations he continued to regard the interview as a success, and assumed an attitude of more pronounced reserve towards the oligarchy. Hence we may conclude that he had struck a sympathetic note, and thereby produced a kind of community of interest and a private understanding between the king and himself. To know how this effect was produced, we have only to read the letters written by the king to Pitt in 1766, both at the time of his appointment to office and afterwards.³ In these we have a constant repetition of George's expectation that Pitt would put an end to the party system, abolish family interest, and restore proper subordination in all matters to the government. In these ideas, which Pitt derived directly, and the king through his mother indirectly, from Bolingbroke, they doubtless found themselves in sympathy, thus renewing the old ties which had formerly connected Pitt with Leicester House. Nor could the result have been otherwise. The underlying identity of opinion naturally became prominent as soon as the cause of discord, the peace question, had been removed, and ample opportunity given for exchange of ideas. Pitt

¹ For accounts of the audience see (a) Hardwicke's letter to Lord Royston of September 4, 1763; (b) Newcastle's 'intelligence' of August 27, in the Newcastle Papers; (c) the king's account to Grenville: *Grenville Papers*, ii. 197, ff.; (d) account given by the Duke of Cumberland to Newcastle on September 20, 1763: Newcastle Papers; (e) account given by the king to Sir John Philipps, and repeated by him to Grenville on September 8, 1763: *Grenville Papers*, ii. 117 ff.; (f) Walpole, *George III.*, i. 228 f.

² He said so to Cumberland (as the latter reports) on September 20, 1763; and to Newcastle on September 28. In the Newcastle Papers we read: 'And, as his great point was to prove that the King was not angry with him, and that what he had said to his Maj. had made an impression. . . .'

³ *Chatham Correspondence*, vol. iii.

would not have been Pitt, the man of all-persuasive speech, if he had failed here. Agreement was secured even upon the attitude to be assumed to the peace, which was henceforward beyond criticism. George acknowledged that there were defects in the treaty, which ought to be repaired if possible; and Pitt affirmed his willingness to take his stand upon the footing of the peace.

But now came the discussion of the question which made Pitt's reinstatement impossible for the time being. He demanded, under the modest pretext that he was of no use without his friends, that the opposition, as a party, should come into office. He named the suitable recipients for certain appointments, in particular mentioning Lord Temple as the first lord of the treasury; others he merely recommended generally. The king was greatly startled by these demands, which were so little in accordance with the principles which Pitt had just professed. How could an opponent of corruption desire to see its most pronounced supporters in the government? Why should an opponent of the party system desire to champion the most solidly constructed of parties? Pitt gave the weak reason that he could not desert the friends who had loyally supported him. Curiously enough, he had hitherto been in the habit of accusing them of the most shameful disloyalty. The king answered by asking in his turn, how it was possible for him, the sovereign, to dismiss the men who had served him faithfully and devotedly. To this Pitt replied that the responsibility for such a step rested on the minister; that at present the all-important matter was to save the sinking ship, and that for this all means were permissible. Pitt thus expected that a pessimistic view of the situation would help him out of this difficulty and induce the king to yield. The latter, however, only promised to take the matter into consideration, and requested Pitt to come to him again on the 29th.

If Pitt believed that this interview had brought him any nearer to his immediate aim, he was entirely mistaken. The king was determined to retain Grenville as his prime minister, and told him so definitely on the following (Sunday) evening, whilst giving him a description of the whole audience.¹ He intended to receive Pitt once more, to give him an oppor-

¹ *Grenville Papers*, ii. 197 ff.

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tunity of reconsidering his decision and entering the Grenville ministry. Pitt employed the interval in communicating with the leaders of his party and preparing the list of ministers. He first went out to Claremont to see the Duke of Newcastle, with whom he spent five hours, and to whom he gave a full account of all that had passed the day before. Then he wrote to the Duke of Devonshire and the Marquis of Rockingham, Newcastle meanwhile communicating with Lord Hardwicke.¹ But it was all fruitless labour. The king, when Pitt appeared on Monday,² assumed a much more determined attitude, and declared with greater decision that his honour did not permit him to dismiss his servants. He consented, indeed, to discuss the above-mentioned list of ministers, and actually made certain concessions, chief among them the acceptance of Lord Temple as a suitable first lord of the treasury; but nothing would induce him to accept the whole oligarchy. 'Well, Mr. Pitt,' were his concluding words; 'I see (or I fear,) this won't do. My honour is concerned, and I must support it.'

This episode being thus concluded, the king again gave his support and confidence to the existing ministry. The affair, however, had several important consequences. We have already dwelt on the change which it produced in the relations between Pitt and the king. At the levée at St. James's on August 31, Pitt and Temple received special marks of favour. His majesty asked Pitt sympathetically if he had not suffered from standing so long when with him on Monday.³ Bute was obliged to leave London and take up his residence in the country. This, though represented as a voluntary proceeding on Bute's part, was the result of an express stipulation made by Grenville, who now found it doubly necessary to keep the king exclusively under his own influence. Pitt displayed great indignation at the banishment of a man who had been neither legally accused nor condemned, for no other reason than that he had endeavoured to assist him (Pitt) to an interview with

¹ Newcastle to Hardwicke, August 28, 1763.—Newcastle Papers. Thackeray, ii. 37; Albemarle, *Rockingham*, i. 171.

² For this audience see Lord Hardwicke's letter to Lord Royston of September 4.—Thackeray, ii. 37. Pitt to Newcastle, August 30.—Newcastle Papers (only a short notice). Cumberland's account of September 20.—*Ibid.*

³ Thackeray, ii. 41.

the king.¹ As for Lord Shelburne, who had conspired with Bute,² he was obliged to resign his appointment and go over to the opposition. Finally, the Duke of Bedford was now persuaded to enter the cabinet, a circumstance which requires explanation.

We learned that Bedford was the first to propose Pitt's reinstatement with the object of promoting a reconciliation between the advocates and the opponents of peace. The negotiations with Pitt having fallen through, the ministerial party did everything in their power to arouse the duke's indignation against Pitt and the opposition, in the hope of inducing him to give his support to the government. He received the most exaggerated accounts of Pitt's demands.³ He was told that it had been one of Pitt's express conditions, that every one who had been concerned in the conclusion of peace should be excluded from office, and that the Duke of Bedford in particular should never again occupy a position of authority; indeed, Pitt was declared to have maintained that the duke had committed a criminal offence by signing the peace. All this was only half true. Pitt had, undoubtedly, in conversations which took place before Bedford's conciliatory step, spoken of the exclusion of all the peace-makers, and against the enlistment of Bedford. In the conferences of August 25, 27, and 29, however, he seems at least to have avoided this point, though it was one which would call for settlement. We are puzzled by contradictory accounts. The fact of the matter is that Pitt did not wish to appear ungrateful, but neither did he wish to have the duke in the cabinet. Bedford, however, believed what he was told, and in his indignation determined to make common cause with the ministry. In the beginning of September he accepted the office of lord privy seal, and thenceforward he was the life and soul of the administration. But now Pitt, in his turn, accused Bedford of insincerity.⁴ He had told the duke openly enough, he said, that he would not co-operate with him. If the duke, in spite of this, had proposed that he should receive

¹ From Newcastle's notes (September 28, 1763) of a conversation with Pitt.—Newcastle Papers.

² Albemarle, *Rockingham*, i. 172.

³ *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 240 f.

⁴ Conversation with Newcastle, September 28, 1763.—Newcastle Papers.

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office, it had been done only in order to substantiate his charges of ingratitude. Whether Pitt really thought this, or merely desired to injure the new minister, it is impossible to tell.

It was thus that Pitt lost the most favourable opportunity of acquiring the long-desired leadership of the government, and failed to conclude that alliance with the young and pliable king which was the aim of his life. A hidden current had drawn him out of his right course, and now all his skill was required to keep his ship afloat amidst the changing winds and towering waves.

CHAPTER VI

TACKING AND TRIMMING

ALTHOUGH Pitt continued his connection with the opposition, he refused, as far as possible, to take any active share in its proceedings. To his friends he gave as his reason the embroiled and hopeless condition of public affairs, which stifled all useful effort.¹ He feigned pessimism and the resignation of despair, to excuse his opposition to the measures desired by the king. All Newcastle's and Cumberland's persuasions failed to move him; and these noblemen could not help suspecting that he had some secret understanding with the favourite. Newcastle nevertheless endeavoured to cultivate his intimacy with Pitt. We hear of him inviting himself to Hayes,² to talk over party matters. Whether the visit was paid or not, we do not know. Certainly nothing definite came of it. The old gentleman must have been vastly provoked by his political friend's resigned lamentations, the real reason for which, however, he failed to discover. During an interview with the Duke of Cumberland, on October 31,³ Pitt was more frank than usual, and to a certain extent divulged his real standpoint. He again declined, in spite of all the duke's representations, to take any active part in opposing the government measures, giving as his reason that no result

¹ Pitt to Newcastle, September 12, 1763: 'As to the Country, it is lost beyond the possibility of being restored; the moment now thrown away was, in my judgement, the last which offered the smallest gleam of hope. May it never be my fate again to hear anything of taking a share in the affairs of a Nation devoted to confusion and ruin.'—Newcastle Papers. Similar utterances occur repeatedly.

² Newcastle to Lord Lincoln, September 24: 'I have wrote a short letter to Mr. Pitt, to beg he would give me leave to spend all Tuesday with him at Hayes; that is, from 12 o'clock at noon till we are drove home by the night.'

³ Newcastle to Devonshire, November 2, 1763, gives Cumberland's report.—Newcastle Papers.

could be gained thereby. Nor would he promise to attend the proposed opposition dinner. The Wilkes affair was the only case in which he was prepared to give any practical effect to his views. For his inaction he, however, on this occasion gave a second and very significant reason. He declared that his participation in the arrangements of the opposition would represent him as a party man. He was thus actuated by a desire to show deference to the king's opinions. He confessed quite frankly, on being questioned by the duke, that he believed he had made an impression on his majesty; and when the duke said that he believed him, on the contrary, to be the best hated man at court, he merely smiled and said nothing. The leaders of the opposition now knew that they might count on practically no assistance from Pitt at the opening of Parliament.

All interest at the beginning of the new session was concentrated on the Wilkes affair, which had been much complicated in the interval by accusations and counter-accusations. It is worth while to indicate the significance of this affair in the development of English constitutional government; we shall then be better qualified to decide whether Pitt, in assuming the attitude which he did, was or was not endeavouring to influence that development.

We know that the English Parliament by no means formed a body representative of the English nation, that is to say, of all classes of the population; it represented only certain privileged classes. There was nothing inconsistent in this; for the social and economic conditions, and the actual stage of national civilisation, were not yet such as to admit any real or useful co-operation of the lower and numerically larger classes. The great power which Parliament had secured precluded any too extensive widening of parliamentary foundations; there was always the danger that popular leaders might, by influencing the masses, attain to positions of authority and revolutionise everything. But, even though such agitators were unable, in consequence of the limitations of the franchise, to acquire much influence in Parliament, they found means to evoke such strong expressions of popular feeling as it was impossible for Parliament entirely to disregard.¹ We have repeatedly seen the importance which even the king and his

¹ See Introduction, p. 7 f.

ministers attached to public opinion. The press had already become the most effective means of influencing this opinion; the legislators of the country had consequently placed it under severe restrictions. Their aim was to make it almost impossible for private persons to write against the government: the proper place for opposition was Parliament. This was to be the sole arena open to party conflicts; in other words, only the members of the ruling classes were entitled to aspire to power.

But, although agitators and discontented individuals had no chance of commanding a parliamentary majority, it was by no means impossible for them to become members of Parliament. There were still bodies of independent electors; nor was it an impossibility to secure the patronage of an opposition nobleman. Once in Parliament, there were two methods by which a man could spread his political ideas: he could embody them in speeches, using the liberty of speech permitted in the House; or he could take advantage of his privilege as a member of Parliament to publish pamphlets. The first course was rendered of little avail by the fact that publication of the debates was a punishable offence. The second seemed likely to be more effective, for the privileges of the Commons upon questions of publication were as yet somewhat indefinite. Wilkes was the first to adopt this plan boldly and recklessly, for the purpose of stirring up the nation against the new government. We have seen that the attack was not particularly successful, from the fact that Lord Bute, against whom it was chiefly directed, was no longer in power.

Lord Chief Justice Pratt's decision, that the pamphleteer had not overstepped the limits of this privilege as a member of Parliament, was only a temporary settlement of the matter. As soon as Parliament met the question would recur, whether the publication of libels did or did not come under the category of offences unpunishable in members of Parliament, whether it did or did not constitute a breach of the peace. The House of Commons was thus placed in an extraordinary position. Whereas, as a rule, its inclination was to increase its privileges, its object must in this case be to curtail them; for, if it consented to the amplification suggested, it exposed itself to the danger that individual malevolent members might

be in a position to direct the force of public opinion against the decisions of the House. And there were weak points enough in the existing system to make such attacks very serious matters. They threatened the whole system of corruption upon which the power of the ruling classes was founded, and prepared the way for a fundamental revolution. The leaders of the opposition, whose interest for the moment it was to assist the man whom the ministers were prosecuting, could not but hesitate to support his view of the legal position, for, in the long-run, their interests would prove to be identical with the interests of the ministry. Hence Hardwicke, when consulted on the privilege question, gave it as his opinion that members of the House of Commons did not possess the privilege which Wilkes claimed, and that the three criminal offences mentioned in the act were simply cited as examples to show that no serious offences committed by the representatives of the people were to go unpunished.¹ Under these circumstances the ministers had no need to apprehend any untoward result from the debate.

We have now to consider Pitt's attitude upon the question. He had never countenanced the corruption prevailing in the House of Commons; on the contrary, whenever his other aims permitted, he had strongly opposed it. An improvement in this matter would, he hoped, increase his own power, for it would increase his personal influence. He was therefore free from the anticipations of evil with which his party friends regarded any extension of the privileges of the House; and his past, moreover, obliged him to advocate such extension. His friendly connection with Temple was a further inducement to defend the persecuted man. But, on the other hand, he must, unless he were prepared to lose the advantage which he had just gained, show great consideration for the feelings of the offended king; and this so impeded his action that the ministers had not much to fear from him. Only one course of action was open to him—that which he had chosen from the beginning—to make a clear distinction between the question of guilt and the question of privilege; in the former to adopt the king's view, in the latter Lord Temple's.

Parliament was opened on November 15 with a speech from the throne which dwelt on the necessity for domestic

¹ Harris, *Life of Lord Hardwicke*, iii. 384 ff.

unity and for the suppression of the licence which was subversive of real freedom.¹ No sooner had the Commons returned to the Lower House than Wilkes rose to make his complaint of the breach of privilege committed in the seizure of himself and his papers, whilst Grenville, in the name of the government, claimed the right first to inform the House of the action taken regarding the *North Briton*. The speaker announced that according to parliamentary etiquette, Grenville must be heard first. A debate began on this question, in which Pitt spoke on behalf of Wilkes. When the question was put to the vote, the decision was in favour of Grenville, who thereupon delivered his report on the proceedings and read 'No. 45' to the House. Lord North, the natural heir of Sir William Pynsent, brought forward two motions: the first was a vote of thanks to the king for the action of his government; the second, a proposal that 'No. 45' should be burned by the hangman. Pitt took part in both of the debates which ensued. He fully recognised the culpability of the article, but disputed the legal position of the member whose motions had produced the debate. He blamed the action taken by the ministers as breach of privilege, and moved that the epithet 'traitorous,' which had been applied to the pamphlet to constitute it a breach of privilege, should be retracted. Both motions were, nevertheless, carried without amendment, by a large majority. It is worthy of notice that Pitt seized the opportunity for a sharp discussion with Lord North, whose political opinions were extremely objectionable to Sir William Pynsent.

Wilkes's complaint was to form the subject of debate on the following day; but in the interval he found himself obliged to fight a duel with a certain Mr. Martin, who had, during the debate, used most offensive language concerning an attack made on him in the *North Briton*. Wilkes was severely wounded, and this affair had to be postponed. The address to the king was debated instead; and on this occasion Pitt, in a somewhat unconvincing speech, explained his attitude towards the authors of the peace, and towards the Tories and the Whigs. It was, indeed, difficult for him, with all the considerations which he felt bound to observe, to give any satisfactory explanation of it.

¹ For the debates see Walpole, i. chaps. xxii. and xxiii.

The great question, that of the breach of privilege, was debated on November 23 and 24, although many demands had been made that the debate should be postponed until Wilkes had recovered, and he himself had sent in an appeal to the same effect. The debate was violent and long; it was not till the second day that Pitt took part in it. Then he spoke at some length. A few days previously he had entered into relations with Lord Shelburne, who, like himself, whilst siding with the opposition, had a kind of secret understanding with the court. When Grenville informed the king of the interview between Pitt and Shelburne,¹ with the intention of arousing his majesty's suspicion of these two men, George, strangely enough, expressed satisfaction, and added that he was glad to see the earl in the opposition. The substance of Pitt's speech has, fortunately, been handed down to us,² so that we know exactly what attitude he assumed.

He began by stigmatising the motion as an attempt to minimise the privileges of the House, which, if successful, would put every member of Parliament who did not vote with the minister under a perpetual terror of imprisonment. 'To talk of an abuse of privilege, which the adherents of the Government frequently did, was to talk against the constitution, against the very being and life of Parliament. It was an arraignment of the justice and honour of Parliament, to suppose that they would protect any criminal whatever. Whenever a complaint was made against any member, the House would give him up. This privilege had never been abused. But take it away, and the whole Parliament is laid at the mercy of the Crown. Parliament had no right to vote away its privileges; they were the inherent rights of the succeeding members of that House, as well as of the present; and he doubted whether the sacrifice made by that House was valid and conclusive against the claim of a future Parliament.'

With this rather audacious assertion, which neither side of the House could approve, since it controverted the doctrine of the omnipotence of Parliament, Pitt terminated that part of his speech in which he supported Wilkes upon the legal question. He then adopted an entirely different tone, severely condemning 'No. 45' and the articles of the *North Briton* generally. 'He called them illiberal, unmanly, and detest-

¹ *Grenville Papers*, ii. 226.

² See Thackeray, ii. 43 ff.

able. He abhorred all national reflections. The King's subjects were one people. Whoever divided them was guilty of sedition. His Majesty's complaint was well founded, it was just, it was necessary. The author did not deserve to be ranked among the human species—he was the blasphemer of his God, and the libeller of his King. He had no connection with him. . . . It was true that he [Pitt] had friendships, and warm ones; he had obligations, and great ones; but no friendships, no obligations could induce him to approve what he firmly condemned.' He spoke warmly of his own close friendship with his noble relation, Lord Temple; 'they had lived together, and would die together'; and he declared that he knew nothing of any connection between Temple and Wilkes. In conclusion he declared 'that the dignity, the honour of Parliament had been called upon to support and protect the purity of his Majesty's character; and this they had done by a strong and decisive condemnation of the libel. . . . But having done this, it was neither consistent with the honour and safety of Parliament, nor with the rights and interests of the people, to go one step farther.'

We observe that these utterances were not specially calculated to be of assistance to the opposition. Some of the arguments advanced against the motion in the earlier part of the speech were certainly open to attack, and seemed almost calculated to secure the disapproval of the House; they certainly produced a very unfavourable impression. Their effect, however, was almost nullified by the studied and violent outburst against Wilkes and by the very cordial approval of the king's action. The general impression conveyed to the audience must have been that Pitt approved of the action taken by the ministers, but held that there were certain legal objections to it, objections, however, which he himself was hardly able to justify. Why, then, should the ministers under such circumstances resist the will of the majority and allow themselves to be deterred by imaginary dangers from taking energetic proceedings against the pamphleteer, whom Pitt himself had pronounced to be a thoroughly bad character? Pitt had not expected a victory; he probably did not even desire one. The debate had simply given him an opportunity to display, on the one hand, his faithfulness to his principles by proclaiming anew the same conception of the law which he

had enounced from the beginning; on the other, his loyal attachment to the king, by an ardent defence of his majesty's personal interests. For the extraordinary vehemence with which he had suddenly denounced Wilkes there was, however, possibly yet another reason, of which more shall be said later. As on the occasion of the peace debate, Pitt did not wait for the division. His gout, which was very bad at this time, furnished him with an excellent excuse for leaving the House as soon as he had spoken.

In the upper House, Lord Shelburne's attitude was very similar to Pitt's, a fact which further justifies the supposition of an understanding between them. He, too, spoke against the motion, but plentifully interlarded his deprecatory remarks with flattery of Bute and the king.¹ The real opponent of the measure was Lord Temple, who had prepared a vigorous and excellently written protest, twelve folio pages in length. Of the thirty-five opposition peers, however, only seventeen signed this document; and Shelburne was not of the number.

The person who took Pitt's behaviour most amiss was, naturally, Wilkes himself. He gave vent to his indignation in a letter to the Duke of Grafton, in which he accused Pitt of duplicity,² asserting that the latter had read and approved of the most boldly outspoken of his earlier pamphlets, the *Essay on Woman*. How much truth there was in this assertion it is impossible to discover; but one thing cannot be denied, namely, that after Pitt's audiences with the king, his attitude towards Wilkes underwent a great change, to which expression was given in his speech in the House of Commons on November 24. This change had further consequences; for it was Pitt's violent condemnation which rendered it impossible to prevent the exclusion of Wilkes from the House of Commons. After the debate upon a motion for his exclusion had been several times postponed on account of his illness, it was arranged that it should begin, in spite of his absence, on January 20, 1764. After a lengthy discussion the motion was carried almost unanimously. Wilkes was declared to be no longer a member of the House, and a writ was issued for the election of a new member for the borough of Aylesbury.

But this complicated affair was by no means concluded yet.

¹ Fitzmaurice, *Life of Lord Shelburne*, i. 300.

² Adolphus, i. 133.

In February new questions connected with it came up for discussion—such as Wilkes's counter-accusation of breach of privilege on the part of the executive officials, who had unjustifiably forced their way into his house and searched it, and, most important of all, a motion that all general warrants, such as had been issued for the apprehension of the authors, etc., of 'No. 45,' should be declared illegal. This question of general warrants plays a conspicuous part in the history of Parliament for some time. It would be of little interest to describe the different debates and the part taken in them by Pitt. Suffice it to say that he maintained the standpoint which he had adopted at the beginning—maintaining, in opposition to the ministers, that a stricter adherence to the laws of the country ought to be observed, but showing extreme moderation on all points where he knew them to be acting in complete accord with the king, and repeatedly giving strong expression to his dislike of pamphlets.

Only one incident is deserving of particular notice.¹ In the matter of the 'general warrants' the ministers appealed to precedent, and were even in a position to prove that Pitt, when he was state secretary, had on two occasions issued such warrants, in which no names were mentioned. This was unpleasant for Pitt, who had denounced them as illegal; but he found a way out of the difficulty. He declared that precedents were insufficient proofs of legality, and that these former actions of his own and of others must also be regarded as illegal. He himself had been aware at the time that he was doing wrong, but he had taken the responsibility upon himself, because at the time in question, that is during the war, the safety of the country was at stake. But was there anything so dreadful about a pamphlet that such dangerous means should be resorted to in dealing with it? This was a very controvertible distinction; being simply a means of escape from a dilemma, it does not bear close investigation.

In this matter, however, the opposition was to a certain extent successful. Whilst the first question, that of breach of privilege, was decided against Wilkes, *i.e.* in favour of the government, the opponents of the government, acting in concert with a number of its adherents, succeeded in postponing the

¹ Thackeray, i. 46 ff.

settlement of the second question, that of the legality or illegality of general warrants, for four months. It was ruled that the matter would not be ripe for decision until further legal advice had been taken. Whether this apparent victory of the opposition, which was at once interpreted as the first sign of a revulsion in political feeling, really was a victory, may be regarded as very doubtful, seeing that it was entirely devoid of result. Indeed, it was from this very time that the power of the ministry began to increase—an increase largely due to the attitude now assumed by Pitt.

Since his interviews with the king Pitt had lost all desire to interfere in public affairs, because he ran the risk on each occasion of offending one of the persons on whom he knew that his future in a manner depended—the king or Sir William Pynsent. The safest policy was to keep quiet. It was an attitude which each might interpret in his own favour. The Wilkes affair was the only case in which he considered himself obliged to take an active part; for, in the first place, it was necessary that he should remove the king's unfavourable opinion of his attitude upon this question; and in the second, he must avoid the appearance of indifference to great national questions, and must proclaim his devotion to liberty, though without making himself unduly obnoxious to the government. As soon, however, as he had completed this task, he intended (as he had intimated in October to the Duke of Newcastle)¹ to retire to the country, only to appear again in public on occasions of the first importance. To this programme he strictly adhered. In March 1764, when excise and customs questions were to be discussed, he and a number of his friends disappeared from the scene, thereby depriving his party of all importance.² The members with no settled opinions, who constituted the so-called 'flying squadron,' which was always to be found on the stronger side, and who had lately been supporting the opposition, now returned to their allegiance to the government, which was placed in a remarkably safe position by these and other accessions from the ranks of the enemy. All the attempts of Newcastle's friends to spur Pitt to greater activity were in vain.³ He absolutely declined to undertake

¹ Newcastle to Devonshire, October 16, 1763.—Newcastle Papers.

² Thackeray, ii. 49.

³ Albemarle, i. 174; Walpole, ii. 12.

any duties or to make any arrangements.¹ He expressly reserved to himself the right to act exactly as he chose, and to do exactly what he thought most likely to benefit the country. The consequence was that he soon ceased to be regarded as a full member of the opposition, but rather as a free-lance, or, as Hardwicke expressed it, an *animal sui generis*.² Here, again, we note a desire to please the king, who was strongly opposed to the party system.

Nevertheless, in the estimation of the nation and of foreigners, Pitt was still the resentful enemy of the court—an idea which he carefully endeavoured to foster, as, for instance, on the following occasion. In January 1764 the heir-apparent of the house of Brunswick came to London, to be married to the king's sister, Princess Augusta.³ Neither the princess nor her fiancé was on good terms with the Princess of Wales; they were, consequently, not in favour with the king, whose consent had been given to the marriage mainly with the view of removing the lady from the English court. The Prince of Brunswick, in order distinctly to show his unfriendly feeling towards the court, was particularly friendly with the leaders of the opposition; recognising Pitt as one of the chief, he went to call upon him at Hayes on January 22, and stayed three hours. There was no great risk in this for Pitt, who had never concealed from the king that he differed from him in his views on German questions, a difference which the king had not taken seriously amiss. His majesty would understand that only political questions and not court intrigues would be discussed at Hayes. On the other hand, however, the visit showed, in a manner very agreeable to Pitt, that he was recognised as belonging to the opposition. Sir William Pynsent would feel reassured that it was not to a friend of the court that he was leaving his property.

About this time, however, a more serious estrangement divided Pitt from the king. The financial question now became the most important problem of the day. Means were required to enable the country to support the enormous weight of debt which had accumulated during the war; and Grenville seemed to be the person most capable of finding them. He

¹ Pitt to Newcastle, October 1764.—*Chatham Correspondence*, ii. 296 ff.

² Albemarle, i. 177.

³ Walpole, *George III.*, i. 277 ff.

displayed wonderful energy, and developed ideas which found much favour with the king. One of the principal of these was to throw part of the burden on the American colonies, and this was a plan which met with general approval. Grenville did not yet go the length of proposing direct taxation, although he already had a stamp-tax in view. He meant to wait for an expression of opinion from the Americans before coming to a decision on the matter; so, though the general intention was announced in Parliament in March 1764, the only bill brought in was one for enlarging the scope of the Navigation Acts and imposing certain new ship taxes.

In these matters complete concord prevailed between Grenville and the king, who was entirely of the opinion that the power of the kingdom over the colonies should be more firmly asserted. The action of the ministers and their success in the Wilkes affair had reinstated them in George's favour, which was increased by their attitude upon colonial policy. It was, however, unsatisfactory that, just as they were beginning to feel their position secure, Bute should seize the opportunity to request their consent to his return to London.¹ Lady Bute, through the intervention of Lord Gower, inquired of the Duke of Bedford whether it was true that he would consider her husband's return 'a signal for resigning his office'; she was told that the duke denied ever having made such an assertion, whereupon the favourite reappeared in London and at court with the excuse that he was tired of the country, and that he had daughters to marry, and other business which obliged him to come to town. The ministers could not well object, unless they were prepared to encounter the king's displeasure again. The king himself endeavoured to prevent any suspicion that Bute's return was a preliminary to fresh negotiations with Pitt. When the latter appeared at a levée in the end of June, George received him with marked coldness.² He spoke to every one else before taking notice of him, and then only asked him a single question, and scarcely waited for an answer.

Pitt spent the summer in retirement at Hayes, and did not trouble himself with state business. Seldom in the course of his life did he occupy so isolated a position as now. His relations with the king had become less friendly; he was com-

¹ *Grenville Papers*, ii. 483.

² *Ibid.*, ii. 376.

pletely estranged from the ministers, and in particular from his brother-in-law, Grenville; he had almost entirely broken with the opposition; and his friendship with Temple had suffered from the Wilkes affair.¹ New events were required to rescue him from this unpleasant situation. These occurred in the following year; but in the interval the momentous decision had been taken, which Pitt could have opposed more effectually than any other man: the Stamp Act had been passed. His consideration of purely material interests, his hope of a considerable inheritance—for in no other way is his behaviour to be explained—had prevented him from seizing the helm of state at the right moment and guiding the country through the difficulties of the American question to the shore of reconciliation. If matters had been under Pitt's management the outbreak of the revolution might have been, if not altogether prevented, at least long delayed. The man who made an attempt to solve the problem was unfitted for the task by reason of his character and political principles. No one at that time, neither Grenville nor Pitt, could tell which method was correct; no one possessed sufficient knowledge of the colonists' frame of mind, of their capacities, or of the influences acting upon them. Determination was, so far as any one could tell, just as likely to succeed as compliance. Events, however, showed that timely overtures might have produced an effect which, if not wholly desirable, would have been far preferable to the actual result. In view of this result, it is clear that though Pitt may not have been the more far-sighted and more sagacious statesman, he was undoubtedly the man whose political principles made him more competent to deal with the situation. It was a misfortune for England that side-issues led him in the year 1763 to refuse the leadership of the government in the form in which it was offered him.

On January 10, 1765, the parliamentary session was opened with a speech from the throne, in which the king emphasised the necessity of establishing the right of Parliament to legislate for all parts of the British dominions. This sufficiently indicated that the Stamp Act was to be proposed, and also intimated the standpoint of the government. Grenville regarded the act not merely as a financial, but also and more particularly as a political measure, since by its means the dis-

¹ Walpole, *George III.*, ii. 19 f.

puted question, whether or not Parliament had the right to tax the colonies without the intervention of the colonial legislatures, would be decided once for all. Even the reports of the American agents had not convinced the minister of the injudiciousness and danger of the step he was about to take.¹ On February 3 the fateful measure was passed in a moderately full House, and without any animated debate. Colonel Barré was the only person who opposed it with a certain amount of energy. Pitt was ill in bed at the time, and therefore took no part either in the debate or in the conferences of the opposition.²

It was, of course, a long time before anything was heard of the effect produced by the act in America; consequently it attracted little attention at first. Few suspected that the passing of the act was an epoch-making event. To Pitt, as to the rest, it seemed a matter of comparatively small importance. But two other events which happened about this time changed the course of his career. These were the death of Sir William Pynsent and the regency bill necessitated by the illness of the king. Sir William died on January 12, 1765, and it soon became known that he had bequeathed his great possessions to Pitt, who thus found himself in possession of real and personal estates worth about £40,000.³ The yearly income, which was almost £3000, was chiefly derived from the property of Burton Pynsent in Somersetshire. To the very last Pitt had, in all probability, felt somewhat uncertain of the inheritance; for it was said that old Sir William had for a time displayed a leaning towards Wilkes, as being the more determined antagonist of the court; this fact provides an additional reason for the sudden violence with which Pitt attacked the editor of the *North Briton*. Shortly before his death the testator was also reported to have thought of General Conway, who had been dismissed from his appointment on account of his behaviour during the Wilkes debates. It would seem as if Pynsent had not been perfectly satisfied with Pitt's reserved and ambiguous attitude. From the Great Commoner, as Pitt was at that time called by his admirers, he had expected a faithful allegiance to the old Whig party

¹ Bancroft, *History of the United States* (Kretschmar's translation), v. 185 f.

² Walpole, ii. 35 ff.

³ Phillimore, *Life of Lord Lyttelton*, ii. 661.

and a definitely antagonistic attitude towards all 'King's friends.' Fortunately for Pitt, the old man had not had sufficient decision to choose another heir.

Thus our hero was released from a bond which had for a considerable time been impeding his action. A further event soon increased his prospects of place and power. In March 1765 George III. was attacked by an illness which may be regarded as an early precursor of the mental affliction with which he was visited in later life. It fortunately lasted only a few days, but was sufficient to make him feel the necessity of providing for the event of his death. As soon as he recovered the king suggested to his ministers the propriety of bringing in a regency bill; and whilst they were giving effect to this suggestion such friction arose between him and them that he resolved to overcome, if possible, the obstacles which had hitherto impeded Pitt's reinstatement.

CHAPTER VII

VAIN SOLICITATIONS

IN the framing and passing of the regency bill the ministers had undoubtedly a very critical task before them, which could only be successfully accomplished by the greatest prudence and by a clear recognition of the difficulties and dangers in the way. The hostility between them and Lord Bute, which had for the time subsided, might easily be so far revived as to occasion a quarrel between them and the king; for whilst the king would undoubtedly desire that his favourite should hold a post in the provisional government and that his mother should be legally qualified to act, if necessary, as regent, it was to the interest of the ministers that these persons, of all others, should be excluded from the regency government. Grenville and his friends, and even Bute, at first showed considerable reluctance to attack this delicate problem, although the king's condition gave rise to serious apprehensions. It was believed that he had consumption, and that he was not likely to live a year.¹ Bute was unwilling to quarrel with the ministry so long as he was uncertain of support. But both on the opposition and on the government side there were men desirous of change; and these now united in persuading him to take action.² Horace Walpole on the one side, the paymaster, Lord Holland, on the other, gave him to understand that in case of a quarrel they and their friends would support him. Bute was hereby encouraged to impress on the king, to whom for a time he alone had access, the necessity of a regency bill;³ and George's highly developed sense of duty determined him to adopt the suggestion.

On April 3, after previous consultation with the Duke of

¹ Walpole, *George III.*, ii. 69.

² *Grenville Papers*, iii. 121.

³ Walpole, ii. 70 f.

Cumberland, the king acquainted his ministers with his determination to introduce such a bill in Parliament. At the same time he claimed the right to nominate the regent and several members of the regency council.¹ Grenville raised objections to this, but was obliged to yield, and on the 5th a cabinet council was held, to determine the form which the bill was to take, and the manner in which it was to be presented to Parliament. It was arranged that, in a speech from the throne, the king should ask for an act empowering him to nominate as regent the queen or some other member of the royal family residing permanently in Great Britain, and to appoint four members of the regency council. This would make it possible for George to confer the regency on his mother and to secure a seat in the council for Bute.

Grenville did his best to introduce alterations in this scheme, but only succeeded in making himself obnoxious. On April 24 the king proceeded to Parliament to announce his wish to both Houses. But before the House of Lords had framed the bill, the ministers succeeded in persuading the sovereign to yield on one point, at any rate. He gave up his unrestricted right to appoint the four members of council, nominating at once the five princes of the blood royal, but retaining the privilege, in case of the death of one of these princes, to choose a substitute. Since the Duke of Cumberland was old and infirm, and the king's youngest brother incurably ill, there would thus still, in all probability, be a seat in the council for the favourite. On April 29 a communication regarding this change was made to Parliament.

The king already felt himself aggrieved, but a much greater mortification was in store for him. The ministers' great desire was that the Princess of Wales should be excluded from the regency, since her appointment implied the accession of the favourite to power; and Halifax, by means of the threat that the House of Commons would otherwise reject the whole bill, succeeded in extorting from George, in a weak moment, his consent to an addition which made the choice of the princess impossible. According to the new provision the regent was to be either the queen or a member of the royal family descended from the king's grandfather and permanently

¹ For the details of this affair see *Grenville Papers*, iii. 121 ff.; the *Grenville Diary* in the *Grenville Papers*; and *Walpole*, ii. 69 ff.

domiciled in England. Halifax at once hastened to the House of Lords, to have the change in question made in the draft of the bill; and it was in this altered form that it passed there. Bute himself seems to have encouraged the ministers in their imprudent behaviour,¹ with full knowledge of the consequences for them. They marched unsuspectingly into the pitfall.

The king's eyes were very soon opened to the fact that he had permitted his mother to be slighted. A visit from Chancellor Northington (Robert Henley) awoke this conviction in him and plunged him into the deepest melancholy. Although, following Lord Mansfield's advice, he refrained from revoking the last concession, his resolution was fixed to part with the counsellors who had inflicted such a humiliation on him.

And now the ministers met with another blow. When the regency bill came up for debate in the House of Commons, two tories, Mr. Moreton and Mr. Kynaston, moved as an amendment that the name of the Princess of Wales should be inserted after the queen's. The supporters of the government could not, out of consideration for the king, oppose this amendment; the opposition members were induced by Walpole either to vote for it or to abstain from voting; with the remarkable result that the House which ought, according to the information received by the king, to have refused to allow the bill to pass with the princess's name in it, expressly demanded the insertion of her name. On May 13 the bill, thus amended, was sent back to the House of Lords, where it passed by a large majority.

This successful intrigue cut the ground from beneath the ministers' feet, and opened to Pitt as well as to the opposition a prospect of return to power. Let us endeavour, however, before considering the succeeding negotiations, to arrive at an understanding of what the goal really was at which Pitt aimed, or rather which presented itself to him, in his new and less dependent position.

In the year 1763 he had still been connected with a definite party, at the head of which he was ready to undertake office, the party of the old oligarchy; there was another political group, consisting of the promoters of the peace, amongst them

¹ *Grenville Papers*, iii. 149 ff.

many 'King's friends,' which he considered himself obliged to exclude. It is practically certain that he was induced to adopt this attitude by his hope of succeeding to Sir William Pynsent's property. He must have known that his programme was not one to which the king could give his consent. Hence he contented himself with convincing the sovereign of his private antipathy to the oligarchy, as also to the party system generally, and with pleading obligations or principles in excuse for his course of action. But now he was released from restraint, and was therefore in a position to act in conformity with his real opinions, which, in a manner, corresponded with the king's. He would no longer act in concert with any party, but would collect the serviceable men of all parties, and, placing himself at their head, undertake the government, relying on the support of the crown and on his own capacity and popularity. The existing parties were to be completely demolished, so that they might never again, as an independent power in the state, force the monarch to yield to their will. In the introduction to this volume I have already endeavoured to demonstrate Pitt's principles of government. These were now to be carried into effect, and these ideas must be kept in mind if we are to understand Pitt's attitude during the different attempts which were made to construct a new ministry.

The king's inclination to dismiss his advisers dated from the cabinet council held on April 5, when the first draft of the regency bill was prepared. Their desire to exclude his mother must have been patent to him from the beginning; and the influence of Bute, who was now at court again, had doubtless begun to make itself felt. The first negotiations with the Duke of Cumberland were carried on through the medium of the Earl of Northumberland, whose son had lately married a daughter of the favourite.

For the moment nothing could be done, as the lords of the opposition were not prepared to meet the king's wishes in the matter of the regency bill. They considered it good policy afterwards to offer no real opposition to it; but it would have been in direct opposition to their Whig principles to concede to the sovereign of their own accord the full powers which he craved: they would have felt obliged to insist that the regent should be chosen in a constitutional manner, that is, by Parliament. Hence the Duke of Cumberland refused

to enter into negotiations as long as the regency question remained undecided.¹ Not until May 13, the day when the bill, as amended in the House of Commons, was passed in the House of Lords, did the negotiations begin in earnest; Northumberland then conveyed to the Duke of Cumberland a request from the king that he would confer with the leaders of the opposition, namely, Pitt and Temple, Newcastle and Rockingham, regarding the formation of a new government.

This plan of action showed that the king was ignorant of the change which had taken place in Pitt's attitude; he believed him to be still allied with the old oligarchy, and imagined that the best way of engaging his services was to summon that party to take office. The negotiations in 1768 had failed because Pitt insisted that all the Whig lords should receive appointments in the government, whilst the king would only agree to confer office on one or two of them. Now his majesty, having resolved to dismiss the present ministry, was in a position to fulfil Pitt's supposed wish that all his political friends should receive office; and it seemed to him that the Duke of Cumberland, to whom the opposition owed its unity, was the most suitable person to entrust with the necessary arrangements. But here he made a great mistake. The very fact that Newcastle and his allies were approached as a party, of which Pitt was to figure merely as a member, not as the head, and that it was Cumberland, and not the king, who applied to him, decided Pitt at once to decline all proposals. In these negative tactics he and his brother-in-law, Lord Temple, were in accord; but their subsequent lines of action were, as we shall see, widely divergent.

The main outlines of the new administration were determined on May 14 by the Duke of Cumberland in consultation with the Duke of Newcastle and the Marquis of Rockingham. The Earl of Northumberland was to be first lord of the treasury; Pitt and Charles Townshend were to be the two secretaries of state, and the Duke of Newcastle and Earl

¹ Albemarle, *Rockingham*, i. 189. Here we find Cumberland's notes relating to the negotiations. His dates, however, from May 13 onward, are incorrect—a week too early—as we see by referring to Grenville's Diary and the *Memoirs of the Duke of Grafton*, edited by Anson (London, 1898), which supplement Albemarle's narrative.

Temple were to be respectively president and privy seal. Lord Egmont was to be first lord of the admiralty. Rockingham desired no appointment for himself, believing that he could serve the government better as a private member. As soon as these preliminary arrangements had been made, the Earl of Albemarle, the victor of Havana, was despatched to Hayes to request Pitt's co-operation. Pitt seems at once to have adopted a reluctant attitude; but the delegate could at least report that he had not declined, though he had made conditions. He could not well refuse directly, as this would have been in too marked contradiction to all his previous acts and utterances; but his subsequent behaviour proved his insincerity. The conditions were: (1) the restoration of all the officers of the army, as well as many others, who had been dismissed for political reasons; (2) that favour should be shown to Chief Justice Pratt; (3) that the question of the warrants should be settled, and that the cider bill should be amended; (4) that the corruption prevailing in both the army and the navy should be ended; (5) an improvement in the management of foreign affairs.

Although these conditions were practicable, and were indeed requests which could have been refused to no new minister, it is evident that Pitt's demeanour had inspired very little hope of success; for on the following day the Duke of Grafton, summoned to a conference with Cumberland, was asked by the latter if he considered that it would be possible to form an administration without the assistance of Mr. Pitt. Grafton was obliged to acknowledge that he did not believe it possible.¹ Cumberland then sent for Temple, with whom he had two interviews, one on the 15th and one the 16th, after Lord Temple had been to Hayes. The outlook only became more unpromising. Temple condensed Pitt's five conditions into three questions, to which his brother-in-law and he must have satisfactory answers if they were to take office; but he also explained that they did not bind themselves, even if they received such answers, to enter his majesty's service. Hence it was impossible for the duke to secure what had doubtless been his aim in these last negotiations, an interview between the brothers-in-law and the king; for he could not expect the sovereign to negotiate with subjects

¹ *Memoirs of the Duke of Grafton*, p. 44.

regarding conditions which were not to be definitely binding. Pitt thus escaped the difficult and disagreeable task of proving to the king that his present and his former attitude were not inconsistent. He could not well have confessed that the reason for the former was his expectation of an inheritance.

Although Lord Temple at this time adopted the same position as Pitt, he was actuated by another motive. He was beginning to hope that he might form a strong party himself, and with its assistance make himself independent. In 1764 the two brothers-in-law had become reconciled to Lord Lyttelton,¹ whose path had long (since 1754) diverged from theirs. Now that Grenville had quarrelled with the king and stood in need of support, while Pitt appeared immovably attached to Temple, the moment seemed to have come to renew the old Cobham family alliance.² The power of each member had, since the days of its dissolution, greatly increased, and the following of each had become more numerous; consequently they would, united, at once constitute an important power in politics. The natural leader of such an alliance, however, could be none other than Lord Temple, the head of the family, the owner of the family estates, the bearer of the title. Temple, accordingly, now took steps to effect a reconciliation with his brother; and we can easily understand that, under existing circumstances, he could have no desire to rejoin the following of the Dukes of Cumberland and Newcastle. But it must not be imagined that Temple had induced Pitt to adopt this policy of refusal. Highly as he valued Temple's friendship, he now occupied far too important a position to allow himself to be led by any one. He followed only when his own aims made such action advisable.

On May 18 the Duke of Cumberland informed the king of the unsatisfactory result of his negotiations. George felt completely puzzled, but finally came to the conclusion that Pitt's hesitation must be due to want of faith in the sincerity of the proposals offered. He therefore desired his uncle to go in person to Hayes (in full publicity, with a military guard),

¹ Phillimore, *Life of Lord Lyttelton*, ii. 652. Lyttelton also was desirous of forming a Grenville party.

² Albemarle, *Rockingham*, i. 203. 'Temple, who wished the "brothers," as they were called, should form a government of themselves.'

to try and overcome the obstinate man's reluctance. Everything that Pitt demanded was to be conceded.¹ Cumberland accordingly drove to Hayes on May 20,² escorted by troops, his visit having been previously announced. Lord Temple had been requested to follow an hour and a half later, so that the duke and Pitt had a lengthy interview before he arrived. The unfortunate Pitt had no easy task in providing reasons for his refusal. He explained that he was rendered almost a complete invalid by the gout, and that his ideas on foreign affairs were much disliked at court, while he made his 'three demands' as difficult of fulfilment as possible. Curiously enough the point which the ministers afterwards assumed to be the real reason of Pitt's refusal,³ namely the choice of Lord Northumberland as first lord of the treasury, was not mentioned during the interview. Northumberland's candidature had, it seems, already been abandoned as Rockingham had been induced to take an appointment.⁴ Certainly, the matter cannot have been discussed with Pitt, for one or other of the narrators of the interview would have mentioned the fact. Hence the further inference that Temple and Pitt refused office because they feared that Northumberland's appointment would imply interference by Bute was also incorrect. This fear existed only in the minds of Grenville and his friends, whose power depended almost entirely on the favour of the king, over whom Bute had more influence than any one.

Cumberland effected nothing during his private interview with Pitt, and was no more successful after Temple and Albemarle appeared. Pitt, indeed, promised to give his support to the measures of the new ministers in so far as they coincided with his own ideas, and also to do what he could to induce his relatives to take office; but he himself refused any

¹ *Memoirs of the Duke of Grafton*, p. 45.

² According to Grafton's *Memoirs* and Cumberland's account as given by Albemarle (making allowance in the latter for the mistake of a week), Cumberland's visit was paid on the 19th; but Albemarle's letter to Pitt announcing the visit for 'eleven to-morrow morning' is dated the 19th. It is to be found among the Chatham MSS. Besides Cumberland's account of the interview and that given by the Duke of Grafton in his *Memoirs*, p. 45, etc., we have information regarding it from Pitt's own pen, in a letter to Grafton's brother, Charles Fitzroy.—*Grafton Memoirs*, p. 51.

³ *Grenville Papers*, iii. 226.

⁴ Albemarle, *Rockingham*, i. 194 ff.

appointment. Even when the duke requested him to draw up a list of nominees, promising him that the king would agree to them all, he remained obdurate. The envoys returned with their mission unaccomplished. Pitt afterwards explained his real standpoint in a letter to Lord Charles Fitzroy, the Duke of Grafton's brother. He said that he had nothing against the great Whig families (revolution families, as he called them) personally, but he would have them unconnected and under no banner; for all *that* was factious.

On this same day, May 20, the long enmity between the Grenville brothers came to an end.¹ Temple had, as a matter of form, mentioned one or two of the chief reasons of his dissatisfaction; on these points George had no objection to yield, and the reconciliation, which was much desired by the whole family, took place. Pitt gave a dinner in celebration of it at Hayes, but characteristically requested that the conversation on this occasion should be 'of a friendly domestic nature, without entering upon political topics.'² He wished it to be distinctly understood that the festivity was of a family, not of a political nature.

The Duke of Cumberland, in his desire to extricate the king from his difficulty, now endeavoured to secure Lord Lyttelton as first lord of the treasury, but again met with a refusal; Lyttelton would not separate himself from his new friends, the Grenville family.³ The duke had now nothing better to suggest than that his majesty should come to an understanding with the ministry still in office. It was a painful humiliation which George underwent in following this advice, for Grenville and Bedford did not hesitate to impose very severe conditions, of a nature excessively onerous to the king. He was obliged again to promise that he would not discuss political matters with Lord Bute; to give his word that he would take the privy seal of Scotland from Mr. Stuart Mackenzie, Bute's brother, and the paymastership from Lord Holland, who had been implicated in the regency intrigues; and to appoint several of the ministers to posts desired by them. He objected most strongly to the dismissal of Mr. Mackenzie, to whom 'he had passed his royal word that his

¹ *Grenville Papers*, iii. 226.

² *Ibid.*, iii. 191.

³ *Grafton Memoirs*, p. 47 ff. Phillimore, *Memoirs of Lord Lyttelton*, ii. 678.

office should continue for life.' He entreated his ministers not to force him to break his word, but Grenville persisted in the demand, whereupon the king complied; but he was so agitated by this breach of faith that he refused to take the sacrament the following day.¹ The ministers continued to behave as if they wished to make co-operation impossible between themselves and the king. In days past their moral lectures had wearied him and made him nervous; now they resumed their exhortations upon the subject of the recent events,² with the very natural result that he was driven to take refuge in similar measures at the earliest opportunity. He felt himself in the position of a prisoner subjected to tortures, and longed with all his heart for a rescuer. No one, however, except Pitt, could rescue him; for Pitt alone possessed great power unaccompanied by any desire to enslave him. The problem was to overcome the unknown obstacles which had hitherto obstructed all overtures made to Pitt.

This time the king adopted a very simple expedient. He sent to ask Pitt 'what steps would be the fittest for him to take in order to constitute an Administration of which Mr. Pitt was to be the head . . . and which might give satisfaction to his people.' The envoy on this occasion was the Duke of Grafton, a man of twenty-nine, who as a boy had known Pitt at Stowe, and had always met with much kindness from him. Grafton was descended, in the third generation, from the first Duke of Grafton, Henry Fitzroy, a natural son of Charles II. He had been educated in strict Whig principles and was an avowed adherent of the Duke of Newcastle, but at the same time retained a considerable amount of political independence. His desire was to use his power and his position for the good of the country, and for this purpose to co-operate with able and experienced politicians. A certain want of acuteness and of self-confidence induced him to attach himself with sincere veneration to a man of genius like Pitt. Hence he now seemed the most suitable person to discover Pitt's wishes.

During a visit of more than two hours which Grafton, in obedience to the king's wishes, paid to his father's friend,

¹ Regarding this affair see *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 284; *Chatham Correspondence*, ii. 312 ff.

² *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 288 ff.

on June 18,¹ the latter appears to have talked very openly on political matters and to have won the younger man as an ally; for the duke in his autobiography tells that, besides what he was to communicate to his majesty, he received much other information which he was to keep to himself; and if we examine his subsequent behaviour, we cannot fail to perceive that it was entirely in keeping with Pitt's plans. He was a valuable stone removed from the building of the oligarchy to be made of important use in the new edifice planned by Pitt.

The answer returned by Pitt to the king, or rather to the Duke of Cumberland, through whom Grafton had received his commission, is not on record, but he doubtless expressed his desire for an audience with the king (for permission, in other words, to negotiate directly with the king), and said that he would do his utmost to meet his majesty's wishes. At any rate, Pitt immediately received an invitation to Queen's House, whither he proceeded on the morning of June 19. According to one account, nothing very material occurred in this conference;² according to another, only political measures, home and foreign, were discussed;³ but the two accounts do not contradict each other, because, as far as these political measures were concerned, the king and Pitt had long been of one mind. During the second audience, which took place on the 22nd⁴ and lasted two and a half hours, the personal questions were discussed. A considerable and unexpected advance was made, as both Pitt and the king showed extreme compliance. Pitt agreed to the provision made for Lord Bute's friends. 'Mr. Mackenzie was to have some office equivalent in value to that he had quitted, but without the power, in Scotland.' Pitt seems to have relinquished what he considered his righteous intention of punishing the 'King's friends.' The king returned the obligation by consenting to make Lord Temple first lord of the treasury, and agreeing to all other appointments suggested by Pitt. In spite of all this, however, the final result of the interviews was not entirely

¹ *Grafton Memoirs*, p. 52 f.

² Pitt to Temple, June 22, 1765. — *Grenville Papers*, iii. 60 ff.

³ Mr. Grenville's Diary, June 25, 1765. — *Ibid.*, iii. 201.

⁴ For this audience see Pitt's letter to Temple of June 22; also *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 297 f.; and *Albemarle*, i. 214.

satisfactory. Immediately after the second Pitt wrote, 'Upon the whole, I augur much good, as far as intentions go.' But he was unable to pronounce the negotiations a success. He communicated at once with several of the persons who had been named for office in the new government, and requested the Duke of Grafton to come and see him, so that he might tell him everything.¹

But now came the catastrophe. Lord Temple was summoned to an audience on June 25, to receive the king's offer. A nephew and representative of the Duke of Newcastle had previously both spoken and written to him, imploring that he would not add to the dangers menacing the country by refusing to take office, but would sacrifice his own interests to the public welfare.² Temple, however, refused,³ alleging that the new government would be insufficiently represented in the Lower House, since he himself sat in the Upper House, and Pitt's health incapacitated him from undertaking the leadership of the House of Commons. On Temple's retirement Pitt entered the king's presence, only to be informed of his brother-in-law's refusal. Under these circumstances he, too, declared that it was impossible for him to undertake the construction of a new ministry.⁴

Much conjecture has been expended upon the reasons which prompted Earl Temple's refusal.⁵ As his excuses to the king were inadequate, some supposed that he had acted as he did from consideration for his brother, George Grenville, that he had bound himself in some manner to the ministers still in office, or that he did not choose to take the place of the brother with whom he had just been reconciled. Lyttelton, again, was of opinion that the favour shown to Bute's relations had displeased Temple. Both conjectures are probably incorrect. The latter motive would not have been sufficient to keep a practical, ambitious man like Earl Temple from entering an administration otherwise satisfactory to him. What did it matter to him if Northumberland were made lord chamberlain and Mr. Mackenzie nominal privy seal of

¹ *Memoirs of the Duke of Grafton*, p. 53.

² *Grenville Papers*, iii. 63.

³ See *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 298 f. (Grenville to Bedford), and 302, (Sandwich to Bedford).

⁴ *Memoirs of the Duke of Grafton*, p. 53 f.

⁵ See Phillimore, *Life of Lord Lyttelton*, ii. 680 f.

Scotland? If he opposed these appointments, he did so only to make himself popular. And as to the first motive mentioned, consideration for Grenville, Temple himself expressly denied it, telling Mr. Grenville that his second reason was of a tender and delicate nature which he preferred not to explain.¹

The solution of the enigma is to be found, it appears to me, in what we have already discovered to be Lord Temple's aim—namely, to become himself, as head of the Grenville faction now in process of formation, the leader of the government. With this aim the project divulged to him by the king was quite incompatible. His majesty had, in making his plans, consulted no one but Pitt, who was to be prime minister; not until everything was arranged had Temple been invited to co-operate. This sufficiently indicated the subordinate position which he was intended to occupy. The Grenville party which he had gathered together was to serve as a pedestal upon which Pitt was to be elevated to power. Moreover, the important offices were not to be held by this party in their entirety; some of them were to be given to adherents of other factions; in short, a ministry was to be formed of the most heterogeneous elements, which would owe its solidarity to Pitt alone, and be supported entirely by the power of the sovereign. This was a programme which Temple could not accept. An exponent of the old style of party politics, he was actively engaged in collecting a following of his own, supported by which he could force himself upon the king. Pitt's aim, on the contrary, was to deprive the different parties of all power, and to plant himself in the character of an all-powerful paladin, beloved of the nation, at the side of the throne. Between these two aims no compromise was possible. The intimate friends had become rivals, and rivals who were endeavouring to attain their aims by radically different methods. The supposition that this was the state of affairs is confirmed by the tone which Temple adopted in the following year, when Pitt actually succeeded in forming an administration. His criticism was then especially directed against the mixed nature of the cabinet and the absolute supremacy of Pitt. At the head of this ministry he himself, he writes, might have stood, 'a capital cypher, surrounded with cyphers of quite a different complexion.'²

¹ *Grenville Papers*, iii. 65 and note.

² *Ibid.*, iii. 267.

The next question that suggests itself is—Why did not Pitt accede to the king's earnest request,¹ and form an administration without the assistance of his refractory brother-in-law? The usual answer is, that he was deterred by the friendship which had so long united himself and Temple, and to which he had been ever ready to give public expression. In questions of political power, however, friendship did not always count for much. It might unite individuals into parties, but it could not prevent rivalries. The real reason for Pitt's refusal was the reason he frankly gave the king. He was not powerful enough to act without his relations; he could not maintain his position if, in addition to the old oligarchy, he had the Grenville faction against him.² It was useless to ignore the certainty that Temple, as soon as an administration had been formed without him and his friends, would begin a violent opposition which would make government impossible. A preliminary condition of Pitt's elevation to power was thus some split in one of these two factions, which would provide him with the chance of winning its most able members for his own policy, and thereby destroying its power as an opposition party.

This was very much what happened. As the king would under no circumstances whatever return in penitence to his old ministers, he had no choice but to summon the old party of the Duke of Newcastle in a body to take office; and it was fortunate for him that they consented to do so without Pitt's support. Their decision was taken and their plan of action prepared at a meeting of the Whig leaders on June 30.³ It was resolved that Bute's relations were to be excluded from office, in spite of the fact that this determination would cost the new government much of the king's favour. For Pitt's friends, on the other hand, as much as possible was to be done, so that he might be induced, if not to support the ministry, at least to remain neutral.

The new administration came into office on June 8. Its leader was not the old Duke of Newcastle, who no longer felt equal to the onerous post and had lost too much of his

¹ Phillimore, *Life of Lord Lyttelton*, ii. 681 f.

² This is the explanation given by Shelburne in a letter to Barré, July 2, 1765.—Fitzmaurice, *Life of Lord Shelburne*, i. 331 f.

³ Albemarle, *Rockingham*, i. 218 f.

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
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Lord Rockingham.

former reputation, but a much younger politician, the Marquis of Rockingham. Possessed by nature of a calm mind, a clear intellect, a benevolent heart, and amiable conciliatory manners, and firmly resolved to make the principles of the constitution the guide of his actions, Rockingham, as first lord of the treasury, seemed to be the very man to reunite and strengthen the Whig party, which was threatening to collapse altogether. He was not an eloquent or persuasive speaker, but his speeches commanded attention from the confidence inspired by his thorough integrity and practical good sense. Though not pre-eminently gifted, he was a capable statesman, well fitted to take part in the practical business of government.¹

The secretaries of state were the Duke of Grafton, who owed his appointment to the fact that he was Pitt's confidant, and General Conway, who was also on friendly terms with Pitt. Newcastle undertook an office which was to a great extent a sinecure, namely that of lord privy seal, that he might devote himself to his congenial task, the superintendence of political bribery and corruption. Following the old custom, he at once began to distribute appointments among his adherents. The old Earl of Winchelsea became president of the council, and the chancellor of the exchequer was Mr. Dowdeswell, a man of considerable financial ability, formerly a Tory.² It remains to be observed that at least one friend of Bute's, namely the Earl of Egmont, received a high appointment, being made first lord of the admiralty. Some of Pitt's adherents, either in their desire to please him or at his request, refused to take office, among others the Earl of Shelburne, who was asked to preside at the board of trade.³ Neither would Lord Lyttelton have anything to do with a government of which Pitt and Temple were not members.

Thus began the first Rockingham administration. The cabinet proved to be more serviceable than its predecessor. During its short existence it despatched much business of real importance. On February 5, 1766, a treaty with Sweden was signed; on April 8 an agreement was arranged with

¹ For Rockingham's character see Albemarle, i. 140 f., and Walpole, iii. 139 f.

² Albemarle, i. 225.

³ *Ibid.*, i. 234 ff.

France regarding Canadian financial matters; on June 20 a commercial treaty was concluded with Russia. In making these arrangements England did not obtain everything she wished and demanded; but definite and, on the whole, satisfactory results were attained. The country once again began to feel that its affairs were in good hands. The most important national question, the repeal of the Stamp Act, was also satisfactorily settled. But this weighty matter, in the settlement of which Pitt took part, did not come up for discussion till the winter session; consequently Pitt had time in the interval to attend to his private affairs and to do something for his health.

In July he travelled down to Somersetshire with his family to take possession of his new estate, Burton Pynsent.¹ One great recommendation of the place to him was that its proximity to Bath enabled him to remain in easy communication with his family whilst he was undergoing treatment there for his gout. As there was no immediate prospect of return to office, and as it was his intention to take no more share than was absolutely necessary in the debates of the House of Commons, he resolved to make Burton Pynsent his permanent residence, and, if possible, to sell Hayes, so as to be in a position to acquire more land in the neighbourhood of his new property. This plan was carried out, Hayes being sold in December to Thomas Walpole, a gentleman of large means.²

The estate of Burton Pynsent³ lies in the valley of the river Parrett (a stream flowing into the Bristol Channel from the south) on the slope of a ridge of wooded hills which form

¹ Phillimore, *Life of Lord Lyttelton*, ii. 684.

² Temple to Pitt, November 5, 1765: 'I shall with the greatest pleasure facilitate as far as in me lyes, the favourite object of enlarging round Burton Pynsent, at the expence of Hayes, and I wish your estates in Somersetshire may not only rival the great Peter [probably a reference to the draining of the moors], but extend as wide as the sight from the top of the monumental column on the black Promontory, which, through determined purpose, not blind chance, I shall most certainly see next summer, as well as the rising towers and I hope flourishing plantations, which your active mind has plan'd and expeditious right hand already executed, so far breaking in upon Mr. Brown's department, by adorning the country, which you were not permitted to save.'—*Chatham MSS.* See also Pitt to Thomas Walpole, November 5, 1765.—*Chatham Correspondence*, ii. 328.

³ Collinson, *Hist. of Somerset*, quoted in *Chatham Correspondence*, ii. 326, note.

the northern boundary of the parish of Curry-Rivel. In a sheltered nook at the top of this ridge lay the old house, commanding an extensive prospect of all the plain as far as the Mendip and the Quantock Hills, of the Channel, and of the distant Welsh mountains. Immediately below the house, in front, 'is a beautiful moor, level as a bowling-green, and covered with the finest verdure, to the extent of nearly six miles in length, and one to three miles in width, skirted thick with villages.' The back of the house looks into a finely wooded park. A quarter of a mile north-west of the mansion is a smooth green knoll, with a steep declivity of more than three hundred feet down to the edge of the moor. Here Pitt at once proceeded to erect a huge column of white stone, 140 feet high, to the memory of the man to whom he owed his beautiful home. It is known by the name of Burton Steeple, and bears the inscription:

Sacred to the memory of SIR WILLIAM PYNSENT.

Hoc saltem fungar inani munere.

The house, which has its principal front to the north, is a large, irregular building, erected at different periods, and composed of various materials. The fields and meadows must all have been on the low part of the estate, for they suffered severely from floods in the following year.¹

In these delightful surroundings Pitt spent the first months after the change of ministry, occupied with arrangements for the management of the property and for beautifying his private grounds. He again found ample opportunity to indulge his pleasure and display his skill in landscape gardening. But he was not altogether exempt from misfortune during these months. In September his wife had a bad attack of fever, while his gout was aggravated by a fall from his horse, which obliged him to return to crutches, and to drive in 'a one-horse chair' instead of riding.² On November 2 he set out for Bath, where he expected to meet the Crown Prince of Brunswick, who was again spending some weeks in England; but on the way he was stopped by the news that

¹ Lady Chatham to Pitt, July 11, 1766.—Chatham MSS.

² Pitt to Thomas Nuthall, September 15, 1765.—*Chatham Correspondence*, ii. 325 ff.

the Duke of Cumberland had died suddenly of apoplexy, and that the Duke of Brunswick had consequently remained in London.¹ On October 31 the Duke of Cumberland, who had come that day from Windsor to London to attend a cabinet council, was suddenly seized with a shivering fit in the presence of his friend the Earl of Albemarle, of the Duke of Newcastle and Lord Northington. Exclaiming to Albemarle, 'Tis all over,' he sank lifeless into his lordship's arms.²

Pitt went to Bath some ten days later, leaving his family at Burton. For a time he must have been very ill, for on November 24 he writes to his wife: 'What comfort, my dearest life, to be able to send you, with my own hand, better tidings of my gout!'³ And a few days later he communicates the fact that, with the help of crutches, he can stand.⁴ Nevertheless, at this very time urgent political matters were forced upon his attention, as it was intended that he should take the lead in settling the great question which was now beginning to occupy the attention of the whole nation. And as this affair, namely the repeal of the Stamp Act, exercised a lasting influence on Pitt's political future, as well as on that of England, it demands our careful consideration.

¹ Pitt to Nuthall, November 15, 1765.—*Ibid.*, ii. 329 ff.

² *Chatham Correspondence*, ii. 329, note.

³ To Lady Chatham, November 24, 1765.—*Ibid.*, ii. 335.

⁴ To Lady Chatham, November 28, 1765.—*Ibid.*, ii. 336.

CHAPTER VIII

THE STAMP ACT

THE passing of the Stamp Act had created tremendous excitement in the American colonies and had caused a whole series of illegal proceedings.¹ The officials were forcibly prevented from collecting the imposts, some of them being actually compelled by threats to promise that they would never again demand them; and all possible means were employed by the insurgent masses to prevent the citizens using stamped paper. Retaliatory measures, too, were taken. The colonists, instigated by societies whose aim was liberty, began to avoid using English manufactured goods, and seriously damaged the trade of the mother-country. But more portentous than anything else was the attempt now made by the colonies, hitherto only connected with each other by their common dependency on Britain, to establish a common representative assembly. After many vicissitudes a congress, consisting of the representatives of nine provinces, met at New York; and two other provinces announced the likelihood of their agreement to its decisions.

It would be incorrect to maintain that all or even most of the excitement among the colonists was really due to these insignificant taxes as such. There was dissatisfaction enough with the rigorous commercial laws which had lately been passed, and indeed with the whole colonial policy which England, in common with the other powers, pursued—the policy of the Navigation Acts and of mercantilism. The colonies would undoubtedly sooner or later have resisted this treatment and have forced the mother-country to make improvements in the system, if not to change it altogether. There was, however, no question here of any violation of rights,

¹ See Bancroft, *History of the United States*, vol. v. chaps. xiii., xiv., and xvi.-xix.

as the power of the mother-country to make commercial laws had never been questioned; therefore there was nothing to cause a rebellion. But any direct taxation of the colonies had hitherto been carefully avoided by Parliament; and hereby the opinion had been confirmed that such taxation was an infringement of the colonists' rights and contrary to the principles of the English constitution.

The great liberty which had always been allowed the colonies in the management of their domestic affairs had gradually produced a desire for complete independence; or, to put it differently, the practice of administration had produced numbers of men desirous and capable of ruling, who were determined that their sphere of action, instead of being contracted, was to be extended as far as possible. By them the Stamp Acts were turned to account as a means of fomenting the discontent which already existed, with a view to action against the home government. Here there was a point of right on which it was possible for them to take their stand, and which could easily be demonstrated as such to the indignant population. Had they represented the Stamp Act to be merely a pernicious measure against which it was necessary for the sake of self-preservation to rebel, they would possibly have met with but little response; for the burden which it imposed on the people was very slight in comparison with the other restrictions to which they were obliged to submit; but the idea that the home government, in addition to all the other injuries it had done the colonies, should now in its treatment of them commit a distinct breach of the law, filled the cup to overflowing and produced serious apprehensions in the minds of even the quietest citizens.

This action transferred the dispute to a plane from which the mother-country could not possibly retire, if the colonies were to continue to form an integral part of the state. It was imperative that king and Parliament should remain the source of all rights and laws, and should, as such, be at liberty to pursue any course of political action which seemed right to them. They might, indeed, avoid exercising their right to tax, and might even pass an act conferring on the colonial legislatures, with certain reservations, the sole right to levy taxes within their respective colonies; but they could not possibly permit such a matter to be entirely

and for ever withdrawn from their sphere of influence. It must remain in their power at any time to supersede such a law, like any other law, by fresh legislation. The central authority could not permit any diminution of its sovereignty. The British colonies of to-day form one state with Britain only in so far as king and Parliament are accredited with the power of changing their constitutions. The question at issue in this case was simply whether the colonies possessed a legal right to exclusive self-taxation, in which case a law depriving them of this right must be passed; or whether no such right had been conferred on them, in which case Parliament might at once proceed to tax them.

On the other hand, there remained the great question of policy. Was such interference in the financial arrangements of the colonies advisable? Regarded from the administrative standpoint it was undoubtedly sensible, for only thus was it possible to arrive at a rightly distributed and rational system of taxation, advantageous to the great whole, to the empire, as the colonial legislatures were not likely to agree to any uniform system. But its policy depended upon the strength of the home government to enforce its demand, to combat and suppress the desire for independence which its action had produced and promoted. It might not consider the moment suitable to enforce the rights of Parliament, and might choose to await a more favourable opportunity, perhaps a time when the colonies were more in need of the mother-country's protection, or were in a more contented frame of mind. Or it might not consider the disadvantages of exclusive self-taxation great enough to warrant interference by the central authority, a view of the matter which would very likely have ended in the voluntary, legal establishment of the colonies' sole right to tax themselves. If, on the other hand, the government felt itself strong enough, and considered interference advisable, then the charters must be examined, and, after the alteration of any possible clause prohibitive of such action, direct taxation could be continued. In this last case it would naturally be all-important to hold out—not to be driven by violence or insubordination to a change of policy, which would be equivalent to a complete resignation of authority. To begin with, an attempt to invalidate old claims, and then, on meeting with opposition, to beat a retreat, would imply a resignation of power

to the leaders of the resistance; for all neutral and undecided persons, who generally form the great majority, invariably go over to the side which proves itself the stronger. The struggle for independence would receive a strong impetus.

At the close of 1765 the main question, whether the right to tax the colonies was to be enforced or not, had already been decided. Grenville, with the full consent of Parliament, had ventured to issue the Stamp Act, and was determined, if necessary, to carry it into effect by force. However, before news of the colonial resistance reached England, another ministry had undertaken the responsibilities of government, and the question now arose, whether the new ministers would endorse the action of their predecessors. One thing was certain. As the critical question of the legal competence of the home government had once been raised, it must be answered. Nor could the answer of the new ministry differ from that already given, because the various parties, in spite of all their differences, felt themselves bound to each other by a community of interest, namely, the desire to prevent any limitation of the ruling classes' sphere of authority.

We know that in England at that time the state authority did not rest upon a broad popular basis, but upon the comparatively narrow foundation of the well-to-do classes, and that amongst these, again, the richest and best born occupied a dominant position. This quasi-oligarchic rule extended to America, but with the difference that, whereas in England it assumed the form of a Parliament or national representative body, in America it took the form of an authority superior to the colonial representative bodies or legislatures. There now began between the legislatures and this authority the same conflict as was proceeding in England between the Parliament and the crown; the legislatures aimed at absolute power, the home government obstinately maintained its sovereignty. The relinquishment by Parliament of the unlimited right to legislate would have signified an abdication by the plutocracy of their sovereignty in America; and to such a step it was self-evident that they could not agree. This was a matter in which the opinion of the new ministry in no way differed from that of the old.

The retention or abolition of the Stamp Act, however, was quite another question. This act was a measure regarding

which a new ministry might well be of a different opinion, which it might condemn as unwise and seek to undo. Nor would there have been any objection to such a line of action, if it had been taken in time; but the open resistance with which the measure had met made repeal almost impossible. To the impost itself the English rulers attached no peculiar importance. It slightly relieved the English burden of taxation; but by this all classes benefited, not the ruling classes alone. If, however, the success of the present rebellion were to imperil the commercial laws, then the profits of the aristocracy, especially of the Whigs who were engaged in trade, would be seriously endangered. The new government was perfectly willing to repeal the Stamp Act if any one could guarantee that real tranquillity would result, and that no new demands would be made. But who could undertake to guarantee this? The American agitators might say: Since the mother-country has broken the law, and adheres to her unjust pretensions, we, too, are no longer bound by the regulations of the law. The political science of that period, with its theory of the social contract, which regarded the state as a legal union of free men, lent itself exactly to this style of argument.

Pitt's opinions almost isolated him from the rest of the aristocracy; but he was supported by the approval of larger sections of the population. He undoubtedly belonged to the privileged class, but his and its interests were not entirely identical, because he had won, or was trying to win, other supports for his power—public opinion and the sovereign. Therefore it was not objectionable to him that the colonial legislatures should acquire greater independence of the central government. Unlike the corrupt British Parliament, these legislatures were popular representative bodies in the truest sense; and with such he expected, when he came into office, to find it easiest to deal. The union of the colonies with the mother-country did not seem to him endangered by their greater independence, since the Crown and its ministerial representative constituted a power which exercised equal control over both. A purely personal tie was not, however, his aim. King and Parliament were, as hitherto, to regulate the relations of the colonies with the mother-country, and, in particular, their commercial intercourse. Pitt would have lost all his commercial friends if he had advocated the over-

throw of the mercantile colonial policy. But on this one point at least, that of internal taxation, the colonies should have complete independence. To this, there could have been no objection in principle, if Pitt had demanded that the rights in question should be communicated to the colonial legislatures by an act of Parliament and had thus based them on the sovereignty of the mother-country. But his audacious intention was to set a limit to this sovereignty by deciding that certain matters lay outside of its sphere; and hereby he came into conflict with the fundamental principle of the British constitution; he denied the omnipotence of 'the King in Parliament.' It was by no means easy to present his theory in a constitutional form; but in this he was assisted by his legal adviser, Pratt, who had just been created a baron with the title of Lord Camden. Pratt provided him with the necessary arguments, and undertook the advocacy of his cause in the House of Lords, where the difficulty of the task was accentuated by Lord Mansfield's legal acumen.

The division of opinion regarding the maintenance or repeal of the Stamp Act was by no means equivalent to the division between government and opposition, or, indeed, to any party division whatsoever. It may be said that, with very few exceptions, all the leading men desired a continuation of the policy hitherto pursued, a few slight modifications being the most they would consent to.¹ The whole Grenville connection (especially Lord Temple, George Grenville, and Lord Lyttelton), the Duke of Bedford, with his friends Lord Gower and Lord Halifax, the king with Bute and the court officials, and, amongst the members of the party in power, Northington, Charles Yorke, Newcastle, Mansfield, and Charles Townshend—all these refused to hear of a repeal of the act, and some of them were in favour of very severe measures. Only Rockingham, Grafton, and Conway inclined towards repeal; but they carried weight, since they held the most important posts in the government.

To Rockingham, if he really intended to carry his conciliatory policy into effect, Pitt's assistance was indispensable; not only because his eloquence might persuade the unwilling and his withdrawal or opposition defeat the whole plan, but also and chiefly because he enjoyed the confidence of the Americans.

¹ Bancroft, *History of America*, vol. v. 299 f.

The glorious liberator of the colonies from the French danger, the manly defender of liberal principles, was the object of special love and veneration on the part of the colonists. If the repeal of the Stamp Act were brought about by this man against the will of his most distinguished fellow-countrymen, there was a possibility that the measure might not be regarded as a sign of weakness, but as an expression of goodwill and real political conviction, and that thereby the dreaded ill consequences might be averted. Hence about the middle of November a certain Mr. Thomas Townshend was sent to Bath as the ministers' delegate to offer the invalid statesman a seat in the cabinet.¹ Their request was to the effect that he would assume the leadership of the government, but this Pitt could not take seriously, as such a request ought to have come from the sovereign. He therefore received the envoy somewhat coolly, and committed himself no further than to say that those measures which embodied true revolution principles would meet with his support, and that he would give public expression to his opinion on the colonial question. 'This was some real gain. The government now knew that, if repeal were proposed, Pitt would not keep silence, but would support the attempt. The Marquis of Rockingham also made an effort to win over Lord Shelburne, and Colonel Barré, a man who, since we last heard of him, had become Pitt's adherent; but here again he was unsuccessful.'²

Parliament was opened on December 17 with a speech from the throne, in which the members were informed that it had been found necessary, for want of sufficient information, to postpone the settlement of the American question. The Houses soon adjourned, not to assemble again until February 1766. During the interval the Duke of Grafton urged Rockingham to secure the help of Pitt by a summons from the king.³ The marquis was obliged to yield, because he knew that a refusal might lead to the resignation of both his state secretaries. Newcastle, with whom Pitt had refused ever to act again, declared his willingness to resign office; but the king declined the proposal. He declared that if he were to take such a step, and it were again to prove unsuccessful, his dignity would be compromised, and all confidence in the

¹ *Grafton Memoirs*, p. 62, etc.

² *Albemarle, Rockingham*, i. 265.

³ *Chatham Correspondence*, li. 359.

strength of the ministry would be at an end. So Rockingham had no choice but to struggle on without the desired assistance. He might count himself fortunate, in that Grafton and Conway did not resign at the last moment, and thus bring about the fall of the ministry. For this, however, Pitt did not consider that the time was ripe. Without Rockingham and his friends he himself would have no chance of success in the Stamp Act conflict; he therefore preferred for the present to play the part of an unofficial assistant.

When the time came for Parliament to reassemble Pitt's health was not yet completely re-established. A longer stay at Bath might have entirely restored his strength.¹ But he was determined under all circumstances to take part in the debate on the address; so on January 11 or 12 he set off for London, accompanied by his family, whom he had summoned from Burton Pynsent.² He arrived in time to take his share in the debate, though too late to hear the king's speech read.

The speech³ conveyed no announcement of any decision on the colonial question, but merely suggested that solution desired by the ministry. After announcing the repressive measures which had been taken, the king declared that the decision of all further action was left to the wisdom of Parliament, in the expectation that all due regard would be paid to the honour of the Crown, the rights and authority of the British legislature, and the welfare and prosperity of *all* his people. This passage implied that although the home government relinquished none of its rights, yet some means would be devised whereby tranquillity and regular intercourse between the different parts of the king's dominions would be re-established. Everything depended upon the manner in which Parliament interpreted the king's words. It appeared that the Lords inclined to severe measures, and that the Commons were as yet undecided what attitude they should assume. The address of the House of Lords expressed their satisfaction with the repressive measures, and announced their firm determination to assert and support the king's dignity and honour and the legislative authority of the kingdom over its colonies, and their readiness to take into consideration the most proper

¹ So he himself said in his speech of January 14, 1766.

² *Chatham Correspondence*, ii. 361 f.

³ *Annual Register*, 1766, i. 216.

methods to provide for the restoration of the tranquillity of the colonies, for the moment disturbed by such violent and dangerous commotions. As far as the Lords were concerned, therefore, the question of maintenance of authority was decided, whilst that of the manner in which tranquillity was to be restored, whether by force or conciliation, remained open. The expressions 'violent' and 'dangerous,' however, led to the inference that severe measures were likely to be approved. In the address of the House of Commons, moved by Thomas Townshend, the king was merely thanked, in as few words as possible, for graciously entrusting to the care of the House the royal authority, the rights of Parliament, and the happiness of his subjects. This mode of expression plainly revealed the want of unanimity among the king's ministers. In the council held for the purpose of drafting the address, they had not been able to agree upon more than these empty words.

In the middle of the long debate,¹ after Mr. Nugent had been speaking emphatically in favour of a strict enforcement of the Stamp Act, and had blamed the weak indecision of the address, Pitt unexpectedly appeared in the House. No one knew that he had arrived in town that morning. The eyes of all at once turned to the man whose interference would inevitably prove decisive in the solution of the great question. The Americans present in the gallery 'gazed at him, as at the appearance of their "good angel, or saviour."' Before long he rose, and made a speech in which he once again succeeded in displaying all his rhetorical power.²

Avowing himself to be an oppositionist, though, he took care to remark, 'single, unsolicited, and unattached,' he made one or two thrusts at the new ministry, sarcastically approving the address, which decided nothing and left every member free to act as he chose, blaming their delay in giving notice to Parliament of the troubles, and hinting at an overruling influence in the cabinet. He referred to the Duke of Newcastle, to whom at this time he bore a particular grudge, because he regarded him as the chief representative of the obnoxious faction system, and as the chief offender in the

¹ Derived chiefly from the description of Bancroft, chaps. xxii. and xxiii. See also Walpole, ii. chap. xii.

² The best account of Pitt's speech is given by Bancroft. See also Thackeray, ii. 61 ff., and Walpole, ii. 184 ff.

matter of corruption. But his animadversion against the late ministry was sharper. 'Every capital measure they have taken,' he said, turning scornfully towards Grenville, who sat close to him, 'is entirely wrong.'

He next expressed his deep regret for his absence when the Stamp Act was passed. 'If I could have endured,' he said, 'to be carried in my bed, so great was the agitation of my mind for the consequences, I would have solicited some kind hand to have laid me down on this floor, to have borne my testimony against it.' He had, he said, as his health was still so infirm and precarious, determined to speak on this occasion, though somewhat unseasonably, on a point of infinite moment, on the question of *right*. And he proceeded to develop his theory regarding the right of Parliament to vote money. He declared it to be an absurdity that a representative body should permit the government to tax a population which was not represented by that body. 'Taxation,' he said, 'is no part of the governing power. The taxes are a voluntary gift and grant of the Commons alone. In an American tax, what do we do? We, your Majesty's Commons of Great Britain, give and grant to your Majesty—what? Our own property? No. We give and grant to your Majesty the property of your Majesty's Commons in America. It is an absurdity in terms.' This was a view of the matter which had constitutional custom in its favour; for it was the House of Commons alone, in the name of the tax-payers of the country, which granted all subsidies; and it would be difficult to prove that the House acted in the name of the Americans also, more particularly as the tax in question was not a general, but a special American tax, which of itself indicated them to be a separate community. What was at present under discussion, however, was no ordinary grant, but an act passed by 'the King in Parliament,' a law in the evolution of which both Houses had taken part, and the right to legislate was one which had always been recognised as unrestricted. It could be exercised even to the extent of passing judgment in criminal cases.

Leaving this consideration out of the question, the orator had no difficulty in showing that the tax was inadmissible and in disproving all arguments to the contrary. Whereas it had been maintained that only a small part of the English

nation was really represented in the House of Commons, he asserted that, although the present distribution of the franchise was antiquated and in great need of improvement, nevertheless every member of the House was to be regarded as a representative not of his borough or constituency, but of the whole British nation, whilst the idea of a virtual representation of America in Parliament was the most contemptible that ever entered the head of man, and deserved no serious refutation. The commons of America, represented in their several assemblies, had always exercised their constitutional right of giving and granting their own money. The perpetual framing by Parliament of regulations for their trade was a sufficient proof that the colonies formed a body separate from Great Britain. They were obliged to submit to such restraints; but if they were now to be deprived of the last remnants of their liberty, this would be plunging them into the most odious slavery, from which their charters should protect them.

After asserting that, if the Stamp Act continued in force, France would gain more from the colonies than if her last war had been victorious, Pitt concluded his speech with a panegyric on the might of Parliament and a friendly allusion to the new ministry.

Pitt's friend, General Conway, then rose and expressed his approval of the principles which had just been enounced, and his readiness to act according to them, and even to serve under the orders of the man who had propounded them. At the same time, however, he politely disclaimed for himself and his colleagues any overruling influence.

The next speaker was a not unworthy opponent of the great orator, namely, George Grenville. He advanced striking historical instances of the supreme power claimed and exercised by Parliament in the matter of taxation, and had the statutes which bore upon the point read to the House. He denied the right of the Crown to limit the authority of Parliament by the concession of charters. And he made the not altogether unjustifiable assertion that the Stamp Act was merely a pretext of which the Americans were availing themselves to acquire independence. In this he certainly went too far; but there is no doubt that those colonists who were most active in agitating against the act aimed at much more

than its repeal, and hoped to gain at least commercial independence.

Grenville further maintained that the protection which Great Britain afforded her colonies, the sacrifices which she had made on their behalf, entitled her to demand lawful obedience and a return so small as the tax in question. When he had, some time previously, proposed to tax America, no one, in answer to his repeated appeals to the House, had expressed the slightest doubt of Parliament's right of taxation. 'The seditious spirit of the colonies,' exclaimed the orator, now attacking Pitt, 'owes its birth to the factions in this House. We were told we trod on tender ground; we were bid to expect disobedience. What was this but telling the Americans to stand out against the law, encouraging their obstinacy with the expectation of support from hence? Let us only hold out a little, they would say; our friends will soon be in power.' Grenville's reproach was not unfounded, for nothing encouraged the agitators more than the attitude of their friends in the British legislature. But his concluding remarks, in praise of Britain's benevolent commercial policy, were distinctly open to attack; for behind an outward appearance of benevolence there existed gross selfishness.

As Grenville ceased, several members got up, but Pitt was given precedence. Encouraging cries of 'Go on! go on!' resounded from many parts of the House. He at once singled out the heaviest charge which his brother-in-law had brought against him. 'Sir,' he said, 'I have been charged with giving birth to sedition in America. The Americans have spoken their sentiments with freedom against this unhappy Act, and that freedom has become their crime.' After making some observations upon liberty of speech, he continued: 'The gentleman tells us that America is obstinate; America is almost in open rebellion. I rejoice that America has resisted.' This was indeed an audacious assertion, one which any one but Pitt would have been afraid to make. But he repeated it to the astounded assembly: 'I rejoice that America has resisted. If its millions of inhabitants had submitted, taxes would soon have been laid on Ireland; and, if ever this nation should have a tyrant for its king, six millions of freemen, so dead to all the feelings of liberty as voluntarily to submit to be slaves, would be fit instruments to make slaves of the rest.'

The next passages in which Pitt attempted to refute Grenville's historical arguments were also more distinguished by enthusiasm for liberty than by legal insight. 'I draw my ideas of freedom,' he cried, 'from the vital powers of the British constitution, not from the crude and fallacious notions too much relied upon, as if we were but in the morning of liberty.' And again: 'The gentleman asks, When were the colonies emancipated? I desire to know when they were made slaves.'

Noteworthy also is Pitt's distinction between internal and external taxation. 'If the gentleman,' he remarked contemptuously of Grenville, 'cannot understand the difference between internal and external taxes, I cannot help it. But there is a plain distinction between taxes levied for the purposes of raising revenue and duties imposed for the regulation of trade for the accommodation of the subject, although in the consequences some revenue may accidentally arise from the latter.' Here he was right, as regarded the possibility of drawing such a distinction and paying due regard to it in legislation. Upon the question of granting the colonies autonomy in a given domain of finance, this distinction would doubtless be the best and most practicable. But to regard it as a line of demarcation of such fundamental nature that on one side of it the state should *a priori* have unlimited power, on the other side *a priori* no power at all, was certainly to overestimate its importance; for it was and would ever be an arbitrary distinction.

More forcible were Pitt's observations on the profit derived by Great Britain from her colonies. Two millions a year of trade profits and a rise in sixty years of fifty per cent. in ground rents—such was the price, he affirmed, paid by America for the protection afforded by the mother-country. 'And shall a miserable financier,' he proceeded, 'come with a boast that he can fetch a peppercorn into the exchequer to the loss of millions to the nation?' He also indicated a possible increase of profits owing to the immense increase in the population of the northern colonies; and, more important still, declared his conviction that the whole commercial system might be altered to advantage. 'Improper restraints,' he observed, 'have been laid on the continent in favour of the islands. Let Acts of Parliament in consequence of treaties

remain; but let not an English minister become a custom-house officer for Spain or for any foreign power.' Here was a sensible idea. Let them begin by a revision of the commercial system, and they need have no further anxiety regarding the effects of the Stamp Act. Pitt's recognition of the importance of this step testifies to his statesmanlike penetration. Whether the violent opposition of the mother-country would permit any measures of the kind was another question.

Pitt was also bold enough to refer, in a tone of menace, to improvements required nearer home. 'The gentleman,' he observed, 'must not wonder he was not contradicted when, as the minister, he asserted the right of Parliament to tax America. There is a modesty in this House which does not choose to contradict a minister. I wish gentlemen would get the better of it. If they do not,' he continued with emphasis, 'the collective body may begin to abate of its respect for the representative. Lord Bacon has told me that a great question will not fail of being agitated at one time or another.' It would be a mistake to see in these words any reference to a real reform of Parliament. Pitt only meant to scare the members into an attitude subversive of corruption, to incite them to emancipate themselves from illegal influences, and to point out to them that in the end the power of public opinion was sure to prove irresistible.

In conclusion he shortly summarised his demands. 'I will beg leave to tell the House what is really my opinion. It is that the Stamp Act be repealed, absolutely, totally, and immediately; that the reason for the repeal be assigned, because it was founded on an erroneous principle. At the same time, let the sovereign authority of this country over the colonies be asserted in as strong terms as can be devised, and be made to extend to every point of legislation, that we may bind their trade, confine their manufactures, and exercise every power whatsoever, except that of taking their money out of their pockets without their consent.'

The deep impression which this great speech everywhere produced was promptly turned to account by the Duke of Grafton in an endeavour to obtain Pitt's appointment to office.¹ He interviewed the Great Commoner, both alone and

¹ Bancroft, iii. 184; Grafton, p. 64, etc.; *Chatham Correspondence*, ii. 371, etc.

in company with the Marquis of Rockingham; but he was unable to persuade the king to send for him. The chief hindrance to an arrangement was Pitt's demand that the right of Parliament to impose taxes on the colonies should be denied; but a further difficulty was the fact that Rockingham showed, as before, no desire to relinquish the reins of government. He succeeded in convincing the king of the danger of Pitt's demand. The only new or important element in the negotiations was Pitt's declaration that Lord Temple's attitude on the American question would make it impossible for them to act together in future. A resolution in direct contradiction to Pitt's opinions was now drafted. It affirmed that the king in Parliament had full power to bind the colonies and people of America in all cases whatsoever. The great problem was thus divided into two questions. The question of right was to be decided first, the practical measure afterwards.

It was the Duke of Grafton who, against his own wishes, proposed this ministerial resolution in the House of Lords on February 3. There ensued a heated debate, in the course of which the two greatest lawyers of the day, Lord Camden and Lord Mansfield, crossed swords in single combat. With ever closer attention the Peers listened to the many arguments, more or less convincing, but all testifying to extensive knowledge of the subject, with which each supported his view of the matter. The assent of practically the whole House testified to Mansfield's victory. Camden was regarded as completely defeated, and his defeat implied the failure of his ally, Pitt. The resolution was carried by 125 against 5 votes.

In the House of Commons, where the resolution was proposed by General Conway, who at the time when the Stamp Act was passed had denied the right of Parliament to impose it, the question was fought out in a different manner. Only three members, Pitt, Beckford, and Barré, opposed the resolution; and they, like Horatius Cocles and his allies in the days of old, had to withstand the assault of a whole army. In the hostile ranks fought a rising politician of future celebrity, Edmund Burke, who on this occasion, by his eager defence of the rights of Parliament, distinguished himself for the first time. The debate, in which many old and few new arguments

were advanced, continued until four in the morning, when the House divided. The resolution was carried with an overwhelming majority; not ten members—some said five or four, some only three—voted against it.

The temper prevailing in Parliament did not promise well for the second and more practical question, the repeal of the Stamp Act. Rockingham did everything in his power to improve the chances of the bill. He urged the king to declare himself definitely in favour of repeal, hoping that such a declaration would incline many to vote for it. But George would not be induced to make so false an assertion; he would go no further than to admit that of the two alternatives, severer measures or repeal, he would prefer the latter. This did not greatly advance matters; but in reality the bill was in less danger than it appeared to be. An attempt to bring about a coalition between the old Grenville ministry and the court failed. Its only result was to place the favourite unexpectedly in the agreeable position of finding that Grenville and Bedford, who had subjected him to such indignities, were now his humble suppliants whose request he could proudly refuse. Pitt did not omit a humorous reference in the House to the incident. But the chief reason which induced the ministers to expect a victory, though probably not so complete as on the question of right, was the vital importance of repeal to trade. Trade with America was for the moment entirely interrupted, and English manufacturing and shipping interests were already suffering severely. A dangerous crisis was to be dreaded if the cause of offence were not removed at once. Therefore general relief was felt that a prime minister was in office who was prepared to take the responsibility of the somewhat hazardous measure, and that such a statesman as Pitt was vigorously arguing that the dangers which seemed likely to arise from it were imaginary. Perhaps the merchandise which the Americans had countermanded might still be sold to them.

On February 20 the ministers came to an agreement regarding the resolutions of repeal, and on the 21st the bill was brought in by Conway in the House of Commons, where there was an unusually large attendance. Pitt was ill again, but did not allow this to prevent him from attending. 'I must get up to the House as I can,' said he; 'when in my place,



Edmund Burke.

I feel I am tolerably able to remain through the debate, and cry ay to the repeal with no sickly voice.' Did he perhaps consider that it would be to his advantage to appear again as an invalid, swathed in flannel and supported on crutches? He was received in the lobby with loud huzzas.

Conway, with correct appreciation of the situation, spoke of the economic dangers resulting from the act. He also reminded the House of the small number of English troops in America, and of the possibility, if the act were not repealed, that France and Spain might declare war and protect the Americans. This last was an argument which Pitt, in his proud patriotism, would not hear of. Edmund Burke, who had so warmly defended the rights of Parliament, spoke on this occasion, in his philosophic style, in favour of repeal. Then Pitt rose. He spoke in a gentle, conciliatory tone; for his aim this time was not to maintain principles and to crush his enemies, but to persuade the wavering and, if possible, to convert opponents of the measure. Besides, he desired on this occasion to figure as an opponent of the government, who, though he approved of their measure, disapproved of their reasons for bringing it forward. It was not from fear of consequences, but purely and simply from a sense of justice that he would repeal the Stamp Act. He admitted that the opponents of repeal had good ground for their apprehensions, and acknowledged his own perplexity in making a choice between two ineligible alternatives; but he pronounced for repeal, as due to the liberty of unrepresented subjects, and in gratitude to their support of England through three wars. But he added, menacingly, that if America afterwards should dare to resist, he would second a resolution of the most vigorous nature to compel her with every man and every ship in Britain.

This was an utterance after the king's own heart, an utterance which made a Pitt ministry under George III. a possibility. Now the sovereign knew that the victor over France had not degenerated into a weakling who was terrified by the first symptom of rebellion, but that he merely desired the repeal of a mistaken measure, to which he objected on principle. He was now the man qualified above all others to dispel the dangers which might arise from the temporary vacillation; for in him moderation appeared to be combined with strength; and, if the worst came to the worst, he was capable both of

keeping the colonies in subjection and of averting the attack of the Bourbon powers. The alliance system which he had planned would, no doubt, in such a predicament prove of great service.

The debate lasted till half-past one in the morning; then 275 members voted for, and 167 against repeal. Rockingham boasted that he had carried the day against the court, the Tories, the Scots, and the whole opposition. This was true enough, for the king had not forbidden his friends or the court officials to vote against the bill; but the prime minister had had two valuable allies, to whom alone he owed his victory, Pitt and commercial interests. On leaving the House Pitt received a regular ovation from the crowd of interested persons assembled at the door, whilst Grenville was received with jeers and hisses.

There is nothing important to record of the other readings of the bill, although Pitt spoke again several times. At last, on March 4, both the declaratory bill of right and the repeal were passed in the House of Commons. In the House of Lords the ministry succeeded in obtaining a majority of more than thirty for the repeal; but a strenuous protest against the measure was afterwards presented by Lord Lyttelton. The king's assent was given on March 18, and the bills became law.

The cause of contention, which had produced such furious discord between the political parties at home and between the mother-country and her colonies, thus seemed to be removed. Would the hoped-for peace and tranquillity ensue? This was the question which men now asked; and in asking it, the eyes of all turned towards Pitt. At last the position for which his qualities and his achievements had long marked him out was to fall to his share.

SECTION III

THE CHATHAM ADMINISTRATION

CHAPTER IX

THE INTRODUCTION OF THE NEW SYSTEM

THE victory which the ministry appeared to have won in the violent conflict was in reality a defeat; for the settlement of the repeal question removed the one serious obstacle to Pitt's advancement. Rockingham's most influential supporters, the state secretaries, Grafton and Conway, were at Pitt's beck and call. As soon as he removed them, the government would collapse. Pitt had now no further reason to hold his hand. Even during the American debates he had repeatedly displayed marked amiability towards Bute and Bute's friends,¹ as, for instance, in the debate of February 10, when he expressly denied that he entertained any personal animosity to the favourite. In return, Bute, by retiring to the country for three weeks at the most critical time, had avoided offering any personal opposition to the repeal of the Stamp Act. Now that this great question was decided, relations became still more friendly, thus preparing the way for Pitt's elevation to office. The Rockingham ministry, on account of the slights offered by them to the favourite, had been in ill-favour from the very beginning.

In Parliament, on March 10, to the astonishment of the House and of the strangers present, the Great Commoner pronounced a panegyric on Lord Bute. He blamed the late ministry severely for depriving the favourite's brother and

¹ Reports of the Prussian chargé-d'affaires, Baudouin, of March 11 and 14, 1766.—Berlin Archives. See Von Ruville, *Pitt und Bute*, p. 103 f., where the passages are given.

friends of their posts for no other reason than because these gentlemen were unpopular, and affirmed that although, for the same reason, he would not himself advise the king to re-appoint Bute to the leadership of the government, he would approve of every other mark of favour shown him. In the course of another speech, after letting it be plainly understood that he was inclined to make common cause with Bute's friends, he made the remark, characteristic of his political creed, that in England two varieties of ministry were possible, the one consisting of men in favour with the public, the other of men in favour at court; he himself had come to the conclusion that a combination of the two kinds would produce the best ministry. And on April 24, shortly before leaving for Bath, he gave expression, also in a speech, to the wish that all factions might cease, 'that there might be a ministry fixed such as the King should appoint, and the public approve,' and declared 'that if ever again he was admitted, as he had been, into the royal presence, it should be independent of any personal connections whatsoever.'¹

Desertions from the Rockingham camp now began.² At the end of April the Duke of Grafton, after a private conference with Lord Northington and another with Lord Camden, went to Hayes, to ask for instructions from Pitt. After his return he took the first opportunity to declare, from his place in the House of Lords, that in his opinion 'the administration wanted authority, dignity, and extension.' This was the signal for his resignation of office, which occurred on May 14, and placed the Marquis of Rockingham in a serious dilemma. After fruitless negotiations with Lord Hardwicke (the son of Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, lately deceased) the vacant secretaryship was given to the young Duke of Richmond; but this arrangement was a mere makeshift, which could not arrest the downfall of the ministry. Bute was now in constant conference with the king and the Princess of Wales; Pitt was at Bath, endeavouring to improve his health in prospect of the difficult task awaiting him.

At the beginning of July, when all was in readiness, Northington, the lord chancellor, provoked a dispute in the cabinet council during the discussion of a Canadian question, and

¹ *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 333.

² Cp. Von Ruville, *Pitt und Bute*, p. 106 ff.

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seized the opportunity to resign, thus rendering the position of the ministry completely untenable. Through Northington a letter from the king, dated July 7, was at once despatched to Pitt at Bath. It was to this effect :—

‘MR. PITT,—Your very dutiful and handsome conduct the last summer makes me desirous of having your thoughts how an able and dignified ministry may be formed. I desire, therefore, you will come, for this salutary purpose, to town.

‘I cannot conclude without expressing how entirely my ideas concerning the basis on which a new administration should be erected, are consonant to the opinion you gave on that subject in Parliament a few days before you set out for Somersetshire.

‘I convey this through the channel of the Earl of Northington, as there is no man in my service on whom I so thoroughly rely, and who, I know, agrees with me so perfectly in the contents of this letter.

GEORGE R.’

The king’s direct reference to Pitt’s utterances in Parliament in spring shows that it was these which had decided him once more to venture on negotiation with a man whom it was so difficult to satisfy.

After despatching a letter of thanks, Pitt set off at once for London, where he arrived on July 11, and took up his residence in the house of Captain Hood, a relative of his wife. The interview with the king took place on the 12th, at Richmond; it lasted from eleven till two o’clock, and its results were, as was to be expected, eminently satisfactory. Neither as to measures nor as to persons did any differences arise.

The next step of great importance was to secure Lord Temple, for whom the appointment of first lord of the treasury was destined. The earl was summoned to an audience with the king on the 13th, and on this occasion was granted permission to assist in the construction of the new cabinet; but as one of his demands was that all the present ministers should be excluded from it, agreement proved impossible. He begged, however, that the decisive interview between the king and Pitt should be postponed until he himself had held a consultation with his brother-in-law. The king having acceded to this request, Temple went on the 16th from Stowe to London, where he spent a whole day with Pitt. As the views of the two politicians were diametrically

opposed, nothing resulted from the meeting. Pitt desired to be the leader of an administration constructed of men of both parties, in which Temple was to occupy a prominent position, but not equal in importance to his own. Temple desired an administration composed of the Grenville connection, and for himself a position at least equal to Pitt's—an arrangement which, as they held opposite views on the most important questions, would very soon have led to dissensions. In a letter written by Temple at this time he repeatedly gives expression to the opinion that he would find it impossible to carry out his views in co-operation with Pitt. The favours proposed for Bute and his friends do not appear to have been any greater obstacle upon this occasion than before.

There was no longer any reason why Pitt should allow his brother-in-law to stand between him and power. He believed that he could dispense with Temple's assistance, now that the old oligarchy was broken up and that the last question was settled upon which the king and himself had differed. He therefore announced to his majesty that he was prepared to set about the construction of a new cabinet.

The first question for decision was the nature of his own office, the title under which he was to act as leader. The post of first lord of the treasury, which, as the most important, had generally been chosen by the leader of the government, was unsuited for Pitt, who had a distaste for finance. The state secretaryships were offices which involved an amount of attention to detail, which he preferred to avoid in order not to lose his grasp of the whole, and were, moreover, not of sufficiently high rank. It was best that he should choose an appointment which, combining high rank with few duties, would make it possible for him to devote himself entirely to his task of leadership. Next in rank after the royal family, the archbishops, and the lord chancellor (whose appointment, being purely legal, did not come into consideration) came the lord president of the council, and directly after him the lord privy seal.¹ Of these two posts the first must be reserved for the retiring lord chancellor, who was to retain as high rank as possible; consequently the second, that of privy seal, seemed the most suitable for Pitt. It gave him precedence not only of all state and court officials excepting the above-

¹ See Charles R. Dodd, *A Manual of Dignities*, etc. London, 1842.

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named, but also of the whole nobility of the country, including the dukes. The first lord of the treasury did not hold such an exalted position, being merely the chief of a commission which performed the functions of the lord high treasurer, a post which had become obsolete. One advantage of this arrangement was that commoners were eligible for the appointment.

The offices which gave their holders precedence of the whole nobility—namely, the posts of lord chancellor, lord high treasurer, lord president, lord privy seal, and one or two others—might be held by peers only. Pitt was thus obliged to enter the Upper House if he decided to become lord privy seal, and this course he followed. On July 30 he became both keeper of the privy seal and Earl of Chatham. The announcement of his elevation to the peerage runs as follows: ¹ 'The king has been pleased to grant unto the Right Hon. William Pitt, and his heirs male, the dignity of a Viscount and Earl of Great Britain, by the name, style, and title of Viscount Pitt of Burton Pynsent in the county of Somerset, and Earl of Chatham in Kent.' As an earl he was thus to receive the name which his wife had borne as a baroness since 1761. Their eldest son would consequently become both Earl of and Baron Chatham.

It was a much disputed question amongst the politicians of those days, and has been amongst historians since, why Pitt allowed himself to be transferred to the House of Lords. The change was certainly not of advantage to him. His enemies mocked, and his friends were as angry as at the time when he accepted the pension of £3000. Lord Chesterfield wrote: 'Mr. Pitt has had a *fall up stairs*, and has done himself so much hurt that he will never be able to stand upon his legs again.' The public rejoicings, the illuminations, and so forth, which had been planned in the City were abandoned.² A

¹ Thackeray, ii. 84.

² Maltzahn reports on August 1, 1766: 'On n'entend que des plaintes et des lamentations de ce que ce grand homme a préféré le titre de Comte et Pair au glorieux épithète GREAT COMMONER, qu'il portait par excellence et qui le rendait si cher à la Nation. Les habitants de la cité s'étaient proposés de célébrer cet événement par des festins et des illuminations, mais ayant appris qu'il était accompagné par une métamorphose, la joie s'est changée en tristesse et un morne silence a pris la place des acclamations. Quelques-uns même ont drappé en noir devant leurs maisons, et le peuple a jetté en l'air les lampions, qu'on avait préparés pour l'illumination. . . .—Berlin Archives.

swarm of pamphlets appeared on the subject of the remarkable event. Men busied themselves in all manner of surmises, and in these surmises Bute's reputed cunning once more began to play a conspicuous part. It could not fail to excite surprise that the man whom the nation honoured as the Great Commoner, and who had risen as such to place and power, should, just when he had attained his aim, give up his safe position in order to enter the House of Lords, 'that Hospital of Incurables,' as Chesterfield nicknamed it. And yet the explanation of such a step is not difficult to find if we know and keep in mind Pitt's real tendencies.

Pitt was, as I have already endeavoured to demonstrate, by no means primarily a popular leader, a Parliamentarian, who considered it his business to legislate in the Lower House and to control the government. His eloquence was to him chiefly the means of gaining entry to the government, and securing the opportunity to exercise his gifts as a statesman. When in power he much preferred to maintain his position by able, energetic action, and by successes, than by holding all opposition in check through the force of his oratory. It was only when he was out of office that he developed great rhetorical power, and then only on occasions when some important national or personal question was under debate. He never acted as ministerial leader of the House of Commons. It had certainly been one of his cherished ideas that he might, when guiding the affairs of the state, produce harmony between the will of the king and the will of the nation; and he doubtless regarded the power of his eloquence in the Lower House as a means to this end. He hoped to win the consent of the king, on whose authority his own depended, to the useful measures which he planned, and of the value of which he was capable of persuading the nation. But this oratorical activity did not seem to him so all-important that it might not, given sufficiently good reasons, be dispensed with. There were other persuasive debaters who could represent him; and, moreover, he would have at his disposal the crown influence and the protégés of his colleagues, though to use these was, strictly speaking, against his principles.

There were excellent reasons for his action. It is improbable that Pitt was determined by his desire for the privy seal, for he might just as well have bestowed that post on a useful

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follower, and have led the government as first lord of the treasury or secretary of state. The choice of office probably followed the resolve to accept a peerage. The state of his health, the physical exhaustion consequent on the protracted sufferings of the previous winter, obliged him in undertaking the duties of prime minister to relieve himself of as many others as possible. The position in the Lower House, where all the attacks of the opposition would have been directed against him, was too harassing for his weakened nerves; the greater quiet and more dignified tone of the Upper House would better suit the present state of his health. Of course it was at his option, as a member of the House of Commons, to refrain from taking part in the debates; but if he did not wish to remain in that House, there was no reason for him to refuse the honour offered him by the king.

It would be a mistake to suppose that the peerage had no attraction for him. He loved outward pomp and circumstance and rejoiced in all the appurtenances of high rank. The Earl of Chatham, in the scarlet robe of a peer, was a very different personage from plain Mr. Pitt in sober broad-cloth. Moreover, his family would now take rank with the family of his brother-in-law, Lord Temple, which, considering the pretensions of the latter to reign over the connection, was not an unimportant consideration. We learn that at an earlier period the idea of weakening Pitt's power by procuring a peerage for him had occurred to his opponents;¹ hence it is clear that his desire for such an honour had become known to them. Another circumstance which helped to decide him was his acquirement of a great estate. Before he succeeded to the property of Burton Pynsent he was not, according to English ideas, in a position to maintain the dignity of an earl; but the possession of it doubtless induced in him the desire for the title. The second title which, according to custom, was conferred on him at the same time with that of earl, was borne (also according to custom) by his eldest son. The young John Pitt was henceforth known as Lord Pitt.

The new honours entailed considerable outlay.² For his investment with the titles of earl and viscount Pitt had to pay £785, 3s.; for his instalment as lord privy seal, £139, 12s. 6d.

¹ *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 30.

² Particulars are given in the Chatham MSS.

There were no great difficulties to overcome in the construction of the cabinet; but in one case, to the detriment of Pitt's reputation, matters had to be arranged by a very free use of public money. The first thing to be done was to fill the post that had been intended for Temple, that of first lord of the treasury. The Duke of Grafton was chosen for this, and his former secretaryship, that of the southern department, was given to Lord Shelburne, that of the northern department being retained by General Conway. Sir Charles Saunders, who had commanded the fleet before Quebec, was made first lord of the admiralty, and the Marquis of Granby, Prince Ferdinand's faithful comrade-in-arms, became commander-in-chief. Of appointments of the first rank, only the presidency of the council remained for disposal. It was to be given to the Earl of Northington, the present lord chancellor, who would thus vacate his post in favour of Lord Camden, Pitt's old friend and counsellor. Northington declared himself willing to make the exchange, after he had been assured of a pension of £4000 for life on ceasing to be president. Lord Camden also made the stipulation that he was to have a pension of £5000.¹ Both these bargains were naturally exposed and turned to advantage by the opposition. It may further be mentioned that Lord Barrington became secretary for war, Charles Townshend chancellor of the exchequer, and the Earl of Hillsborough first lord of trade; while the office of paymaster-general was shared by Lord North and Mr. George Cooke.

In making his selection Pitt was guided by the desire to employ individuals of ability, selected from all the different factions as ministers under his leadership; but no heads of factions and no groups were included in the new administration. Some of Bute's friends received appointments, but the favourite himself was excluded. A number of the members of the late government retained office, but Rockingham and Newcastle were not of the number. Pitt himself and several others belonged to the Grenville connection; but Temple and

¹ Walpole, *George III.*, ii. 356 f.; *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 26 note. George III. at a later period called this transaction a shameful bargain made by the idol of the House of Commons to procure the great seal for Camden. See *Correspondence of George III. with Lord North*, ii. 194. Edited by Donne: London, 1867.

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George Grenville did not receive office. The adherents of the late Duke of Cumberland were represented, but not by either Lord Holland or the Duke of Bedford. Thus the plan which Pitt had prepared with the king's approval was carried out as exactly as possible. This was a ministry constructed upon entirely new principles, and many were the expressions of astonishment and even contempt which it evoked. Edmund Burke wrote of it that it was 'so checkered and speckled, a piece of joinery so crossly indented and whimsically dovetailed, a cabinet so variously inlaid; such a piece of diversified mosaick; such a tessellated basement without cement; here a bit of black stone, and here a bit of white; patriots and courtiers; king's friends and republicans; whigs and tories; treacherous friends and open enemies—that it was a very curious show—but utterly unsafe to touch, and unsure to stand on.'¹ Its coherence was secured by the favour of the king, which carried great weight with many, and by belief in Pitt's genius, from which great results were expected. All were willing to take their share in glorious achievements. Hence the success of the measures which it was proposed to undertake was more indispensable than anything else to the permanence of the new system. In the event of failure, it was to be feared that the various constituents of the administration would gravitate again to their old centres outside of it.²

On July 30 Mr. Pitt kissed hands as Earl of Chatham and lord privy seal. The invitation to this ceremony so clearly expresses the fundamental principle of the Chatham ministry that I give it here:—

'RICHMOND LODGE, July 29, 1766.

'MR. PITT,—I have signed this day the warrant for creating you an earl, and shall with pleasure receive you in that capacity to-morrow, as well as entrust you with my privy seal; as I know the Earl of Chatham will zealously give his aid towards destroying all party distinctions, and restoring that subordination to government, which can alone preserve that inestimable blessing, Liberty, from degenerating into Licentiousness.

GEORGE R.'³

¹ Phillimore, *Memoirs of Lord Lyttelton*, ii. 709.

² Walpole, i. 256.

³ *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 21.

If Lord Chatham, as our hero must henceforward be called, conducted the administration according to the principles here indicated, then his new position differed materially from that which he had occupied during his former term of office and from the position of any of his predecessors. He was not merely indispensable as before for his ability and energy and therefore the most important personage in the ministry; he was its formally appointed leader. For the first time he could really regard himself, and that with much better reason than Rockingham or Grenville, as prime minister, a title which had no legal existence, but which was, nevertheless, often conferred on Pitt, by some to magnify his importance, by others to stamp his position with a certain quality of illegality. It soon became evident that he did not intend the government of this ministry to be of the usual co-operative nature; his own supremacy was to be distinctly asserted. Charles Townshend writes to Lord George Sackville: ¹ 'From him [a certain Colonel Cunningham] you will know how entirely everything proceeds from Lord Chatham to the King, from thence without any intermediate consultation to the public, and I am confident that no other man has the least previous knowledge or influence.' His methods of official communication with the other ministers, who were actually his equals, must have struck his contemporaries as most extraordinary. The Prussian ambassador, Baron Maltzahn, reports on August 8: ² 'Yesterday, at the King's levée, we had quite a new performance. The Earl of Chatham held a kind of reception in his Majesty's anteroom. All the Ministers in office came and paid their respects to him, and to each, as he took leave, the Earl handed a little note, with which the Minister retired into a corner of the room, to read it, and to note down what Pitt had said to him. People were much struck by this innovation, and many imagined that there was some secret involved. It was, however, nothing but a symptom of the subordination in which Pitt keeps the present Ministers, to whom he gives his orders in the style of a commandant to his inferior officers.'

His official duties as lord privy seal did not greatly interfere with this general superintendence.³ His function was to

¹ *Hist. MSS. Comm., Ninth Rep.*, part iii. p. 13.

² Berlin Archives.

³ They are described in the Chatham MSS.

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append the privy seal to all charters, warrants, grants, etc., which did not require the great seal. The privy seal was always in his custody, even if he were travelling. He had as principal assistants the head of the privy seal office and four chief clerks with their deputy clerks. The documents for which the seal was required were sent into the office, where they were examined and copied. The copy was forwarded to the clerk of the king's signet, who approved and sent it with a sealed order to the lord privy seal. It was compulsory that the original documents to which the latter was to append the privy seal should be accompanied by these attested copies. A certain day in the week was set apart by the lord privy seal for performing his special function, and on the previous day he received a list of the documents to be sealed. At the appointed hour the head of the office or one of the clerks appeared with the documents and the copies. The attested copy was first handed to the minister, and afterwards, in his presence, the privy seal was affixed to the original. It was in his power to refuse to seal any document to the contents of which lawful objections could be offered. He was responsible for all that passed through his office, it being 'his especial duty to apprise the sovereign of any matter in the instruments he has to seal, that may be inconvenient, or not in perfect accordance with the law.'

Chatham had thus chosen a post involving duties which were the reverse of fatiguing, and which he could perform even if he were obliged to be absent from London. Its emoluments were by no means inconsiderable. The salary of the lord privy seal was still nominally what it had been in old days, £365; but the sixteen dishes of food daily which had been his due of old had been commuted for a payment of £4 a day; and a yearly grant of £1175 had been voted him for the better maintenance of the honour and dignity of the office. This amounted in all to a fixed salary of £3000, and in addition to this there were important perquisites. It is distinctive of the conservative spirit of the English government that the different items constituting the revenue were still kept separate.

Chatham's ill-health rendered it difficult, nay, in a manner impossible, to carry the new system into practical effect. At the end of August he was again attacked by gout. Hayes being no longer in his possession, he lived at Hampstead, at a

house called North End, which became his headquarters ; but at times he was too ill to receive any one, and the machinery of government was clogged in consequence. He was, however, generally able to interview the ministers or to receive and despatch couriers.¹ When he was unable to attend the cabinet councils he communicated his opinion by letter. At the end of September he became so ill that he was obliged to employ all his remaining strength in taking the journey to Bath,² where for some weeks he was not able to hold a pen. In the beginning of November, after a short stay at Burton Pynsent, he returned to Hampstead sufficiently improved in health to be able to confer with the king and appear repeatedly in the House of Lords.³

On November 11 the king opened Parliament, and it was on this day that Pitt made his formal entrance into the House of Lords, taking the oath as Earl of Chatham.⁴ Together with him appeared the Dukes of Cumberland, Northumberland, and Montague, to be introduced under their new titles. The first was the king's brother, Prince Henry Frederick, on whom the title of his late uncle had been conferred. The second, known to us hitherto under the name of the Earl of Northumberland, had been made a duke as compensation for receiving no appointment. The third, until now Lord Cardigan, had been long promised the promotion now received.⁵ The Houses adjourned until December 13 ; then came the Christmas holidays, so that they did not meet again till January 16. Chatham went to Bath and Burton Pynsent, and serious illness obliged him to be absent from London for a long time after Parliament had met. This, as we shall see, caused further postponement of state business. Even after his return to town in the end of February he was so frequently unable to attend to his duties that the real leadership of the government began to pass into other hands. He was actual leader only for a few months, and the fact that he remained nominally at the head of affairs for a comparatively long period

¹ Shelburne to Chatham, September 20, 1766.—Chatham MSS. Report of the Prussian ambassador, September 19, 1766.—Berlin Archives.

² Report of the Prussian ambassador, September 30, 1766.—Berlin Archives.

³ *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 115 f. ; report of the Prussian ambassador, November 14, 1766.

⁴ Report of the Prussian ambassador, November 14, 1766.—Berlin Archives.

⁵ *Grenville Memoirs*, iii. 384 f.

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was due to the king's excessive aversion to another change of ministry, and to his persistent hope of a restoration to health. But the programme which Chatham endeavoured to carry out during the short period of his ministerial labours was very comprehensive. It embraced the most varied domains of administration. In proceeding to describe its development and results I shall begin with foreign affairs.

CHAPTER X

FOREIGN POLICY

CHATHAM's first endeavour, as soon as he felt certain of gaining office, was to promote the alliance project which had occupied his mind ever since the conclusion of the great war. A triple alliance of the northern powers, Russia, Prussia, and England, was a scheme which had also suggested itself favourably to the unfortunate Czar Peter III. He had appointed Count Woronzov, an ardent advocate of the idea, ambassador to the court of England, and in 1762 had ordered him to begin negotiations on the subject;¹ but the plan was frustrated by the dethronement and death of the czar. Pitt, who believed, even after the conclusion of peace, that the Bourbon powers remained the inflexible enemies of England and would begin war with her again sooner or later, did not abandon the proposed alliance; he maintained close relations with Woronzov, and communicated with him on the subject² even after 1764, when that ambassador had left England. The new ministers, Grenville and Bedford, were, on the contrary, of opinion that England's salvation lay in a sincere reconciliation with France; it was an opinion for which they could not be blamed, in view of the extremely unfriendly attitude of Frederick the Great to the authors of the peace of Paris. In 1764 the relations between England and Prussia were so strained that the ambassadors were recalled. Prussia became remarkably friendly with Russia; an alliance between the courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg was concluded in March 1765.

The relations of England with these two courts improved when the Rockingham ministry came into office. Russia

¹ Prussian ambassador's report of July 1762.—Berlin Archives.

² Letter to Woronzov in the Chatham MSS.

became more conciliatory, and the long-desired commercial treaty was actually concluded. King Frederick, who saw in the new ministers the opponents of the hated Bute, began to feel a little more confidence in England. He consented to renew diplomatic relations; Baron Maltzahn was sent as ambassador to London, and Mitchell returned to his old post in Berlin. But a triple alliance, which was doubtless desired by Rockingham and Newcastle, was still very far distant. Frederick did not believe in the stability of the new government, as he still suspected Bute of intriguing; and Catherine, who at times favoured the idea of the triple alliance, made a condition which England could not accept. She insisted 'that the *casus fœderis* should extend to a Turkish war.' This the commercial policy of England would not permit. Both sides remaining inflexible, the negotiations ceased for the time.¹

Such was the situation when Lord Chatham undertook the management of public affairs. From the very beginning he displayed the most unbounded self-confidence. He believed that the power of his name, and the confidence which he imagined himself to have inspired by his loyalty to the allies, would, in conjunction with skilful management, speedily overcome all difficulties, and secure the result which his predecessors had unsuccessfully laboured to attain. In this expectation he met with indifference all the virulent attacks upon his acceptance of a peerage. Such a success would silence every scornful tongue. Immediately after his entrance upon office he proposed and carried a resolution in the cabinet to the effect 'that his Majesty be advised to take the proper measures for forming a triple defensive alliance for the maintaining of the public tranquillity, in which the crown of Great Britain, the Empress of Russia, and the King of Prussia were to be the original contracting parties; with provision for inviting to accede thereto the crowns of Denmark and Sweden, and the States-General, together with such of the German or other powers as the original contracting parties shall agree upon, and as are not engaged in the family compact of the House of Bourbon.'² He had previously come to an agreement with Conway as to the manner in which his

¹ Macartney's reports from St. Petersburg.—Public Record Office.

² *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 31.

aim was to be pursued, but Conway had displayed no great enthusiasm.

The plan was that, in the person of a gentleman already known to us, Mr. Hans Stanley, an ambassador-plenipotentiary should be sent to St. Petersburg to complete arrangements and finally conclude the alliance with Russia, and that this plenipotentiary should visit Berlin on the way in order to procure the assent of Frederick the Great. Chatham was so certain of the advisability of this plan that he contrived to have Stanley appointed at the same time as the new ministers, and would have despatched him immediately but for various objections raised by Conway and by Stanley himself.¹ They desired if possible to avoid offending Macartney, the ordinary ambassador at St. Petersburg, who had just successfully concluded the commercial treaty, and whom it seemed, to say the least of it, ungracious to reward by a recall, and they also wished to conciliate the trusted and tried Mitchell, whom they were depriving of an honourable task. Therefore they insisted that these two ambassadors should at least be immediately and fully informed of the position of affairs. But the resolution to adopt this plan was taken too late, for Macartney had heard of his recall from Count Panin, the Russian chancellor, some days before the ministerial communication arrived. Stanley also advised Pitt not to send him to Berlin unless Mitchell could assure them that the proposals he brought would be favourably received by the King of Prussia; otherwise it would, he considered, be better to go directly to St. Petersburg by sea.

This last idea approved itself to Chatham, and accordingly, on August 8, full information regarding the plan was despatched to Mitchell, who was ordered to learn Frederick's views on the subject of a triple alliance. He was directed to confide the project to his Prussian majesty, to represent all its advantages, and to give expression to King George's earnest hope that the alliance might be concluded. But the idea was not to be conveyed that such an alliance was necessary to England. Chatham upon this point insisted in an autograph letter to Mitchell: ² 'The King, on his part, assuredly wishes

¹ Conway to Pitt, July 29, 1766.—*Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 17. Stanley to Pitt, July 30, 1766.—*Ibid.*, iii. 19 f.

² *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 29 f. and note.

it; but his Majesty wishes it like a great King of Great Britain, *salvâ majestate*.' But no attempt was made by Chatham to conceal that 'his own heart was in this arduous business.'

Whilst awaiting results Stanley endeavoured, by means of an examination of the various despatches from St. Petersburg, to form an opinion upon the chance of success. He came to the conclusion, as he wrote to Chatham on the 19th,¹ that there was little hope as far as Russia was concerned. That country, having no maritime and colonial interests, did not stand in need of England's assistance. Moreover, the old political system of a close connection with the house of Austria was by no means eradicated. Nothing, Stanley discovered, had been left untried by his predecessors to induce Russia to ally herself with England. The only possibility of success lay in a good understanding with Prussia, a recommendation from whose sovereign would be of the greatest value. It was, however, unfortunately evident that King Frederick desired to reserve the connection with Russia exclusively for himself.

A communication to the above effect was transmitted by Stanley to the king.² The first news received from Mitchell was also unfavourable.³ He regretted that the King of Prussia had not been consulted before Stanley's appointment, and feared that the nomination of an ambassador to the court of Russia who was only to call upon Frederick *en passant* might arouse that sovereign's jealousy, and also awaken suspicions that Great Britain had been secretly negotiating with Russia.

It was undoubtedly with small hope of success that Mitchell, on September 15, went to Potsdam for an interview with Frederick,⁴ who had just returned from a tour of inspection in Silesia. He was received very graciously, but when he laid his project before the king, Frederick at once raised so many objections that his aversion was unmistakable. The danger from the Bourbon powers he declared to be very slight, since they were not yet in a position to make war. Spain was even

¹ *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 36 ff.

² *Ibid.*, iii. 66.

³ Mitchell to Chatham, August 21, 1766.—*Ibid.*, iii. 49 f.

⁴ *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 67 ff. and note. *Politische Korrespondenz Friedrichs des Grossen*, xxv.

likely to adopt a very conciliatory attitude, since she was crippled by internal troubles; he made no doubt that she would pay the Manila ransom on demand. The institution of a northern alliance system at the present juncture would simply serve to arouse suspicion, and thereby endanger the peace which all desired to preserve. Alliances made with a view to distant events were valueless, Frederick averred; it was wiser to wait till the dangers really existed. He then quoted an Italian proverb: *Chi sta bene non se muove*. To this Mitchell gave the ready answer: *Chi sta solo non sta bene*, and proceeded to the best of his ability to controvert Frederick's arguments. He insisted upon the purely defensive character of the proposed alliance, which could not justly give alarm to any power in Europe, and on the danger of the family compact, which was an alliance offensive and defensive 'against mankind.' He spoke warmly of the friendly disposition of his master towards King Frederick, instancing Stanley's mission as a proof of it. Frederick agreed to take the matter into consideration, but said that the natural interests of his country forbade him to be drawn into any conflict between England and France in which Prussia had no concern. He did not omit to allude to the bad treatment he had received from England when the last peace was made, and also spoke of the instability of the English administrations and measures. The ambassador could not deny that there was a certain amount of justice in both these complaints, but assured Frederick that it was probable there would now be an end of such unsteadiness. A settled policy had been adopted by a strong government. After the king had asked some questions regarding particular stipulations the audience came to an end. Mitchell could not but report that his Prussian majesty was unconvinced of the necessity or expediency of the alliance.

An alliance with England was at that time very far from Frederick's intention. He felt quite strong enough, in alliance with Russia, to encounter any hostility at all likely to arise; and with regard to those powers, on account of whom Chatham desired the alliance of Prussia, he felt practically no anxiety. He still hoped to alienate France from Austria. France, if she did make war with England, was hardly likely to exhaust her strength in Germany again. With Spain

Prussia had no cause of quarrel. Frederick was at this time actually negotiating a commercial treaty with her, which was to open a market in her colonies for Prussian manufactured goods—a measure to a certain extent intended to injure England. To forward this negotiation Frederick threatened the Spaniards with the prospect of an alliance between Prussia and England.¹ He thus made use of Chatham's proposals to advance his own purposes, but he did not see any reason whatever for complying with them.

A further reason for refusal was his pleasure at finding himself in a position to refuse the request of England. The main inducement to refuse was not hatred and desire of revenge, but there is no doubt that he welcomed the opportunity to pay off an old score. It was, indeed, from his ancient friend and ally, Pitt, that the proposition came, and it might, therefore, have been expected that he would, out of regard for him, have shown a more conciliatory spirit, and at least have avoided any display of his suspicions. But Frederick did not know what to make of this friend, since he had been transformed into the Earl of Chatham. He had received with astonishment and anger the news that Mr. Pitt, hitherto so honourable and so independent, had entered into close relations with the Earl of Bute, the treacherous, faithless minister—that he had not been ashamed to make a speech in Parliament in praise of the man whom Frederick still regarded as the personification of political evil, the friend of Austria. At first, indeed, Frederick refused to believe the report, and asked if Pitt's panegyric had not been ironical;² but when his new ambassador, Maltzahn, informed him officially of the reconciliation between the former opponents he could no longer refuse credence to the astounding fact. He now believed that Pitt, in order to procure a peerage and the official appointment which made him leader of the government, had sought the good graces of the favourite and agreed to support his policy. The peerage was to Frederick a highly objectionable point.³ And consequently his ambassador continued for a long time, in the cipher part of their despatches, to employ the designation 'le Chevalier Pitt.' And although Chatham, immediately after his accession to office, announced himself as

¹ *Politische Korrespondenz*, xxv. 302. ² Von Ruville, *Pitt und Bute*, p. 105.

³ *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 77.

most amicably disposed towards Prussia, Frederick was unable to regard this as a sign of sincere friendship. He suspected some perfidy inspired by Bute, some intention to entangle him in the quarrels in the west, to make use of him and then to abandon him. He may not have credited Chatham himself with such an intention, but he no longer felt him to be a safeguard; he expected to see him at any moment superseded by the favourite. Hence he imagined that, by coldly declining to meet Chatham's wishes, he was probably also dealing a blow to his enemy, Bute.

In London, however, it was not believed that Frederick's utterances were equivalent to a definite refusal. King George was of opinion¹ that the King of Prussia had not yet been able to free himself from certain apprehensions, but that his inquiries into all particulars of the scheme showed that he was not altogether unfavourable to it. Referring to Frederick's remark on the frequent changes of government in England, George said to the Duke of Grafton, 'God forbid that there should be any more.' He was determined, under all circumstances, to keep Chatham in office. Mitchell was directed to impress on the Prussian government the advantages which would accrue to it from the triple alliance, and to remind it of the danger still threatening Silesia. But he was forbidden to enter into details until Prussia had shown herself sincerely desirous of an alliance with England. Then Frederick was to be met more than half-way. Otherwise, it was not consistent with his English majesty's honour to go farther. King Frederick would, however, probably repent ere long of his non-compliance.²

But the victorious prince, who had held his own successfully against the half of Europe, felt himself so strong in his alliance with Russia that he could treat with indifference the ardent wooing of the mighty naval power, England, and her great minister. He preserved silence, and thereby placed Chatham in a most embarrassing situation.³ What was to become of

¹ Grafton to Chatham, September 27.—*Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 79 ff.

² Conway to Mitchell, September 30.—*Ibid.*, iii. 82 ff., note.

³ *Ibid.*, October 24, 1766: 'The total silence and inattention of His Pruss. Maj. for so long a period . . . grows from day to day a more extraordinary Phenomenon. I shall however still more wonder, if they are not broke thro' in consequence of the instructions you have had in mine No. 3.'—Public Record Office.

the embassy to St. Petersburg if no understanding with Prussia could be secured? There was, quite apart from Frederick's behaviour, little expectation of a favourable answer from Russia, and a second refusal of an alliance from that quarter would be a very disagreeable event.¹ The ministers tried to prove that England stood in no need of an alliance,² but nevertheless felt obliged to make a last attempt to win Frederick's favour, although such a step had been expressly declared inadmissible. On November 14, 1766 an order was despatched to Mitchell³ to request another audience with the king, and to endeavour to procure a favourable answer to the alliance proposal.

Another event now influenced these transactions. At the end of June 1766 Spain had proposed to England that the disputed question of the Manila debt should be decided by the arbitration of a sovereign who had no direct interest in the matter, and had suggested as arbitrator the King of Prussia, the friend, ally, and relative of the King of England.⁴ This was a clever move, for no reasonable objection could be offered by England to Frederick as an arbitrator unless open confession were made of the strained relations with Prussia; Frederick would, moreover, regard a refusal to accept him as a fresh cause of offence; and yet it would be dangerous to entrust the interests of England to the care of the insulted and injured monarch. The English ministry resorted to the expedient of declaring the idea of arbitration to be beneath the dignity of both nations, whilst recognising the arbitrator selected as peculiarly well fitted for the task. Their endeavours, if they made any, to conceal this transaction from Frederick were unsuccessful, for the Spanish ambassador, Prince Masserano, at once told the Prussian ambassador, Maltzahn, the whole story. It was to the advantage of Spain that the coolness between the two old allies should increase. Frederick, however, though he considered the refusal a slight, ignored the whole affair, in order that he might still be able to employ the English alliance project as a means of putting pressure on Spain in the matter of the

¹ Stanley to Chatham, October 1, 1766.—*Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 86.

² So Maltzahn reported after an interview with Conway on October 31.—Berlin Archives.

³ Public Record Office.

⁴ *Politische Korrespondenz*, xxv. 159.

commercial treaty. He did not wish any tokens of his displeasure with the English to discourage their proposals for an alliance. But his inclination for an alliance was still further diminished by this affair; nor was it ultimately possible to conceal the fact that the arbitration proceedings were known in Berlin. On October 3 Conway voluntarily apologised for England's behaviour in the matter,¹ and Chatham doubtless had a shrewd suspicion that there was some connection between this and Frederick's reluctant attitude.

Acting under orders from England, Mitchell procured another audience with Frederick on November 4, in which he again recommended the alliance project to his majesty's consideration.² The king expressed surprise that Mitchell had not understood him on the last occasion—it was now, as then, his opinion that it would be time to make arrangements when there was a real prospect of danger; at present he saw no reason for any action of the kind. Mitchell then remarked that it would create great surprise in England that his majesty should be unwilling to enter into a defensive alliance which would secure the peace of the world. Frederick admitted that France and Spain entertained hostile intentions towards England, which were apparent in their attitude in various colonial matters, but maintained that war in these distant regions, or in Portugal, would in no wise affect Prussia. Mitchell was glad that the king did not mention the arbitration affair, for he feared that the Spanish ambassador had made use of it to prejudice Frederick against England. He now had recourse to the argument which Conway had directed him to employ should the king persist in his refusal, namely, the impossibility of foreseeing, if war did break out, how far it might spread. There was a certain great power in Europe which he would not name; that power would doubtless seize the opportunity to enforce its claim, justifiable or not, to certain parts of his majesty's dominions. In view of this danger, it was surely to his majesty's interest that an alliance which ensured universal peace should be formed. Here Frederick, interrupting the speaker, said brusquely: 'I understand perfectly what you mean. If I am attacked, I am prepared to defend myself. You yourself have seen what I am capable of

¹ *Poilitische Korrespondenz*, xxv. 265.

² Mitchell's report to Conway of December 4, 1766.—Public Record Office.

doing.' To this the ambassador replied despondingly: 'I have, undoubtedly, witnessed performances of which no one but your Majesty would have been capable; yet it might be dangerous to repeat such experiments.'

The different positions of the two nations are here clearly defined. England now stood face to face with two united powers, from whom she had lately succeeded in extorting an advantageous peace, because the stronger of the two, France, had suffered severe defeat by the combined strength of England and Prussia. From this disaster, however, she had recovered, and might soon prove extremely dangerous; therefore England stood in need once again of her old ally. Prussia, on the other hand, had held her own successfully against a much larger and more powerful coalition, of which only one member, France, had cost England much trouble; and not only had this coalition since then been broken up, but one of its important members, Russia, had been acquired by Prussia as an ally. Hence Prussia could afford to dispense with her old ally.

Chatham's cherished plan, with the rapid execution of which he had intended to usher in his new period of administration, was thus lamentably frustrated. When Count Nugent, the Austrian ambassador, threatened that Austria would ally herself with the Bourbon powers if an alliance were concluded between Prussia and England, Mitchell was obliged, sorely against his inclination, to assure him that nothing of the kind was in preparation.¹ And Conway was obliged to inform Macartney at St. Petersburg of the failure of the scheme, and to request him to overlook the apparent slight upon him which had been intended.² It was of importance to the government that this experienced diplomatist should remain at his post; for, now that the fulfilment of his mission had become impossible, Stanley could not well be employed as the representative of England. But the Empress Catherine, who had received the intimation that an ambassador plenipotentiary was to be accredited to her court, demanded the fulfilment of the promise,³ and Stanley had actually applied

¹ Mitchell to Conway, December 6, 1766.—Public Record Office.

² Conway to Macartney, December 19, 1766.—Public Record Office.

³ Conway to Chatham, January 24, 1767.—*Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 172 f.

for his discharge from that appointment; Macartney was therefore commanded to return to England, and was then sent back to St. Petersburg invested with the required powers. This happened at the end of January 1767.

It cannot be denied that in this affair Chatham was guilty of serious blunders. They were due to his overweening self-confidence. He overestimated his personal influence, and was, in consequence, so convinced of the inevitable success of his scheme that he advanced without due precaution. He thereby incurred a defeat, which might have been much worse than it was, if his subordinates had not persuaded him to exercise a little forethought. It is certain that he took his failure very much to heart. It unsettled him, and Walpole was probably not far wrong when he wrote:¹ 'These foreign disappointments, I believe, were the chief ingredients in the strange conduct of Lord Chatham that ensued,' thereby referring to his gradual retirement from public business.

A second problem which now imperatively demanded settlement, and in which Chatham was deeply interested, was that of India. This question may be considered under the head of foreign policy, as it largely affected the relations of the East India Company with foreign powers, and as the company itself partook of the nature of an independent power with which a compact was required.

A result of the last war in India, of almost equal importance to the defeat of the French, was the acquisition of Bengal and the surrounding states.² No account has been given of the different events which occurred during the course of this acquisition, as they had little or no connection with Pitt's policy and government. By the beginning of 1760 Britain's influence over this enormous area was so firmly assured that Clive could return to England, where he received an Irish peerage, and was elected to a seat in Parliament. Vansittart meanwhile undertook the management of Bengal from Madras. Troubles soon began. Meer Jaffier, the nabob appointed by Clive, proved so refractory that he was deposed, and his son-in-law, Meer Kassim, appointed in his stead. Meer Kassim, however, caused more serious trouble. The suppression of

¹ Walpole, *George III.*, ii. 259.

² See A. Zimmermann, *Kolonialpolitik Grossbritanniens*, i. 354 ff.; Adolphus, *History of England under George III.*, i. 261 ff.

his rebellion in 1763 cost many English lives. After a complete English victory, Meer Jaffier was re-installed, whilst Kassim took refuge with the Nabob of Oudh. This nabob now interfered in favour of his protégé, and new conflicts began, which lasted until 1765, when the company was obliged to send Lord Clive back to Bengal as governor, to restore order. He arrived in May, and immediately took such energetic measures that the Nabob of Oudh, although he had secured the Mahrattas as his allies, was obliged to submit before the end of the month. The Mahrattas were driven back into their hills.

The affairs of Bengal were now arranged in a manner which ensured the supremacy of England for the future. To the Nabob of Oudh was conceded unlimited control over the greater part of his territory, with the result that he was quite contented. The Grand Mogul, Shah Allum, who had placed himself under English protection during the struggle, gained little in the way of territory, but was guaranteed a large pension from the revenues of Bengal, in return for which he gave his imperial sanction to the new arrangements. The Nabob of Bengal, now Najim ud Dowlah, the natural son of Meer Jaffier (who died in 1765), retained a great revenue, but gave up his domains entirely to English management; they produced to the company a yearly income which Clive estimated at £1,700,000. In the spring of 1766 a dangerous and widespread mutiny broke out among Clive's native troops. The movement was occasioned by a reduction of their high war pay after the fighting had come to an end. Clive, however, cleverly managed to introduce discord among the mutineers, and turned the different parties against each other. Soon all danger was at an end, and complete subordination restored.

Intelligence of this mutiny reached England immediately after Chatham had taken office. It did not create any great excitement, as the news of its suppression arrived at the same time; but the prime minister regarded it as imperatively necessary that Indian affairs in general should be submitted to careful investigation. Such fabulous reports were spread of the immense wealth and resources of the country that it was not impossible that the affairs of the East India Company might reach some dizzy height of prosperity, and might then, like the South Sea Company, collapse with extreme disaster

to the general welfare of the English nation. Of even greater importance was the fact that the nature of the company had altogether changed. From a trading company in possession merely of some settlements within its commercial zone, it had become a great organising and administrative power, ruling over an ever-increasing number of Indian states. Several questions suggested themselves. Could its charter and Pitt's mandate of December 1757 (see vol. ii. p. 345) be so construed as to give it the right thus to change its very constitution? Were the territories which it had conquered with the assistance of the royal fleet legally its own? And was it able to provide a competent administration for these great states with their millions of inhabitants?

Chatham's attention had been drawn to these questions by Clive as early as the year 1759.¹ The general's letters then informed him that, although the natives would certainly be satisfied with the comparative mildness of European rule, it was doubtful whether the defence and government of the conquered states were not a task beyond the capacity of a trading company. He thus hinted that it would be well to consider the advisability of interference on the part of the English government, and the establishment of its rule, so that the great revenues of the country might be secured and turned to account for the benefit of the whole nation. Now that the conquest was finally completed, the same important question was again discussed with Chatham in the same spirit by a representative of Clive, a Mr. Walsh.² Thomas Walpole, too, a shareholder and rich City merchant, whose opinion carried weight, declared that the constitution of the company was such as to incapacitate it from properly governing a country; the annual change of directors was an especial drawback, as rendering any uniform system impossible. He, too, was of opinion that the home government ought to take charge of 'that which is too unwieldy for a subordinate body of merchants.'³

Chatham was not inclined to take the initiative in this matter, as he feared the unpopularity which might result from such action. The circle interested was exceedingly influential; and he was at all times particularly unwilling to disturb his

¹ *Chatham Correspondence*, i. 388 ff.

² *Ibid.*, iii. 62 f.

³ *Ibid.*, iii. 61 ff.

relations with the merchant class. Yet he could not but recognise the necessity for investigation and proper regulation. He was therefore ready to countenance parliamentary action, though he would not engage himself to any definite line of policy entirely, as he agreed with Clive and Thomas Walpole. On August 28 the cabinet council, on Chatham's proposal, determined to advise the governors of the East India Company of the intention of Parliament to inquire into their affairs.¹ This step created great excitement, and aroused the suspicion that Chatham meant to impose a heavy tribute on the company.² He, however, asserted in conversation with Walsh that he had no definite measure in view, and did not wish to receive any propositions, but simply to be informed upon existing facts. The matter must, he said, be decided by Parliament, the members of which came from all different parts of the kingdom, and were thus in a position to throw new light on the question before coming to a decision.³ Chatham's colleagues, however, especially Lord Shelburne as secretary of the southern department, and Charles Townshend as chancellor of the exchequer, occupied themselves in evolving schemes. Shelburne proposed to limit the company's dividend to ten per cent. and to place any remaining profits at the disposition of Parliament.⁴ Townshend displayed, to Chatham's annoyance, a disposition to favour the company. He then suddenly adopted opposite tactics, and thus gave rise to a suspicion that he was making use of his position to speculate.⁵ On September 24 a general meeting of the East India proprietors was held, at which the directors, doubtless in anticipation of the approaching intervention by Parliament, proposed a dividend of only eight per cent., giving as their reason that they did not yet possess their great revenue in hard cash, and that large war debts were outstanding. But only a few of those present, among them Thomas Walpole, supported this proposal. The majority decided to make the dividend ten per cent., which decision was regarded as a thrust at the government.⁶

¹ Walpole, *George III.*, ii. 391.

² Prussian ambassador's report of September 5, 1766.—Berlin Archives.

³ *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 93 ff.

⁴ Fitzmaurice, *Life of Lord Shelburne*, ii. 19 f.

⁵ Walpole, ii. 394; *Grenville Correspondence*, iii. 323.

⁶ *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 344 f.; *Grenville Correspondence*, iii. 323 f.

On November 25 the question came before Parliament. Chatham's friend, Beckford, moved to take into consideration the state of the East India Company's affairs; and the motion was carried by 129 to 76 votes. But this very success, which made a conflict with the powerful East India Company probable, destroyed the harmony of the ministry. Several of the Rockingham Whigs refused to have any share in measures which threatened the interests of the commercial classes. Defection began. Only one of the highest posts, the admiralty, became vacant by the resignation of Admiral Saunders; but four other important personages—the Duke of Portland, Lord Scarborough, Lord Bessborough, and Lord Monson—and two other lords of the admiralty, Meredith and Keppel, also resigned.¹ Chatham found himself, as once before, compelled to seek support from the Duke of Bedford, for whose friends there were now sufficient appointments vacant. Negotiations were begun, and Chatham might have succeeded in his endeavour if the duke had not made such excessive demands for posts and honours that the king at last refused his consent.² He himself promised Chatham the warmest and most effectual support, in order to induce him to abandon all thoughts of alliance with the Bedford party. Finally Sir Edward Hawke was appointed to the admiralty, and the other offices were given to adherents of Bute.

On December 9 the Indian question again came before Parliament.³ In the House of Commons Beckford moved for inspection of the company's charters and treaties, of its revenue in Bengal, and for an account of its expenditure. A lively debate ensued, in which the most famous speakers on both sides took part. Grenville and Burke opposed the motion, and the latter took the opportunity to attack Chatham. 'But perhaps,' said he, 'this house is not the place where our reasons can be of any avail: the *great person* who is to determine on this question may be a being far above our view; one so immeasurably high, that the greatest abilities (pointing to Mr. Townshend), or the most amiable dispositions that are to be found in this house (pointing to Mr. Conway), may not gain access to him; a being before whom "thrones, domina-

¹ Walpole, ii. 395; Thackeray, ii. 99; *Grenville Correspondence*, iii. 390.

² *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 135; *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 335 ff.

³ Walpole, ii. 403; *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 144 f.

tions, principedoms, virtues, powers (waving his hand all this time over the treasury-bench, behind which he sat), all veil their faces with their wings"; but though our arguments may not reach him, probably our prayers may!' He then began a solemn prayer to the Great Minister above, who rules and governs all things, to have mercy, and not to destroy the work of his own hands; to have mercy on the public credit, of which he had made so free and large a use. Here the Speaker called him to order, on which he added: 'I have often suffered under persecution of order, but did not expect its lash while at my prayers. I venerate the great man, and speak of him accordingly.' It was Chatham's commanding position, the docility of the other ministers, and at the same time the frequent absences and the secluded life of the great statesman, to which Burke chose to direct attention in this satirical manner. But his chief argument against the measure was that an inspection of the company's charters, treaties, etc., which would naturally lead to unpleasant disclosures, would impair the credit of the country.

As no decision was secured before the House adjourned for Christmas, the debate was continued in 1767. In the interval the company's representatives, alarmed by the intervention of the House of Commons, and bearing in mind the disagreeable circumstance that their charter would expire in a few years, tried to make as favourable terms with the government as possible. They were particularly anxious to establish their right of ownership in the conquered provinces. In February, after Parliament had met, but while Chatham was still detained at Bath by his gout, they made certain definite, and not particularly modest, proposals.¹ They desired that they should be confirmed in possession of their late acquisitions; that their charter should be renewed for a period of not less than fifty years; and that they should be entitled to distribute a dividend to be fixed subsequently. In return, the surplus profits were to be divided between the shareholders and the country, and £500,000 were to be paid for the new charter. Such daring demands would not have been made but for Townshend's avowal of his belief that Parliament was likely to agree.² Chatham was furious, and declared

¹ *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 196, note.

² Shelburne to Chatham, February 1, 1767.—*Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 183.

that the audacity of the company was due to the want of unanimity in the cabinet. He insisted that the settlement of the question of the company's right to their enormous revenue must precede every other measure, as the directors were simply endeavouring by their proposals to distract attention from this main point at issue, and to tempt the government to make counter-demands, which would be equivalent to a recognition of the company's right to the revenue.¹ Chatham's position was undoubtedly correct. To begin negotiations on the subject of the amount to be paid by the company out of its territorial revenues for the assistance received from government and for the renewal of its charter, was a sufficient acknowledgment of legal ownership. This was the last solution of the problem that Chatham desired. He would have liked the state to take over the government of all the territory acquired in India; for this would have provided the country with resources already enormous, and capable of increase. The company's proposals seemed to him quite beneath consideration. Unable to refrain from passionate expression to his displeasure, he threw the document containing the proposals into the fire in the presence of the directors who had been deputed to wait on him.² But unfortunately he could not reckon with any certainty upon the support of his colleagues or of Parliament, especially as it would be impossible for him to exercise any personal influence on proceedings before the beginning of March. Nevertheless, he held fast to his demand that the affair should be submitted to the decision of the two Houses. He himself would take action in the matter simply as a member of the House of Lords.³

We need not pursue the details of this affair, as Chatham was unable to take much share in them. Suffice it to say that nothing final was decided. In May it was determined, by both Houses of Parliament, that the dividend for the remaining years of the charter's existence must not exceed ten per cent.⁴ It is enough for us to understand Chatham's

¹ *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 199 f.

² Prussian ambassador's report of March 10, 1767.—Berlin Archives.

³ Chatham to Grafton, February 23, 1767.—*Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 219.

⁴ Adolphus, *History of England*, i. 301.

attitude in the matter, and to have seen how his intentions and efforts were defeated, not by his ill-health alone, but also by the power of vested interests.

The relations of the country with the Bourbon powers were always of peculiar importance to Chatham. It was the threatening attitude of these powers which shaped his whole foreign policy. We have seen how he attempted to provide against the attacks which he feared from them. New ambassadors, who possessed the confidence of the prime minister, were now appointed to both courts. The Earl of Rochford went to Paris, Sir James Gray to Madrid. From the minute private instructions delivered to both we learn what Chatham's policy was.¹ It was from him alone that the directions emanated, although Shelburne may have drawn them up in the form in which they were communicated to the ambassadors.

These ministers were, in the first place, charged to watch the strict fulfilment of the stipulations of the peace of Paris. Rochford received special instructions not to permit the fortification of Dunkirk; he was to find out if any such breach of contact were planned, but not, as his predecessor had done, by a personal visit to the town on his way to Paris. This proceeding on the part of the late ambassador had given offence. The principal injunction given to Gray was to procure the payment of the Manila debt, of which, so Chatham expressly ordered, no part was to be remitted. In a meeting of the cabinet council it had, however, been determined to combine this matter with another question in order to facilitate a settlement.² The English had recently founded a colony in the Falkland Islands, which the Spaniards regarded as part of their South American dominions. They themselves had settlements there. England might possibly relinquish her claims to any ownership in these islands if Spain were prepared to discharge the Manila debt.

The ambassadors were also charged to procure exact information regarding the relations between the two Bourbon powers; it was especially enjoined on them to discover the exact nature of the private family compact and of other

¹ The appointments were made in October 1766. The instructions are to be found among the Foreign Office Records, Public Record Office.

² Cabinet council of October 15, 1766.—Chatham MSS.

contracts. Chatham desired information regarding certain cessions of territory which France and Spain had made to each other abroad, as these might materially affect the English colonies. At this particular moment rumours were current of a cession of the Falkland Islands to France.¹ He furthermore directed the ambassadors to be on their guard lest a commercial treaty should be concluded between the two countries, by which Spain favoured France to the disadvantage of England.

The relations between the Bourbon powers and other European nations were of almost equal interest to the English prime minister. He feared that others besides the family might be drawn into the family compact. Austria he regarded with particular suspicion. He therefore wished the ambassadors to discover if marriages or alliances of any nature were proposed. Nor were the northern nations forgotten. He was especially anxious to discover on what terms the two powers stood with Prussia. The refusal with which his offer of an alliance had been received, could not fail to awaken the suspicion that King Frederick had in some way connected himself with England's enemies.

But it was of still more importance to Chatham to learn exactly what economic and military progress France and Spain had been making. He knew perfectly well, so we gather from these instructions, that it was not the want of resources, not poverty, not incapacity, not numerical inferiority, which had led to the defeat of the two countries; their failure had been due to insufficient preparation, bad leadership, and temporary financial disorder. Their heavy losses of territory and the desire to retrieve their military honour would, Chatham felt sure, spur them to repair their former gross neglect and to regain in a new war what they had lost in the last. Energetic improvement in all domains was, therefore, to be expected, and, in particular, a thorough reorganisation of both the military and naval forces. The ambassadors were charged to send exact information upon these points, so that Chatham might know what danger was in store and take diplomatic measures accordingly. They were also to try to find out if France kept up relations with the American Indian tribes and with the French inhabitants

¹ Report by the Prussian ambassador, October 17, 1766.—Berlin Archives.

of the lost colonies, which might facilitate their re-conquest. Chatham wished to discover what intermediaries were used. He suspected the Catholic priests, and consequently took much interest in the attack on the Jesuit order, which had acquired great influence in Canada.

With the fear of a new war before him, Chatham endeavoured to improve the chances of his own country by ordering Sir James Gray to collect as much information as possible regarding the state of the Spanish colonies in America, their reported strained relations with the mother-country, and the defensive capacities of all their fortified stations. The ambassador was directed to procure maps and plans of the different Spanish possessions and their coasts, either printed or drawn by hand, and, before sending them, to find out to what extent they might be regarded as reliable. Hence it is clear that Chatham proposed to aim severe blows at the Spanish colonial empire, the weakness of which was displayed in 1762, and appeared to promise a good chance of success. Nevertheless we are able to trace a certain similarity between his present Spanish policy and that which he pursued at an earlier period. It is still France which he regards as the principal enemy; it is France which he is bent on defeating; with Spain he would prefer to be at peace. He gives particular injunctions to his ambassador to embrace every opportunity of influencing public opinion in Spain in favour of England; he is to impress upon all with whom he comes in contact how unwillingly England entered into the war with Spain, a power with which she felt herself connected by so many interests. The very choice of Sir James Gray as ambassador bespoke this friendly tendency; for Sir James had been English envoy at Naples, and whilst there had won the special favour of Charles III., the King of Sicily. Chatham's real aim was, if possible, to detach Spain from France, with which country alone he would then proceed to settle accounts. If, however, he did not succeed in carrying out this plan, he was prepared, with the superior fleet at his disposal, to inflict severe damage on the Spanish colonial empire. His policy in 1761 had been exactly the same, whereas Bute, in the following year, had immediately exerted himself to win the friendship of France.

Such were the main features of Chatham's foreign policy. In certain cases he made attempts which ended in speedy

failure; in others he merely, as it were, sketched the outlines of a policy, which he proved unable to carry into effect. His administration of home and colonial affairs was attended with equal ill-success. The new system, the superiority of which had been so loudly proclaimed, proved a complete failure, the reasons for which will be explained as far as possible.

CHAPTER XI

HOME AND COLONIAL POLICY

CHATHAM entered upon office with many plans for improving the condition of the people and of the national finances.¹ He hoped to keep down the price of food, to provide better markets for the manufactures of the country, and to diminish the national debt. Unfortunately he could carry out but few of these projects. During the first months of his administration such attention as he was able to devote to economic matters was entirely occupied by the dearth from which the country was then suffering.

Throughout the year 1766 the weather had been particularly unfortunate. From March to August rain had fallen almost every day, so that the grain crops were damaged and the harvest practically ruined.² At Burton Pynsent, as in other places, the fields had been devastated by floods, of which Lady Chatham sent graphic descriptions to her husband in London.³ August happened to coincide with the expiration of the two years' term during which the king had been empowered by legislation to prohibit the export of grain.⁴ Consequently, at the very moment when it was all-important to ensure a sufficiency of food for the people, grain began to be exported to the continent, where there had also been a general failure of crops. Numbers of farmers, too, kept back their corn in expectation of making great profits later, and prices rose accordingly.

¹ Prussian ambassador's report, September 2, 1766.—Berlin Archives.

² Thackeray, *History of the Earl of Chatham*, ii. 87.

³ Chatham MSS.

⁴ *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 345. Report of the Prussian ambassador, September 9.—Berlin Archives.

Naturally complaints and appeals to the government flowed in from all sides. In answer to these Chatham began by reviving an old law of Edward VI. against 'forestallers and regraters.' He also planned the establishment of county grain-magazines.¹ This last measure had been employed with success in Prussia in regulating the prices of grain; but any immediate result was naturally impossible. The export premiums formerly in existence were abolished. But these measures did not suffice to keep prices moderate, and the lower classes became apprehensive and excited. There were riots throughout the country. In the western counties these were of a very serious nature.² Farmhouses were wrecked; the corn was carried off to prevent the possibility of its exportation, or was sold at prices fixed by the rioters. Where there was any suspicion of concealment of stores the barns were burned down. Complete prohibition of export was loudly demanded.

Chatham convoked a meeting of the cabinet council on September 23,³ to deliberate on the best mode of action. All agreed that the urgent demand of the nation for an embargo on the export of wheat must be acceded to, for such repressive measures as had been immediately taken were not sufficient to prevent further mischief. The difficulty, however, was to legalise the step which they proposed to take, which was constitutionally possible for the king alone, with the consent of Parliament. But Parliament had adjourned, and according to established custom forty days' notice must be given before it could meet.⁴ Thus the beginning of November would be reached before any parliamentary decision could be taken, and in the interval much mischief might happen. A precipitate summons, such as was permissible in the case of invasion or rebellion, would alarm the country and withdraw at the most dangerous time the persons whose authority was requisite to the preserving of order. These considerations determined the ministers to take action supported

¹ Report of the Prussian ambassador, September 23, 1766.—Berlin Archives. Walpole, ii. 259 f.

² Report of the Prussian ambassador, September 23, 1766.—Berlin Archives. *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 73.

³ Shelburne to Chatham, September 20, 1766.—Chatham MSS.

⁴ This is explained by Chatham in his speech of November 11.—*Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 125 ff.

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by the consent of the king's privy council. They felt convinced that this step, urgently demanded by the public welfare, would be approved by Parliament.

The privy council accordingly assembled on September 24. A severe attack of gout prevented Chatham from attending; he was obliged to vote by letter.¹ A committee was appointed to investigate the matter, and by the evening of the same day it was resolved that no more grain-laden ships should be allowed to leave English ports. The embargo came into force at once, and Italian merchants who had come to buy wheat for Tuscany—in ordinary years Italy exported wheat—were obliged to return with their errand unaccomplished.² Though the disturbances were not entirely checked by the passing of this measure,³ they were no longer of the same generally alarming character. It now only remained to procure the assent of Parliament to what had been done, and with this object in view Chatham took steps to weaken the power of the opposition. He negotiated at Bath with the Duke of Bedford regarding government appointments for the latter's party,⁴ and though they were unable at this time, owing to personal considerations, to come to any agreement, the parliamentary action of the duke and his friends was affected at the decisive moment by the prospect of important posts. Chatham also regained a certain amount of popularity by his efforts to procure the revocation of the sentence of banishment passed on Wilkes.⁵

Parliament met on November 11. It was opened by the king with a speech from the throne which briefly referred to the dearth, the riots, and the measure passed, without mentioning the illegal nature of the order in council. This omission was a constitutional innovation, or perhaps, more strictly speaking, a restoration of pre-revolution custom. It implied that the king in council should not only be entitled, when he took autocratic action for the public benefit in a case of imperative necessity, to lenient judgment and acquittal by Parliament, but that he should actually in such cases possess the acknowledged right to act independently. The right of

¹ *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 73.

² Prussian ambassador's report, September 26, 1766.—Berlin Archives.

³ *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 90.

⁴ *Bedford Correspondence*, iii. 349 ff.

⁵ Prussian ambassador's report, November 4, 1766.—Berlin Archives.

emergency action was thus to be—not newly introduced, for in certain cases it was already exercised—but generally recognised. This implied the introduction into the English constitution of a principle subversive of the power of Parliament.

In the House of Lords, where the most eminent lawyers sat, there was an interesting and excited debate on this subject.¹ Chatham took part in it. After the introduction of the new peers and those lately raised to higher rank had taken place, Lord Spencer laid before the House an address of thanks to his majesty, in which everything that had been done was recognised as right. The opposition, however, demanded the insertion of a clause defining the rights of Parliament and providing against future usurpation of them. Certain members even demanded that a bill to this effect should be brought in. It was maintained that the king ought to have called Parliament together sooner, or have chosen other means of tranquillising the country.

In refutation of the first of these assertions Chatham spoke at some length. He began with a reference to the feelings which affected him as speaking from a new situation, in an unaccustomed place, before the most learned of lawyers, in the presence of the hereditary legislators of the realm, whilst he could not look upon the throne without remembering that it had just been filled by majesty, and by all the tender virtues which encompass it. After thus in well-chosen words introducing himself to the august assembly, he submitted the reasons, already familiar to us, which had induced him to refrain from a premature summons of Parliament. He did not omit to aim a blow at the prevailing factious spirit by observing that if he had advised the immediate calling of Parliament, the opposition would at once have made capital out of this action and have censured him for the alarm to the public. He did not enter at length into the question of the legality of the embargo, as there were others in the House better qualified than he to discuss this. He, however, read a paragraph from the writings of Locke to show how that great man held that such action, though it might not, strictly speaking, be legal, was nevertheless right.

¹ *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 125 ff., note. Prussian ambassador's report, November 14, 1766.—Berlin Archives.

Chatham was supported by Lord Northington, who brought forward more arguments in justification of the measure, and very sharply attacked by his old enemy, Lord Mansfield, who, with his accustomed juristic skill, proved the illegality of the order in council. The final decision was due to Lord Camden, who summed up the essential principle in the words, *Salus populi suprema lex*, and declared mere matters of form to be of comparative unimportance. This was, of course, an ingenious evasion of the real question, which was: Who possesses the chief and first right to define and safeguard the *salus populi*, the king or the Parliament? According to the pre-revolutionary view of the matter, it lay with the king, but since 1688 the opinion had steadily gained ground that it lay with the national representative body. This assembly ought, therefore, either to have been summoned, or to have been afterwards requested to exculpate those who had proclaimed the embargo. Camden's catchword, however, produced the effect he had desired, every one being in reality well pleased that the step had been taken. The address of thanks was voted without any amendment. A similar address was voted by the House of Commons, and the matter of the embargo could now be regarded as concluded. But another question soon gave rise to a dispute which was not decided in favour of the ministry for the reason that the prime minister did not interpose at the right moment.

Chatham employed the Christmas recess, with the exception of a few days spent at Burton Pynsent, in endeavouring to restore his health at Bath. It was his intention to return to London for the re-opening of Parliament on January 16, but an aggravation of his malady compelled him to protract his absence. This was extremely inconvenient for the king and the other ministers, as matters of special importance—the East Indian and the American questions and the settlement of the land-tax—were to be discussed at once. The king made careful inquiries into the state of the prime minister's health,¹ and Grafton urged him to return as soon as possible, since no decisive steps could be taken without his advice and co-operation.² At last, in the middle of February,

¹ Letters from Lord Bristol to Chatham, January 24 and 29, 1767.—*Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 171 and 179 f.

² *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 195.

Chatham set out for London; but before a quarter of the distance was traversed he was seized with so violent an attack of gout that he was obliged to stop at the little town of Marlborough.¹ There he engaged the whole inn for himself, his family, and his servants, and held a miniature court,² which for a short time was the centre of interest to the whole country. From the 16th to the end of February Chatham remained at Marlborough, in spite of the urgent solicitations of his colleagues. It will probably never be known whether he was really unable to travel, or whether—which in his position seemed by no means improbable—he was trying to avoid the responsibility of very important decisions. Of the reality of the illness there could be no doubt. How easy, then, to turn it to account in this way!

But presently an event occurred which restored the prime minister's powers of locomotion. On February 25 the question of the land-tax, one of the principal sources of revenue, was raised in the House of Commons.³ This tax had recently been raised to four shillings in the pound, in consequence of the heavy debt incurred during the war, and the government now proposed that the high rate should be continued. The consequence was fierce opposition on the part of the landowners and a revival of the American question. The opponents of the heavy tax declared that it was unjust to burden the English landowners in this manner, whilst the Americans, for whose sake the state debt had been incurred, evaded taxation by mutiny. All the passions which had raged at the time of the repeal of the Stamp Act were again aroused, and threatened to sweep everything before them in the House of Commons. Energetic action on the part of the government would, nevertheless, have ensured victory, since the Tory gentry never cared to oppose what they knew to be the king's wish, and most of the Whigs were in alliance with the ministry or shared its views. But the man on whom everything depended, Charles Townshend, the chancellor of the exchequer, was in this case only a nominal supporter of the ministerial policy. Privately sharing the views of the

¹ Chatham to Shelburne, February 16, 1767.—*Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 211 f.

² Walpole, *George III.*, iii. 295.

³ Report of the Prussian ambassador, March 6, 1767.—Berlin Archives.

opposition, he did not exert himself in the least. It was his desire that strong measures should be taken against the Americans. To win them by kindness and indulgence he regarded as a Utopian scheme; and he expected that a diminution of the home taxes would, more than anything else, incline Parliament to authorise such measures, with the view of opening new sources of revenue in the colonies.

It must not be imagined that Townshend had independently adopted an attitude so inconsistent with the ministerial policy. He knew perfectly well that his tactics were quite in consonance with the views of the king and the court, or, to put it more correctly, knew that he had persuaded them to acquiesce privately in his line of action. His negligence would not in itself have led to a defeat of the ministry if Parliament had not been well aware of the opinions held in the highest quarters. But, knowing what they did, the small landowners, most of them Tories, joyfully voted on the side of the opposition Lords, who wished to relieve them from their burden; and the result was that the proposed land-tax of four shillings in the pound was negatived by Parliament, the old tax of three shillings coming into force again.¹ This result produced great rejoicing, not only amongst the opponents of the ministry, but amongst the landed and agricultural classes generally. Addresses of thanks were sent to Parliament from all parts of the country.²

As soon as the news of this government defeat reached Marlborough, Chatham, in spite of his suffering condition, made ready for the journey to London.³ He appeared to be both angry and alarmed, but it may be doubted if the emotions displayed were quite sincere. Certainly none of the previous warnings which had been sent him⁴ had prevailed on him to attempt the journey; and taking former occur-

¹ *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 222 ff.; *Grenville Memoirs*, iv. 211.

² The counties of Buckingham and Essex sent delegates. Reports of the Prussian ambassador of March 6 and 13, 1767.—Berlin Archives.

³ The Prussian ambassador writes on March 17: 'Il doit pourtant paraître un peu extraordinaire à tous ceux qui ne lui sont pas aveuglement attachés, que la goutte lui donne du relâche précisément dans le moment que l'opposition commençait à devenir victorieuse. . . .'—Berlin Archives.

⁴ James Grenville, for example, had written to him on February 20: 'There is great opposition intended to four shillings in the pound. The Country Members in good number are expected to be for a reduction.'—Chatham MSS.

rences into consideration, one can hardly avoid the conclusion that he had really desired this accomplished fact, upon which, without being responsible for it, he could proceed to build.

Of course, as prime minister, he was obliged to display indignation, and to require satisfaction from the insubordinate member of the cabinet. He also allowed the king to feel his displeasure. George was particularly desirous that the ministry should appear united and strong, in spite of the recent occurrence, so that the opposition might not continue to gain ground. He wished under all circumstances to retain Chatham in office, and his desire increased as American affairs became more complicated, because in him he saw the man most capable of conducting the imminent war. It would, moreover, have seemed a kind of slavery to George if Grenville, Temple, and Bedford had returned to office. Hence, on March 2, as soon as he had heard of Chatham's arrival in London, the king announced his wish to see him, 'if it was but for a quarter of an hour. He [the king] would not talk upon business, but only wanted to have the world know that he had attended him.'¹ But Chatham was not to be mollified. Neither Lord Bristol's letter (above quoted), nor one written the following day by the king himself, induced him to comply with his majesty's wish. With many professions of devotion he declared himself still to be 'out of a condition to attend his Majesty's most gracious presence.' In order to make this assertion more credible Lady Chatham acted as her husband's secretary; the letter is in her handwriting. On the morning of the day on which it was written, however, Chatham himself was seen walking about in town with only a slight limp.²

The king found himself obliged to sacrifice his own will to that of his minister, or, at any rate, to prove his readiness to do so. He agreed that Townshend, who in the meantime had opposed another government proposal regarding East Indian affairs,³ should be dismissed, and Lord North appointed in his stead. Strangely enough, however, Lord North, for somewhat feeble reasons, declined the appoint-

¹ Letter from Bristol to Lady Chatham.—*Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 226 ff.

² Walpole, *George III.*, iii. 302.

³ Fitzmaurice, *Life of Lord Shelburne*, ii. 48.

ment;¹ there is little doubt that court influence had been at work. Another person to whom it was offered also declined; and now happened the strangest thing of all: the prime minister consented to the insubordinate minister's retention of office.² The king had extracted from Townshend a promise to refrain from opposition in future, and to act in concord with Chatham.³ Enough had, therefore, been done to save appearances, and the position remained as before. Chatham, preserving an appearance of displeasure, continued to act as prime minister, and Townshend provided for more energetic measures against the American colonies. The king now made a further attempt to renew personal intercourse with his chief counsellor; and this time he did not meet with a repulse.⁴ In reply to a letter, dated March 7, in which George adopted the friendliest possible tone, and attributed to Chatham the improvement in the attitude of the House of Commons, the latter intimated that his health was slowly improving; and on the 12th he begged his majesty's permission to wait on him at Queen's House that same morning. The conference took place, and one result of it was that a very important measure was resolved in the cabinet council held in the evening. It was a measure altogether in Townshend's spirit, which shows how little advantage Chatham had gained over him, or, possibly, had desired to gain. But, to understand this change of affairs, we must consider the last phases of the great colonial conflict.

In America, after the repeal of the Stamp Act, Chatham was the hero of the day. The colonists rightly recognised that, but for his energetic assistance, their success would have been impossible. From the legislative assembly of the province of Massachusetts Bay, the centre of the most violent disturbances, he received an address of thanks in which his efforts in behalf of the colonies,⁵ and in particular those

¹ *Memoirs of the Duke of Grafton*, p. 122 f.

² George Grenville's diary for March 8.—*Grenville Papers*, iv. 213.

³ Report of the Prussian ambassador, March 17.—Berlin Archives.

⁴ For correspondence see *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 229 ff.

⁵ Resolution of July 1766: 'Resolved unanimously that the most grateful acknowledgments of this House be made to the R. H. William Pitt, Esq., for his noble and generous efforts in the present session of Parliament in favour of the British Colonies and particularly for the display of his great abilities and his assiduous endeavours in procuring an Act for the Repeal of the Stamp Act,

which secured the repeal of the Stamp Act, received the highest praise. From the pulpits effusive panegyrics resounded.¹ 'To you,' said Mayhew, speaking to him across the ocean from the heart of the people, 'grateful America attributes that she is reinstated in her former liberties. America calls you over and over again her father; live long in health, happiness, and honor; be it late when you must cease to plead the cause of liberty on earth.' But it was impossible to prevent a great disappointment if the colonists, in the joy of victory, continued, as they were actually doing in various parts of the country, to disregard the laws passed by the home government. As minister Chatham could not allow such behaviour to pass unnoticed; and the moment he interfered his nimbus of popularity would vanish.

He made an attempt to be conciliatory and firm at the same time. New York having refused to support the royal troops, though bound by act of Parliament (the American Mutiny Act) to do so, the cabinet council at once (August 5) sent a despatch to the governor, in which, after due mention of the rights of Parliament and the leniency displayed, the hope was expressed that the province would do its duty.² Another display of insubordination occurred in Massachusetts, where the assembly refused compensation to those whose property had suffered from the late riots.³ It yielded, however, on receiving information that the sums of money due by the treasury to the colony would not be paid until this compensation was made; but the act which it passed included a clause of indemnity to the offenders in the riot, which would obviously be offensive to England. After this there was peace for some months, until, in February 1767, unfavourable intelligence began to arrive, and that at a time when the state of Chatham's health prevented him from displaying his accustomed energy. From Massachusetts came serious complaints from Governor Bernard,⁴ who was no longer supported by a majority in the assembly, and who was being thwarted in every measure he attempted to take. The conflict for sove-

and that the Speaker be desired by the first opportunity to transmit to him a letter accordingly.'—Chatham MSS.

¹ Bancroft, *History of the United States*, iii. 214.

² Chatham MSS.

³ Adolphus, *History of England in the Reign of George III.*, i. 281.

⁴ Colonial Office Reports, America and West Indies.—Public Record Office.

reignty was beginning, a conflict which it was impossible to still by indulgence. If the representative assembly could with impunity set the governor at defiance and enforce its demand for the appointment of a new and more congenial governor, then the sovereign power no longer lay with either the king or the Parliament, but with the colonial representative assemblies. It was indeed the desire for this change which inspired the whole movement. In the present instance, however, Governor Bernard did not hesitate to employ every means at his disposal to check the aspirations for autonomy. From New York unsatisfactory news came; the colonists there still refused to submit to the enactments of the home government, and a deputation of merchants was sent to England to demand concessions in those commercial matters against any interference with which the English government had hitherto jealously guarded.

The two alternative methods of dealing with the American difficulty between which it was now necessary to choose were represented in the ministry, one by Lord Shelburne, the other by Charles Townshend. We must, therefore, examine the principles by which these two statesmen were guided.

The Earl of Shelburne, a sober, cautious statesman, neither very far-sighted nor very ambitious, was sincerely anxious to carry out the wishes of his master, Chatham, as thoroughly as possible. He desired reconciliation with America, and believed that this could be best attained by carefully removing every cause of discontent that could be removed without infringing the rights of the mother-country. He was convinced that, if this policy were adopted, the crisis in English colonial affairs would be safely passed, and time gained in which to find a solid and enduring basis for the relations between the contending parties. If the confidence and attachment of the colonists were regained, they would probably submit to a tightening of the reins. All his colonial measures, which were his special department, were made in this spirit. He communicated his orders in the first place to General Gage,¹ the commander-in-chief of the royal troops in North America, as being the only government official who occupied a central position and exercised equal influence in all the

¹ Winter Correspondence of 1766-7.—Colonial Office Records; Military Correspondence, No. 123.—Public Record Office.

colonies. The first injunction was that friction of any kind with the natives was to be avoided, as leading to expenditure and thereby to disputes as to whose duty it was to supply the necessary funds. A certain Colonel Taylor, who had unnecessarily begun warfare with the Creeks in West Florida, was at once to be dismissed from his post. General Gage was further instructed to make the quartering of soldiers on the colonists as little burdensome to the latter as possible. Most of the troops were to be scattered over the newly settled and undeveloped districts, where their protection and assistance would be welcome; in the old colonies they were regarded as a burden and a menace. Shelburne also expressed his desire that, in some manner not oppressive to the colonists, a fund should be raised, out of which the cost of their administration could be defrayed. He selected for this purpose the ground-rent, which the landowners were legally bound to pay to the government for their properties, but which was very seldom paid. He did not intend to enforce retrospective payment, but henceforward these ground-rents were to be strictly required of all holders of land, and the sums thus produced would provide the royal government with a solid financial basis. Strict economy was enjoined, and Gage was instructed to take measures to prevent the smuggling which diminished the revenue.

These were, at any rate, practical, statesmanlike plans, and Shelburne did his best to carry them into execution. But the success of this conciliatory policy depended upon two conditions. In the first place, king, Parliament, and nation must be unselfish enough to resign all claim to surplus revenue from the colonies; in the second, the aim of the Americans must be restricted to the prevention of encroachment on their rights, and especially of direct taxation by Parliament; it must not extend to increased independence. Given these conditions, Shelburne's method was undoubtedly the only sound and practicable policy. But seeing that both of them were absent, the only possible line of action, unless England chose to abandon all real supremacy over her colonies, was that which his opponent (and many other statesmen) advocated with full persuasion of its ultimate success.

Charles Townshend was a man of many and brilliant gifts, clear-sighted, and strong-willed. If he sometimes displayed

levity, he nevertheless aimed high. He was a brilliant orator, and unrivalled in the House of Commons after Chatham's departure.¹ His ambition led him not only dutifully and industriously to fulfil the tasks which fell to his lot, but also to neglect no opportunity of securing his own advancement. His nature and character were thus, in certain respects, akin to Chatham's; but, unlike that statesman, he had no record of great achievements, and the king could not but hesitate to sacrifice his tried, experienced minister to him. On the other hand, however, he had the advantage of possessing no political past: he was at perfect liberty to pursue any policy which he considered correct, whereas Chatham could not renounce the principles of which he had made solemn profession.

Townshend did not consider it advisable to bargain any further with the rebellious subjects, to grant any more concessions or mitigations. His policy was to lighten the burden of the home government at their expense, and to compel them to obey the laws enacted by Parliament. He differed from Shelburne regarding the disposition of the troops, his proposal being to quarter them principally in the large towns, whereby expense would be saved and a wholesome restraint might be exercised upon the assemblies. Instead of proposing to diminish the expense of keeping the natives in check, he desired to throw it upon the colonies. And he intended, by the imposition of new port duties, to provide the mother-country with a considerable increase of revenue, out of which the cost of administration could be defrayed.

It lay with Chatham to decide which of the two policies should be adopted. He himself assumed a very remarkable attitude towards recent events. In letters to Shelburne² he is full of complaints upon the sad condition of affairs, upon the folly of the American people, who are doing the work of their worst enemies, upon the Stamp Act, of most unhappy memory, which is to blame for everything; but he expresses no sensible opinion regarding the causes of the complications and suggests no practicable plan for their removal. The enemies of America in England were sure, he averred, to take

¹ Mahon, *History of England*, v. 273.

² Chatham to Shelburne, February 3 and 7, 1767.—*Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 188 f. and 193 f.

advantage of the foolish behaviour of the colonists to arouse an irresistible storm of indignation against them. The obstinate determination of the latter not to listen to their real friends had put them into the power of their enemies. As in the matter of the East India Company, he saw nothing for it but to refer the decision to the wisdom of Parliament. This, in the case of an English prime minister, unless it was a feint, almost amounted to resignation. It was his task to create Parliamentary opinion.

There is little doubt that Chatham here again adopted the same tactics as at the time of the Wilkes affair. In order to give free scope for the pursuance of a line of action which in his inmost heart he acknowledged to be right, or which, at least, he by no means felt certain was wrong, but which he did not wish to appear to favour, he took up the position that the previous mistakes rendered further action futile and resistance useless. Whilst continuing to avow himself a supporter of Shelburne's policy, his inactivity secured the triumph of Townshend's plans. Hence it came about that, at the afore-mentioned meeting of the cabinet council on March 12, 1767,¹ severe measures were determined. A law was to be passed in Parliament prohibiting the assembly of New York from exercising its functions until the province had complied with the terms of the American Mutiny Act. Townshend ventured to propose other measures which were equally contrary to the prime minister's official policy.

But, although Chatham had permitted this one step, he had no intention that his cabinet should on its own responsibility inaugurate a perfectly new policy. He intended, as he had already intimated in his letter to Shelburne, that Parliament should make known its will and decide which policy was to be henceforth pursued. This meant that he would permit the adoption of the opposition policy in the form of a decision of Parliament. On March 30 he laid the American acts before the Upper House for examination, in the expectation that the opposition would seize the opportunity to propose an American tax.² Then a majority for the desired decisions would be obtained, and the whole would appear to be an

¹ For Grafton's and Shelburne's account of this meeting see *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 231 ff.

² Report of the Prussian ambassador, April 10, 1767. — Berlin Archives.

independent expression of the will of Parliament, to which the ministry had felt bound to yield. As the documents were laid before the House of Lords in accordance with a wish expressed by the Duke of Bedford at a previous sitting, there was nothing remarkable in the proceeding. But the opposition saw through the minister's manœuvre perfectly, and carefully refrained from doing what he wished. Lord Temple, indeed, pointedly asked Lord Chancellor Camden if the government, seeing that it was bringing up the American question again, had no proposals to make. Camden answered that the papers were laid on the table simply because the Duke of Bedford had asked that they should be produced, whereupon Temple recommended that, as the duke was not present, they should be deposited in the document repository of the House until he came to give an opinion upon them.

It was the failure of this attempt which induced the prime minister again, and permanently, to retire from public life. Deprived by it of the last plausible reason for adopting the new policy, he left the responsibility for future events to his colleagues, who were not committed to principles, as he was. Strangely enough, a very severe attack of gout came on at this very time, and obliged him to retire to the solitude of Hampstead and take to bed. His administration was now practically at an end, although it was long before the king, who had an extreme dislike to changing his ministers, could make up his mind to part with the statesman whom it had cost him so much trouble to enlist in his service.

CHAPTER XII

ILLNESS AND RESIGNATION

It is undoubtedly the saddest period in the life of our hero that we have now to consider. Profound pity is the one and only feeling as we observe his great mind from time to time giving way under the strain of illness and disappointment, and are confronted with actions which can hardly be regarded as those of a reasonable man. Yet we cannot allow the problematical events of this period to pass before us without at least making an attempt to discover the correct explanation of them.

There was certainly something very remarkable about Chatham's disease. Its most violent attacks, which rendered him incapable of attending to business, always occurred on special occasions, when the opposition had won an advantage, or when some scheme of his own had failed; hence the opinion that his illness was only feigned, especially as he would at times appear in town whilst proclaiming himself a helpless invalid. It was the belief of many that he was simply waiting for a more favourable conjuncture of affairs to resume action. But others, to whom his political action as a whole seemed utterly incomprehensible—we know what contradictions it contained—believed that the gout had attacked his head and nerves and produced mental derangement. They were confirmed in this opinion by the excitement which Chatham displayed on occasions when he was compelled to attend to business whilst suffering. At one time he would burst into tears, at another be seized with a fit of trembling.¹ In private life, too, his behaviour excited remark. He became very extravagant; he did not shrink from great outlay in purchasing houses and land to free himself from intrusive neighbours;

¹ Walpole, *George III.*, ii. 319 f.

he could not even bear to have his own children under the same roof with him.¹ Ridiculous sums were spent on the adornment of the grounds of Burton Pynsent; an extensive hillside was planted with cedars and cypresses which had to be carted from London. Chatham drove in a coach and six, with ten outriders, in the manner of the richest nobles of the day, though it was a style quite beyond his means.² His sickly and uncertain appetite added greatly to the expense of housekeeping. It was always uncertain when he would desire to eat; a succession of chickens had to be kept boiling and roasting at every hour, so that one might be ready whenever he should call. These particulars of his behaviour are derived from so reliable a source that we have no reason to doubt them.

Many were disposed to attribute this apparent derangement to the treatment adopted by the physician to whose charge Chatham had recently confided himself, Dr. Anthony Addington.³ Addington, a man of over sixty, was considered a gout specialist, but Horace Walpole regarded him as a kind of superior charlatan, and believed that he had succeeded in driving the gout from the limbs to the inward parts, where it attacked the heart and other chief organs. This was a fanciful, scientifically untenable theory, suggested to Walpole by the change which undoubtedly took place in the manifestations of the disease. It is probable that the malady, which was now of long standing, without any injurious interference on the part of the doctor, began to affect the kidneys and the heart, thereby acquiring a more dangerous character, a common enough occurrence with gout. Nor is it likely that Dr. Addington was a charlatan, for the king afterwards chose him as his own physician. At the time now in question, however, his majesty, too, seems to have been prejudiced against him, for he advised that, after the fever had been cured, Addington should be dismissed. He himself, he said jestingly, would be Chatham's doctor. He prescribed four months in the country—not at Bath, which was too far from London, but at Tunbridge Wells, the waters of which spa would have the same effect.⁴

¹ See Walpole, iii. 30 f.

² For Addington see Walpole, ii. 320.

⁴ Walpole, iii. 11.

³ Bancroft, ii. chap. xvii.

If we carefully examine all the accounts preserved of Chatham's illness—including a number of letters from Addington to Chatham and his wife¹—we cannot but come to the conclusion that a real and very grave malady existed, which explained behaviour otherwise very remarkable and which prevented him from fulfilling the duties of his office. Unprejudiced persons who saw him wrote of his strangely nervous behaviour and of his weakness and pallor;² and the medicines prescribed and directions for diet given by his physician make it almost impossible to believe in mere simulation. Lady Chatham at times would not allow him to drive out without a servant sitting by him in the carriage,³ a precaution which gave fresh vigour to the reports spread of his mental weakness. It was remembered that his sister (doubtless Elizabeth Villiers-Pitt) had been subject to mental disorder of the same kind.⁴

It was impossible, however, notwithstanding the reality of the malady, to fail to see a connection between political events and Chatham's state of health. It was plain that he grew worse, and less capable of taking action, as soon as insurmountable difficulties presented themselves. It is permissible, therefore, to assume that such situations affected him very injuriously, both in body and mind, that they increased his suffering and produced relapses.⁵ Hence at the very junctures when it was most imperative that he should take decisive action, he was overcome by a morbid fear of undertaking state business, and his wife consequently employed every means in her power to keep it from him. Nor is it difficult to understand how Pitt's nervous system, weakened by great and long-continued physical suffering, should have been seriously affected by the disappoint-

¹ Among the Chatham MSS. there is a small packet of letters from him, but they do not contain much valuable information, as they do not relate to the serious attacks, or the times specially important to us; on these occasions the doctor was in personal attendance.

² See *Grenville Papers*, iv. 123 f., 157 f., 180.

³ Lady Chatham to Lord Temple.—*Grenville Papers*, iv. 9.

⁴ Prussian ambassador's report of May 5, 1767: 'Il doit être d'une tristesse et d'une langueur qui font craindre qu'il ne tombe dans le même état d'imbécillité où une de ses sœurs s'est trouvée, il y a quelque temps.'—Berlin Archives.

⁵ Prussian ambassador's report of August 18, 1767: 'On nomme présentement sa maladie une fièvre sur les nerfs, occasionnée par ses longues et fréquentes rechutes de la goutte, et envenimée par une profonde mélancholie, qui, à ce qu'on prétend, tire sa source du repentir dont son esprit doit être agité de ce qu'il s'est embarqué dans les affaires.'—Berlin Archives.

ment of high hopes (in particular the frustration of the triple alliance scheme), by the troubles resulting from the rebellious spirit of America, by the hindrances constantly placed in his way by an embittered opposition, by the manifold personal attacks to which he was exposed, and by the threatened collapse of his ministry. The resulting condition, the craving for alleviation or distraction, produced requirements which admit of none but a pathological explanation, and which occasioned the remarkable behaviour in private life already described.

There were several reasons why Chatham could not bring himself to resign and pass the remainder of his life in well-earned leisure. Chief among these was, probably, the king's earnest desire and constant entreaty that he would remain at the head of affairs. The name in itself, the Chatham administration, was of the greatest importance to George; it kept the hostile foreign powers in check, for Chatham's was a name which still inspired them with profound respect; and it restrained the Americans from many an illegal act which they would have committed without hesitation if another minister had been in office. But it is also to be remembered that, in spite of physical frailty and mental depression, the old ambition was by no means extinct. Chatham still hoped for a recovery of his powers and an improvement in the position of affairs, which would make new achievements possible. Complications increased daily, and though he did not see his way to disentangle them, and prevent the threatening storm, he felt capable of commanding the ship of the state and weathering the gale safely. He did not wish to incur the blame for the approaching disaster, therefore he shrank from making himself responsible for decisive measures, and would not reassume the practical leadership even when his health would have permitted. But after the calamity, for which he was not responsible, had fallen on the nation, he would bestir himself, enter the lists, and win the victor's laurels. It was certainly unnecessary that he should with this object remain continuously in office. He could count upon recall in the hour of need. And at last, when the cabinet refused altogether to listen to his advice, he definitely resigned. But pecuniary considerations, as well as others, induced him to retain as long as possible the appointment which gave him little trouble and

was highly profitable. Even with his official income he could not make ends meet; without it he would sink much deeper into debt. Consequently he held on until circumstances made retirement inevitable.

To return to American matters. Since Chatham lay ill and refused to give any advice, the other ministers were obliged to act on their own responsibility. In cabinet councils, held on April 24 and May 1, they resolved upon the measures to be proposed to Parliament.¹ It was by no means Townshend alone who urged energetic action. The most varied ideas were propounded as to the right way of dealing with the colonists. One suggestion was that the governors should receive authority to distribute billets assigning quarters to the soldiers, as they deemed advisable. Another was that the salaries of officials should be at once deducted from the first taxes collected. And yet another, that all utterances, spoken or written, against the unlimited legislative power of Parliament should be made punishable offences. The suggestion that extra port duties should be imposed was not made by Townshend, and was at first unfavourably received by the majority. The only measure which originated with him was that suspending the powers of the New York legislature; and this he also managed to carry. The cabinet eventually decided, first, to request Parliament to pass an act for the above suspension, to hold good until the colony thought fit to comply with the terms of the Mutiny Act; secondly, to propose the establishment of a board of customs in America, by means of which payment should be assured of the duties intended to cover the expense of administration. These duties, which were to be laid upon certain wares already selected, would secure the salaries of the government officials, who would thus be more independent of the legislatures.

On May 13 these pregnant proposals, announcing a fresh departure from the policy of indulgence and conciliation, were laid before the House of Commons by Townshend, who thereby made himself responsible for them to the colonies and to the world. During the course of the long debates which ensued he made his dominating position

¹ See Shelburne's report to Chatham of April 26, 1767.—Chatham MSS. Bancroft, *History of the United States*, III. chap. xix.

sufficiently plain; he even ventured to attack the prime minister and his representative.¹ He declared that, though Chatham and Grafton were meritorious statesmen, who at times had valuable ideas, yet their plans were occasionally so immature that they would require to be ripened in a forcing-house. Townshend's bills were passed, in spite of all the efforts of a divided opposition, which, however, in spite of its divisions, was strong enough to rouse in the ministry serious apprehensions of defeat on other questions upon which Rockingham and Grenville did not hold such diametrically opposite opinions as on that of America.² In this predicament Grafton appealed to Chatham; but it required a letter from the king himself³ to induce Chatham to see the duke. When they met, Grafton explained that an attempt must be made to win over either Bedford or Rockingham to their side; and with great trouble he elicited from Chatham an opinion in favour of the former.⁴ But the general impression which he received was that he must expect no more support from Chatham, and must in future conduct the affairs of the state on his own responsibility.

The situation was further complicated towards the end of June, when General Conway attempted to leave the sinking government ship;⁵ his withdrawal seemed to presage a defection of all the members of the old Newcastle faction. King George once more turned to Chatham for advice, but Chatham could say nothing but that the king must endeavour to prevail upon Grafton and Townshend to remain. Grafton, however, was determined that under no consideration whatever would he retain his post if Conway resigned.⁶ Fortunately the knowledge of this fact induced General Conway to continue for the time being to discharge his duties as leader of the House of Commons. One consequence of these occurrences was that, after the prorogation of Parliament in the beginning of June, Grafton, instead of attempting to ally himself with the Duke of Bedford as Chatham had advised, sought alliance

¹ Prussian ambassador's report of May 19, 1767.—Berlin Archives.

² *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 257 f.

³ *Ibid.*, iii. 260 ff.

⁴ *Grafton Memoirs*, p. 138.

⁵ *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 275 ff.

⁶ Grafton to Lady Chatham, July 31, 1767.—*Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 281.

with the Marquis of Rockingham, believing this to be the surest means of preventing Conway's resignation. But he was unsuccessful. The marquis was not disposed to place his influence and his ability at the service of the Chatham administration; his wish was to undertake the charge of affairs at the head of his own party. This, however, was not the king's desire. The negotiations came to nothing. Chatham had taken no share in them, notwithstanding the appeals of the king; he answered that the state of his health rendered him quite incapable of attending to business.¹ Fortunately for the government, more favourable intelligence arrived from America about this time. The assembly of New York had voted a sum of money for the support of the troops, a proceeding which Shelburne immediately recognised as compliance with the disputed clause of the Mutiny Act. He intimated to the governor that the decree of suspension was no longer to be enforced.² This was, however, a hazardous act of clemency; it was almost certain to encourage the Americans in their wilfulness, and to arouse the indignation of their enemies in England.

A man now appeared in London who felt himself capable of ending the terrible confusion of public affairs and offered his advice. This was old Lord Holland (Henry Fox). He was a practical politician, whose sight was unobscured by illusions, and knew exactly in what manner it was possible to establish in the corrupted state a strong government, against which no opposition would have any power. What he had never doubted was becoming daily more obvious, that the changing winds of popularity, and the irregular and contrary currents of party, made progress impossible. To bring the will of Parliament and the will of the king into unison by the excellence of the object aimed at, as Chatham proposed to do, was, under existing conditions, a chimerical scheme, which would end in shipwreck. There was only one means which made steady advance possible, in spite of wind and current. This was the proper application and the full employment of the power of the Crown. In the reign of George II. this influence had never been felt, because it had been divided

¹ Report of the Prussian ambassador, July 14, 1767.—Berlin Archives.

² Fitzmaurice, *Life of Lord Shelburne*, ii. 60; Prussian ambassador's report of July 17, 1767.—Berlin Archives.

between the king and the heir-apparent. At the time of the peace Fox had attempted to introduce a system upon this basis, but the king himself and the favourite had deserted him. Since then he had contented himself with looking on, watching the two going their own way and experiencing one disappointment after another. Whatever ministry they formed, there was invariably an opposition to undermine its foundations. They had set their last hopes on Chatham, and now he, too, had succumbed to the force of circumstances. It seemed to Fox, now Lord Holland, that the moment had arrived for him to come forward again with his theory.¹ He maintained to the doubting Horace Walpole that the King of England could always make what ministry he pleased, that he might make a peer first minister and could maintain him so, if he but set about it in the right way. There had been no necessity whatever, he declared, to take so much trouble to retain Conway in office; it would have been easy to fill his place.

Holland had no longer any ambition to take the reins of government into his own hand; he felt that he was too old and feeble; but he desired to see the triumph of his political theory and to assist the king to replace the many formidable complications with a stable administration. On July 22 he had an audience with his majesty,² during the course of which he explained his system. The whole influence of the Crown—its rights and powers, favours and punishments, the bestowal of posts, titles, pensions, promotions in the army and navy—all this and every other available means were to be employed to create a docile Parliament, and thus to invalidate any attempt at opposition to the measures of the government. Forty years' experience had convinced Holland that this was the only effectual remedy. It would spare the king the necessity of humouring influential politicians in order to induce them to take office; any of his lords-in-waiting could, when required, enter the cabinet.

It cannot be asserted that the king adopted this plan at once and without reservation. He shrank from the odium which he would thereby incur, from the danger to his popularity and to the reputation, as a strictly constitutional

¹ Walpole, *George III.*, iii. 49.

² Prussian ambassador's report of September 4, 1767.—Berlin Archives.

monarch, which he valued. We observe him continuing to tack and trim. He would not follow the advice of his ministers in September, to dissolve Parliament before the usual time. He declared that as long as lawful means were at his disposal he would not have recourse to such as were abhorrent to the nation.¹ Nevertheless he did not despise or neglect Holland's suggestions. He felt that in them he had something to fall back on; they gave him hope for the future and enabled him to adopt a more decided tone. Nor did he oppose the extensive preparations which Bute and his friends were already making for the election in the following year, for which purpose they were dispensing crown favours with unprecedented liberality.² The royal coffers, which were in a very empty condition, were untouched, and the work was done at the expense of the country and of the opposition.

Chatham remained till the end of August in London, where he had another very severe attack of his malady. For a long time he was confined to bed,³ entirely occupied with thoughts of death.⁴ Towards the end of July he fell into a condition of complete apathy.⁵ He got up, but sat all day at a table, supporting his head in his hands, and taking no notice of any one. Lady Chatham only paid him short visits. When he wanted anything he knocked on the floor with a stick, and then avoided all unnecessary words, generally making known his desire by signs. In the middle of August he was again so ill that Lady Chatham procured a power of attorney qualifying her to transact all his business.⁶ His condition gave rise

¹ Report of the Prussian ambassador, September 18, 1767.—'Les ministres commençant à craindre de ne pas pouvoir s'assurer de la pluralité à la prochaine séance du Parlement, ont proposé au Roi de la dissoudre, immédiatement après sa rentrée, et de gérer seul les affaires jusqu'à l'assemblée de nouveau. Sa Maj. n'a cependant pas goûté cet expédient et leur a répondu, qu'aussi longtemps qu'Elle pourrait se servir des voies légales, Elle ne voulait pas recourir à des moyens odieux à la nation.'—Berlin Archives.

² Prussian ambassador's report of September 4, 1767.—Berlin Archives.

³ *Grenville Papers*, iv. 38.

⁴ Prussian ambassador's report of July 14, 1767: 'Occupé du matin au soir de l'idée de sa maladie et se croyant mort au moindre mouvement de son corps, il ne fait que demander à sa femme, au médecin et aux assistants, s'il ne va expirer à l'instant, idée qui le fait trembler au delà de toute expression.'—Berlin Archives.

⁵ *Grenville Papers*, iv. 123 f.

⁶ *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 282, note.

to the gravest fears; the physicians had so little hope of his recovery that they considered it necessary to inform him of his danger during a lucid interval, information which he received with perfect resignation.¹ A few days later, on August 20, Dr. Addington declared that, although the prostration was excessive, his patient's head was so clear that recovery might be hoped for, an opinion which was literally accepted.² On the 24th he was still considered to be in great danger, because of his extreme emaciation. It was believed that nothing but an attack of gout could save him.³ But a change for the better had undoubtedly taken place, for Dr. Addington now decreed a change of air to be necessary, regarding a journey as not only possible, but likely to be beneficial. Hence on the 28th Lady Chatham begged that the king would permit her husband to travel into Somersetshire, a request which was willingly granted.⁴

At the beginning of September, therefore, Chatham went down to Burton Pynsent, accompanied by Dr. Addington, who was, however, soon called away by the dangerous illness of his own son.⁵ Chatham remained at Burton for some weeks, and thence reports of decided improvement in his condition reached town.⁶ The country air reinvigorated him and gradually dispelled the melancholy which had taken hold of him. In the course of a few weeks he was able to walk out and did not mind being seen. But he would not yet have anything to do with business. To Grafton's appeals he returned the stereotyped answer that the state of his health did not permit him to think on political subjects.⁷ Towards the end of October he went to Bath,⁸ to complete his cure. His

¹ Prussian ambassador's report of August 18, 1767: 'La maladie du Comte Chatham empire de jour en jour, et selon les apparences il sera bientôt fait de lui. Une personne bien instruite . . . m'a dit que son état actuel était pire que la mort. Les médecins désespèrent aussi de son rétablissement, et l'ont fait informer, il y a quelques jours, dans un de ses bons intervalles, de la crise où il se trouve actuellement, nouvelle qu'il a reçue avec beaucoup de résignation.'

—Berlin Archives.

² *Grenville Papers*, iv. 154.

³ *Ibid.*, iv. 157 f.

⁴ *Grafton Memoirs*, 169 f.; *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 282 f.

⁵ *Grenville Papers*, iv. 163.

⁶ Prussian ambassador's report of September 25, 1767.—Berlin Archives.

⁷ *Ibid.*, October 6, 1767.

⁸ *Ibid.*, October 30, 1767.

improvement continued; he was soon able to ride, and, although still thin and pale, seemed to be in a much more satisfactory condition.¹ Lord Camden and Mr. Thomas Walpole were also taking the waters at Bath at this time; but Pitt seems still to have avoided holding intercourse with any one, and this in so marked a manner as to confirm the opinion that his mind was affected.²

At this time a desire took possession of him to regain his old property at Hayes.³ It seems to have been an idea which preyed upon his mind, for we find Lady Chatham doing everything that lay in her power to effect the purchase, although they had no ready money at their disposal. It was not even with the view of living at Hayes that Chatham coveted the possession of the place—this could have been arranged without purchase—he simply desired to own it again. On October 24 Lady Chatham wrote to Mr. Thomas Walpole, begging that he would allow them to buy back the property.⁴ She pathetically dwelt upon the benefit which he would thereby confer upon her husband and his children and children's children. Walpole replied that he was very averse to parting with the place, on which he had laid out much money; but he offered Lord Chatham the use of the house for a month, or for the whole summer, and proposed to remove his own family from it at once. This offer Lady Chatham declined, and again urged him to sell. Mr. Walpole consulted Lord Camden, and then unwillingly decided to part with the place, as he would not run the risk of the charge of retarding Lord Chatham's recovery. The re-purchase was concluded in November, and Walpole arranged that Chatham should take possession of his old home again before Christmas. The purchase-money was provided by the sale of a part of the Pynsent estate which lay in Wiltshire. This land being already heavily mortgaged, the mortgages had to be transferred to Hayes. As land to the value of £28,000 had already been sold at Burton⁵ (probably by Lady Chatham under her power of attorney in order to pay off debts), the possessions in the west must have been considerably diminished.

¹ *Grenville Papers*, iv. 180.

² *Ibid.*, iv. 185 f.

³ See Walpole, *George III.*, iii. 30 f.

⁴ The letter is preserved among the Chatham MSS.

⁵ *Grenville Papers*, iv. 163 f.

On the other hand, Chatham now owned Hayes and a piece of land in the neighbourhood of the value of £2000, which had been bequeathed to him in the summer of 1767.¹ It seemed to be the fashion to leave legacies to Lord Chatham. At Ralph Allen's death in 1764 he had received one of £1000.

In the meantime important changes had been taking place in the political world. These were brought about by the unexpected death of Charles Townshend, the man to whom the future seemed to belong. He died on September 4, of an illness the nature of which cannot be established by the accounts given of it; it was called² 'putrid fever,' but this is a name applicable to a number of different diseases. Townshend was succeeded as chancellor of the exchequer by Lord North, the future prime minister. North was already more intimately acquainted with the king's political ideas than Townshend had been, and at a later period he did not hesitate to employ the means recommended by Lord Holland. Other changes took place after Parliament had met, when Chatham's continued absence necessitated a reinforcement of the ministry. Since an arrangement with Rockingham had proved impossible, negotiations were now begun with the Duke of Bedford, with the aim of introducing some of his friends into the government; the duke's feeble health obliged him to decline office. This change implied a stronger bias of the cabinet towards Townshend's energetic American policy, and consequently an abandonment of Shelburne's views. But it was necessary to avoid a difference with Shelburne himself, since his resignation would inevitably lead to Chatham's, which the king was determined to avoid. Hence the expedient was devised of dividing the secretaryship of the southern department into two separate appointments. Henceforward colonial affairs were to constitute the special province of a third secretary of state. Shelburne was courteously offered his choice between the two offices into which his own had been divided, but he could hardly do otherwise than choose the department of foreign affairs, since he would as secretary for the colonies have been in perpetual collision with the majority in the cabinet.³ Grafton, of course, was on his side, and

¹ *Grenville Papers*, iv. 118.

² Fitzmaurice, *Shelburne*, ii. 65.

³ *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 298 f.

would have liked him to retain the management of colonial affairs; but Grafton alone, without Chatham, was not a sufficient support, and it was evident that Chatham had no intention of interfering. Shelburne, in a long letter to Lady Chatham, requested to be informed what her husband's opinion on the matter in question was; but Chatham again made the excuse of illness, and declined to speak.¹ Shelburne thereupon resolved to retain his old office, the secretaryship of the south, leaving the colonial department, which had been separated from it, to Lord Hillsborough, a member of the Bedford faction.

The new cabinet, which resulted from the negotiations with the Duke of Bedford and was formed on December 22,² could hardly be designated a Chatham ministry. Only three of Chatham's adherents—Grafton, Camden, and Shelburne—continued to hold important political appointments, while three occupied important military posts: Lord Granby was commander-in-chief, General Conway, lieutenant-general of ordnance, and Sir Edward Hawke, first commissioner of the admiralty. Lord Northington, who retired, was succeeded as lord president by Bedford's friend, Earl Gower; Conway was succeeded as secretary of the northern department by Lord Weymouth; and Lord Hillsborough became secretary for the colonies. Although Chatham was still nominally prime minister, and Grafton in appearance leader of the government, the real power, as the American question assumed greater importance, was gradually transferred to that section of the ministry dominated by the influence of the Duke of Bedford. This change was most distasteful to the king, little as he approved of the policy of conciliation; for in the rise of the Bedford faction he saw the commencement of a return to party government. His displeasure fell chiefly on Chatham, who had promised to make such a return impossible.³ He called him 'a charlatan, who in difficult times affected ill-health, to render himself the more sought after,' a speech made in the heat of the moment, which need not be regarded as a true expression of the king's opinion.

¹ *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 292 ff.

² Prussian ambassador's report of December 22, 1767.—Berlin Archives. *Grafton Memoirs*, p. 183.

³ Bancroft, *History of the United States*, iii. 266.

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² Prussian ambassador's report of December 22, 1767.—Berlin Archives. *Grafton Memoirs*, p. 183.

³ Bancroft, *History of the United States*, iii. 266.



Duke of Grafton

As soon as Shelburne heard of the move to Hayes, which was made at the very time when the changes were taking place in the cabinet, he rode out to Bromley, where he thought he could not fail to see Chatham as he passed, and oblige him to express some opinion and give some advice upon the new political situation. But Chatham had taken a different route; to avoid passing through London he had spent the night at his sister's house at Putney, and had reached Hayes by the direct route from the west. After waiting some hours Lord Shelburne went away, leaving a letter for Lady Chatham.¹ It proved impossible for him to obtain an interview with his chief.

In 1768 the Chatham administration drew to its close, having to a great extent lost its original character. A prelude to resignation was the fact that Chatham found himself obliged at the beginning of February to give up the privy seal for a short time.² Lord Bottetort (Norborne Berkeley), a favourite at court, had speculated in the shares of an 'unincorporated' company of copper-workers at Warmley which was threatened with bankruptcy. Lord Bottetort, in order to save his private estates from the creditors, begged for the immediate incorporation of the company, after which private estates would not be liable. This would have been equivalent to a deception of the creditors. Chatham honestly refused to affix the privy seal to the deed of incorporation, affirming at the same time that he did not feel able to enter into the matter fully, or to hear witnesses. Lord Bottetort hereupon threatened to petition the House of Lords to remove Lord Chatham, as incapable of properly fulfilling the duties of his office. This would have been unpleasant for Chatham, as inquiry would have led to the public exposure and discussion of his complete inactivity. Grafton undertook the part of mediator. He persuaded Lord Bottetort to delay the execution of his threat, and he induced Chatham, who had more than once spoken of retiring, to resign the seal for a short time, that the affair might be settled whilst the seal was in commission. He was able to cite precedents for such procedure. At the beginning of February, therefore, Chatham delivered up the seal

¹ *Grenville Papers*, iv. 199 f.; *Life of Lord Shelburne*, ii. 74 f.

² For this affair see *Grafton Memoirs*, p. 184 ff., and Walpole, iii. 108.

to a commission of three persons, authorised to perform his functions.¹ But the opposition protested loudly against the transference of one of the highest offices of the state to persons of low rank,² and it was not until the end of the month that the commissioners were confirmed in their powers; and then they dared not legalise what was so evidently a fraud, so that the aim of the whole proceeding was defeated, doubtless to Chatham's great satisfaction. It nevertheless cast a shadow on his reputation, that he should have condescended to such a manœuvre in preference to resignation. He ought undoubtedly either to have stood firm or resigned. On March 21, the appointed time having elapsed, a deputation of high state officials, headed by the lord chancellor, conveyed the privy seal to Hayes and solemnly confided it again to the charge of its rightful custodian, requiring of him anew the prescribed oath.³

Chatham's tenure of office, however, depended altogether upon the retention of his friends, the Duke of Grafton and Lord Shelburne, that is, upon the avoidance of any change in the situation which would oblige one or both of them to retire. Of course, if Chatham himself would have taken the lead again, all would have been well; the position of his adherents would then have been perfectly safe. But he could not make up his mind to the effort; his aversion to business was still too great; and besides, in order to act with any possibility of success, it would be necessary for him to abjure his principles. Therefore the most important question at present was: Would Grafton and Shelburne be able to agree with the Bedford faction? If so, the fragments of the Chatham administration might continue to exist.

The elections which took place in the spring, after the dissolution of a Parliament which had been in existence since 1761, produced no material change in the situation.⁴ There were many riots during the course of these elections, especially in London, the chief township of the county of Middlesex, which chose as its representative the notorious Wilkes, who had returned to England in defiance of the sentence of out-

¹ *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 319, note.

² Prussian ambassador's report of March 2, 1768.—Berlin Archives.

³ Chatham MSS.

⁴ Mahon, *History of England*, v. 199, ff.

lawry still in force against him. The traffic in seats proceeded upon a hitherto unprecedented scale, men who had made great fortunes in the East and West Indies offering enormous sums for them. On the whole, however, the party position was not greatly altered. Of more importance than the elections were the events in America and on the Continent, which were of a nature to render Shelburne's position untenable.

Very unsatisfactory news arrived from Massachusetts in the middle of April.¹ The assembly of that province, having solemnly protested against the new Townshend taxation, although there could be no doubt of its legality or of the right of Parliament to impose it, sent an indignant address to the king and his ministers. Thus far there was no reason for anxiety; a quarrel with this colony had long been anticipated, and no doubt was entertained by the home government of being able to reduce it to order. But the assembly had at the same time sent a circular to the other colonial governments informing them of its protest against the acts and requesting their co-operation; and this measure revived the fear of a united resistance. Vigorous action was considered advisable. It was resolved at a meeting of the cabinet council that the assembly of Massachusetts should be peremptorily ordered 'to rescind the resolution which gave birth to the Address.' The other states were to be ordered to take no notice of the circular, and their assemblies were, like that of Massachusetts, to be dissolved in the event of a refusal. General Gage was to receive instructions to concentrate a body of troops in the neighbourhood of Boston. Shelburne, to whose opinion on colonial matters much value was still attached, had been outvoted in the council, and his resignation would not have excited surprise. As the question, however, was not one which concerned him in his new post, there was no necessity for this step, from which he refrained in consideration for Chatham.

However, a disaster soon occurred in Shelburne's special department, of a magnitude to shake his own reputation in particular and that of the ministry in general. In the island of Corsica, which belonged to the republic of Genoa, there had for years been frequent rebellions, on account of the

¹ Fitzmaurice, *Shelburne*, ii. 126.

heavy taxes imposed by the commercial sovereign state.¹ In 1736 the rebels actually elected a Westphalian adventurer, Theodore Neuhof, their king, and they succeeded in maintaining their independence for some time under his rule. Then the Genoese obtained assistance from France, to which country they had been of service in various ways, and chiefly by providing crews for her vessels in time of war. The insurrection was put down, and King Theodore fled to England, where he died in 1765. But the Corsicans remained rebellious, and soon there was another dangerous revolt, headed by a certain Pascal Paoli. The Genoese now determined, in order to gain relief from the heavy expense of these small wars, to cede the island to France for a sum of money. A treaty to this effect was concluded with the Duc de Choiseul in 1768. This event created great excitement in England, where it was considered that the arrangement brought an excessive increase to the power of France. Rochford, the English ambassador, made the strongest remonstrances, and might possibly have prevailed on Choiseul to give way, if the latter had not been aware of Chatham's persistent inactivity and of the weakness of the English government. As it was, he ventured to take over the island, and at once despatched troops there. Grafton and Shelburne now resolved to assist the Corsican insurgents; but before acting they sent a certain Captain Dunant to the island to ascertain the position of affairs. After receiving his report they despatched the help demanded by Paoli, in such a manner as to leave the Duc de Choiseul no pretext to complain. But it was already too late. The French had suppressed the insurrection; Paoli, like Theodore, took refuge in London.

There was no injustice in holding the ministers responsible for this failure; trusting to their own impression that the struggle in Corsica would last longer than it did, they had been guilty of culpable delay. As Grafton wished to remain in office he had no choice but to sacrifice his colleague to the wrath of the nation. In the beginning of June the fact of the annexation became known to the public, and about the same time Grafton proposed that Lord Shelburne should be removed from the office of secretary of state. But the Bedford party wished to delay changes until they had so strengthened them-

¹ For this affair see Mahon, *History of England*, v. 207 f.

selves by new alliances, as to be capable of resisting any opposition that Chatham might offer. It was Grenville in particular whom they desired to win over.¹

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resume his duties as prime minister. An architect, Mr. Taylor, who had been at Hayes on business, gave the Duke of Grafton an excellent report of his master's condition. On the occasion of Mr. Taylor's second visit, however, he saw only Lady Chatham, who endeavoured to convince him that her husband was very rarely so well as he had seen him, and that he was, indeed, still very ill, an explanation which evidently did not find full credence.¹ In August he was, we learn, able to be on horseback five hours a day;² but he still could not persuade himself to take any share, however small, in public business. He even declined a proffered informal visit from King George's brother-in-law, the King of Denmark, who was in London at this time.³ It was inevitable that the court should now begin to regard his illness as simulated.⁴ Yet it is quite probable that he really was incapable of work. We find Lady Chatham, immediately after his resignation, writing to Anna Pitt that it was possible for them, now that he was relieved from the dread of retention in office, to look forward to speedy improvement.⁵ We are thus led to conclude that in mind at least he was still ailing, and that he had not overcome his morbid antipathy to political business. A plausible reason was all that was needed to decide his resignation.

At the beginning of October such a reason presented itself. Grafton desired to know with certainty if he might reckon on the active support of the prime minister during the coming parliamentary session, even in the event of Lord Shelburne's dismissal. He consequently requested the favour of an interview with Lady Chatham, which was granted upon October 9.⁶ He then learned from her that it would probably be a long time before Chatham could attend to public business

¹ *Granville Papers*, iv. 310 f.

² Prussian ambassador's report of August 12, 1768: 'Je sais au reste de très bonne part, que le Lord Chatham se porte beaucoup mieux et qu'il est journellement cinq heures à cheval. Les amis sont presque assurés qu'il reparaitra à l'ouverture du Parlement.—Berlin Archives.

³ Report of the Prussian ambassador, August 30, 1768.—Berlin Archives.

⁴ *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 334.

⁵ '... the Doctor had found my Lord any way better, but he thinks him not mended since he last saw him in any respect. I trust, however, that by degrees his health will be benefitted by his being freed from the anxiety of remaining in a publick station.'—Chatham MSS.

⁶ See *Grafton Memoirs*, p. 218 ff.

again, and on his part communicated to her not only the intelligence of Amherst's dismissal, but also his intention of dismissing Shelburne. He carefully explained the circumstances which had rendered the dismissal of both these officials necessary, with the evident desire to conciliate the invalid prime minister and prevent his resignation, since such a step on Chatham's part would give the opposition a great advantage. But this was the very opportunity which Chatham desired. Three days later he communicated to the duke his resolve to retire.¹ He gave as his reason his weak and broken health, but he did not omit to add that he could 'not enough lament the removal' of Amherst and Lord Shelburne, thereby indicating that this was what had finally decided him to resign. The king still hoped to induce him to remain in office. In an autograph letter of the 14th he asked him to reconsider his decision. 'As you entered upon that employment in August 1766, at my own requisition, I think I have a right to insist on your remaining in my service; for I with pleasure look forward to the time of your recovery, when I may have your assistance in resisting the torrent of Factions this country so much labours under.' After assuring him that Lord Camden and the Duke of Grafton were equally desirous that he should remain, the king concluded: 'I again repeat it, you must not think of retiring, but of pursuing what may be most conducive to restore your health, and to my seeing you take a public share in my affairs.' But Chatham was no longer open to persuasion. In the most obsequious terms he declared it to be absolutely impossible for him to continue to hold the privy seal.

This decided the matter. After a term of office of two years and three months, during only eight months of which he had actually (and even then with considerable interruptions) guided the affairs of the state, Chatham retired from his exalted post. His health had undoubtedly been the chief obstacle to effective action, but he had also to taste in full measure the bitter grief of witnessing the failure (no doubt in part due to his enemies) of some of his most cherished plans. It cannot be denied that there was a sad collapse of

¹ On October 12. The correspondence on the subject of the resignation is to be found in the *Grafton Memoirs*, p. 221, and the *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 343 ff.

proud hopes, a collapse which proved that the great arbitrator of war was not after all the man best fitted to solve the difficulties of home and colonial administration. In his management of home affairs he did not grasp the real questions at issue, and was led to operate with ineffective means; and he possessed neither the economic knowledge nor the political sagacity requisite to the successful handling of colonial questions. Eager though he again became to take an active part in public life, the only position that now remained for him, aged as he was before his time, was that of the Greek chorus, of the spectator whom ample experience has qualified to criticise; and this part he played to the end of his days with a spirit which gained for him new renown and reverent admiration.

SECTION IV

THE END

CHAPTER XIII

THE OPPOSITION PEER

CHATHAM'S resignation did not, however, necessitate the retirement of all his adherents. The Duke of Grafton, whom only necessity had impelled to ally himself with men of other political opinions, still remained at the head of affairs. The great seal was still in the hands of Lord Camden, who, though his conduct during Chatham's illnesses had been 'subject to squalls of time-serving,' had invariably, as soon as his patron reappeared on the scenes, returned to his allegiance.¹ It was Camden who now, as representative of his invalid friend, returned the privy seal to the king.² And George, it must be noted, bestowed it upon a nobleman of the same political views as Chatham, namely, the Earl of Bristol,³ who did not accept it until he had assured himself of the approbation of his predecessor.⁴ It was evident that the court desired to treat the great statesman with the utmost consideration, so that there might be no occasion whatever for opposition on his part, and that the possibility of his return to office might be left open. But this policy by no means coincided with Chatham's own intentions. He had for the moment no objection that his friends should continue to hold office, since it

¹ Walpole, *George III.*, iii. 169 f.

² Thackeray, *History of the Earl of Chatham*, ii. 117 f.

³ Report of the Prussian ambassador, November 25, 1768: 'Qu'il [the ministry] se croyait assuré par l'engagement du Comte Bristol.'—Berlin Archives.

⁴ *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 347 f.

was impossible for him, in his present state of health, to think of unseating the government; but he wished to preserve the means of accomplishing its downfall at any moment he thought fit. He wished, as it were, to have his arms round the pillars which supported it, in order to pull them down when the appointed time had come. Therefore his consent to Camden's retention of office, and to Bristol's appointment, was expressed in very ambiguous terms, which he almost immediately averred had been misunderstood. He would thus be able to justify himself should his policy oblige him to compel these friends to resign and therewith to end the existing system of government.

In the meantime the ministers continued to rule unmolested; indeed their position became more secure, as the news now received from both America and the Continent was more satisfactory.¹ At Boston a period of tranquillity began with the arrival and installation of the new troops, the pacific majority of the population rejoicing in the safety and order ensured by their presence. In Corsica the French had met with several repulses, which caused them to regard their new acquisition as a somewhat doubtful gain. Hence it was possible for the government to enter on the parliamentary winter campaign without many misgivings, especially as the widely divergent opinions of the different opposition groups made their union improbable.

Chatham, relieved from the harassing cares of office, now devoted himself entirely to the task of restoring his own health. The fact that he succeeded in a surprisingly short time, and to such an extent that he was able to take part in the debates of the House with a clear brain and the old rhetorical vigour, does not entitle us to adopt the belief then generally entertained, namely, that the whole illness had been counterfeited.² We have seen how necessary to his recovery a respite from political activity was, and there is no reason why we should be surprised at its speedy efficacy.

The most important occurrence at this time was Chatham's reconciliation with his brothers-in-law, Lord Temple and

¹ Walpole, iii. 171.

² Report of the Prussian ambassador, November 29, 1768: 'Quant à moi je regarde . . . que la maladie du Lord Chatham était une comédie politique.'—Berlin Archives.

George Grenville,¹ which was for the moment rather of a personal than of a political nature. It was Lady Chatham who took the initiative. Before her husband's resignation she had exchanged some rather mysterious letters with her eldest brother,² and now she gave him a direct invitation to Hayes. As Chatham had turned his back on politics, there was no longer any reason to continue the family feud, which was due to purely political causes. Temple also was of this opinion, and on November 25, 1768, he appeared at his brother-in-law's country house, where he received a hearty welcome. George Grenville knew and approved of the step his brother was taking. On the 29th we find him also dining at Hayes.³ But we must bear in mind that this reconciliation did not by any means indicate a settlement of political differences, and that the union of the members of the family into a party, of which reports were of course immediately set in circulation, was still very far distant. The only political consequence at the time was that the Bedford party succeeded, by suggesting that Lord Temple and Mr. Grenville meant to take office themselves, in gaining the support of some of their friends.⁴

There is no doubt, however, that Temple desired to live on good terms with his brother-in-law in political as well as personal matters. Like Chatham, and for a reason which he could not but approve, he presently desisted, for the time being, from parliamentary activity. Hitherto an advocate of the adoption of vigorous measures for the Americans, he suddenly, on December 20, opposed a vigorous measure brought forward by the ministry. They proposed to revive a statute of Henry VIII., according to which mutinous colonists were to be sent to England for trial, that is to say, were to be removed from the jurisdiction of their own courts. This was a measure which played an important part in the development of the American war. In the debate upon it Lord Temple declared that he had hitherto believed that the object of stern measures was to bind the colonies to the mother-country, but that he now saw the opposite was intended; and

¹ *Grenville Papers*, iv. 398 and 403 f.

² *Ibid.*, iv. 280 ff.

³ Prussian ambassador's report of November 29, 1768: 'Sr. Grenville va dîner aujourd'hui avec Lord Chatham à sa campagne de Hayes.'—Berlin Archives.

⁴ *Grenville Papers*, iv. 404.

as it was impossible for him to prevail against the superior power of the court, it seemed to him useless to continue in the House. He thereupon left and did not return.¹ This was a plain intimation that he intended in future to support Chatham's policy; for Chatham also had, at any rate officially, withdrawn from public life because he disagreed with the direction American policy had taken, on which question Shelburne had been driven out of office. In spite of this intimation, however, Chatham continued in political matters to keep his own counsel; he went on his way without enlightening his brother-in-law as to his real intentions.

The most important event of the winter session was the struggle with John Wilkes, who was still obstinately endeavouring to obtain a seat in the House of Commons. In this affair the ministry acted in perfect concert, and, in the main point at issue, attained their aim. We shall return to this subject presently. In the spring Grafton took a step which could not fail to be regarded as an attempt to consolidate the cabinet, and to render it independent of outside influences. He had recently been divorced, and he now became a suitor for the hand of a niece of the Duchess of Bedford, Miss Wrottesley, the daughter of a poor clergyman, a lady who had hardly any prospect of marriage.² Bedford could not but feel impelled thereby to attach himself more closely to Grafton,³ not only out of gratitude for the honour done to his relative, but also because this step appeared to evidence a determination on the part of his colleague to continue to co-operate with him instead of seizing the first opportunity to recall Chatham. The marriage could not fail to be regarded as a step which rendered Chatham's return to power less likely and as an attempt to exclude his influence.

Although Grafton insisted that in his marriage, which took place on June 24, he had no political end in view, and although Lord Camden, at Grafton's instance, endeavoured so

¹ Prussian ambassador's report, December 20, 1768.—Berlin Archives. See Appendix.

² *Ibid.*, May 23, 1769.

³ Temple to Chatham (undated): 'This marriage connects him, I think, very closely with the Bedfords, whom he is to govern, or who are to govern him. In that light, as unconnection was his only strength at St. James', connection may prove his weakness. The Butes may be alarmed.'—Chatham MSS.

to persuade Chatham,¹ that statesman nevertheless made the event an occasion for giving a vigorous sign of life. By this time, the summer of 1769, he felt his health to be so far restored that he might venture to reappear in the political arena. His condition, he wrote to Temple,² was much as it had been ten years before; and although his legs were still weak, and inclined to swell, he could ride six or seven hours a day without fatigue. He now suddenly resolved to pay his duty to the king at a levée to be held on July 7, and made his appearance without previously giving intimation of his intention to be present. Every one was astonished, as he was supposed to be still ill. The king, whom he had not seen for two years and a half, received him very graciously, 'and whispered him to come into the closet after the levée, which he did, and staid there twenty minutes.'³

Of the conversation which then took place, and which must have influenced Chatham's political attitude during the last years of his life, and in particular his attitude to the king, we have several more or less credible accounts; but it is evident that we cannot ascertain all that really passed between the sovereign and his ex-minister. The least circumstantial of the accounts is that given by Chatham himself to his brother-in-law,⁴ whereby we are led to the conclusion that Chatham had taken the step rather in an unfriendly spirit towards Temple than with his approval. He had profited by Temple's absence at Stowe to carry out his project without revealing his intentions, and now he wrote to him as if the whole thing had been a sudden inspiration, as if, feeling himself remarkably well, he had been seized with the desire to pay his duty to the king, and as if only banal compliments had been exchanged during the private audience. Baron Maltzahn, who went to Stowe on purpose to glean information, and to whom Temple read Chatham's letter, draws attention in his report⁵ to the improbability that nothing more important had been said in the course of an audience which lasted twenty minutes.

¹ *Grafton Memoirs*, p. 236; Mahon, *History of England*, v. 381.

² *Grenville Papers*, iv. 426.

³ Walpole, *George III.*, iii. 248 f. Report of the Prussian ambassador, July 14, 1769.—Berlin Archives.

⁴ *Grenville Papers*, iv. 426 f.

⁵ Of July 21, 1769.—Berlin Archives.

It appeared to him, moreover, that Earl Temple was by no means satisfied with the communication.

Much fuller are the Duke of Grafton's notes,¹ which were made immediately after the event, undoubtedly from the king's report to him of what had passed. According to these, George had expressed his regret that Chatham had felt obliged to resign, whereupon Chatham had most distinctly assured him that the state of his health, and that alone, had compelled him to do so. Then the earl had complained of various measures, which he had not been able to nip in the bud, and which it was now too late to prevent, and had expressed the hope that the king would not take it amiss if he felt impelled not by ambition, but by a sense of duty, publicly to express his dissent. The very uncertain state of his health would entirely preclude him from personally resuming the direction of affairs.

We may safely assume this account to be trustworthy, in so far that all the above speeches were made in the course of the conversation; but this does not at all exclude the possibility that much more was said, which the sovereign did not choose to repeat to his prime minister. In July Baron Maltzahn transmitted to his government the French translation of a speech which Chatham was reported to have made to the king on this occasion,² and which contains very much more. In it the ex-minister explains his appearance by his desire to assure his sovereign of his loyal attachment at a moment when the hydra-headed monster, faction, is again approaching the throne. He then begs his majesty to continue his protection to those statesmen who had been introduced into the ministry by himself (Chatham), and not to trust those who were only actuated by selfish motives. He further counselled him not to allow himself to be too much influenced by the complaints and petitions of the deluded masses, and especially not to permit the fomentation of discord between the two nations composing the kingdom of Great Britain. In conclusion he declares that ill-health alone was the cause of his resignation, and that if he recovers a sufficient measure of strength he will not be disinclined to undertake the leadership again.

¹ *Grafton Memoirs*, p. 236 f. Quoted by Mahon, v. 381.

² See Appendix ii.

It is not credible that Chatham rehearsed a carefully prepared speech on the occasion of this unexpected private interview with the king; therefore the probability is that the composition from which these quotations are taken is a pure fabrication, consisting of what the earl was supposed to have said, or of what its authors wished the public to believe that he had said. If we examine the ideas expressed in it we find that they are those which led to the construction of the Chatham ministry in 1766; and this fact suggests the inference that the oration emanated from the party to which Chatham's elevation to office at that time was due, and from the ranks of which a considerable number of the ministers were taken; this was the party of Bute and his friends. The stress laid upon the struggle with faction, the advocacy of the interests of the ministers chosen in 1766 (special attention is drawn to the reasons for which they were selected), the warning against the Bedford faction, which was specially hostile to the favourite, the condemnation of the popular movement and of that against the Scots, these are points which support the inference so strongly that we feel almost certain of its correctness. Chatham's declaration that he might take office again, which, according to Grafton's account, he did not make, is also suggestive of Bute, who still saw in the rule of the great statesman not only the salvation of the country, but also his own advantage. It seems clear to me that we have before us in this speech an attempt to turn Chatham's appearance to account in the interests of the Tory and Scottish faction, an attempt to increase its influence by representing him as its ally. The truth, however, is hardly to be gathered from it.

But what, then, was Chatham's real intention in making this sudden appearance? It seems to me that the key, which is not to be found in the correspondences and memoirs of the day, is given in a report of the well-informed Prussian ambassador. He writes on July 21: 'I venture to believe that Lord Chatham had no other intention than to undeceive the public regarding the report which his enemies had spread, that his illness had so impaired his faculties that he had become almost imbecile—a report by means of which they hoped entirely to crush the hope of the nation that he might in course of time again undertake the direction of

affairs. Now that he has shown himself to be in excellent health, this excuse is no longer available, and everything depends upon whether or not the King is prepared to satisfy the nation and to put an end to the derangements and disorders by offering the Earl conditions which he can accept.' The ambassador was undoubtedly mistaken in his supposition that Chatham would be easily persuaded to take office again; but his other conjectures are so entirely in accord with all that we know of the facts that we are inclined to accept them as correct. It must, however, be added that the Duke of Grafton's marriage, which suggested the danger of a consolidated government, proof against his influence, was the inducement to display his restored energy at this particular moment.

In harmony with this theory is the obvious fact that no definite decision of any kind was secured by the audience. Chatham had no desire to take office, but neither did he desire to quarrel with the king. By royal invitation he took part at this time, as we are credibly informed by Maltzahn,¹ in the deliberations on American affairs of either one or two cabinet councils, and the king again favoured him with half an hour's conversation. The ex-minister wished, by displaying political activity and showing that the king's door was always open to him, to disprove the unfavourable reports in circulation, and to regain his old influence over his friends. A certain confirmation of this view of the matter is to be found in the fact that after the first audience he purposely lingered in the ante-room, engaging in conversation with one and another, as if to display the satisfactory state of his health. To the Dukes of Grafton and Bedford he was reserved and cool, to Granby, Conway, and a few others particularly friendly.²

But Chatham also meant to carry out that intention which he had notified to the king, of opposing the latest ministerial measures. With this purpose he began to give a political colouring to the lately restored alliance with the Grenville

¹ Report of July 11, 1769: 'My Lord Chatham, dont la santé est aujourd'hui assez bien raffermie, fut invité d'assister au dit conseil, où il se rendit en effet et où il eut un entretien avec le Roi pendant une demi-heure. Il a roulé, à ce qu'on dit, sur les affaires d'Amérique. Aujourd'hui il doit revenir en ville, à ce qu'on m'a assuré, pour être présent à un nouveau Conseil, qu'il tiendra à St. James.'—Berlin Archives.

² Walpole, *George III.*, iii. 249.

family and to enlist new allies, in order to form a coalition which, though it might not have a common positive, would at least have a common negative policy. With the whole of his family except his son William, who had not sufficiently recovered from a serious illness to travel, and was left behind at Hayes, he proceeded in great style to Stowe on July 28.¹ He himself drove tandem in a vehicle known as a 'jim-whiskie'; two coaches and six conveyed the family, with twenty servants, male and female. Temple asserted that the object of this visit was a private and political understanding, and this statement is corroborated by the fact that George Grenville hastened from Wotton to join the party.

Chatham now tried to win the favour of the Marquis of Rockingham, by declaring that he himself was too old to take office, but that Rockingham had friends enough to form an administration, and that he (Chatham) would forget all differences, and would never again attend a council in which the marquis and his adherents were not to be met. It was evidently his sincere desire to confront, with all the forces that seemed suitable for the purpose, the dangers which he saw threatening the state from without and from within. Rockingham, however, did not at first respond with any cordiality to these advances. Instead of accepting a repeated invitation to Hayes, he hinted that he would expect Chatham to pay the first visit.² Not until they began to make common cause against the government did the barriers between these two statesmen fall.

The case of Wilkes again began to excite the public mind and to raise important questions of principle. In spite of the fact that the penalties of outlawry were still in force against him, Wilkes had appeared in England at the time of the last elections, had been nominated parliamentary candidate for the county of Middlesex, and had been returned by a large majority. He was expelled from the House of Commons and a new writ was issued for Middlesex; but the county re-elected him almost unanimously; such was the popular enthusiasm that no other candidate durst appear upon the hustings. The House of Commons declared that an outlaw was incapable of representing a constituency in Parliament, and that the elec-

¹ Albemarle, *Rockingham*, ii. 102 f. : *Grenville Papers*, iv. 429.

² Walpole, iv. 22 f.

tion was null and void; he was re-elected. Again the election was declared by the House of Commons to be invalid; and on the occasion of the fourth election the ministry brought forward a Colonel Luttrell as candidate and supported him with their whole influence. Wilkes was again returned by a large majority; but the House of Commons ordered his name to be erased from the return and that of Colonel Luttrell substituted. In so doing the House exercised the right which it had always claimed to decide the legality of elections; and it could hardly be denied that it was perfectly justified in refusing to count the votes given to an incapacitated candidate. But it was disputable whether the validity of an elector's vote could be affected by a resolution of one branch of the legislature unsupported by any existing law. There was no law in existence applicable to the case in question; hence the action of the House signified the assertion of a new principle evolved from the spirit of the constitution and the traditional position of the House of Commons, as also the domination of that body. The whole question was one of authority; and it could not have arisen at all if there had not grown up, side by side with the hitherto unquestioned authority of the Lower House, a new authority, that of public opinion, led by the press. Of this new authority Wilkes was the chief representative. It was not yet capable of any real victory; it was merely used by the opposition for its own purposes. Once in power, the opposition, after making a few concessions to it, would undoubtedly disregard it as completely as did the present government. All who had any the remotest prospect of office were sworn upholders of plutocracy. Even the power of the crown, which was at present in the ascendant, was in reality a plutocratic force.

It is not surprising that in this position of affairs (which we must bear in mind in considering the whole case and Chatham's behaviour in particular), the attitude of the legal authorities, who, as impartial arbitrators, ought to have been best able to arrive at a decision, should have been marked by great hesitation. Lord Camden was at first strongly prejudiced against Wilkes, but in time came to condemn the behaviour of the government;¹ Lord Mansfield locked up his opinion regarding the legality of the measures against

¹ Walpole, iv. 29.

the agitator in his own breast,¹ and only expressed himself upon the practical consequences of the counter-measures of the opposition. If Chatham had not been affected by this uncertainty he would probably have uplifted his voice sooner than he did.² Not until Camden had resolved to oppose the decision of the majority in the House of Commons, and had prepared the necessary arguments, did Chatham also uplift the banner of opposition.

On January 9 the king opened Parliament with a speech, the first part of which was devoted to the measures taken for preventing the spread of the 'distemper among horned cattle,' a circumstance which excited much ridicule. The peaceful policy of the government was then detailed, as were also its endeavours to restore obedience to authority in America. In conclusion Parliament was exhorted to cultivate the spirit of harmony. In the House of Lords the usual motion was made for an address to the throne approving of everything which the king had said. In this case promises were added of all possible endeavour to secure harmony. But now Chatham, present for the first time after the lapse of several years, rose,³ and in vigorous words, which bore evidence to his possession of all the old intellectual force, condemned this display of deference and empty veneration as being of no real use to his majesty. It was the duty of the grand hereditary counsellors of the Crown to lay before their sovereign the true state and condition of his subjects, to inform him of the distresses and discontent which prevailed amongst them, and to show him the means by which the causes of these might be removed.

After dilating, with many a fine period and telling thrust, on his old themes—England's need of alliances, the unsatisfactory peace of 1763, and the forbearance which was imperatively demanded in the settlement of American difficulties—he came to the royal exhortation to unanimity. The most perfect harmony in the House of Peers, he said, would have little effect towards quieting the minds of the people and removing the causes of their discontent. It was the

¹ Thackeray, ii. 132.

² His reproach to Grafton for the hastiness of his decision shows that he himself had required to give matters longer consideration. See Thackeray, ii. 129.

³ For Chatham's speech see Thackeray, ii. 127-145; Walpole, iv. 23 f.

duty of that House as much as of the House of Commons to watch and guard the rights and liberties of the people. When the people had lost their rights, those of the peerage would soon become insignificant. An example of what he meant was to be found in the fate of the Spanish peers under Charles v., who, after assisting their master in overturning that part of the Cortes which represented the people, themselves became the victims of despotism. Slavery—by this name he drastically indicated every position of dependence—was to be suffered to exist nowhere, neither in America, nor in Ireland, nor at home; because the man who has lost his own freedom becomes from that moment an instrument of tyranny, a danger to the freedom of others. The discontent at home was due, he declared himself firmly persuaded, to the behaviour of the House of Commons in the Wilkes affair; consequently he begged leave to submit the following amendment to the address:—

‘And for these great and essential purposes [the restoration of harmony] we will, with all convenient speed, take into our most serious consideration the causes of the discontents which prevail in so many parts of your Majesty’s dominions, and particularly the late proceedings of the House of Commons touching the incapability of John Wilkes, Esq. (expelled by that House), to be elected a member to serve in this present Parliament, thereby refusing (by a resolution of one branch of the legislature only) to the subject his common right; and depriving the electors of Middlesex of their free choice of a representative.’

The amendment was so worded that it only declared a determination to investigate and brought forward indisputable facts; it passed no verdict upon Wilkes, or upon the election, or upon the behaviour of the House of Commons. An appearance of condemnation was, however, produced by the mention of the assailable points. This was a ruse to induce the other side to tilt at windmills. If they exposed themselves by so doing, they could afterwards be sharply attacked and overthrown. Lord Mansfield, ever ready for the fray, actually allowed himself to be outwitted. He put forth all his powers to prove that the House of Commons possessed the right to pass final judgment in questions touching the seats of members in that House, and that, consequently, their

action could not be regarded as unauthorised legislation; he showed the danger of an interference by the Upper House in the private affairs of the Lower House, which the latter was certain to resent; and he concluded by affirming that only an act passed by all the three branches of the legislature (to which, however, the Commons would very probably not give their consent) could undo the wrong, if wrong it were, which had been done.

Then Chatham rose for the second time. He expressed, in a sarcastic tone, his regret that a man of such subtle understanding, the whole of whose learned argument he was not qualified to follow, should have given to his (Chatham's) words an interpretation so entirely foreign to that which he had intended them to express. He then demanded that the amendment should be read again, and, after this had been done, asked if anything of what the noble lord had been labouring to controvert were contained in it—if every fact stated in it were not completely and indisputably true, and could not, if necessary, be verified by reference to the journals of the House. He then proceeded, in his turn, to attack. He submitted Mansfield's assertions to careful examination, with the special object of proving that the claim he advanced on behalf of the House of Commons was untenable. Of particular interest to us is Chatham's endeavour to show that there is a higher power or law which sets limits to the authority of the House of Commons and controls its actions. He characteristically attributed this power neither to the House of Lords nor to the king—his respect for the body representing the nation was too great; he recognised it in the principles which are contained in Magna Charta, in the Statute Book, and in the Bill of Rights, and, 'if a case should arise unknown to these great authorities, in that plain English reason which is the foundation of all English jurisprudence.' Only what was sanctioned by such authority was valid and permissible. The spirit of the constitution must not be violated; and the first principle of the constitution he affirmed to be this: 'that the subject shall not be governed by the *arbitrium* of any one man, or body of men (less than the whole legislature), but by certain laws, to which he has virtually given his consent, which are open to him to examine, and not beyond his ability to understand.'

We see how precarious was the basis on which Chatham declared the authority of the state to rest, a basis which could

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only be consolidated by the conscientiousness of those in power. Instead of expounding the law Chatham was making of himself a lawgiver, a sovereign, by arbitrarily propounding fundamental legal principles, and then adapting them to given cases. It was an attempt to realise the theory of the constitutional state, an attempt the success of which would have given free play to individual caprice. Proceeding from such fundamental principles, from which a thousand different conclusions can be drawn, the French Revolution overturned state and society, and, under the banner of liberty, established the most cruel tyranny.

In consonance with the general tendency of his speech, Chatham further affirmed the will of the nation to be more deserving of regard than the will of the House of Commons, and the rights of the constituents to be of more importance than those of their representatives. 'Five hundred gentlemen, my Lords, are not ten millions; and if we must have a contention, let us take care to have the English nation on our side.' These words were a reference to the numerous addresses which had been received from all quarters expressing reprobation of the conduct of the House of Commons, and he was undoubtedly right in maintaining that such an expression of popular feeling must be respected and its causes thoroughly investigated. But it was not permissible to assume forthwith that this very vigorous expression of opinion really represented the will of the nation. Careful inquiry would undoubtedly have led to the discovery that the movement was largely artificial and due to the influence of ambitious agitators and of the opposition. Certainly the power and authority of the House of Commons, upon which, as its basis, the whole edifice of the state now rested, ought not to be called in question on account of such dubious machinations as these. If they really were the result of serious, healthy, widespread desires, these would find expression in the House also.

In the month of April of this same year, 1770, appeared Edmund Burke's pamphlet, *Thoughts on the Causes of the Present Discontent*. It touches on many of the same points as Chatham's speech, but is no more successful in convincing us that the political condition of the country was utterly bad. It gives expression chiefly to the indignation of the old Whigs at seeing the Crown employ the same means to deprive them

of power which they themselves had employed in governing. It was through them that the House of Commons had become corrupted; others were now reaping the advantage of corruption; hence they suddenly began to accuse the House of presumption and to draw attention to the faults and disadvantages of its constitution. And as to Chatham, even granting that he was impelled to act as he did by honest conviction—he vigorously repudiated the charge of ambition—it certainly cannot be maintained that he displayed a very clear understanding of existing circumstances. The new ideas of the age were exerting their influence upon him; but he was unable to give intelligible expression to them, and unable to cast aside the principles of his youth.

When Chatham stopped, Lord Camden rose and expressed the same ideas in even stronger terms. A lengthy debate ensued, and the amendment was eventually negatived by a majority of 100 to 36. This was a proof of the existence of a community of interests between the two Houses; the dominant elements in the Upper House exercised a preponderant influence in the Lower House; consequently there was as yet no real division of the legislature.

Shortly after this debate the House of Lords adjourned, as important changes were taking place in the cabinet. Chatham had at last condescended to pay the required call upon the Marquis of Rockingham,¹ and had thereby restored the old understanding with him and his friends. The consequence was the resignation of those members of the old Whig party who had been installed, and hitherto maintained, in office by Chatham. It would have been impossible for Lord Camden in any case to retain his appointment in view of his attitude throughout the last debate; he received his dismissal on January 17. About the same time Lord Granby resigned his appointment as commander-in-chief; and several other resignations followed. The Duke of Grafton alone tried to maintain his position by attempts to deprive the hostile coalition of some of its most able adherents. He endeavoured to secure as lord-chancellor the eminent lawyer, Charles Yorke, second son of the late Lord Chancellor Hardwicke; and it seemed as if he had succeeded.² Although Yorke at first gave a

¹ Walpole, *George III.*, iv. 39.

² See Walpole, iv. 35 f.; and Albemarle, *Rockingham*, ii. 159 ff.

decided refusal and repudiated the idea of deserting his friends, he finally allowed himself to be persuaded by the king, in a private audience, to accept the seals. But whilst the patent of his peerage, the necessary preliminary to his investment with the office of lord chancellor, was preparing, he died suddenly. It was reported that he had taken his own life in a fit of despondency produced by the contemptuous attitude of his relatives after his apostasy.

This sad event was in itself sufficient to render the Duke of Grafton's position untenable; the double attack made on him in the House of Lords on January 22 was hardly necessary.¹ The Marquis of Rockingham (on the 22nd) moved for a day to take into consideration the state of the nation, made a speech in which he subjected the whole new system since the accession of George III., and all the measures of his own political opponents, to criticism which was by no means in complete harmony with Chatham's opinions. Grafton having offered a calm and dignified explanation and defence of his position, Chatham considered himself obliged to reply. In a long speech he directed attention to the defects in the existing system of government, and proposed means for their rectification. In this speech, which otherwise offers little that is new, one passage attracts our attention, as containing an idea of far-reaching importance. After speaking of the principles of the English constitution, of the procrastination of the government in the Corsican affair, of the condition of affairs in Ireland, and of the expense of his majesty's civil government, he turned to the subject of that corruption which had become increasingly prevalent and dangerous since the great influx of wealth from India. This corruption he declared to be the chief cause of the universal discontent. Some immediate remedy for the great evil must be provided, and he himself had one to suggest for the consideration of the House.

'Whoever,' he proceeded,² 'understands the theory of the English Constitution, and will compare it with the fact, must see at once how widely they differ. We must reconcile them to each other, if we wish to save the liberties of this country; we must reduce our political practice, as nearly as possible, to our principles. The Constitution intended that there should

¹ Thackeray, *History of the Earl of Chatham*, ii. 149-66.

² *Ibid.*, ii. 162 f.

be a permanent relation between the constituent and representative body of the people. Will any man affirm that, as the House of Commons is now formed, that relation is, in any degree, preserved? My Lords, it is not preserved; it is destroyed. Let us be cautious, however, how we have recourse to violent expedients.

'The boroughs of this country have, properly enough, been called the rotten parts of the Constitution. I have lived in Cornwall, and, without entering into an invidious particularity, have seen enough to justify the appellation. But in my judgment, my Lords, these boroughs, corrupt as they are, must be considered as the natural infirmity of the Constitution. Like the infirmities of the body, we must bear them with patience, and submit to carry them about with us. The limb is mortified, but the amputation might be death.

'Let us try, my Lords, whether some gentler remedies may not be discovered. Since we cannot cure the disorder, let us endeavour to infuse such a portion of new health into the body of the Constitution, as may enable it to support its most inveterate disease.

'The representation of the counties is, I think, still preserved pure and uncorrupted. That of the greatest cities is upon a footing equally respectable, and there are many of the larger trading towns which still preserve their independence. The infusion of health which I now allude to, would be to permit every county to elect one member more, in addition to their present representation. The knights of the shires approach nearest to the Constitutional representation of the country, because they represent the soil,' etc.

We see from this interesting passage that Chatham, in the course of his endeavours to check the despotism of the House of Commons, had taken an important forward step. In his last speech he had proposed to limit the powers of the House, a process which would have shaken the constitution to its foundations. He now proposed a transformation of the House from within, which would both qualify and oblige it to express the will of the nation more distinctly and forcibly than it had hitherto done. It would then, he believed, refrain of its own accord from such injustice as it had lately committed. But this was a means of reform fraught with danger to the aristocracy; it would probably in time deprive them, as well as

the king and the present ministry, of their preponderating influence. Therefore Chatham proceeded with the utmost caution. He did not meddle with the 'rotten boroughs,' the suppression of which (in a parliamentary sense) ought to have been his first demand, but declared them, without giving any reason, to be a necessary evil, the removal of which would be attended with danger to the state. The real danger which it threatened was the loss of safe seats in Parliament for his sons, relations, and friends; and this he did not choose to bring about. (It may be noted that it was with the assistance of the borough of Appleby that his son William, at a later period, raised himself to the dignity of prime minister.) He therefore devised the expedient of increasing the number of members, taking due precaution to ensure that the new representatives should be either quite independent, or if subject to any influence, then only to that of the landed aristocracy—in no case to that of the government. This was undoubtedly a project only capable of realisation in the future,¹ for it was plain that the ministerial majority would not consent to undermine the foundation of its power.

The hostility displayed by Chatham to the Duke of Grafton had deprived the latter of all inclination to retain the management of state affairs, especially now that his old allies, the Rockingham faction, had united with Chatham in opposing the government. All Grafton's colleagues had deserted him, and his relations with the Bedford party were not sufficiently secure to form in themselves an adequate support. Gower, Savile, and others were agitating against him behind the back of the Duke of Bedford, who himself was well disposed towards him. Hence, on January 27, he sent in his resignation. It would be wrong, however, to regard this as a victory for the opposition; the new ministry was not recruited from its ranks, nor did it gain an ally in the fallen premier. The change was rather of a personal than of a political nature; the king chose a more suitable leader, one prepared to face all the dangers threatening the state from within and from without. This was Frederick, Lord North, who now exchanged his post of chancellor of the exchequer for that of first lord of the treasury.

¹ The younger Pitt made practical application of his father's ideas in 1783.—Thackeray, li. 163, note.

This statesman,¹ who was destined to remain in office much longer than any previous prime minister of George III., differed markedly from Chatham in two respects. He had no ambition to be the leader of the government, a position into which he was almost driven by force, and he was never influenced in his policy by secondary considerations, least of all by desire for popularity. He calmly pursued the policy which seemed best to him, without any regard to the changes in public opinion or to the clamour of the masses, and without consideration of his own personal interests. He had supported Bute and the cider duty, although his action cost him the estate of Burton Pynsent. An advocate of the Stamp Act, he continued to support it after public opinion demanded its repeal, because he considered the retrograde policy to be mistaken and mischievous. He opposed Wilkes from the outset, and demanded his expulsion from the House of Commons, because he regarded the maintenance of authority as the primary condition of a healthy national development. It cannot be asserted that his action was invariably judicious whilst in power. But his mistakes were due, not so much to any want of judgment on his own part, as to a certain weakness which he displayed towards persons whom he loved and trusted. No one could force him to take a step of which he disapproved, but he often proved amenable to persuasion, and this was fatal to consistency of action.

It was hardly to be expected that Lord North, who had no party of his own worth mentioning, should be able to hold his ground against the powerful opposition. The power of the Crown, however, was now employed in the manner which had been recommended by Lord Holland, with the result that the government remained certain of a majority. This was, it had now been proved, the only means of securing a stable government, unless the king were prepared, like his predecessor, to deliver himself into the hands of a faction. In the present case the faction must have been that of the old oligarchy—no other being sufficiently powerful. George III., who favoured Chatham's political principles, had done everything in his power to carry that statesman's policy into practical effect. But Chatham himself had not been equally determined, and had again and again declined the responsibility of leadership.

¹ See Mahon on Lord North, *History of England*, v. 264 f.

What could the king do but choose other men, who would naturally administer the affairs of the country according to his and their ideas of what was advisable, and not according to Chatham's? And, as Chatham now collected all available forces round him to attack the new government—no one knowing what his real object was, since he disclaimed all desire either to found a party of his own or to assume the leadership of an administration—the king was forced to defend himself as best he could, and with all the means which the constitution permitted him to employ. To corruption he opposed corruption, not because he had any particular leaning towards autocratic rule, but because there was no other way out of the difficulty. The country at the present crisis stood in need of a strong, stable government, a government against which the intrigues of faction could not prevail; and the only means of securing such a government was potent corruption. It was not George III. who was to blame for this, but the selfishness of the upper classes.

No sooner was the new government in office than Lord Chatham, acting in co-operation with the Marquis of Rockingham, began a systematic series of attacks. With these I shall deal briefly, as they are of importance only for their general tendency.¹

On February 2, in consequence of Lord Rockingham's previous motion, 'the state of the nation' was taken into consideration, on which occasion Chatham again discoursed upon the Middlesex election, endeavouring to prove that the precedents cited by his opponents in defence of their behaviour bore no analogy to the case in question.

On March 2 he seized the opportunity of a naval debate to attack the foreign policy of the government, and also to complain of the secret influences to which the king was exposed, influences from which he himself, while in office, had suffered deeply. This last assertion was a violent exaggeration, as Bute and the court party had, generally speaking, helped and not hindered him; but he knew that Lord North owed his now certain majority to their active interference, so he felt impelled to calumniate them.

On April 5 he supported a bill of George Grenville's proposing a better method for trying disputed elections, an

¹ For the debates see Thackeray, vol. ii.

excellent measure, the aim of which was to deprive the majority in the House of Commons of a means of increasing their strength.

On May 1 Chatham himself presented to the House 'a Bill for reversing the adjudications of the House of Commons, whereby John Wilkes, Esq., has been adjudged incapable of being elected a member to serve in this present Parliament, and the freeholders of the county of Middlesex have been deprived of one of their legal representatives.' He on this occasion made a speech in which he described in as glaring colours as possible the injustice that had been done.

On May 4 he moved a resolution which was, in a manner, directed against the king personally. The lord mayor (Beckford) and council of the City of London had presented to his majesty an address, which in reality emanated from the opposition camp. The leaders of the opposition had met and deliberated upon it at a dinner given by Beckford on March 22, on which occasion Chatham was not present.¹ In this address the king was petitioned to redress grievances; complaint was made of the violation of electoral freedom; and his majesty was urged to dissolve Parliament, to correct malpractices in administration, and to remove 'evil' ministers. It was, without doubt, couched in unseemly and presumptuous terms. The king's answer was a refusal of the petitions and a sharp reprimand; certain parts of the address were singled out as specially blameworthy, and the whole was declared to be 'disrespectful to the King, injurious to his Parliament, and irreconcilable to the principles of the constitution.' And now Chatham, in the House of Lords, moved a resolution severely blaming this answer, as an infringement of the right of the subject to petition. In a speech of some length he dissected the royal message, directing attention to its weak points, and showing that it could not possibly have emanated from the king himself.

On May 14 he moved for an address to the throne, praying his majesty to dissolve the present Parliament—this being the last available means of checking the extravagant pretensions of the House of Commons. He again dwelt upon the discontent in England, Ireland, and America; he affirmed that the people had no confidence in their present repre-

¹ *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 431; *Albemarle, Rockingham*, ii. 471 f.

sentatives, who, he said, had betrayed their trust; and he pointed out the urgent necessity for a Parliament on which the nation could rely.

All these attempts were, as must have been foreseen, unsuccessful. There was always a large majority against the motions of the opposition, because their whole tendency was at variance with the desire of the ruling classes for power, and also because it was plainly the king's will that they should be negatived. With the motion of May 14 the first parliamentary campaign against the ministry came to an end. Chatham spent most of the summer at Hayes, strengthening himself for the second. In August he paid a short visit to Burton Pynsent, in company with his son John, Lord Pitt. John went from there for a tour in Cornwall.¹ Father and son met on the return journey, and were together for some days at Eastbury, the property and country residence of Chatham's brother-in-law, Henry Grenville.²

During the years immediately following Chatham's resignation several men died who had played a more or less important part in his life. The first was the Duke of Newcastle.³ In the beginning of the year 1768 Newcastle had an apoplectic fit, after which he was obliged to abandon political business altogether. He was for a time tormented by the fear of death, and expended great sums upon physicians and remedies; but when, in the autumn, he felt that the end was approaching, he tranquilly resigned himself to his fate, concerning himself with nothing but the conscientious discharge of all the rites of religion. He died on November 17, 1768, at his house in Lincoln's Inn Fields, after receiving the sacrament from the Bishop of Salisbury. Mention has already been made of the sudden death of Charles Yorke in January 1770. On October 1 of the same year Lord Lyttelton's brother Richard, who had made a name for himself in America, died at Chelsea. His nephew, Mr. Thomas Pitt, caused an obelisk to be erected to his memory at Boconnock.⁴ On October 19 died the Marquis of Granby, who, after his

¹ *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 469 f.

² Letters from Chatham to his wife, written in August 1770.—Chatham MSS.

³ See Albemarle, *Rockingham*, ii. 84 f.

⁴ *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 472.

retirement from office, was still connected with the army by his colonelcy of the Blues, the regiment to which Chatham had once belonged. General Conway now became its colonel.¹ But the death which touched Chatham most nearly was that of his brother-in-law, George Grenville, which occurred on November 13. Grenville was carried off in his fifty-ninth year, by a fever of the nature of which no account has been transmitted to us.² It must have been a consolation to the whole family that he died completely reconciled with Chatham. His wife had predeceased him in 1768.³ As Grenville's death happened on the day of the opening of Parliament, Chatham and Temple were prevented from attending that ceremony, and a debate in the House of Lords on the address was consequently avoided.

In the session which now began a man became prominent with whom Chatham, during the last years of his life, was destined to come frequently into political contact. Charles Lennox, Duke of Richmond,⁴ was born in 1735, and in 1750, on his father's death, succeeded to the title. He entered the army and distinguished himself at the battle of Minden. After the accession of George III. he held a court appointment for a short time; but he soon attached himself to the Duke of Cumberland, which led to political connection with the Rockingham party. When this party came into power in 1765, Richmond was first sent as ambassador to Paris, and then appointed secretary for the southern department. Under the Chatham administration he belonged to the opposition; he strongly condemned the aggressive American policy, advocating conciliation even more strongly than did the prime minister. After Chatham's resignation he remained an important member of the opposition coalition, and was thus brought into closer relations with that statesman.

The chief disputes between the government and the opposition during the autumn session of 1770, when Chatham once again took an active part in parliamentary proceedings, were on the subject of the Falkland Islands.⁵ These islands, which lie in the South Atlantic Ocean, off the coast of Patagonia,

¹ *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 476 ff.; Albemarle, *Rockingham*, ii. 187.

² *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 480, 483, 486.

³ *Ibid.*, iii. 366.

⁴ See *Dictionary of National Biography*.

⁵ See Mahon, *History of England*, v. 288 ff.

possess good harbours, but are, from their barrenness, only suitable for sheep-rearing. They were discovered at the end of the sixteenth century by English navigators and were named after a certain Lord Falkland. When, in 1748, an expedition was fitted out in England to explore them, the Spanish ambassador, Ricardo Wall, remonstrated on the ground that they were the property of the Spanish crown; whereupon, though without recognising this pretension, the plan was abandoned. The first settlement was made by the French in 1763, after enterprising fishermen from St. Malo had for long plied their trade off the coasts. It lay on the eastern large island, and was called Port Louis. The English, not to be behindhand, took possession of an outlying island to the west, and founded the military station of Port Egmont, which remained unmolested for several years. In 1767 the Spaniards bought Port Louis, to which they gave the name of Puerto Soledad. Towards the end of 1769 the Spanish governor began to protest against the presence of English troops and ships. No attention having been paid to these protests, the governor of Buenos Ayres, Don Francisco Buccarelli, appeared off the English station with five frigates and 1600 troops. The small English garrison was, naturally, incapable of resisting such a superior force; it capitulated on condition that it should be allowed to depart unmolested. But, in order that the English account of the affair might not reach Europe before the Spanish, the English ships were forcibly prevented from sailing for twenty days after the capitulation.

Information of the Spanish protests reached England in June. In October came the news of the attack made against international law upon an English possession. It produced great excitement throughout the country. The ministers immediately took the measures which honour and prudence prescribed. They had no desire to begin a war on account of so valueless a possession, but they demanded the restitution of the settlement as an indispensable preliminary to any negotiation, and they began ostensible preparations for war. A considerable fleet assembled at Spithead. But, as it was known from the reports of Harris, the British envoy at Madrid, that Spain was neither prepared nor inclined for war, it was not considered necessary, in spite of the defiant attitude which

she at first assumed, to incur great expense by mobilising all the available forces. Strict secrecy was wisely observed regarding the transactions.

The opposition of course endeavoured to make capital out of the aggression and the long delay in procuring reparation for it. In the House of Lords, on November 22, the Duke of Richmond moved that all the papers relating to the Falkland Islands affair should be laid before that assembly.¹ As Lord Weymouth, the secretary for the southern department (a grandson of Earl Granville and an adherent of the Bedford faction), declined to produce these papers or to give any information concerning the progress of the negotiations, the duke endeavoured to prove, from such facts as were known, that the government was guilty of negligence and of pusillanimity. The colonial secretary, Lord Hillsborough, in his reply incautiously exaggerated the consideration which must be shown for the Spaniard's delicate sense of honour. This provided Lord Chatham with an opportunity to take part in the debate.

His speech, founded as it was upon a totally inadequate knowledge of its subject, was naturally of no real importance and could produce no definite result. In the course of it he contrived to deal his opponents an occasional telling thrust; but as regarded the main point at issue his blows were aimed at vacancy, since the policy which he propounded with such ardour, and magnified at the expense of the supposed ministerial policy, was that which the ministers were actually pursuing, whilst all their deviations from his requirements were dictated by their possession of information that was inaccessible to him. Under the circumstances it would undoubtedly have been wiser silently to await events; but the opposition wished to show signs of life and activity, and to display themselves to the country in the light of fearless defenders of the national honour; and Chatham personally did not wish to let the opportunity slip of again displaying his martial spirit. This he succeeded in doing; and this is all that makes the speech interesting to us.

After due observance of the established opposition ritual, in other words, after inveighing against the ministers personally and accusing them of ignorance, negligence, and treachery, he

¹ For the debate see Thackeray, ii. 203-25.

proceeded to take advantage of the weak point in Lord Hillsborough's defence. Instead of being so wonderfully tender of the Spanish point of honour, the noble lord would have done better, he said, to tell them what care had been taken of the honour of England, whose government officials and naval and military officers were men of higher character than those of Spain. Having dilated on this subject, he strongly condemned the secrecy observed by the government, which he was certain only served to conceal cowardly measures. He tried to convince his audience that if a resolute attitude had been assumed, the matter would have been already settled, the island already restored. Negotiation before this restitution was in itself weakness and dishonour. To enforce his words he recalled what had happened during Grenville's administration; the French, who had taken unlawful possession of Turk's Island, restored it at once when threatened with war. We see what a wrong idea he had formed of the government attitude. They had actually adopted the course he recommended, and were only leaving the enemy time to make the required concession. The insufficient military preparations provided him with another welcome point of attack. He mentioned exactly how many more ships and how many more troops could have been and ought to have been got ready; and it is worthy of observation that, for purposes of comparison, he selected and praised the preparations made by the Newcastle ministry after the capture of Minorca. At the time he had charged that ministry with culpable negligence; but this contradiction he explained by pointing out that subsequent investigation had shown how conscientious and energetic its behaviour had been.¹

Here we have the second point of special interest to us in the speech. Chatham enters into detail with regard to certain past occurrences, and thereby provides us with a means of testing the conclusion at which we ourselves arrived regarding these same occurrences. He here admits that, before he first came into office, extensive military preparations had been made (by Cumberland and Fox); consequently this fact, information of which was obtained by us from other sources,² may now be regarded as established. Then, in speaking on the subject of possible alliances, he affirms that the alliance with Frederick

¹ For the true connection of events see vol. ii. p. 114 f.

² Vol. ii. p. 78.

the Great was not contracted with his approval—that it was a burden bequeathed to him by his predecessors in office, of which honour forbade him to rid himself. Though this assertion does not prove that Chatham really objected to the alliance, it shows, as I have already pointed out,¹ that he particularly wished it to be understood that as far as it was concerned, he was simply completing work begun by others. Now he reaffirms his objection to it, because he knows that a new alliance with Prussia is unattainable. Nevertheless he acknowledges England's need of allies with a frankness to which we are quite unaccustomed, declaring her to be unable to cope alone with 'the united power of the House of Bourbon.' His computations, and in particular those regarding the comparative numerical strength of the countries, correspond on the whole with the facts which we have already established. As a means of equalising the disproportion, he recommends alliances with some of the German princes—the old continental policy after all!

The determined attitude of the ministry towards Spain brought matters to a crisis in December, when war appeared to be at hand. Everything depended upon whether or not France came to the assistance of her ally. For the moment this contingency seemed probable. At this particular moment Lord Weymouth, after displaying in the Upper House a marked inclination to side with Chatham, resigned office. It was said, and probably not without reason, that he did not feel equal to the management of a war, and that he would prefer, in the event of war, to serve under Chatham.² He did not, however, go over to the opposition, as the crisis quickly passed. The change which introduced Lord Sandwich to the cabinet as a secretary of state proved to be merely a personal affair.

The dismissal of Choiseul put an end to the danger of war, Louis xv. himself having no desire to interfere in the quarrel. Spain found herself obliged to retract her refusal and to send messengers after the English ambassador, who had started on his journey home. She agreed to restore Port Egmont, though she retained her claims to the territory. The English returned

¹ Vol. ii. p. 90.

² Walpole, *George III.*, iv. 157 f. Report of the Prussian ambassador of December 18, 1770.—Berlin Archives.

to the settlement, but it proved not to be worth the cost of maintenance, and was evacuated two years later, though the English flag long waved above the bare rocks. It was not till the nineteenth century that Britain finally took possession of the islands.

During the remainder of the winter session the question of the Falkland Islands constantly reappeared in the debates of the House of Lords. The opposition, and Chatham in particular, seized upon and severely criticised every weak point in the treaty with Spain. Chatham enlarged especially upon the territorial claim retained by that country, and on the possible existence of some secret agreement; but his utterances contain nothing new or of interest to us. Their only result was that the ministers felt compelled to send several squadrons to America and India, whereby great expense was incurred.¹ Another subject which more than once came up for discussion was that of the Middlesex election; but the debates upon it produced no change in the position of matters.

Chatham, dissatisfied with the result of his endeavours as a member of the opposition, now for a time withdrew almost entirely from the field of practical politics. He gave as his reason the incapacity of his associates,² with whom he had had various differences; but the real reason is probably to be found in the fact that the policy he was obliged to pursue was opposed to the interests of the public, was a purely obstructive policy, which the common-sense of the majority must condemn. England was, however, now approaching the most dangerous crisis in the course of her development; the American troubles were threatening to produce war; and it was, therefore, impossible that Chatham should long remain in seclusion.

¹ Prussian ambassador's report of March 8, 1771.—Berlin Archives.

² *Ibid.*, November 17, 1772.

CHAPTER XIV

CHATHAM AND THE AMERICAN TROUBLES

CHATHAM's opinions on the American question have already repeatedly claimed our attention, especially during the course of the Stamp Act disputes. It would be incorrect to assert that these opinions never altered; nevertheless their formulation was comparatively unchanged. When he thought differently he kept silence, and his thoughts (as was the case while he was in office) were to be divined only from his actions. As the American question became more acute, Chatham resolved to take part in the proceedings; we must therefore recapitulate his fundamental ideas.

As in the question of the Middlesex election, which seemed to him to be of the same nature as the American question, he advanced a political axiom, which he declared to be inherent in the English constitution, in order to prove by means of it that certain acts of the government were inadmissible and invalid. On the occasion of the Wilkes affair the axiom was: No elector may be deprived of his free choice of a representative; in the quarrels with America it was: What a man has honestly acquired is absolutely his own, and cannot be taken from him without his consent, or the consent of the representatives whom he himself has chosen. Both these demands could not fail to meet with violent resistance, because their final aim was the destruction of the existing system. They were an attack upon the stronghold of plutocracy, or the Parliament which had been erected to command the British nation as well as the American colonies. The resistance was certain to be successful, not only because the fortress was strong, but also and chiefly because Chatham himself had no

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intention of destroying it. He desired to disarm it to a certain extent, in order to tranquillise the enemy and prevent further attack, but otherwise to leave it in its commanding position. The natural consequence was that the assailants, encouraged by the apparent approval of one of the enemy's leaders, proceeded the more energetically to work, whilst the defenders, after a vain attempt at conciliation, organised a more determined resistance.

Chatham's attitude both on the question of parliamentary reform and on the American question was thoroughly inconsistent. As matters now stood, there were only two ways of restoring a good understanding with the colonies. Either, treating them as an independent power, a union must be negotiated, which might be firmly established in view of the close national and economic connection existing between the two countries; or the rebellion must be suppressed, after which the future relations between the mother-country and her colonies would be established by law, probably with a wise removal of many causes of complaint. In the first case the real, though not necessarily the nominal, sovereignty would henceforth belong to the colonies themselves; in the second it would remain with the mother-country. It was by no means necessary to regard the reduction of America by force of arms as an act of brutal violence offered to a whole nation, or as the enslavement which Chatham always maintained it to be. The military were only to be employed to overturn the revolutionary and to restore the lawful authority, to which latter and more powerful force the great body of the indifferent were quite as ready to yield allegiance as to the former, especially if their obedience meant the restoration of order and prosperity. Chatham purposed to restore the power of the mother-country by conciliation and an exhibition of weakness; but this, in dealing with a new, aspiring nation, was a fatal policy; with each concession the new body politic gained in strength.

The question of legality, upon which so much stress is always laid in passing judgment on this matter, was a very immaterial factor in the actual proceedings. It was not difficult for the revolutionary leaders to represent every action of the home government as illegal, especially if they appealed to principles instead of appealing to written laws. Chatham

and his adviser, Camden, could not refuse their support even when the assertions of the Americans assumed very audacious forms. They were obliged to prove that the colonists were only endeavouring to defend their lawful rights; for if this were not so, it would be impossible to justify their own policy of conciliation, and the colonists were rebels with whom no minister could have any dealings. It was a testimony to the high reputation enjoyed by the old statesman that his doctrines and actions, which might easily have been represented as treasonable, were not only unopposed, but were actually allowed to a certain extent to influence the policy of the government, unfortunately with no other effect than to multiply its mistakes.

Lord North may, for instance, be said to have acted in accordance with Chatham's theories when in March 1770 he consented to abolish all the duties imposed by Charles Townshend except that on tea.¹ The Americans had regarded the imposition of these duties also, although they were not innovations, as a violation of the law, and had made them a reason for further restricting their trade with England. Chatham had declared them to be in the right in this case too, and had justified his position by an appeal to the principles of the constitution. The actual decline in the exports,² which was severely felt by the British commercial classes, provided Lord North with a satisfactory reason for removing the duties. The step was not to be regarded as a recognition of the principles enounced by the colonists, but simply as the abandonment of certain commercial measures which had not answered the expectations of the government. It was partly for the purpose of emphasising this intention, and partly as a slight indemnification for pecuniary concessions lately made to the East India Company, that the duty upon tea was not removed. To this one impost, which had been reduced to such an extent as to make the smuggling which had formerly been carried on a wholly unprofitable trade, the Americans might possibly have offered no objection if the company had not, in May 1773, received permission to sell its tea free of duty everywhere except in North America. (This was to enable it to

¹ Bancroft, *History of the United States*, vi. 261.

² See P. Busching, *Die Entwicklung der handelspolitischen Beziehungen zwischen England und seinen Kolonien*, p. 45. Stuttgart, 1902.

dispose at a moderate price of its large and hitherto unsaleable store.) A movement in America against the import of tea was the immediate result. The agitators determined that the tea, which, once in the country, would have found purchasers, should not be landed; and this determination resulted in the famous riot at Boston on December 31, 1773, when the cargoes of the tea ships were thrown into the sea by the insurgents.

Chatham had not approved of the government policy,¹ and had prophesied evil consequences from the retention of the one duty which was an infraction of his principle. But when in March the news of the Boston riot reached him at Burton Pynsent, he could not refrain from indignation. 'The violence committed upon the tea cargo,' he wrote to Shelburne,² 'is certainly criminal; nor would it be real kindness to the Americans to adopt their passions and wild pretensions where they manifestly violate the most indispensable ties of civil society. Boston, therefore, appears to me to owe reparation for such a destruction of the property of the East India Company.' However, he by no means approved of the measures which the government proposed. He feared that, instead of restricting themselves to a dignified demand that the owners of the destroyed merchandise should receive compensation, the ministers had determined to suppress the spirit of independence displayed by the colonists. Faithful to his conciliatory policy, he minimised the importance of the movement. Yet it was a movement of which the Boston riots were not the only outcome, and which did not emanate from the actual rioters alone. It amounted, in fact, to open insubordination of the whole population, for which consequently mere pecuniary compensation did not atone.

The ministers promptly determined to take severe measures against the mutinous town, and to suppress all insubordination by force. It was, therefore, most desirable that there should be no championship in England of American claims, and in especial that the great Chatham should not oppose the government policy, much less make demands of a contrary nature. It was quite possible that the occurrence at Boston

¹ Shelburne to Chatham, September 26, 1773.—Chatham MSS.

² *Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 336 f.

might lead to a change in Chatham's views on the American question, especially as his attitude during the last years had been more neutral. It was undoubtedly more than mere coincidence that at this particular moment the king presented John, Lord Pitt, with an ensign's commission in the 47th regiment of foot, an action which was universally regarded as a special sign of favour.¹ A commission in those days was not simply an appointment, as it is now; it also represented a considerable sum of money. And, as a matter of fact, the attitude now assumed by Chatham, though it by no means amounted to definite approval of the government policy, was very far removed from violent opposition.

The government's first measures were to recall the revenue officials from Boston and to close the port to foreign traffic. On the Port Act followed other bills, which provided for changes in the government and the courts of justice of Massachusetts. The quartering of troops in Boston or any other town of the colony was legalised and a new delimitation of the Canadian frontier was determined. The aim of all these measures was to curb the independence and check the territorial extension of the rebellious colony.

Chatham, strangely enough, made his appearance in London too late to take part in the principal debates, although a more important decision than that under consideration could hardly be imagined. He afterwards proffered the excuse of illness; but of such an illness we find no mention in any of our authorities. All that we can discover is an intimation in a letter to Lord Shelburne,² that the uncertain weather, which makes him afraid of gout, causes him to postpone his journey to London. This he was not in the habit of doing, even in mid-winter, when important public business was on hand. He remained quietly at Burton Pynsent till the end of May, Shelburne keeping him informed of all that was happening. When he at last did appear, it was evidently the conviction of the government party that such action as he intended to take would be of service to them. They were desirous that he

¹ Report of the Prussian ambassador, May 31, 1774. Chatham's letter of thanks to General Carleton, dated March 28, 1774, is preserved among the Chatham MSS.

² To Shelburne, April 6, 1774.—*Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 343.

should speak, and a debate was actually postponed for nine days that he might be present.¹

On May 26, on the occasion of the third reading of a bill 'for the quartering and regulating the troops in the colonies,' Chatham rose in the House of Lords—as usual to oppose the government proposal. This being his first speech after a silence of three years, much excitement naturally prevailed.² All were eager to learn the views on the new situation of the man whom a great part of the nation regarded as their oracle on the American question. Many doubtless believed that he would overthrow the government and himself assume the leadership of the misguided state, for he was still credited with the ability to perform such an exploit. But his speech³ by no means justified such expectations. He certainly made an attempt to defend the Americans. He reminded the House how grateful they had shown themselves for the repeal of the Stamp Act, and how it had tranquillised them, reading in proof of his assertion a passage from a report of Governor Bernard of Massachusetts, written at the time in question. The new disaffection was entirely due to the renewal of the attempt to impose duties, and the last instance of it to the non-removal of the tea-tax. The discontent was justifiable, since the imposts were an illegal infringement of the rights of property. Taking his text from an American pamphlet, he expounded his theory of rightful taxation, a theory with which we are already familiar. He severely condemned the late illegal and violent proceedings at Boston, but reminded his hearers that the love of liberty, which had in this instance degenerated into lawlessness, must be regarded as the inevitable result of a past distinguished by its achievements and its hardships. The men who had founded these colonies were men ready to fly to the ends of the earth rather than submit to tyranny at home, not, as in the case of other countries, emigrants who carried with them the chains of slavery and the spirit of despotism. Therefore it was unfair to condemn their descendants so severely for exhibiting some-

¹ Lyttelton to Temple, May 17 and 18, 1774.—*Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 344 and 345, note.

² Prussian ambassador's reports of May 22 and 24, 1774.—Berlin Archives.

³ Thackeray, ii. 262 ff.; Prussian ambassador's report of May 31, 1774.—Berlin Archives.

what extreme self-will. The means employed to bring them back to a sense of their duty to the parent state seemed to him most ill-judged, chiefly because they caused the many who were innocent to suffer along with the few who were guilty. The colonists ought first to be heard, to be given an opportunity to excuse and possibly to justify themselves, and to be allowed time to repent of their wrong-doing. The home government ought to act like a kind and affectionate parent, who is able to forgive and forget.

These were noble sentiments beautifully expressed and by no means inopportune if the matter in hand was nothing more than an outrage due to a momentary impulse. In that case extenuating circumstances might be discovered, time for repentance allowed, and pardon granted. But every one, Chatham included, knew perfectly well that no such premise existed, that the point at issue was a premeditated, carefully organised resistance. Consequently all these suggestions were valueless. Nothing could, and probably nothing was intended to come of them; they simply served to harmonise the orator's present with his former attitude, to show his loyalty to his principles, without obstructing the ministerial policy.

The speech was, indeed, of actual assistance to the ministry. Chatham laid great stress upon the supreme legislative authority of Parliament, and declared himself in favour of the severest punishment of the colonists if they should attempt to resist it. He also demanded that strong measures should be taken if the inhabitants of Boston, proving unable to justify themselves, should refuse to acknowledge themselves in the wrong. He would then not be content with the small force that was being despatched, but would advise that a large fleet should be sent to reduce the rebels to submission. As the premise in this case did exist, as the authority of Parliament had already actually been repeatedly resisted, and as the burgesses of Massachusetts had no intention of either justifying their outrage or repenting of it, Chatham's words were neither more nor less than a demand for the suppression of the revolt. It was practically certain that all those acquainted with the actual situation would condemn as utterly useless another attempt to make the insurgents acknowledge themselves in the wrong; this being the case, the advice to employ strong measures was the only alternative. On inattentive

listeners the speech could not but produce the impression that the orator did not really know his own mind; the attentive and sagacious part of the audience, on the other hand, must have been led to the conclusion that he was badly informed upon the facts of the case, but that when he understood the true situation he would offer no objection to the energetic measures of the government. The Prussian ambassador wrote:¹ 'His speech, in short, instead of adding to his reputation, detracts from it, since it approves on the one hand, and disapproves on the other, simply to avoid arriving at a decision. Public opinion sees in the step a civility to the government, which it required, in order to disabuse the nation of its illusory hope in Lord Chatham's intentions. On one point the nation has not allowed itself to be deceived; it sees that the patriot's game is to make his peace with the Court. He has two sons to place, and only two months ago the King presented the elder of these with an ensign's commission.'

It is thus evident that at this important crisis Chatham allowed himself to be so far influenced by the amiable attentions of the sovereign as to abandon the cause of the Americans, though without openly adopting a new policy. He was undoubtedly influenced in the same direction by his own extreme disapproval of the Boston outrage, so that it would be wrong to say that he acted positively against his convictions. But George had unmistakably chosen the exact moment when it was easiest to induce him to change his attitude, to cast a royal favour into the trembling scale.

In order to prove that he was none the less a stout adherent of the opposition party, Chatham opposed another American bill, which was not so closely connected with the disturbances. This bill was intended to settle affairs in Canada. It so extended the boundaries of that colony as to include in it the Lakes, the valley of the Ohio, and part of the basin of the Mississippi. This made it impossible for the rebellious colonies to extend their boundaries farther inland, which the terms of their charters entitled them to do. It further provided Canada with a government destitute of all constitutional checks. The legislative council was to be appointed by the king, and the decision of all important matters was to be referred to the 'King in Council.' The ancient laws without

¹ Report of May 31, 1774.

a trial by jury were restored. The Roman Catholic religion received legal recognition.

After passing the House of Commons this bill, on June 17, 1774, came before the House of Lords, on which occasion it was attacked by Chatham.¹ He spoke in terms somewhat condemnatory of the despotic arrangements, which were not excused by the circumstance that most of the inhabitants, being French, were not accustomed to liberty. At the time of the annexation in 1763 they had been promised the protection of the English laws (he read in confirmation of this assertion a passage from the royal proclamation), and the freedom thereby guaranteed them must be granted them. He found fault with the legal arrangements, and strongly condemned the favour shown to Roman Catholicism. Whilst speaking on the subject of religion he directed his discourse to the bench of bishops, and endeavoured to incite them to oppose the measure; but this none of them felt called upon to do.

What gives this tolerably insignificant speech an interest for us is the circumstance that Chatham never even mentions the clause in the bill which largely affected the great quarrel between the mother-country and her colonies, namely, the new frontier delimitation. A splendid opportunity was offered here for condemning the harshness and cunning of the ministers, who were endeavouring by indirect means to deprive the aspiring young colonies of the possibility of development, who were circumscribing the domain of liberty and enlarging that of absolutism! Chatham could have appealed to the old charters granted by English kings, which conferred on the colonies the right to extend their boundaries to the Pacific Ocean, and which were now to be annulled in favour of the illegal boundary arrangements made by French rulers. But the opportunity was undesired. He carefully confined himself to the regulations affecting Canada alone, and expended all the powers of his oratory upon them. Here we have another proof that he was not disposed at this time to hinder the ministry in the pursuance of their American policy. It was a remarkable and suggestive circumstance that Lord Camden, the ardent defender of

¹ Thackeray, ii. 266 f.; Prussian ambassador's report of June 21, 1774.—Berlin Archives.

the colonial pretensions, was unable to be in his place on the day of this debate. Chatham had told him, and Lord Chancellor Bathurst had confirmed the statement, that the Canadian question was to come before the House at a later date. Thus he missed the debate, to his exceeding regret.¹

But there was to be another great revulsion in Chatham's attitude. The government measures provoked indignant opposition, not only in the colonies directly affected, but also in most of the others. Their Boston quarters were made as uncomfortable for General Gage and his troops as possible; the citizens frequently refused the general's requisitions and even declined to sell provisions. Independent assemblies supplied the place of the suspended legislative assembly. Trade with England was checked in every possible way. Particular damage was caused by the general determination to refrain from purchasing English wares. The consequences were severely felt in the mother-country; discontent prevailed in commercial circles, and much displeasure was expressed with the government. All this had its influence on Chatham. Reports reached him from the City, through Sheriff Stephen Sayre, of the behaviour of the English troops in Boston.² These tales, coming, as they originally did, from a Boston citizen, were naturally highly coloured. From them Chatham received the impression that the arrogant behaviour of the soldiery was provoking, nay, driving the Americans to resistance. It afterwards appeared that General Gage's attitude had been one of most marked non-interference. Chatham, however, came to the conclusion that he himself had been too hasty in passing judgment upon the Boston affair, and he consequently resolved to procure reliable information on the subject from American sources.

Since 1757 Benjamin Franklin, probably the most gifted and most intellectually active American of the day, had been fulfilling the duties of agent in London for the colony of Pennsylvania. During the great war he had more than once endeavoured to communicate personally with Pitt; but the latter had never granted him an interview.³ 'He was then,'

¹ Camden to Chatham, July 16, 1774.—*Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 353.

² *Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 359.

³ Concerning this and the first interview see the *Memoirs of Benjamin Franklin*, edited by John Bigelow, ii. 258-61. London, 1875.

writes Franklin, 'too great a man, or too much occupied in affairs of greater moment.' We may assume that, to the statesman engrossed in great military undertakings, the plain Pennsylvanian printer did not seem worthy of notice. Potter and Wood, Pitt's secretaries, however, did not neglect to apply to him for information regarding American affairs; and during the war Franklin took every advantage of his intercourse with them to urge the wisdom of gaining possession of Canada.

Towards the end of August 1774 Franklin paid a visit to his friend, Mr. Sargent, at Halsted, in Kent, a country-house not far from Chevening, the seat of Lord Stanhope, who, being a son of Lucy, daughter of Governor Thomas Pitt, was Chatham's cousin.¹ (Stanhope's son, Lord Mahon, married Chatham's daughter at the close of the year.) Soon after Franklin's arrival at Halsted, Mr. Sargent told him that he had promised to take him to Lord Stanhope's, and the two gentlemen drove to Chevening the same evening. Stanhope gave the famous American a very friendly reception. He informed him that Lord Chatham also wished to see him; and it was arranged that Stanhope was to call for Franklin next morning at Halsted and drive him to Hayes, a distance of only a few miles. Everything had been previously arranged by the three neighbours to secure a meeting between Chatham and Franklin.

Franklin was received by the old statesman 'with abundance of civility.' Chatham expressed great regard and esteem for the Americans; he quoted some passages from his May speech, and expressed the hope that the colonists would succeed in defending their constitutional rights by all peaceable and legal means. Franklin promptly took the opportunity to impress upon Chatham that it was impossible for the mother-country directly to govern such distant possessions—that to do so Parliament would require to be not only omnipotent but omniscient. He ignored two facts—that the quarrel had not been the result of interference with the self-government of the colonies, but of the demand for a contribution towards the expenses incurred on their behalf, and that eminently practical reasons had led to the decision that this contribution should be imposed by Parliament. The sagacious American

¹ See vol. i. pp. 54 and 74.

endeavoured to arouse the political cupidity of the English statesman, hoping thereby to secure his assistance. He showed him how the colonies might have helped to extend the empire of England, 'adding province to province as far as the South Sea,' but how the imposts, and the general perversity of the home policy, had for the present undoubtedly checked this grand expansion.

These observations did not fail to produce the desired impression. Chatham expressed his entire approval of the idea of extending the empire in the manner suggested, and his wish that a good understanding might be secured between the different factions of the opposition at home, as a means of restoring the ancient harmony between the mother-country and her colonies. But he spoke of the coalition of the factions, of their faithful pursuance of one and the same colonial policy, as a prospect rather to be desired than expected. He also expressed a fear that America aimed at making herself an independent state, or, at least, that she aimed at getting rid of the Navigation Acts. On these last points Franklin tried to reassure Chatham. He declared that though he had travelled from one end of the American continent to the other, and had kept a great variety of company, he had never heard the least expression of a wish for a separation from the mother-country. As to the Navigation Act, the main, material part of it was as acceptable to the Americans as it could be to Britain; the Americans were not against regulations of general commerce by Parliament, provided such regulations were really for the benefit of the whole empire, and not merely for that of a small circle of interested persons. Some amendments, of which he gave examples, ought certainly, he said, to be made in these acts.

Franklin's utterances were not entirely reassuring. Although, before his departure from America in 1757, he had not perceived any desire among the inhabitants of that country for independence, this was no proof that the desire did not exist now, seeing that circumstances had completely changed. And he said nothing as to whether or not such a desire had been brought to his notice by correspondents. His concession in the matter of the Navigation Act was almost nullified by the reservation; for the tendency of the whole policy inaugurated by this act, concealed though it might be

by the wording of the regulations, was to favour the mother-country in every manner possible. Therefore the Americans would have no difficulty in proving at any time that their requirement was not fulfilled. Chatham on his side gave no definite information regarding the attitude he intended to assume; he delivered an opinion on some minor matters, and expressed his delight that America was not aiming at independence. It was a somewhat chilling conclusion to the interview, and showed plainly that Franklin's assurances had not satisfied the shrewd statesman. He, however, expressed a desire to see Franklin again.

For a time there were no further negotiations, and we perceive no alteration in Chatham's standpoint. But events succeeded one another more rapidly than before. The English government looked forward with anxiety to the inevitable dissolution of Parliament and general election impending in 1775. What they feared most was the discontent certain to be produced by the depression of trade; they knew that the results of the repressive measures adopted in the colonies would become plainly evident exactly at the time of the elections, and they recognised that there was a possibility of their defeat. To avoid this they suddenly determined, at the end of September, to dissolve Parliament prematurely, and to issue writs for the new elections at the earliest possible date.¹ This proceeding was disadvantageous, as it did not leave sufficient time for preparations. The government lost many seats which it might otherwise have retained.² But the danger of a complete change was averted: the ministry felt certain of a majority for seven years longer.

In the meantime, on the other side of the Atlantic, a government had been established which was to prove a dangerous rival to the re-established English ministry. On September 5, 1774 the general Congress at Philadelphia, composed of delegates from all the colonies, held its first meeting.³ This Congress was an irregularly constituted body, unrecognised by the law, and without any distinctly formulated powers; but as it numbered amongst its members the most capable and most highly respected men in the country, its authority was great

¹ *Franklin Memoirs*, il. 258.

² Report of the Prussian ambassador, October 11, 1774.—Berlin Archives.

³ Bancroft, *History of the United States*, iv.

from the outset. It began its work by passing five measures affecting the relations of the colonies with the mother-country. It forbade the import of English wares after December 1, 1774, and ordered the cessation of all exports to Great Britain and Ireland after September 10, 1775, unless there had been a redress of grievances prior to these dates. It approved of the opposition offered to the late acts of Parliament by the people of Massachusetts Bay. It drew up a Declaration of Rights similar to that of 1789. It issued proclamations to the old and to the new colonies, and to the people of Great Britain. It addressed a petition to the king.

Whilst the first and second measures proclaimed a determination to employ every means by which resistance might be successfully continued, the others evidenced a moderation which had hardly been expected from the revolutionary assembly. It is sufficient for our purpose to examine the Declaration of Rights,¹ as the other documents contain nothing more than is there to be found except points which show how the demands made by the assembly affected the persons addressed. These demands were summarised as a claim for the same rights and liberties as were possessed by English subjects in the mother-country, and in particular for the right to participate in the legislature (as circumstances made it impossible for America to be represented in the British Parliament, this meant the full, exclusive authority of their own legislative assemblies), the right to be tried in their own courts of justice, and the right to assemble to consider their grievances. These rights, founded on the immutable laws of nature and the principles of the English constitution, must be recognised by every government. Proceeding from this principle the colonies refused to submit to taxation, internal or external, by Parliament; to deprivation of the immunities and privileges granted by their charters; to the keeping of a standing army in any of the colonies in time of peace without the consent of the people; and to the exercise of legislative power by a council appointed at pleasure by the crown. They declared themselves ready to maintain the union with the mother-country, and to consent to the operation of British acts of Parliament, '*bona fide* restricted to the regulation of

¹ Adolphus, *History of England*, ii. 120 f.

commerce.' In the proclamation¹ all desire for independence was emphatically denied, and in the petition to the king² the customary subservient tone was retained.

The dissolution of Parliament, which suddenly deprived Chatham of the hope that the composition of the new House of Commons would be more favourable to his designs, had aroused in him a distinct animosity to the ministry. What did it avail him that, at the time of the election, the opposition proclaimed him to be their leader and the coming prime minister? The only real success obtained was the final admission of Wilkes (now Lord Mayor of London) to the House of Commons as member for Middlesex. A complete change in Chatham's attitude towards America was, however, observable after he received from Franklin, on December 19, the report of the proceedings of the Philadelphia congress.³ When Franklin waited upon him at Hayes on the 26th, to hear his opinion of the document, he found him much more affable and much more favourably disposed towards the Americans. He applauded the moderation and wisdom of the congress, declaring that he thought it the most honourable assembly of statesmen since those of the ancient Greeks and Romans in the most virtuous times; and he expressed approval of its proceedings on the whole. He said, however, that it was mistaken in asserting the retention of a standing army in the colonies to be illegal without the consent of their legislatures. He then inquired particularly into the state of affairs in America, asked if the colonies were likely to persevere in their determination, if they were aware of the difficulties they would encounter, and if their resources were sufficient. He intimated that he would probably have a measure to propose to Parliament after the holidays, and that he should wish previously to have Franklin's opinion on it.

The American, anxious to further the interests of his country, took advantage of Chatham's favourable disposition to advocate a measure much desired by the colonies. He eloquently impressed upon him that the presence of the troops in Boston was the greatest obstacle to the reconciliation and good understanding desired by them both. The

¹ Bancroft, *History of the United States*, iv.

² Adolphus, ii. 121 f.

³ *Franklin Memoirs*, ii. 288 f.

very sight of them was a constant offence to the citizens ; and any unforeseen, unpremeditated quarrel between a citizen and a soldier might bring on a riot, tumult, and bloodshed, and in its consequences produce a breach impossible to be healed. No accommodation could well be proposed or considered by the Americans while the bayonet was at their breasts. Chatham listened patiently, and seemed to think these sentiments had something in them that was reasonable. His subsequent behaviour showed that he had assimilated Franklin's ideas.

It cannot be denied that the great statesman with his idealist tendencies allowed himself to be overreached by the Americans, by Franklin in particular—if it is permissible to employ such an expression in referring to the skilful advocacy of a policy regarded as advantageous for both sides. He allowed himself to be deluded by the loyal phrases which abounded in the utterances of the colonists. In his delight at the unexpected moderation and conciliatory spirit of a revolutionary body he overlooked the fact that that body engaged itself to no positive concessions whatever, for the prerogative of regulating commerce, which it acknowledged as belonging to the mother-country, might be rendered perfectly illusory by a suitable application of the Declaration of Rights. The one thing which the congress did grant was permission to exact lawful compensation for the destroyed tea ; but in this case it was not known who the delinquents really were. The congress assumed the position of an independent power prepared to conclude an alliance ; in fact, in the proclamation federation with England was openly mentioned. Of submission to the home government there was no mention whatever. And now Franklin was at work endeavouring to remove the one hindrance to the practical application of the principles proclaimed by the congress, the one means by which the power of the British government made itself felt in America, the standing army. Chatham was actually persuaded to believe Franklin's deductions, and to suppose that the submission which he desired would be more easily attained without the presence of the troops, whereas the reality was that these troops, these ' bayonets at the breast,' were a necessary factor in the negotiations, the right means to extort concessions and bring about submission.

And what, we may ask, was the real cause of Chatham's sudden credulity, of his extravagant respect for the congress, and of his complete agreement with Franklin's opinions, of which he had hitherto been so sceptical? I believe it to have been the resemblance which suddenly became apparent between the American rebellion and the Revolution of 1688. The Declaration of Rights, not only by its name, but by its contents, recalled so forcibly the proclamation issued by the revolutionary Parliament, that Chatham, who had always regarded that first declaration of rights as the outcome of supreme wisdom, could not but be prejudiced in favour of it and of its authors. The perusal of the American documents aroused the enthusiasm of the old Whigs; and he very possibly remembered that his grandfather, Thomas Pitt, had been one of the wise patriots to whose inspiration the English declaration was due.¹ How, then, could he himself do aught but extend the warmest sympathy to an assembly which was pursuing the same path! In the first speech which he made in the new Parliament this train of thought is clearly apparent.

The session began on November 29, 1774, when the weakness of the opposition at once became manifest. The news of the proceedings of the Philadelphia congress, which arrived in December, was, however, likely to produce a considerable change in the situation, and the re-assembly of Parliament after the Christmas holidays was awaited with suspense. To sustain the government credit, its adherents spread a report that Chatham would not appear, or, if he did, would not speak on the American question. The great man had, however, entirely concealed his intentions. Not until two days before he made his appearance did he intimate, through Lord Stanhope, that he intended to make a motion relative to America; but even then he gave no hint as to the character of the motion.² The fact was that he did not intend on this occasion to take any very decisive action, but only, as he wrote to his relative, 'to touch the threshold of American business and knock at the minister's door to wake him.' Lord Stanhope was also commissioned to invite Franklin to attend in the lobby

¹ See vol. i. p. 27.

² Chatham to Stanhope, January 19, 1775.—*Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 371 f.

of the House of Lords at two o'clock on January 20, when Lord Chatham would be there and would personally introduce him.¹ Chatham wished to make a public display of his intimacy with the American, of which few were as yet aware; and he also wished to prove to Franklin himself by his motion and speech that he was a faithful champion of the American's ideas and aims.

In the lobby Chatham said to Franklin: 'I am sure your presence at this day's debate will be of more service to America than mine,' by which he meant that the honour he was showing to Franklin would contribute greatly to the reconciliation of the two peoples. He wished Franklin to enter the House by a door near the throne, but was informed that none might use that entrance except the eldest sons or brothers of peers, upon which he limped back with him to the door near the bar, where admittance was readily granted. Chatham's appearance, and appearance, moreover, in company with the American agent, produced considerable excitement; messengers were at once despatched to summon a number of absent peers. There were many Americans in the galleries, eagerly awaiting the announcement which this friend of their country intended to make. But it is probable that the most eager of all the listeners was the great orator's son. Young William Pitt, then aged fifteen, had for the first time received permission to be present at a debate, to hear his father speak. He afterwards wrote an enthusiastic account of the proceedings to his mother.²

After a few introductory words Chatham moved—

'That an humble address be presented to his Majesty, most humbly to advise and beseech his Majesty, that in order to open the way towards a happy settlement of the dangerous troubles in America, by beginning to allay ferments and soften animosities there; and above all, for preventing in the meantime any sudden and fatal catastrophe at Boston, now suffering under the daily irritation of an army before their eyes, posted in the town; it may graciously please his Majesty, that immediate orders may be despatched to General Gage for removing his Majesty's forces from the town of Boston, as soon as the rigour of the season and other circumstances indispensable to

¹ *Life and Letters of Benjamin Franklin*, ii. 298 f.

² *Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 376 f.

the safety and accommodation of the said troops, may render the same practicable.'

In support of this motion, which evidently owed its origin and its whole conception to Franklin, Chatham made a speech which lasted more than an hour, and which, while reasserting the old principles, differed in various important points from the May speech. Then he had demanded leniency in dealing with the turbulent insubordination of the colonists; now he expressly declared that it was not indulgence but justice that he demanded. Their resistance was no longer an error to be pardoned, but a just and therefore a necessary course of action, which had been entailed by the tyrannical measures of Parliament. Formerly he had demanded that the people of Massachusetts Bay should acknowledge themselves in the wrong and make due apology, and that, in case of their refusal, the severest measures should be adopted. He had gone as far as to recommend the despatch of a much larger military force. Now he strongly advised that the troops should be recalled, although the people of Boston were as obstinately rebellious as ever; and heaped praises upon Congress, although it was supporting the colony in this rebellious attitude. These are unmistakable contradictions, which bear witness to the change in the orator's standpoint. Chatham now employed all the resources of his eloquence to disparage the value of the troops. He described the deplorable, almost ridiculous, position to which their inactivity condemned them amidst that hostile population. His observations on this subject met with the joyful approval of the Americans, but sounded very remarkable from the lips of an English statesman. He certainly denied any intention of censuring the general or the soldiers, who, he acknowledged, were acting for the best by remaining inactive; nevertheless his satire exposed the British army to the ridicule of its enemies. He also represented the chances of war as highly unfavourable to England, thereby lessening the inclination of the Americans to yield and actually helping to bring on the war, since he himself set limits beyond which the endurance of England might not be tried. He directed attention to the fact that the colonists were not dependent upon towns, industries, etc., which it was possible to destroy, but that they could at any moment retreat into their forests and be free.

Chatham went on to declare that the impregnable nature of the American position was most securely guaranteed by that approval with which the principles of the congress were certain to meet in the mother-country. Here we have the central idea of his speech. The Americans had shown themselves to be good Whigs, and would be supported by all good Whigs in England. What effect could a few regiments produce upon this powerful union of two millions of men on the other side of the Atlantic and upon twice that number at home. It would be absurd to take the troops into account at all.

Chatham thus revealed the motives which had really decided him thus to embrace the cause of the Americans. He pointed out the similarity between the present movement in America and the last revolution in England, and maintained that the spirit of resistance now displayed was the counterpart of that which had established the liberties of England. His arrival at the conclusion that every good Whig would now support the Americans merely proves that this point had induced him to change his attitude. The great majority of the Whig party had no intention whatever of following his example.

On the other hand, Chatham adhered firmly to the limits which he had set to England's compliance. The supremacy of Parliament, which would be exercised chiefly in the regulation of commerce, was to be acknowledged. A political opponent having asserted in his speech that the Americans intended to abolish the Navigation Acts, the old statesman reaffirmed his readiness in such a case to support the severest measures. Hence we see that any proposal to negotiate with America as an independent power was very far from his thoughts. And yet he desired to disarm England! This was the inconsistency which made his interference in the matter actually injurious, and which rendered it as impossible for him to come to an understanding with the Americans as with Parliament. A conspicuous proof that such was the state of affairs was presently to be given.

In the course of the debate which began with Chatham's speech, a member of the government spoke of the facility with which the measures of ministers were censured by those who proposed nothing better.¹ Upon this Lord Chatham observed

¹ *Life and Letters of Benjamin Franklin*, ii. 301.

that he was not one of these idle censurers, that he had thought long and closely on the subject in question, and proposed soon to lay before their lordships a plan which was the result of his meditations. He was actually engaged at this time in framing a great bill, which had as its object the transference of the American question from the stage of angry dispute and of blows exchanged to that of calm, conciliatory negotiation.

This bill¹ bore a title suggestive of Chatham's standpoint ('A Provisional Act for settling the Troubles in America, and for asserting the supreme legislative authority and superintending power of Great Britain over the colonies'), and expressed in the clumsy form of an Act the conclusions he had arrived at respecting the ways and means of securing a reconciliation. Its fundamental idea was that the recognition by the Americans of the supremacy of the mother-country and of the legislative omnipotence of Parliament should be purchased by a number of most important concessions, granted and legally established by the said omnipotent authority. Accordingly, after a precise and very decided affirmation of the supremacy claimed, it was declared that no military force could be lawfully employed to violate and destroy the just rights of the people, and that no tax or other charge for the king's revenue was to be levied in America without the consent of the provincial assemblies. The Act further provided for the repeal of all the laws and ordinances by which the Americans felt themselves aggrieved—a list of them being given; and it guaranteed that the judges should hold their offices, as in England, during good behaviour. All these concessions, however, were dependent upon the definite recognition by the colonies of the supreme legislative authority and superintending power of Parliament. This supremacy was to be recognised by a Congress, which was to meet again on May 9 for the purpose of taking this offer into consideration. The objectionable laws were to be considered as suspended until that date, but they would not be repealed until recognition was forthcoming. The congress was also expected to vote a free grant of a certain perpetual royal revenue, a grant which would, it was hoped, be in due proportion to the flourishing condition of the colonies and to the heaviness of the burdens which had been borne for them by the mother-country; it was not, however,

¹ Printed in Thackeray, ii. 293 ff.; also in the Chatham MSS.

to be understood as a condition of redress, but as a free gift.

Lord Camden and Benjamin Franklin were the only persons to whom Chatham submitted his plan previous to laying it before Parliament.¹ He obtained Lord Camden's advice upon the legal portions of the act. Franklin he invited to Hayes upon January 27, and there communicated to him the outlines of his plan, promising that the document should be put into his hands as soon as it was transcribed, so that he might give his opinion and advice. On Sunday the 29th Chatham appeared in person at Franklin's house, bringing with him 'his plan transcribed, in the form of an act of Parliament,' and remaining for two hours to talk it over. Franklin naturally reserved his verdict until he had thoroughly examined the proposals. Every one soon knew of the visit paid by the great statesman to the American; Chatham's carriage waited at the door whilst he was within, and was recognised by the people coming from church. The outcome of the interview was naturally awaited with much anxiety.

On Tuesday, January 31, the day before the proposal was to be laid before the House of Lords, Franklin was again at Hayes, to deliver his opinion. He had in the interval carefully studied the document and made a number of memoranda, which plainly show that his general standpoint was not the same as Chatham's. Chatham was resolved that the supremacy of Britain should be maintained at all costs; Franklin assumes the two contracting parties to be on an equal footing. He asks, for instance, 'If the King should raise armies in America, would Britain like their being brought hither? as the King might bring them when he pleased.' He demands that congress shall be made a permanent institution, and that among its functions shall be the general defence of the frontiers and the making and regulating new settlements. He asks, 'If a permanent revenue, why not the same privileges in trade as Scotland?' and suggests that the conditions of the union between England and Scotland may be taken as a model. He considers that protection should be mutual. The last of his objections is the most important: 'Perhaps if the legislative power of Parliament is owned in the colonies, they may make a law to forbid the meeting of any congress, etc.'

¹ As to this see *Life and Letters of Franklin*, ii. 302-7.

By this he meant that the omnipotence of Parliament might render every concession illusory, might annihilate liberty, whatever agreements were made—a very justifiable objection, in view of the reluctance with which the English government was likely to make the concessions, if it made them at all. There were other memoranda relating to practical details.

Thus prepared, Franklin arrived at Hayes early on the appointed day, and the two statesmen proceeded to discuss the plan. But though Franklin stayed nearly four hours, Chatham was so 'full and diffuse' in supporting every particular which Franklin questioned, that hardly half of the latter's memoranda were gone through, and he had no opportunity to give distinct expression to his views. He listened with great interest to all Chatham's arguments, but no progress was made towards an understanding. Franklin, however, comforted himself with the idea that the bill under consideration was merely a basis for treaty, and that his countrymen would find sufficient opportunity to make their objections and propositions of amendment. He also reflected that Chatham could not afford to offend the prejudices of Parliament by proposing excessive concessions at the outset. Thus it came about that not even on this occasion did the two statesmen become conscious of the fundamental difference between their standpoints. It was supposed by some that Franklin had assisted in the composition of the Act; as a matter of fact his collaboration was limited to the addition of a single word and to the filling up of a blank with the titles of the acts to be repealed, which, as he himself writes, 'was no more than might have been done by any copying clerk.'

Wednesday, February 1, was the memorable day on which the conqueror of French America laid before the House of Lords his plan for saving British America.¹ He made a speech in which he once more explained the principles on which his plan was based, and emphasised the fact that it was not a bill which merely granted concessions, but one which at the same time and to the same extent maintained rights.

When Chatham sat down the colonial secretary, Lord Dartmouth, rose and said that, as a matter of such weight and magnitude required much consideration, he made sure that

¹ Thackeray, ii. 292 ff.; Bigelow, *Life of Franklin*, 306 f.; Bancroft, *History of the United States*, iv. 115.

the noble earl would be willing that the bill should for the present lie on the table. But to this Lord Sandwich at once objected. He vehemently opposed its consideration upon any terms, maintaining that no concessions whatever should be made to the rebellious colonists. He revealed the reason of his violent opposition by asserting that the bill appeared to him to be the work of some American. Looking at Franklin, who had been introduced into the House by Lord Stanhope, and stood leaning on the bar, he continued: 'I fancy I have in my eye the person who drew it up, one of the bitterest and most mischievous enemies this country has ever known.' Franklin, conscious that he had had no share whatever in the composition of the document, was able to preserve an impassive countenance.

The idea that the plan emanated from the enemy decided all the other peers who were supporters of the government to reject with similar abruptness a bill with the provisions of which they were unacquainted, and the title of which promised exactly what all desired. The Duke of Grafton, Lord Gower, and Lord Hillsborough spoke against it, but Chatham's friends, Lords Shelburne, Camden, Temple, and Lyttelton, vehemently demanded that it should be received for consideration. Chatham, in a second speech, vindicated himself energetically, and attacked in particular his old friend, the Duke of Grafton, who had blamed the precipitancy with which such an important measure had been brought forward. But the result of the debate—promoted by Lord Dartmouth's conversion to Lord Sandwich's opinion—was the rejection of the unconsidered plan of reconciliation. The antipathy to everything emanating from the rebels, the suspicion to which Chatham had exposed himself by his open intimacy with Franklin, prevented even an examination and discussion of the proposals to the elaboration of which the most famous statesman of the age had devoted himself with patriotic zeal.

It is quite possible, however, that if they had been discussed Chatham's disappointment would have been still greater, because in this affair he was not sure even of his friends. Temple had frankly told him that he felt obliged to support a different policy,¹ and Rockingham, whom Chatham had specially requested to be present at the debate, had

¹ *Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 397.

returned a very curt answer.¹ In America, also, whither a copy of the Act was at once sent by Franklin, its proposals met with unambiguous condemnation.² The colonists were not prepared, in return for the temporary repeal of a few laws, to deliver themselves again into the hands of Parliament. The one political result of Chatham's step was that Lord North now considered it his duty also to concoct a plan of reconciliation.³ Chatham, in his vindictory speech, had reproached the ministers with their inability to form a plan, and this accusation their leader now endeavoured to disprove. His bill naturally fell still further short of the Americans' desires, and proved to be useless.

All these occurrences, and more especially the parliamentary disputes with their unfortunate ending, had told upon Chatham, physically and doubtless also mentally. In spite of all the precautions taken by his wife, who even arranged for the shutting of certain windows and doors in the House of Commons,⁴ he fell ill again,⁵ and was unable to take any further share in the deliberations; before he was convalescent events had taken place which entirely precluded his participation. He therefore once more retired for a period of years from the political arena.

On April 19 occurred the famous fight at Lexington, near Boston, which opened the war. A detachment of General Gage's troops, sent to destroy military stores collected by the Americans, was attacked by colonial militia, and obliged to retreat with loss to Boston. In June, when Gage had received reinforcements, the British troops redeemed their honour by storming Bunker's Hill, which had been fortified by the Americans; but this produced no real change in the situation.

Great indignation now prevailed in England, and much of the blame for the unfortunate development of events was laid

¹ Rockingham's answer, dated January 31, 1775, is among the Chatham MSS.

² Lord Suffolk to Lord G. Germain, June 15, 1775: 'There is a Colonel Maunsell come from New York, who gives a most ridiculous account of the reception which Lord Chatham's plan met with in that province. He said it was paraphrased in publick prints and abused in every company.'—*Historical MSS. Commission, Ninth Report*, part iii. p. 81.

³ Bancroft, iv. 128.

⁴ *Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 370.

⁵ *Ibid.*, iv. 398 and elsewhere.

on Chatham.¹ The fact that the fighting occurred very soon after Franklin's report of Chatham's attitude reached America could not but suggest a causal connection. Chatham's demand that the troops should be recalled from Boston was regarded as folly, if not actually treason. The king showed great displeasure with him. In February he had blamed him for giving evil counsels, and accused him of ingratitude for the favour shown to his son; he now went so far as to declare that he was looking forward to the time 'when decrepitude or age should put an end to him [Chatham] as the trumpet of sedition.'² On August 23 he issued a proclamation which declared the Americans to be rebels and traitors, but which was evidently also aimed at Chatham and his friends.³ One sentence in it ran: 'There is reason to apprehend that such rebellion hath been much encouraged by the traitorous correspondence, counsels, and comfort of divers wicked and desperate persons within our realm.' And not only all civil and military officials, but all his majesty's subjects were called upon to disclose all treasonable plots, and to give information to either of the secretaries of state regarding all those engaged in treasonable correspondence with America, as well as those in active, armed rebellion, in order that 'the authors and abettors' of such traitorous designs might receive the punishment they deserved. We see the light in which Chatham, because of his intimacy with Franklin, was now regarded by the king. Both confidence and attachment had disappeared.

But George was ready to show favour to the family if Chatham would continue to abstain from interference in politics. In that case the pension of £3000, which had been awarded to the father for three lives, would be settled upon his second son, William.⁴

Ill-health, the impossibility of winning over the majority to his opinion, and the king's openly expressed wish, were probably not the only reasons which induced Chatham to retire from public life after the abrupt rejection of his plan of reconciliation. His own belief in the expediency of his policy

¹ As early as March 21 the Prussian ambassador had written: 'Mylord Chatham est peut-être celui, qui par les discours qu'il tiendra au Parlement, déterminera le plus les Colonies à se roidir contre la mère-patrie.'—Berlin Archives.

² Bancroft, iv. 104.

³ *Ibid.*, iv. 270.

⁴ The king to Lord North, August 9, 1775.—Mahon, iv. 393.

must have been shaken, both by the disapproval with which his proposals met in America, and by the fresh illegalities and violences of which the burgesses of Massachusetts were guilty. This attitude and these events must have shown him the whole movement in a different and less favourable light, must have suggested doubts of the wisdom and moderation of congress. This was no longer purely a defence of menaced rights, as in the case of the glorious Revolution of 1688; it was arbitrary interference with the laws and the constitution. Nevertheless Chatham was not prepared to adopt the position of the government. He preferred to keep silence and await events. Not till the summer of 1776 did he again make a public declaration of his opinions, which announced a new tendency of importance, guiding him to the policy of the last year of his life. But before turning our attention to this last stage of Chatham's political career, we must examine his private life during the great events of this agitated time.

CHAPTER XV

PRIVATE AND FAMILY LIFE

DURING the last ten years of Chatham's life his attention was occupied rather by his private affairs than by those of the country. For a short time, or on important occasions, he might engage in political warfare with all his old energy, but there were much longer periods during which he abandoned politics and lived entirely for his family and the management of his property. Any history of his life which neglected this side of it would be incomplete.

During this quieter existence, untroubled by the agitations of public life, his real personal character is more clearly discernible than in the heat of political strife. The first question that suggests itself is: What change, if any, had taken place in his philosophy of life during the long, agitated period which has elapsed since we last considered this subject? It is hardly probable that the great successes, the bitter disappointments and the suffering which had been his lot had exercised no influence upon his inner life. In reference to this question few authentic records are at our disposal. His letters, even to his nearest and dearest, are singularly deficient in utterances which would enable us to form any conclusion on the subject. Fortunately a series of detached sentences, written at times of quiet reflection, have been preserved;¹ and from these we gain reliable information concerning his spiritual life. They express views so very different from those which he held at an earlier period that we may with tolerable certainty conclude them to have been written during the later part of his life, more especially as they were found among papers belonging to this later period.

In these sentences Chatham repeatedly recurs to and dwells

¹ *Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 238 ff.

upon the change which is effected in the inner man by conversion or regeneration.¹ Quoting from the third chapter of the Gospel of St. John the words, 'Verily, verily, I say unto thee, Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God,' he insists upon the corrupt state of our nature, which must be regenerated before we can partake of the blessings of the gospel. Regeneration he defines as a thorough change of the whole man, by the influence of the Spirit of God, from the love and practice of sin to an habitual holiness of heart and life. Then, employing the words of St. Paul, he indicates what is undoubtedly the greatest hindrance to regeneration. 'Men of knowledge,' he says, 'though they seem wise, must become fools that they may receive the first rudiments of wisdom.' In another sentence he eloquently describes the effect of such regeneration, which witnesses to its divine origin and tells how men of haughty, untamed, and brutal passions become, under the gentle sway of religious principles and hopes, the ornaments of human nature.

Though entirely original and independent, the conception of the regeneration of the human heart which we find in these notes is so correct that it cannot but be the result of personal experience. Chatham must himself have undergone this regeneration and have experienced its blessings. Another argument in favour of this hypothesis is his choice of a man of haughty and untamed nature to exemplify the power of religion; it was evidently his own character which he had in mind. In former days he had, indeed, preached and extolled virtue and humanity, but the foundation of faith upon which to build was wanting, and he consequently remained passionate, self-righteous, and helpless in the hour of temptation. But now the life-giving source was open to him, he had acquired the necessary self-knowledge, and the regeneration which he so well described had taken place. The arrogant, recklessly ambitious man had become humble and sincerely desirous to further the welfare of others and of all. It is naturally impossible to say when this change took place. It was probably the work of no single moment. But it is permissible to assume that the dangerous illness of 1767, the near presence of death of which he was then conscious for a

¹ On page 540 the sixth, seventh, and ninth sentences; on page 541 the third.

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¹ On page 540 the sixth, seventh, and ninth sentences; on page 541 the third.

considerable time, had exerted an influence which can hardly be overestimated.

A result of the inward transformation was that the cold, intellectual attitude towards God which we observed in Chatham at an earlier period gave place to a closer and more heartfelt relation;¹ His fellowship and the keeping of His commandments became a joy. In one of the sentences it is affirmed that to exert ourselves against God's enemies is a means of progress towards perfection; in another, that man must take no care for the morrow, because this is to distrust the power and fatherly goodness of God, who alone can avert disaster; a third tells of the light, liberty, and joy which faith in God's almighty power and providence brings with it, of the manner in which it ennobles human life, nay, makes it divine. No one could write thus who had not experienced the feelings described, who had not, therefore, been rendered capable of them by regeneration.

Chatham now began to recognise the importance of faith to morality,² which, from a misunderstanding of its nature, he had formerly denied. He now knew it to be an active vital principle, irresistibly impelling to a virtuous life. 'There can be no such thing,' he wrote, 'as true faith without good works, any more than there can be a good tree without good fruit.' He had thus rejected the error of that letter written in his youth in which he represented faith as an actual hindrance to virtue. One of the sentences only is somewhat incomprehensible—that in which he maintains that 'belief in Jesus Christ acquits from the guilt of sins committed before such belief . . . but does not acquit from the guilt of any sins continued in after this belief.'³ This idea, which probably occurred to him accidentally, he doubtless rejected after careful consideration.

The remaining sentences may all be regarded as purely of an ethical nature; and yet we feel that they spring, one and all, like fresh, bright flowers from the soil of faith. They are no longer the cut and dried herbarium with which he formerly presented us. Great and open sin he regards as less serious than those bad qualities of the heart which are the

¹ See first sentence in page 538; first, second, and fourth on page 539; second and fifth on page 542.

² Third and sixth sentences on page 539.

³ Seventh sentence on page 539.

origin of everything that is base and mean, of envy and malice, of all evil and misery.¹ He is especially severe towards pride and self-satisfaction, and also to discontent and censoriousness, and this seems to me an indication that he found these to be his own besetting sins.² He declares them to be irreconcilable with the principles of Christianity.³ A Christian must always have the humble feelings of a contrite sinner, and must not seek to conceal his faults, otherwise he will never succeed in curing them. And it is the duty of a Christian to learn, in whatever state he is, therewith to be content; to harbour fretful and discontented thoughts 'is to do yourself more injury than it is in the power of your worst enemy to do you.' It seems to me specially worthy of note that Chatham insists upon the necessity that the Christian's behaviour should always be consistent with his principles.⁴ He himself had often failed to satisfy this requirement; want of true faith had incapacitated him from carrying his moral principles into practice. He was possibly also thinking of himself when he wrote of the injurious physical effects of a sinful life.⁵ Physicians, he writes, had assured him that violent passions and immoderate cares had a great and ill influence upon the body. This they had probably impressed upon him at the time of his dangerous illness, of which political worry had been a primary cause. Now he reflected that a man can have no true peace of mind until he is delivered from the burden of guilt, and consequently arrived at the weighty and unquestionably correct conclusion that the forgiveness of sins has an influence upon the body as well as the soul.

It ought not to occasion surprise that there is as yet little trace of this moral change to be found in Chatham's political life, that he continued to oppose his enemies with the same violence, and to exaggerate in the same manner as of old. These habits had in his case, as in that of most politicians of his age, become to such an extent second nature, that he was unable to acknowledge their wrongfulness, the more so as at the moment he really believed and felt what he said. His dramatic instincts, as we have already had

¹ Page 541, seventh sentence.

² Page 540, first sentence; page 538, fourth sentence.

³ Page 540, fifth sentence; page 541, fourth sentence.

⁴ Page 541, second sentence.

⁵ Page 539, fifth sentence.

occasion to remark, caused him to merge himself in the part he had chosen to play. But that a change of the nature described had taken place is shown by several occurrences which would hardly have been compatible with his earlier character.

In the summer of 1768 Sir William Draper, the hero of Manila, erected on his estate of Manila Hall, near Bristol, a pillar upon which was to be carved a long Latin inscription of his own composition proclaiming Chatham's deserts and fame. Draper sent a copy of this inscription for the approval of the statesman whom it was his desire to honour. The reply came from Lady Chatham, and was to the effect that it was the wish of her husband, who was too ill to write himself, that only the last four lines of the inscription should be used. These were:—

GULIELMO PITT COMITI DE CHATHAM
HOC AMICITIAE PRIVATAE TESTIMONIUM
SIMUL ET HONORIS PUBLICI MONUMENTUM
POSUIT GULIELMUS DRAPER.¹

Though this was a suppression of his entire eulogy, Draper could not refuse to comply with the earl's wishes.

In December 1773 Chatham received a communication from a certain John Woddrop of Glasgow, to the effect that Woddrop intended to bequeath to him his lands in Virginia.² A copy of the intended will was enclosed for correction. After due consideration Chatham determined to decline 'so unmerited a favour,' the rather as 'unhappy disputes among friends' seemed 'to be mixed with the business.' It seems probable that the testator had selected Chatham as his heir in order to disappoint persons with whom he had quarrelled; and in such an unedifying affair Chatham refused to be implicated. In the old days he was, as we have seen, much less particular.

Before leaving the subject of the sentences, we must notice the surprising fact that so active and energetic a man as

¹ For an account of this affair, and for the complete inscription, see *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 325 ff.

² *Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 316 ff.

Chatham should insist so little upon the Christian duty of leading an active and useful life. We should conclude him to be in favour of a life of contemplation if he did not in the second sentence give his reason for considering retirement advantageous, as removing us from the influence of bad company. A Christian ought not, however, to be free from all temptations and opposition, for he is thereby deprived of taking part in the struggle for the spread of religion and the reformation of humanity, a duty which, in another sentence, Chatham declares that he feels it incumbent on him to fulfil.¹ It is delight in the leisure to which he has at last attained that leads the writer to express a not altogether defensible sentiment. Here we have another argument in favour of the supposition that the sentences were written in the later years of Chatham's life, when longing for rest and peace had become at least as strong as ambition.

In a poem addressed in February 1772 to Garrick, the famous actor, we find an expression of the same delight in peaceful retirement from the world.² Garrick, who was paying a visit to Lord Edgcumbe at Mount Edgcumbe, near Plymouth, had written a letter to Chatham of which nothing is known. The answer was the following poetic invitation to Burton Pynsent:—

'Leave, Garrick, the rich landscape, proudly gay,
Docks, ports, and navies, bright'ning all the bay:
To my plain roof repair, primæval seat!
Yet there no wonders your quick eye can meet,
Save, should you deem it wonderful to find,
Ambition cur'd, and an unpassioned mind;
A statesman without power, and without gall,
Hating no courtiers, happier than them all;
Bow'd to no yoke, nor crouching for applause;
Vot'ry alone to freedom, and the laws.
Herds, flocks, and smiling Ceres deck our plain,
And, interspers'd, an heart-enliv'ning train
Of sportive children frolic o'er the green;
Meantime pure love looks on, and consecrates the scene.
Come, then, immortal spirit of the stage,
Great Nature's proxy, glass of every age!
Come, taste the simple life of Patriarchs of old,
Who, rich in rural peace, ne'er thought of pomp or gold.'

¹ Page 539, first sentence.

² See *Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 196 f.; Thackeray, ii. 250 f.; *Historical MSS. Commission, Sixth Report*, Appendix, p. 480.

The actor was extremely flattered by this not specially remarkable poetic effusion. He was obliged to decline the invitation, and expressed his regret in some well-turned verses, in which he compares Chatham, employed in writing poetry, to Achilles, who, when he had wrathfully forsaken the hostile field, 'tun'd the lay and swept the lyre,' and praises both his past achievements and his present educational labours. This poetic correspondence was soon noised abroad, and was much commented upon in London society. It only concerns us in so far as it shows that Chatham at this time strove to display contentment with his lot, and to suppress every prompting of ambition. This very circumstance, however, leads us to conclude that in his inmost soul ambition was as yet by no means extinct. The consciousness that he was not yet completely master of himself in this respect would impel him not only to avoid any betrayal of the fact, but to speak and write on every occasion as if it did not exist. It probably was not altogether disagreeable to him that Lord Lyttelton (in a letter on the subject of the poem to Garrick)¹ should compare him with Cincinnatus and Curius Dentatus, who were called from the plough to save their country.

Chatham was undoubtedly kept well informed, during his retirement, of all that was happening in the political world. Shelburne, Rockingham, and others wrote to him from time to time; and, until the autumn of 1772, a certain John Calcraft regularly supplied him with information. Calcraft,² who died in August 1772, worked for a number of years under Fox in the paymaster's department, and afterwards made a great fortune as an army agent and contractor for the forces. He is said to have been the medium in restoring the friendly relations between Chatham and Lord Temple, and, by the exercise of his financial influence, to have brought about the Marquis of Granby's resignation. In the City corporation, too, his influence was great, and he exerted it in support of the liberty of the subject and of parliamentary reform.

It may be mentioned here that the anonymous author of the famous *Letters of Junius*—violent accusations of political

¹ *Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 195 ff.

² *Dictionary of National Biography*.

misdeemeanours, chiefly directed against Grafton—addressed two of his epistles to Chatham, for whom he professed sincere respect. The first was written on January 2, 1768,¹ whilst Chatham was still in office, with the aim of arousing his suspicion of the trustworthiness of his colleagues, Grafton in particular. The writer was so well informed that he was already in a position to foretell their approaching alliance with Bedford. The purpose of the second letter, dated January 14, 1772,² is to provide Chatham with weapons for use in the Middlesex election affair against Mansfield, whom the writer desires to see called to account for the illegality of his standpoint. As no perceptible political effect resulted from either of these letters, there is no necessity for any discussion here of the interminable Junius question.

For a long time after he regained possession of Hayes Chatham made it his chief place of residence.³ He remained there even after his resignation, partly to be within reach of his physician, Dr. Addington, and of all the requirements of an invalid, and partly because he did not wish to be too far away from his friends and from the political centre. In 1770 he spent only a short part of the summer at Burton Pynsent. But in the spring of 1771, his first opposition campaign being at an end, and his health re-established, he moved with his family to Somersetshire, and remained there, with comparatively short absences, for the next three years. In 1772, from April to July, we find him at Hayes. In the winter of 1772-3 he actually tried to sell Hayes, but did not succeed in finding a suitable purchaser.⁴ He refused to let the property on a long lease, as that would have prevented a sale when opportunity offered.⁵ The absence of any

¹ *Chatham Correspondence*, iii. 302 ff.

² *Ibid.*, iv. 190 ff.

³ See *Chatham Correspondence* and the Chatham MSS.

⁴ Chatham to Nuthall, October 7, 1772: 'I know the annual income [of Hayes] to be such as makes me not impatient to look out for purchasers, well assured that they will look after Hayes, beat down as it has been.'—Chatham MSS. That the competition, however, was not particularly keen is proved by a letter from Lord Temple to Lord Chatham, dated April 22, 1772: 'I have but just to inform you that this moment my agent is come to tell me that a rich Mr. Hopkins, who went to see Hayes, had just contracted for the purchase of Paine's Hill, together with all the statues and furniture, etc., for £25,000. This puts an end to the hopes I had entertained, and I have nothing further to add.'—Chatham MSS.

⁵ Correspondence with a Mr. Rombold, who offered to rent the place, 1773.—Chatham MSS.

purchaser proved fortunate, for when, in 1774, Chatham resolved to resume political activity, it was of the greatest importance to him to have a home near London. We have already noted that in May of that year, towards the close of the parliamentary session, he took up his abode at Hayes; and there the last years of his life were spent. He became so ill in the spring of 1775, after the excitement of the debates on the American question, that it was impossible then to remove him to Burton; and as soon as he regained a measure of health, he was once more drawn into the political struggle, the sudden changes of which made it impossible for him to absent himself long from London.

Apart from occasional intervals of political activity, the chief occupation of Chatham's last years, pursued at Burton and at Hayes, was the education of his children. It was this occupation which made it possible for the active, energetic man to find satisfaction and happiness in his compulsory leisure, and enabled him to turn to good account the experience which he had gained, and the philosophy of life which was the result of his mental struggles. In his own youth, in the later part of it at least, he had had no father to instruct and counsel him; and the experience and the philosophy had come too late to influence much of his own life's work. But his children, at least, should have the full benefit of both, and should enter upon life better equipped than he had been. This thought comforted and gladdened him when he reflected on the repeated disasters which had befallen him, and for which, he was obliged to acknowledge, he himself, or rather the insufficient development of his mind and character, had been largely to blame. Thanks to his energy, eloquence, and power of quick apprehension, and also not a little to the favour of fortune, he had achieved great things. But how short his period of successful effort had been! Ere five years had passed he was dispossessed of his authority; and when he returned to power he could not but be aware that he was no longer either physically or mentally capable of the difficult tasks which fall to the share of a prime minister. His children were to enter life prepared. It is matter of history that Chatham's second son, thanks to the careful and judicious education which he received, attained in his youth to the position which his father did

not reach until he was a middle-aged man with broken health.

Lady Hester had borne her husband five children, three sons and two daughters. Hester, the eldest, was born on October 18, 1755. Then followed John, born September 10, 1756; Harriet, born April 18, 1758; William, born May 28, 1759; and James Charles, born April 24, 1761. The eldest son, John, seems to have shown proficiency and pleasure chiefly in out-of-door exercises, riding and sport of every kind. William was, as a young boy, so delicate that he had constantly to be taken away from his studies; but he was so gifted and so eager to learn that in the time he was able to devote to them he made astonishing progress; at the age of fourteen he was ready for the university. The youngest son, James, is described as amiable and talented. The daughters resembled their mother in character and tastes.

The education which Chatham gave his children was wholly different from that which he himself had received.¹ His own youthful experiences led him to decide not to send his sons to a public school. He wished them to grow up in an atmosphere of liberty, in which they might develop independently and naturally. They were taught at home by an excellent tutor, the Rev. Edward Wilson, who, without imposing many restrictions on them, developed their powers more rapidly than if they had been at school. Their father, too, embraced every opportunity to instruct them. He was particularly anxious to accustom them to think and to express their thoughts with precision. To this habit he attached an almost exaggerated importance, as he had had abundant experience in his own life of the value of a mastery of the art of rhetoric, which cannot be attained without such practice. He recommended to his sons the study of those authors who had been of assistance to himself; amongst newer works he specially directed their attention to the *Letters of Junius*, as models of style. In his son William he had a remarkably apt pupil. William almost justified the anticipations of Legge, who, at the time of Pitt's engagement to Miss Grenville, declared that the

¹ On this subject see the admirable description of the youth of William Pitt, the younger, in Salomon's *William Pitt* (Leipzig, 1901). See also Thackeray, ii. 249 f.

offspring of such a couple would be orators from their birth.¹ Chatham also did what in him lay to inspire his children with a truly Christian spirit; hardly a day passed when he did not read a chapter of the Bible with them; and during the course of this reading he doubtless impressed on them many of the ideas to which he afterwards gave lasting expression in the sentences.

But with all this, he by no means appeared as a severe, pedantic teacher. He took part, when his health permitted, in their sports and pleasures of every kind; and he had a special power of entertaining them with amusing stories and bright talk. With parents and children of such cleverness, the household must have been a lively one. The children were devotedly attached to their father; and the perfect confidence which existed between them and him made them ever ready to receive and follow his teaching. This tendency his son William long retained; he adhered firmly to Chatham's political theories, even to those which the latter had not adopted from serious conviction: these last he was finally obliged to renounce.

In the autumn of 1773 the children began to leave their parents' roof. William's name had been placed on the books of Pembroke Hall, Cambridge, in the spring. Here we have another proof of Chatham's dissatisfaction with his own education; he evidently had no favourable recollections of Oxford. His strong Whig tendency at this time may also have influenced his choice. It had been determined that John, Lord Pitt, was to enter the army; and a regiment destined for service in Canada had been selected. This project was not finally arranged till the following winter; but in the meantime John was to pursue his military studies.

Before his two sons went out into the world, Chatham gave them a long summer by the sea, at Lyme Regis, a little place on the south coast, at no great distance from Burton Pynsent.² Thither they went early in the season with their tutor, Mr. Wilson, the rest of the family remaining at Burton. In June they were followed by their father, who thought that a short stay at the seaside would benefit him.

¹ See vol. i. p. 341.

² On this visit see the correspondence between the parents in the *Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 265 ff.; and in the Chatham MSS.

He was delighted with the manner in which he found his sons occupied, being, as he wrote to his wife, as much pleased with the diligence of the one as with the idleness of the other. It had been arranged that John should continue his studies at Lyme Regis, but that William, who required to gain strength before going to the university, should be restrained from any kind of brain work.

Contrary to his intention, Chatham was obliged to remain at Lyme Regis till towards the end of July, being kept prisoner there by a severe attack of gout, possibly brought on by the many long excursions which his sons had tempted him to take. At last Lady Chatham herself went to bring him home, the boys being left at the seaside. Autumn saw the whole family once more at Burton, where a kind of farewell festival was held, of which private theatricals formed a part. The play, which was entitled 'Laurentius, King of Clarinium,' had been written by the children themselves. Immediately after these festivities William went off to Cambridge.

The future history of this son, who was to equal his father in fame and in greatness, is to be found in the various accounts of his life which have been given to the public. Our interest for the moment is confined to the manner in which the father aided his son's development and influenced him, as this helps to complete our portrait of Chatham's character. Unfortunately, we do not learn much more than has already been told. Chatham's gout prevented him from accompanying his son to Cambridge; he was obliged to content himself with recommending him by letter to the care of the master of the college, whom he informed of the young student's delicate health and ardour in acquiring knowledge. He expressed a desire that 'each of the two public tutors should devote an hour in every day' to his son; and the desire of so famous a father was, naturally, attended to. We cannot discover that Chatham attempted to influence his son, as he had influenced his nephew, Thomas Pitt, by his correspondence with him. Indeed, in reading the father's letters to his son,¹ we are struck by the absence of exhortations to virtue or to industry; we are led to the conclusion that, as regarded the young man's morals, his father felt no uneasiness, and that as regarded

¹ *Chatham Correspondence*, iv.

industry, he dreaded too much rather than too little application. He repeatedly charges him to observe moderation in his studies and to take sufficient out-of-door exercise. William's delicate health frequently interrupted his studies, but in spite of this he kept pace with his fellow-students. During some of his compulsory holidays he was present in the House of Lords, following with eager interest the debates in which his father took part. He sometimes acted as his father's secretary. The principles which Chatham proclaimed in his speeches and championed with all the art of rhetoric, William adopted with an enthusiasm which was probably greater than his father's; for of the secondary considerations and the doubts which influenced the attitude of the experienced statesman the young man knew nothing. The unbounded confidence he placed in his father made it impossible for him to doubt the absolute truth, the perfect sincerity of his burning words. The consequence was that he came to hold opinions much more democratic than Chatham had ever done. In these he found himself in sympathy with his cousin, Charles Stanhope, Lord Mahon, who had imbibed ideas of the same nature in Geneva, where he had received part of his education.

John, Lord Pitt's future was decided during the winter of 1773-4. At this time General Carleton,¹ who had taken part in all the engagements in Canada during the last campaign, and had also fought at Bellisle, held the appointment of vice-governor of the province of Quebec, but was for the time being in England. He was colonel of the 47th regiment of infantry, which was to go out to Canada in the spring, and was already being concentrated in the coast depots. It was Chatham's desire that his son should serve his apprenticeship to the art of war under this distinguished officer, who had won fame and promotion during the Pitt administration. In all probability, therefore, it was not by mere chance that Carleton learned through Lord Shelburne that young John Pitt was to join the 47th regiment. He immediately wrote to Chatham,² to express his satisfaction at the choice made, and his desire to be of service to the young man. Chatham replied, confirming Shelburne's statement, and thanking the

¹ See *Dictionary of National Biography*.

² *Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 292.

general for his kind intentions. As to one matter, however, he avowed himself to be still in uncertainty. An ensigncy, as we know, cost a very considerable sum of money. Chatham writes: 'May I entreat your advice concerning the means? Should I trouble Lord Barrington with my desire to purchase an ensigncy in the forty-seventh, or wait the favour of your own obliging directions therein?'¹ It seems as if he had not quite made up his mind to face this more disagreeable consequence of his determination, and half hoped to be spared the necessity. This is, of course, matter of conjecture, but the fact remains that the ensigncy was presented to John, Lord Pitt by the king in the spring of 1774.

John sailed with his regiment to Quebec, and received rapid promotion. Carleton, who returned to his post in Canada at the close of the year, and was made governor of the province of Quebec in the beginning of 1775, soon appointed him his adjutant. The parents received most favourable reports of their son's health and his military prospects.² But a contradiction soon arose between the son's position in America and the attitude towards the American question adopted by the father in 1774-5. Major Caldwell's letter, which gave such good news of John, also contained the news that the rebellious colonies were threatening to attack Canada. If they did, John would be compelled to take part in a war which his father had condemned as wicked. The letter was undoubtedly written with the intention of enabling Chatham to avoid such a contingency. This was at once perceived by Lady Chatham, who, as her husband was at the moment seriously ill, opened it and answered it without consulting him.³ She tells Major Caldwell that she has left the decision to her son, to whom she has written, desiring him to act as his convictions and his military honour may require. The difficulty was for the moment avoided by the action of General Carleton, who sent the young officer to England with despatches from the seat of war.⁴ In February 1776 Chatham resolved to withdraw his son from the service.⁵ The position in which

¹ *Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 293 f.

² Major Caldwell to Chatham, June 2, 1775.—*Ibid.*, iv. 408 ff.

³ Countess of Chatham to Major Caldwell, July 1775.—*Ibid.*, iv. 410 ff.

⁴ Carleton to Chatham, September 21, 1775.—*Ibid.*, iv. 413 f.

⁵ Lady Chatham to General Carleton, February 14, 1776; James Grenville to Lady Chatham, February 19, 1776.—*Ibid.*, iv. 420 ff.

he now stood to the court and to the government forbade him to derive further benefit from the favour extended to him by his majesty.

The Americans had been perfectly well aware that a son of Lord Chatham was serving in the hostile British army. General Washington had given the following order to Arnold, the commander of the troops which were advancing to the north: 'Should Chatham's son fall into your power, you cannot pay too much honor to the son of so illustrious a character, and so true a friend to America.'¹ But these were exactly the evidences of favour on the part of the enemy which John, as an English officer, was obliged to avoid. It was imperative that he should either prove himself to be in good earnest hostile to them or else resign his commission.

Hester, Chatham's eldest daughter, left her home at about the same time as her two brothers. On December 19, 1774, she was married to Charles Stanhope,² the second son of Lord Stanhope of Chevening, Chatham's cousin. Charles, born in 1753, succeeded in 1763, on the death of his elder brother, to the courtesy title of Lord Mahon. He received the first part of his education at Eton, and was then sent to Geneva, where he distinguished himself as an eager and apt student of physical science. A treatise on the pendulum, which he wrote at the age of eighteen, was adjudged a prize at Stockholm. It was through his friendship with young William Pitt that he became intimately acquainted with the latter's sister. Hester died in 1780, leaving three daughters. Mahon subsequently married a daughter of Henry Grenville of Eastbury, and the grandson of this couple was the historian Philip Henry, Lord Mahon, afterwards Earl Stanhope, of whose *History of England* much use has been made by the author of this work. He lived from 1805 to 1875.

After a military career not particularly brilliant, John, the second Earl of Chatham, died in 1835, and with him the title became extinct. James Charles, a promising young naval officer, died of fever in the West Indies in 1780.³ Harriet, who in 1785 married Mr. Edward James Elliot, died in 1786, leaving a daughter named Harriet Hester, who married Lieu-

¹ Bancroft, *History of the United States*.

² *Dictionary of National Biography*.

³ *Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 495.

tenant-General Sir William Henry Pringle. It was this gentleman who collected the Chatham Manuscripts—which also go by the name of the Pringle Collection. Hester, Countess of Chatham, lived till 1803, and consequently witnessed the greater part of her famous son William's glorious career. She died, aged eighty-two, at Burton Pynsent.

Chatham himself was spared the grief which the early deaths of three of his children must have caused him ; but he witnessed the departure of many of his friends and fellow-labourers. His oldest friend George, Lord Lyttelton, predeceased him. Lord Lyttelton, when his duties in the House of Lords did not keep him in London, lived at his country seat of Hagley. There, in the summer of 1772, he hoped to be visited by Chatham and his family.¹ The visit, however, was put off, which Lyttelton bemoaned, because before another summer came a high wind might blow down some of the fine old trees which he delighted in showing, or a cold wind might blow down himself. His foreboding was fulfilled ; he died on August 22, 1773, without having had the pleasure of seeing his friends at Hagley.

On December 7, 1775, died Sir Charles Saunders, whose skilful manœuvring of the fleet at Quebec had given him a place amongst the heroes to whom the successes of the great war were chiefly due. Some years previously Chatham had hung the portrait of Saunders on the wall of the ballroom at Burton Pynsent, in company with those of himself and his wife, Lord Temple, the Marquis of Granby, and Admiral Boscawen, thereby acknowledging that he regarded him as a most eminent man.

Chatham's own turn was soon to come ; but it fell to his lot, before he was called away, to become once more the general cynosure, to show himself to be not only the hero of past days, but the man to whom England turned in her hour of need. On this occasion he was to abandon the obstructive work which he had long pursued, and to reappear as the bold energetic statesman, and thus bring a life rich in achievement to a fitting and splendid conclusion.

¹ Lyttelton to Chatham, July 27, 1772.—*Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 220 ff.

CHAPTER XVI

LAST RALLY AND DEATH

AFTER the flood-tide of the winter of 1774-5 followed another ebb in Chatham's activity with reference to American affairs. He kept silence and watched the course of events, the character of which became ever more menacing. With the engagements of Lexington in April and Bunker's Hill in June 1775 hostilities began in earnest. It was, undoubtedly, a severe attack of his old malady which prevented his appearance in Parliament; but even had his health permitted his presence, he had no desire to pronounce a definite opinion before events had taken a more decisive turn.

This they seemed to do in March 1776, when General Washington, by capturing the Dorchester Heights, compelled General Howe to evacuate Boston. This success of the Americans made the danger of their support by France more imminent. Under the impression produced by the situation, and by a feeling that his serious illness might not improbably have a fatal termination ere long, Chatham determined to communicate his opinions on the American question to his physician and friend, Dr. Addington,¹ in order that they might be preserved for posterity. He declared verbally to him 'that he continued in the same sentiments, with regard to America, which he had always professed, and which stand so fully explained in the Provisional Act offered by him to the House of Lords.' This he requested the doctor to preserve in memory, in order to be able 'to do him justice by bearing testimony that he persevered *unshaken* in the same opinions.' He was plainly desirous that, even if another opportunity of speaking in Parliament were denied him, his fame as the true prophet, the far-seeing statesman, should still

¹ *Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 423 f.

be secured. In November he caused his declaration to Dr. Addington to be written out,¹ and copies of it to be sent to Lord Camden, Lord Shelburne, and Addington himself. He begged these three gentlemen, whenever they had occasion to speak of his opinions on the American question, to represent them exactly as they were expressed in the 'declaration,' in order that no misapprehensions might arise.

Though Chatham, in the document in question, insists upon the continuity of his American policy, this by no means proves that there had not been an interruption in that continuity. The very craving to proclaim anew his old views shows that he had had serious doubts regarding them, but that he had now returned to his original standpoint. The 'declaration' itself provides us with the reason for this return. In it we read: 'Unless effectual measures were speedily taken for reconciliation with the colonies, he was fully persuaded that, in a very few years, France will set her foot on English ground.' He believed that she was only waiting to see how much the Americans were able to do for themselves, before she joined forces with them against England. It was as plain to him as it had been the year before that right was not on the side of the Americans in every instance, and that their conduct had frequently been most reprehensible. The Declaration of Independence, in particular, was an open defiance of his principles. But foreign enemies were arming; France, England's hated rival, was preparing to profit by the disruption of the British empire to seize the fragments; it was, therefore, necessary to come to an amicable understanding and to preserve political unity at all costs. The Provisional Act still appeared to him to afford the most suitable basis for such an understanding. It had been rejected by both parties, but since then both had had experience of the evils of war, both had become conscious of the danger impending from France; hence there seemed to be grounds for the hope that his plan might now find a more favourable reception.

For some time, owing to the state of his health, Chatham could only express his opinions in writing, but before the close of the parliamentary session of 1776-7 he was to make his appearance again in the House of Lords. On May 30, 1777, shortly before the prorogation, he attended in his place, in

¹ It is printed in the *Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 424 f.

spite of extreme infirmity, to lay his proposals before the House in the form of a motion, supported by a speech.¹ The motion was for an address to the king, praying his majesty 'to take the most speedy and effectual measures for putting a stop to such fatal hostilities, upon the only just and solid foundation, namely, the removal of accumulated grievances.' In the speech he dwelt mainly upon the idea that the crisis had come, that peace must be made with the colonies now if it were to be made at all, because, once France had made a treaty with them, it would be too late; the honour of the Crown would then demand that war should be declared, even if there were only five ships of the line in England. He repeatedly affirmed that, with all her auxiliary forces, England was too weak to conquer America. 'You have ransacked every corner of Lower Saxony,' he said, referring to the raising of troops in Germany; 'but forty thousand German boors never can conquer ten times the number of British freemen. You may ravage—you cannot conquer; it is impossible; you cannot conquer the Americans. You talk of your numerous friends to annihilate the Congress, and of your powerful forces to disperse their army: I might as well talk of driving them before me with this crutch.' He next enlarged upon the importance of the American colonies to England, maintained that trade with them was a chief source of her wealth, and then pointed out the danger that France, Britain's keenest rival, would deprive her of it all. He referred so repeatedly and with such insistence to the support which America was certain to receive from France, that we have no difficulty in recognising this to be the central idea of his speech, the motive which impelled him once more to urge the necessity of treating the rebellious colonies with forbearance and indulgence. He avoided, for the present, any reference to the question of legality and to the grievances of both sides; he even, as in May 1774, acknowledged that the Americans had committed lamentable excesses, and merely tried to excuse them.

But the opponents of this policy, chief among them young Lord Lyttelton, who, in spite of his veneration for the friend of his late father, felt obliged to side against him, succeeded in ousting him from the position he had taken up. Lyttelton

¹ Thackeray, ii. 310 ff.; *Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 433 f.; *Correspondence of George III. with Lord North*, ii. 71 f.

confessed himself surprised at the discrepancy between the noble earl's present despondency and his former fire, spirit, and zeal for the honour of his country—surprised that he should take France so much into consideration, or should in fear of that power recommend Britain to relinquish her undoubted rights and make concessions to the worst of rebels. This attack obliged Chatham to give other reasons for the proposed yielding policy. These were suggested by Lord Camden, who made a speech in which he asserted that the English ministers had really been the aggressors and ought consequently to be the first to make proposals of peace. Chatham took up this idea in a second speech; he recapitulated the offences of the government, and, following a suggestion made by Lord Weymouth, entered into further details regarding the concessions which he proposed to make. The matter in dispute had now reduced itself to the question: Who was to blame for the rupture with America? and, as it was impossible to arrive at an agreement upon this subject, the debate came to an end.

The part played by Chatham on this occasion was by no means brilliant, and this because he allowed himself to be driven from his excellent and defensible standpoint. He might easily have shown that the expectation of hostilities on the part of a foreign enemy was a good and patriotic reason for conciliation of the Americans. But by repeated reference to the English government's violent actions and breaches of the law—which were either purely imaginary or had not been committed as he represented them to have been—he put himself in the wrong in the estimation of all well-informed and impartial people. No one, with the best will in the world, could still believe in the fable of the inoffensive Americans, who were only seeking to protect themselves against enslavement.

It is hardly necessary to mention that the motion was rejected by 76 to 20 votes, while much unfavourable comment was excited by Chatham's speeches. The Prussian ambassador wrote that the old proposal had been produced again and supported by the same arguments as before.¹ He had evidently not perceived the new development in Chatham's policy, because it had been thrust into the background by

¹ Report of June 3, 1777.—Berlin Archives.

Camden's interruption and Chatham's own second speech. The king declared the motion to be most inopportune, and only calculated to add fuel to the flames. He wrote:¹ 'Like most of the other productions of that extraordinary brain, it contains nothing but specious words and malevolence; for no one that reads it, if unacquainted with the conduct of the mother-country and its colonies, but must suppose the Americans poor mild persons, who after unheard-of and repeated grievances had no choice but slavery or the sword, whilst the truth is, that the too great lenity of this country increased their pride and encouraged them to rebel.' Thus we see that he also regarded this speech merely as another attempt to gain a hearing for the old proposals; he did not perceive the real drift of its arguments. What must have seemed to him specially pernicious, nay, actually criminal, was the manner in which Chatham endeavoured to deprive the English of every hope of victory. How it must encourage the enemy to know that the conqueror of French America was so certain of the success of their rebellion! His prophecy was in itself sufficient to stifle every idea of compliance with the mother-country's demands.

One reason why the main idea of Chatham's first speech failed to impress, was the fact that in making it he spoke very indistinctly. 'He looked pale, and grown much older,' wrote H. Walpole,² 'and had one crutch. His voice was so low that it could not be heard to the end of the House, and little remained of his former fire, though his second speech was more spirited.' It happened, thus, to be the new ideas that were particularly inaudible, whilst in the recapitulation of the older ones, which cost him less mental exertion, he was able to raise his voice. It was natural enough that the latter made more impression on the audience. Young William Pitt, who was delighted that his father's first speech 'was full of all his usual force and vivacity,' regretted that he did not raise his voice enough for all the House to hear everything he said, and feared that false reports might consequently be set in circulation.³

Immediately after this debate Parliament was prorogued,

¹ *Correspondence of George III. with Lord North*, ii. 70.

² *Last Journals*, ii. 117; quoted in the *North Correspondence*, ii. 71.

³ To Lady Chatham, May 31, 1777.—*Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 435 ff.

and before it met again the political situation had changed in several respects. In June 1777 General Howe, who had proceeded from New York to Jersey, intending to penetrate thence to Pennsylvania, was compelled, by Washington's skilful operations, to retreat. He then conveyed his troops by sea for an expedition against Philadelphia, the enemy's centre. News of the brilliant success with which this undertaking was at first attended was, however, long in reaching England. During the same month of June the Canadian army under General Burgoyne marched south. It was soon in difficulties from the hostility of the population, and the resistance with which it met increased with its advance. Its movements were followed with much anxiety. Even greater apprehension was occasioned by the fact that the French were assisting the Americans ever more openly—the Marquis of Lafayette went to America in May—and that envoys from the now emancipated colonies, under the leadership of Franklin, were sent to Paris to obtain recognition of American independence and negotiate a commercial treaty.

Such was the position of affairs when the king on November 20, 1777, read his speech from the throne¹ to the two Houses. It announced a considerable augmentation of the naval force on account of the threatening attitude of France and Spain, and the intention to maintain by vigorous measures the supremacy of the mother-country over America—that is to say, a continuation of the policy hitherto pursued. Yet there was a passage in it which might be construed as an intimation of an intended change in the American policy. The king asserted that he would be ever on the watch for an opportunity of putting a stop to the effusion of the blood of his subjects; that he still hoped that the deluded and unhappy multitude would return to their allegiance—that the remembrance of what they once enjoyed, and their present sufferings under the arbitrary tyranny of their leaders, would rekindle in their hearts a spirit of loyalty to their sovereign. Then, with the concurrence and support of Parliament, peace, order, and confidence would be restored.

Thus the government also appeared sensible of the dangers of the political situation, of the threatened war with the Bourbon powers. It was prepared to treat with the Ameri-

¹ Thackeray, ii. 322 f.; *Annual Register*, 1777.

cans, and its policy so far resembled Chatham's. But there was a very material difference, a difference which made the ministerial plan seem better adapted to the actual circumstances. Chatham proposed to begin by conferring benefits on the Americans, by carefully avoiding further hostilities, by suspending laws, etc., in order to gain the confidence and secure the willing submission of the insurgents. The ministers, on the other hand, proposed to continue the military operations, in order that the increasing distress which the war must occasion, and the arbitrary measures which it must compel the *new* masters—that is, Congress—to take, might dispose them to submit to the authority of the mother-country. It must always be borne in mind that the liberty-loving colonists were individualists, that they were as much opposed to a powerful central government in America as to British supremacy, and regarded the comparatively strict rule of Congress merely as a necessary evil.¹ It was not, consequently, an unjustifiable supposition that the continuation of the war would lead the mass of the people to choose a very limited and little perceptible British supremacy in preference to the somewhat arbitrary rule of the revolutionary assembly. This was the idea which the king's speech expressed; and we must acknowledge that a perfectly suitable reply was thereby given to Chatham's last proposals.

Chatham offered every objection to it that he could raise.² He blamed everything blamable that he could discover in the speech or the conduct of the ministers, contradicting himself in the process. He first reproached the government for submitting to such treatment from France, for not at once requiring the dismissal of the American envoys. Even the great Queen Elizabeth, he said, had found herself obliged, when required by the Spanish government, to dismiss the envoys of the rebellious Flemish provinces. But at a later point of his speech he declared England to be at present too weak to oppose the combined forces of the Bourbon powers. 'Not 5000 troops

¹ See Von Ruville, *Das deutsche Einigungswerk im Lichte des amerikanischen* (Halle, 1902), p. 9. After Von Holst, *Verfassung und Demokratie in Amerika*, vol. i.

² For his speech see Thackeray, ii. 323 ff.; *Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 450 ff.; Prussian ambassador's report of November 21, 1777.—Berlin Archives.

in England!' he cried; 'hardly 8000 in Ireland! . . . Scarcely twenty ships of the line fully or sufficiently manned!' The question could not but suggest itself to his hearers: How was it possible to make imperative demands without the power to support them? And it was actually put by Lord Sandwich, the first lord of the admiralty, who, however, at the same time imparted the information that, as a matter of fact, forty-two ships of the line were at the disposal of the government.

But Chatham's chief aim on this occasion also was to prove that the conquest of America was an impossibility; because, if this were acknowledged, pacific measures must necessarily be adopted. He found a new argument in the late engagement of German troops to serve in America, affirming his certainty that the Americans would never lay down their arms as long as foreign hireling troops stood on their soil. He himself, if he were an American, would certainly never do it. He stigmatised the excellently disciplined German soldiers as 'mercenary sons of rapine and plunder.' With regard to the employment of Indians, too, he gave expression to his indignation in the most extravagant terms. He had evidently forgotten that in the last war they had been employed on both sides as a matter of course—that he himself had expressly ordered their enlistment as auxiliaries.¹ On this point there were violent disputes both during the debate now in question and on December 5;² they were ended by the reluctant admission of Lord Amherst that Indians had been employed on both sides, though by the French first. Chatham was forced to endure a reference to his own order.

Even if the orator had succeeded in proving that the Americans were invincible, as he attempted to do (at the same time representing the present military position as extremely unfavourable for the English), this would not have proved the futility of the government policy. The situation did not demand that the colonists should be compelled to surrender at discretion, but only that a reserve should be provided to throw into the scale when negotiations took place. The sufferings of the Americans from the war—their burned towns, their devastated crops, the scarcity of money, the despotic measures of Congress—these certainly were to be

¹ Vol. ii. p. 178.

² Thackeray, ii. 351 f.

regarded as a reserve; but as to gratitude for indulgence shown, that, after all that had happened, would never turn the balance. Chatham was actually engaged in lightening the available reserve by constantly representing the situation as unfavourable to England. He mentioned one circumstance only as in its favour; and it seems doubtful if his information in this instance was correct. He had heard of disagreements between the American envoys and the French government, which would make the colonies at the present moment readier to listen to English proposals.

After the close of his speech of November 18, Chatham proposed an amendment to the address to the king, in the form of a recommendation that peace negotiations should be begun. The proposal in this amendment differed from that of the May address only in this, that it advised a truce, an immediate cessation of hostilities, whereas in May the choice of the means to be employed in securing peace was left to the king. This addition imparted more urgency to the new appeal. On neither occasion could there be any suggestion of the complete recall of the troops, as the war was actually in progress.

The attitude which Chatham had now adopted, as also the course which events had taken, inevitably led to a resumption of his relations with Rockingham and his party. This faction had favoured the repeal of the Stamp Act, but had maintained the right of Parliament to impose taxes; hence their standpoint in the American question had not been the same as Chatham's. They considered that he went too far in the way of conciliatory measures. Now, however, when war with France seemed probable, and the hope of subduing the rebels was diminishing, they also became inclined to make great concessions, and it appeared likely that a joint political programme might be arranged. In fact, as to the object aimed at, neither Chatham nor Rockingham now differed from the government. The ministry, too, desired by means of negotiation to come to an agreement with America on the basis of the sovereignty of the mother-country. The difference concerned only the preliminary steps. The question now to be decided seemed simply this: To which of the rival aspirants would the king entrust the attainment of this aim? The struggle for this distinction would, as usual on such

occasions, take place in Parliament. Two great parties now stood opposed to each other, both desirous to extricate the country from her military troubles—on the one side the ministers in office and the court, on the other the Rockingham party and Chatham.

On November 22, and various subsequent dates, conferences¹ were held between Chatham and Rockingham, and between the influential members of their respective opposition factions; at these union was agreed on and the joint programme was evolved. The decisive attack upon the government was to be made on February 2. The opposition were on that day to propose a motion for taking the state of the nation into consideration. On the occasion of the ensuing debate they might, by their accusations of the government and injurious disclosures of its mistakes, compel it to resign. In order to provide themselves with a basis of operations, they intended at an earlier date to demand that papers relating to the conduct of the war, etc., should be laid before the House. Chatham did not appear at the larger meetings, but his decision on every question was accepted as final, so that everything was arranged according to his wishes.

The preliminary step was taken in the House of Lords on December 2.² The Duke of Richmond moved that certain 'accounts and papers' (exactly specified) relating to the losses and expenses of the army, and to the present condition of the troops, should be laid before the House. This motion met with no opposition. Chatham, however, embraced the opportunity to make a speech suggesting the desirability of certain military measures. His suggestions, apart from the reproaches which he conveyed along with them, were not of a nature to be unwelcome to the government. He pointed out the necessity for reinforcing the inadequate garrisons of Gibraltar and Port Mahon (Minorca), and that by English troops. They were at present garrisoned by Hanoverian soldiers; hence the care of the fortresses and the command of the troops might, should any accident happen to the commanding officer, devolve

¹ Rockingham to Granby, November 28, 1777; T. Townshend to Granby, November 28, 1777; G. Johnstone to Granby, November 29, 1777; *Historical MSS. Commission, Fourteenth Report*, App. 1, Rutland MSS., iii. 10, etc.; *Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 457 ff., 462 ff.; Albemarle, *Rockingham*, ii. 325 ff.

² Thackeray, ii. 336 ff.; *Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 464 ff.

on a foreigner. Chatham eloquently insisted on the importance of the fortresses in question; and there can be no doubt of the almost decisive part which Gibraltar played in the war now beginning. Yet it is probable that the earl had a personal as well as a patriotic motive for giving this particular piece of advice. He wished to open a new field of activity to his eldest son, where he would encounter only foreign enemies; and Gibraltar had no doubt suggested itself as such a field. The fact remains that John, Lord Pitt, re-entered the army this winter, and would have gone to Gibraltar in May if his father's death had not occasioned a delay.

Chatham gave expression, in the course of his speech, to a somewhat remarkable idea. Reminding his hearers how, in the last war, he had employed the formerly rebel Scottish Highlanders as soldiers with good result, he suggested that the Americans, as soon as a reconciliation had taken place, might be employed to fight the battles of England in every quarter of the globe, and thus be made good and loyal subjects. He had not sufficiently reflected upon the difference between the martial Highlanders, accustomed to complete subjection to their chiefs, and the independent and commercial spirit of the colonists. It had been difficult enough to persuade the latter to fight for their country; few indeed could have been induced to fight for hire.

In conclusion, Chatham insisted vehemently upon the unsatisfactory state of the fleet, both as regarded size and efficiency. He had been inquiring carefully into the matter since his last speech. The British navy ought, he maintained, to be equal to the combined navies of France and Spain; in its present state it could not even satisfactorily protect the English coast.

At the time when Chatham was making this first public appearance after his alliance with the Rockingham party, the frigate *Warwick* was already in harbour with news from America¹ that was soon to put an end to the new coalition. It was the sad news that General Burgoyne, with the whole Canadian army, had been compelled to surrender at Saratoga. In view of the influence which this event exerted upon the last crisis of Chatham's political life, it is necessary to examine the circumstances which led to it. Hence, at the close of our

¹ *Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 468.

historical survey, we turn once again to those regions which in years past witnessed the chief triumphs of the great man's strategy.

One of the first plans conceived by the Americans after the beginning of the war was that of adding Canada to the great union of colonies. As an English possession, it threatened them with the same dangers which it had threatened as a French province, since its inland frontiers remained, on the whole, unchanged; this was a proviso of the so-called Quebec Act of 1774, which Chatham opposed. Two reasons led the colonists to regard conquest as possible: the population of Canada was not altogether averse to the idea of revolt, and the English government, not dreaming of any attack, had only a small force in the country. General Carleton, with not more than 800 soldiers at his disposal, displayed no anxiety whatever. Congress, however, did not as yet wish to take aggressive measures; consequently the first attacks were in the nature of private enterprises undertaken by contingents of militia from the New England states. They were very successful. In May 1775 these troops, by surprise and stratagem, obtained possession of Ticonderoga, Crown Point, and a vessel of war stationed on Lake Champlain. After this the commander of the revolutionary army, Colonel Arnold, received permission from Congress to undertake the regular invasion of Canada. Generals Schuyler and Montgomery, crossing Lake Champlain, took, after short sieges, the insufficiently garrisoned forts Isle aux Noix and St. John, and in November 1775 entered Montreal, which the English had deserted. Arnold himself, by Washington's advice, had chosen the northern land route to Quebec, following the courses of the rivers Kennebec and Chaudière. This was the route which, in bygone days, had been recommended to Pitt by Dennys de Berdt, but which he had not seen fit to choose for the English troops. And it now proved to be excessively toilsome and dangerous. Arnold's troops suffered great losses and had exhausted their provisions before they reached the St. Lawrence.

The English commander, Colonel Maclean, retired upon Quebec, only just in time to prevent the surprise of the town. General Carleton, too, reached Quebec with Montgomery in pursuit; and now, on December 1, began another siege of

this important stronghold, Chatham's chief acquisition. It was for some time in serious danger ; but after an attempt at the end of the month to storm it had been repulsed with great loss to the assailants (Montgomery was among the killed), the siege became a blockade, which lasted all winter, but was abandoned in May, when it became known that the troops sent from England were at hand.

Success was now for a time on the English side. As soon as the reinforcements arrived Arnold found himself obliged to quit Canada and retreat to Lake Champlain. But here, too, the English, with the assistance of ships sent in pieces from England, gained the upper hand, recapturing Crown Point. Further advance south they postponed till 1777.

General Carleton, to whose charge the first disasters were probably laid, was now superseded in the command of the greatly enlarged Canadian army by General Burgoyne. Some German regiments under General Riedesel formed part of the addition to the army. Burgoyne, with 7000 men, made his way southward in June 1777, occupied Crown Point, and obliged the Americans to evacuate Ticonderoga (the fortifications of which had in the interval been extended and strengthened), inflicting a considerable loss on their rearguard. Soon, however, the difficulties of the English began ; the retreating Americans placed as many impediments in their way as possible, and the population farther south was extremely hostile. All provisions had to be procured from England or Canada. The enemy increased their forces by recruiting, a process facilitated by the threatened invasion. In spite of everything, however, Burgoyne pressed onwards, in the hope of being able to join forces with General Howe, who was operating in the colony of New York.

At the time of the advance across Lake George and the Hudson River (where its course is west to east) the English met with two reverses, which considerably minimised their chances of success. General St. Leger, who had started from Montreal to make a diversion in the direction of Lake Ontario, was compelled to retreat after an ineffectual siege of Fort Stanwix, so that Burgoyne was disappointed of assistance from him. And a strong detachment, despatched eastwards by Burgoyne to destroy military stores at Bennington, encountered a superior force and was completely routed,

losing 600 men. However, as Burgoyne had received peremptory orders from the government to advance, he marched southwards in September to Saratoga, to operate thence against General Arnold's army, which was advancing from Albany, and in the defeat of which lay his only hope of accomplishing his design. On the 19th, at Still Water, there was a fierce encounter. Both sides lost heavily; but the Americans were in so far victorious that they maintained their position and prevented the advance of the enemy.

In the meantime a hostile detachment had reached the English rear, and had destroyed the boats on Lake George, making retreat northwards impossible. Burgoyne was entrapped. Compelled to relinquish the offensive for the defensive attitude, he took up a strong position at Saratoga on October 8. Here he was surrounded by the hostile force, which received reinforcements daily and cut off his supplies. The English army, which had lost heavily in the different encounters, and was being steadily reduced by desertion, was incapable of long resistance, and the general soon determined to surrender. Favourable terms were conceded, and the surrender took place on October 16. The troops received permission to embark for England at the nearest port.

This was the catastrophe of which the *Warwick* brought the news to England on December 2. It was known on the following day at noon to the leaders of the opposition. Nor was this the only bad news. Information had just been received that King Frederick of Prussia had refused to permit the troops recruited in Germany for America to pass through his territory, which meant a long delay in the arrival of these much needed reinforcements. This news excited great indignation in England. A report spread that Frederick had taken the step to oblige Chatham, in order to facilitate the overthrow of the government.¹ It was a rumour without any foundation, but, remembering Chatham's diatribes against the employment of German hired troops, we are not surprised that it should have arisen. The prohibition was cancelled at the beginning of the following year, when the

¹ Reports of the Prussian ambassador of December 2 and 9, 1777.—Berlin Archives.

outbreak of the war of the Bavarian succession made Frederick anxious to avoid arousing enmity.¹

These disturbing occurrences did not at first seem to produce any change in the party situation. The opposition unanimously proceeded—cautiously avoiding anything which might be construed as inclination to favour the enemy—to turn the failures to account in furthering their own designs. They adhered to their original plan of action. In the House of Lords, on December 15, Chatham moved that the orders given to General Burgoyne should be laid before the House.² In proposing this motion he took occasion to express his deep sense of the calamity which had befallen the nation, and to lament the mistakes committed by the government. On this occasion he was in his element, as he was well acquainted with all the circumstances attending a campaign in the regions in question. He had no difficulty in detecting the weak points in the plan of operations, and he doubtless dwelt upon them at length, though this is not recorded in the report of his speech. His reputation as a strategist ensured him an attentive hearing. But his conclusions were conclusions arrived at after the event. Who can tell if he, in the same position, would have estimated the enemy's strength more correctly, and consequently avoided the mistakes? The high opinion of the Americans' power of resistance, which political reasons led him so frequently to express, cannot be accepted as a proof that he would have modified his action accordingly. It was certainly not very logical to demand documents by means of which to arrive at a decision regarding the strategy, and in the same breath definitely and finally to condemn the ministry's plan of action. However, we have to bear in mind that condemnation of the government, under all circumstances, was the invariable opposition policy.

The motion was negatived, as it was considered that the publication of the papers in question might be injurious to the military situation, and the government soon contrived to put an end to the harassing debates. On December 11 the Earl of Orford proposed to adjourn to January 20, 1778.

¹ Koser, *König Friedrich*, ii. 522.

² Thackeray, ii. 341 ff.; *Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 471 ff.; Prussian ambassador's report of December 9, 1777.—Berlin Archives.

Chatham naturally offered strong opposition;¹ he declared that he objected to being silenced in this way by the majority; but his speech allowed his ultimate aim to be clearly perceived. After showing that, owing to the regulations made by the King of Prussia and the Swiss government, no more troops could be procured from the Continent, and drawing from this circumstance the conclusion that peace negotiations must at once be begun, he asserted that the Americans would never consent to treat with the ministers from whom they had suffered so much injustice. If, however, no settlement were secured, it was improbable that the other enemies of England would allow the war to continue without interference. The inevitable deduction from these premises, an inference which no hearer could fail to draw, was that Chatham and his friends must be promoted to power to conduct peace negotiations. The orator gave a plain intimation that he was prepared to save the situation if the recess were employed in constructing a new government.

It might have been supposed that the point now at issue was simply whether the North ministry was to remain in office or to be replaced by Chatham and the Rockingham party. But the events of 1765 were repeated. As soon as there was a serious prospect of his accession to office, Chatham separated himself from the great party on which he had leaned whilst in opposition, and showed that he desired to treat with the monarch alone.

On this occasion there undoubtedly was a valid reason for his action. To Rockingham and his friends the position of affairs seemed much more hopeless than it did to Chatham. They were convinced that the Americans, victorious and expecting assistance from the Bourbon powers, would not retract their proclamation of independence. They therefore considered that, in order to avoid a continuation of the war, which would probably be much more terrible than it had hitherto been, it would be wise to yield at once on the question of independence, and then to come to as favourable an arrangement as possible with the new transatlantic republic, especially in matters relating to trade. Chatham, on the

¹ Thackeray, ii. 352 ff.; *Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 478 ff.; *Correspondence of Lord North*, ii. 113 f.; Prussian ambassador's report of December 16, 1777.

other hand, to whom the situation, bad as he represented it in his speeches, seemed by no means desperate, and who had perfect confidence in the power of England (more particularly her naval power), was ready to risk everything rather than submit to the loss of the country's greatest colonial possession. He still rejected any basis of treaty except his old proposals contained in the Provisional Act. His views consequently were much more nearly akin to those of the ministry than to those of his opposition allies.

One not unnatural consequence was that several well-meaning persons, who considered the country in danger, made attempts to induce the great statesman, a lover of peace and yet experienced in war, to make advances which might lead to his resumption of the management of affairs. The situation seemed as favourable as it could possibly be for such a proceeding on his part.

The first to take action in the matter was a certain Thomas Coutts,¹ one of the richest English bankers, who also about this time undertook the management of the king's money matters, and whose daughter soon afterwards married Lord Bute's eldest son. This influential man, who was in a position to know the opinions prevailing in the highest circles, wrote a letter on January 21 to Lady Chatham,² in which he informed her that several influential persons had expressed the wish, shared by himself, that Lord Chatham would inform the king that he was prepared to take office. It was believed 'that the King would be very glad at the present moment to receive a proposal from the only person who it is possible should now succeed in a point so essential [the conclusion of peace with America] not only to the welfare, but even to the existence of Great Britain as a powerful nation.' From later letters³ we gather that it was probably Lord Rochford who suggested that Coutts should communicate with Chatham; for Rochford afterwards (through Coutts) placed himself at the earl's disposal.

Another impulse in the same direction came from the Bute faction. In order, however, to value this at its proper worth, we must first understand the nature of the former favourite's present position at court.

¹ See *Dictionary of National Biography*.

² *Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 485 f.

³ *Ibid.*, iv. 511 f., and 515.

Since the break-up of the Chatham ministry, which, as we know, was a great disappointment to him, Bute had led a very retired life; he had been much abroad and had avoided all interference in public affairs. His intimacy with the king, in which there had often before been interruptions, ceased altogether; for years they did not meet. Bute complained bitterly of the king's neglect and ingratitude. We do not know what produced this breach; I am inclined to believe that George's aversion to Chatham's policy, which Bute probably continued to advocate, may have had a considerable share in bringing it about. It is certain that Bute had no relations whatever with Lord North, the representative of the opposite policy. The death of his patroness, the Princess of Wales, in February 1772, broke the last tie between the once familiar friends. Whether, in spite of everything, Bute still nourished the secret expectation that he might once again take an active part in political life, it is impossible to say. His political activity, supposing it to have existed, must, as in previous years, have been limited to acting as friend and adviser of the king, especially in personal matters. Only in a case of imperative necessity, such as was not likely to arise again, could he have acted as minister. His ill-health in itself made the strain of public life undesirable. He, however, thanks to his large circle of friends and to his wealth, still possessed considerable political influence, so that in the case of a change of government his support was of great value.

In January 1778 a friend of Bute's, Sir James Wright, had a conversation with Dr. Addington, Chatham's physician and friend,¹ in the course of which Addington denied, in reply to an assertion made by Wright, that his illustrious patient nourished any animosity whatever towards Lord Bute. Wright repeated this to Bute, and took the opportunity to discover what his sentiments towards Chatham were. The earl had nothing but praise for the great statesman, and declared that he should have his hearty concurrence and sincere good wishes if he determined again to take an active part in administration. It was plainly not Bute who took the initiative here. His friend, desirous to do a good work, induced him to make observations, which, when re-edited for Chatham's benefit,

¹ For the whole affair see Thackeray, ii. 362-8, and also 633-57.

might well seem exhortations to a return to ministerial office. Nor had Wright any difficulty in inducing him to speak as he did. Bute had in reality an extremely high opinion of Chatham, and believed that his restoration to power would be the best solution of all difficulties; and he had no objection to his former colleague being informed of this; but he had no intention whatever of undertaking his own former rôle of minister-maker, now that he had no longer any influence over the king. Chatham was welcome to know that his disposition towards him was friendly, and that he would have his support if he took office; but Bute was neither willing nor able to secure his appointment.

Chatham, who, in the present dangerous situation, could not but be prepared for a summons from the king, and who had actually, in his last speech, covertly indicated himself as the natural rescuer of the country from its present difficulties, was inclined to attach some importance to both these inducements. He imagined that the king, upon whose present attitude towards Bute he was not well informed, might possibly be countenancing the proceedings, with the desire that he, Chatham, should take the initiative. He answered the two communications in exactly the same style, partly even in the same words; but it was Lady Chatham who wrote the reply to Coutts,¹ whilst that to Sir James Wright was dictated to Addington.² In both Chatham declared the situation to be so desperate that it would be folly and presumption to undertake unbidden the task of averting the impending ruin. But if the errors committed were fully perceived, and a complete change of policy were ordered, then 'zeal, duty, and obedience might outlive hope.' The plain meaning of his answer, disentangled from the exaggerated laments and reproaches in which it was involved, was that he declined to take the initiative, but was ready to obey an express command from the king. In spite of the hopelessness of success he would be zealous and obedient. This was the same standpoint which Chatham had adopted before on similar occasions. He demanded a personal appeal from the sovereign, and a mandate which would place him in the position of sole leader. The absence of all hope was a mere phrase; he was

¹ *Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 486.

² *Thackeray*, ii. 635.

obliged to find an excuse for refusing to make the suggested advances. In reality he was burning to inflict new defeats upon the Bourbon powers.

But now Addington and Wright made a blunder which led Chatham to pass a very severe verdict on Lord Bute. Wright had told Dr. Addington that he believed his friend (Bute) would be ready to act with Chatham as secretary of state in the place of Lord Weymouth. Although Wright had had no commission from Bute, and gave none to Addington, the latter wrote what he had been told to Chatham, adding that he himself had replied that Lord Chatham was able to save the nation alone, and that all Lord Bute required to do was to convince the king of his errors.

Chatham immediately changed his tone, for he had always definitely refused to co-operate with Bute. He characterised all the suggestions that had been made as nonsense, and declared that the difference between Bute and himself was this: 'one has brought the King and kingdom to ruin; the other would sincerely endeavour to save it.' The old grievance—the peace concluded without his consent—began to rankle again. But before Chatham's letter reached Addington, Bute had declared his friend entirely mistaken. He affirmed that the idea of undertaking an appointment of any kind was very far from his thoughts, and expressed his sincere hopes that Lord Chatham's endeavours would be crowned with success. Chatham expressed his satisfaction with this communication, which, like all the others, was made indirectly. Through a friend of the Grenville family, Lancelot Brown, he learned that Bute was 'outrageous in his expressions on the indispensable necessity that the King should not lose a moment in sending for Lord Chatham.'¹

What chiefly interests us in this affair is the distinct manner in which Chatham allowed it to be understood that he was prepared to undertake the guidance of public affairs. In his indignation with Bute he had openly declared 'that he would sincerely endeavour to save' the state; this, taken in connection with his other utterances, admitted of no other explanation. The rest of his behaviour was calculated to produce the same impression. He did not reappear in Parliament when it met again, as the state of his health also rendered such action

¹ *Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 493.

advisable; and he separated himself from the Rockingham party. He frankly informed the marquis that he would not give his assent to the independence of the colonies.¹ Nor did he allow his resolution to be shaken by a letter from the American general, Gates, to Rockingham,² which affirmed the Americans' confidence in the wisdom of Chatham and Camden, and expressed the expectation that these statesmen would, by recognising this independence, restore the friendship between the colonies and the mother-country. Opinion in the most influential circles was in favour of Chatham's return to power. Even Lord Mansfield, his most bitter opponent, was reported to have said that he must be sent for.³ Chatham himself had no intention of deviating a hair's-breadth from the path which was likely to lead him to the king's presence.

The king, however, was the person who displayed least inclination to have him at the head of affairs. He strongly objected to placing the destinies of the country in the hands of the man who, as he firmly believed, had brought all these troubles upon it by his opposition. Only under compulsion would he yield. Compulsion might be exerted by the resignation of his present ministers and their recognition that Chatham's recall was imperative. But this pass had not yet been reached. Lord North, who in January had been determined to resign,⁴ had again allowed himself to be persuaded to remain in office. But an event now happened which threatened the existence of North's ministry. On March 13 the French ambassador intimated the conclusion of a treaty of commerce with America,⁵ which was equivalent to a declaration of partisanship with the rebels.

Lord North had only consented to remain in office on condition that he should be at liberty to attempt a reconciliation. He would have nothing to do with the prosecution of the war. On February 17 he had succeeded in passing, as a first conciliatory measure, the repeal of the unlucky tea-duty, and in securing the appointment of a commission which was

¹ *Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 492.

² Dated October 26, 1777.—*Ibid.*, iv. 489, note.

³ Temple to Lady Chatham, February 6, 1778.—*Ibid.*, iv. 493.

⁴ *North Correspondence*, ii. 125 ff.

⁵ *Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 509; *North Correspondence*, ii. 148 ff.

to take charge of the peace negotiations.¹ Now, not only were the hopes shattered which he had begun to entertain of putting an end to the American troubles, but the new war was practically certain. Consequently he again tendered his resignation.² The king, under the pressure exerted upon him from every side, found himself obliged to take the recall of Chatham into serious consideration. He no longer offered a point-blank refusal, but he made it a condition that the greater number of the present ministers should remain in office. North was to be among those who retained their appointments. The proposed change was practically nothing more than a reinforcement of the cabinet by the addition of Chatham and his friends. The king constantly gave expression to the idea, 'no new ministry, but a strengthening of the old.' He refused to send for Chatham, not only because he bore him ill-will, but also and principally because he feared his arts of persuasion. He learned the power of his eloquence by experience, and was afraid that Chatham might induce him to introduce too many new elements into the government.³

Lord North, after wavering for a time, eventually adhered to his determination to resign office; but he first postponed its execution till the close of the session, and then to a still later date. One of the king's demands was the choice of a thoroughly loyal lord chancellor, in order that the rights of the Crown and the Parliament might be properly defended; and as such he indicated the solicitor-general, Baron Thurlow, who had given proof of his devotion. This was equivalent to a rejection of Lord Camden. To Chatham these were matters of indifference. He intended to await a crisis, when the dangerous position of the country might procure him an audience of the king, and enable him to dictate his conditions. Lord North entered into negotiations with Lord Shelburne (through William Eden, a diplomatist who had served under Pitt), but the demands made were too extravagant to permit any agree-

¹ *North Correspondence*, ii. 133 ff., and 137 f.

² *Ibid.*, ii. 151 f., 153 f., 156, and elsewhere. On September 23, 1781, Granville Sharp wrote to Lord Dartmouth that Lord North at one time had serious thoughts of acknowledging the independence of the colonies, but had been deterred from doing so by Chatham's vehement condemnation of such a step.—*Historical MSS. Commission, Fifteenth Report*, Appendix, part i., Dartmouth Manuscripts, iii. 255.

³ *North Correspondence*, ii. 150.

ment.¹ George III. declared that he would rather abdicate than submit to dictation from Chatham. The only advance made by Chatham was that which he had permitted himself on previous similar occasions: he adapted his parliamentary utterances to the policy favoured by the king, in order to make it as natural and simple as possible for his majesty to send for him. We remember the speech which he made in the spring of 1766, and the manner in which the king, in requesting Chatham to form a government, referred to it as having induced him to take the step.² This time the same tactics were to lead to a different, unexpected, and mournful issue.

Repeated attempts had been made by Chatham's and Rockingham's adherents (chief amongst the latter the Duke of Richmond) to reconcile the conflicting opinions of these two statesmen.³ The attainment of this aim might have been possible if Chatham had sincerely desired it. Complete self-government, with a purely nominal dependence on Great Britain, might have been conceded to the United States; and on this basis a commercial union might have been arranged. Chatham himself, however, showed complete indifference, and made no effort to avert the impending breach. The first result of this was the fact that Lord North's proposals of February 17 met with no alarming opposition. At the end of March, however, the Rockingham party resolved to take a decisive step, and to move in Parliament that the independence of America should be acknowledged. This would compel Chatham to show his colours, and to declare whether he really preferred the doubtful favour of the court to the leadership of a great party. It was arranged that the Duke of Richmond was to move an address to the king on March 29; but as Chatham was unable to be present on that day the motion was postponed till April 7.⁴

¹ Mahon, *History of England*, vi. 234. The Prussian ambassador tells of other negotiations. On March 20 he writes: 'Il y a des pourparlers avec Myl. Chatham par la voye du Général Myl. Amherst pour l'engager à entrer dans le Ministère avec Myl. North. Mais l'on ignore encore s'il se laissera persuader.'—Berlin Archives.

² *Supra*, chap. ix.

³ *Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 497-506, and 513 f.; Albemarle, *Rockingham*, ii. 347 f., and 350 f.

⁴ Albemarle, ii. 350 f.

The Duke of Richmond now made a last attempt to persuade the renegade ally to support this address,¹ which was so worded that even opponents of independence, if they were averse to the continuance of the war, might vote for it. It recapitulated 'the expenses, misconduct, and losses of the war,' and then appealed to the king to dismiss his ministers, 'to withdraw all his forces by sea and land from the revolted provinces, and to adopt only amicable means to recover their friendship, at least, if not their allegiance.' The new American power was thus to be acknowledged as an equal; no forcible measures were to be employed; an appeal was to be made to mutual affection, mutual interests. The question of political separation was to be a matter of negotiation; the motion contained no decided pronouncement on the subject; it was, however, hardly to be expected that the new state would voluntarily renounce its own independence.

The duke sent the draft of his address to Chatham with a letter² in which he urged upon him the necessity of that union and mutual confidence between the Chatham and Rockingham parties which Chatham had himself so strongly recommended in November last. Chatham had then declared that the subjugation of America was impossible, and surely, argued the duke, an inevitable consequence of that declaration was the acknowledgment of her independence. Relying, then, on Chatham's own assertion that the mutual confidence and reunion of the opposition were necessary to the safety of Britain, as also on the fact that the address had been drafted in such terms as, it was thought, would be agreeable to his lordship, Richmond hoped that he would honour it with his support. Chatham's answer³ was short and cold. He simply expresses his regret 'to find himself under so very wide a difference with the Duke of Richmond, as between the *sovereignty* and *allegiance* of America, that he despairs of bringing about any honourable issue.' He thus refused to change his standpoint.

It seems, however, to be very doubtful if Chatham at this moment seriously proposed to resume the leadership of the government, or if he considered himself capable of doing so. Since the execution of that political move which opened to

¹ Thackeray, ii. 376.

² *Ibid.*, iv. 518.

³ *Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 516 ff.

him the prospect of office, his health had become much worse.¹ In January he felt comparatively vigorous and free from pain, so that he could face the prospect; but since the 27th of that month, when he caught a severe cold, his sufferings had been constant; he was often unable even to guide a pen. Though he writes only of a little gout in his hand or hands, he must have been very seriously ill. But he and his friends always comforted themselves with the hope that these attacks of gout were beneficial, and were preparatory to a period of steady health. This superstition regarding the action of gout, of which we find frequent mention, probably induced him and others to believe, even when his infirmity became excessive, that he would still be able to take office. In reality there was no longer any possibility of it, more especially under the present extremely difficult circumstances, which demanded undiminished vigour in the man who was to master them. And at last this truth was borne in upon Chatham himself, when, taking advantage of an apparent improvement and putting forth all his remaining strength, he ventured to appear in Parliament. His friends had tried to dissuade him, but he was determined to make the attempt.

On Tuesday, April 7,² the House of Lords was crowded to overflowing, both downstairs and in the galleries, as it was known that the Duke of Richmond was to propose an important motion relating to America, and that the Earl of Chatham intended to deliver his opinion on the situation. The preliminary formalities had been accomplished, and the business of the day had already begun, when the door near the throne opened, and an old man, dressed in black velvet and wrapped to the knees in flannel, was led slowly in by two friends. It was Chatham, who had come from Hayes and had been resting in the lord chancellor's room until his presence seemed advisable.

¹ See reports of it in the *Chatham Correspondence*.

² See Thackeray, ii. 376 ff.; Prussian ambassador's report, April 10, 1778. —Berlin Archives; *Chatham Correspondence*, iv. 518 ff.; Albemarle, *Rockingham*, ii. 351 f.; letters from Camden to Grafton in *Memoirs of the Duke of Grafton*; *Hist. MSS. Comm., Fourteenth Report*, App. i., Rutland MSS., vol. iii. (C. F. Grenville to Lord Granby, April 1778); *Seward Anecdotes*, ii. 422 ff. In the *Chatham Correspondence* the newspaper reports, undoubtedly written by eye-witnesses of the scene, are reprinted. C. F. Grenville was an eye-witness. He happened, at the moment of the catastrophe, to be looking Chatham straight in the face. The report of the Prussian ambassador is given in Appendix ii.

His weakness and his excitement impressed Lord Camden, who had spoken with him there, with forebodings of evil. His appearance, which was almost alarming—he looked like a dying man, an eye-witness declared—testified to a long and dangerous illness. His face was so emaciated that little more was to be seen under the large wig than the aquiline nose and the glittering eyes. Every one who saw him must have felt that this man was no longer capable of guiding the ship of state amid the breakers. His supporters were his son William and his son-in-law, Lord Mahon. They led him to the earls' bench through the ranks of peers, who stood up reverentially as he passed, and whose salutations he acknowledged with his accustomed grace and dignity. Sitting there, he listened with the most profound attention whilst the Duke of Richmond proposed his motion.

After Lord Weymouth, the secretary of state, had spoken against the address, Lord Chatham rose slowly and with difficulty, and, leaning on his crutches and supported by his two relations, proceeded once again to give vigorous expression to his ideas. The stillness in the House was such that a falling handkerchief would have been heard; not a word that the old man spoke was to be lost. Taking one hand from his crutch and raising it and his eyes towards heaven, he began, in a low voice, by thanking God for having enabled him once again to do his duty and to speak on a subject of such great importance. 'I am old and infirm,' he continued, 'have one foot, more than one foot in the grave. I have risen from my bed to stand up in the cause of my country—perhaps never again to speak in this House!'

After this introduction, which shows that he was well aware of his real condition, he recapitulated, his voice becoming stronger as he proceeded, the most important events in the struggle with America, mentioning before each his prophecy regarding it, and beginning with 'And so it proved.' Then he entered upon the particular subject under discussion that day. He ridiculed the apprehension of an invasion, which had so often proved unfounded; and he declared that it was his firm determination never to consent to the dismemberment of the British monarchy, never to 'consent to deprive the royal offspring of the House of Brunswick, the heirs of the Princess Sophia, of their fairest inheritance.' In any case, before that

could be done, the assent of the Prince of Wales and the 'other rising hopes of the royal family' must be obtained. But it would be a degradation of the English nation to shrink from the threats of the House of Bourbon, and in a manner to sue for peace.

Chatham thus advanced three arguments against the address: first, the circumstance that England, even if the foreign powers took part against her, had no reason to doubt her ability to defend herself; secondly, the rights of the royal house as a family, which made it unlawful for the king alone to cede any royal possession on his own responsibility—a very questionable and a purely rhetorical argument; thirdly, the national honour, which forbade any retreat. He had, as we know, on previous occasions declared that England did not possess the resources required to carry on a great war of the kind indicated. But now he said: 'I am not, I confess, well informed of the resources of this kingdom; but I trust it has still sufficient to maintain its just rights. . . . But, my Lords, any state is better than despair. Let us at least make one effort; and if we must fall, let us fall like men!'

He repeatedly referred to his ill-health, which, though it permitted him to advise, prevented his 'insuring to the execution of his measures the wished-for success.' From this it would appear that, conscious of his infirmity, he did not make his speech with the aim of advancing his prospects of office, but simply to give expression once again to his belligerent spirit and his hostility to the Bourbon powers. After all the peaceful, obstructive speeches which his policy had of late years obliged him to make, he delighted to reappear as the war minister who had served his country so well in days past. Thus, naturally, it is chiefly for its rhetorical beauty that this speech has been praised. Enthusiasm fired the old man's words, his looks, his whole bearing, and led him to put a strain on his enfeebled system which it was unable to bear. But with his arguments even his friends were not satisfied. He no longer seemed sufficiently master of his subject. He certainly cannot have entered into details, since the whole speech, as we are informed by an auditor, lasted only ten minutes.

As Chatham seated himself Lord Temple said to him: 'You forgot to mention what we talked of; shall I get up?'

The earl replied: 'No, no; I will do it by-and-by.' The Duke of Richmond had in the meantime risen to reply. He expressed his veneration for the name of the Earl of Chatham; but that name, he observed, great and mighty as it was, could not work miracles; and he proceeded to show that the approaching war must necessarily be far more difficult than the previous struggle had been.

Lord Chatham listened to the whole speech most attentively, occasionally showing signs of displeasure, although, as Camden testifies, Richmond's attitude throughout was very courteous in spite of its tone of frank opposition. When Richmond had concluded Chatham made several attempts to rise; he seemed to try to take something out of his pocket; then he suddenly pressed his hand to his heart and fell backwards, unconscious. Lord Fitzwilliam was the first who sprang to support him, but the Duke of Cumberland, Lord Temple, Lord Stamford, and others pressed round with anxious solicitude. Young James Pitt was particularly active in assisting his father. A physician, Dr. Brocklesby, was immediately in attendance, and Dr. Addington, who was at once sent for, appeared in the course of an hour. The earl was carried into the princes' withdrawing-room and laid upon cushions on the table. A short faint was followed by violent sickness, by which the condition of the patient was so much improved that Lord Camden avowed his belief that the attack was entirely due to overloading of the stomach. As soon as Chatham had sufficiently recovered, he was taken to Mr. Serjeant Strutt's house in Downing Street, where he had been kindly entertained when he had attended the House of Lords on a previous occasion. The scene in the House had naturally produced great excitement and confusion there, and the debate was consequently adjourned.

Such was the famous episode of April 7, 1778, which has been commemorated by Copley in the well-known painting, now in the National Gallery. His representation of the scene is not historically correct. The very name of the picture, 'Death of the Earl of Chatham,' does not correspond with the facts of the case, but it shows the conception of the event which very soon prevailed. The picture was painted in 1779-1780. It was generally believed that the sudden seizure in the House of Lords was the direct cause of Chatham's death, whereas it was in reality only an incident in the fatal illness

which had long been in progress. Attacks of the same nature, though never of such violence, had occurred before, and had been followed by periods of comparative health. Nor was this occasion any exception. Chatham remained two days at Mr. Strutt's house, and was then removed to Hayes; and on April 10 we already find the Prussian ambassador reporting him to be perfectly well and announcing the probability of his reappearance in Parliament the following week.¹ On the 14th the ambassador received from Chatham himself the intimation of his complete recovery.² Doubtless the earnest desire not to be excluded from the political combinations speaks in this message; but there can also be no doubt that the earl must have felt very much better. The king, however, who was most anxious to be relieved of the necessity of appointing Chatham prime minister, had written on April 8 to Lord North:³ 'May not the political exit of Lord Chatham incline you to continue at the head of my affairs?' The estrangement between the two men could not be expressed more plainly than in these few unfeeling words.

Not till the 28th do we hear that doubts are entertained of Chatham's recovery, and that his political career, at any rate, is considered to be at an end.⁴ We have little or no information of events at Hayes. The sick man is said one day to have made his son William read the passage from the *Iliad* which tells of the burial of Hector and the lament of the Trojans.⁵ Not long before his death his son John, Lord Pitt, took leave of him, being ordered to Gibraltar, but before the young man had left Portsmouth the news of the death reached him, and he returned to be present at the funeral.⁶

Chatham died on the afternoon of May 11, 1778.⁷ It was evening before news of the mournful event reached London, and was communicated to Colonel Barré, the earl's most prominent adherent in the House of Commons. That gentleman

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⁴ Prussian ambassador's report of April 28, 1778.—Berlin Archives.

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⁶ James Grenville to Lady Chatham, May 25, 1778: 'I understand that Lord Chatham is returned to you from Portsmouth.'—Chatham MSS.

⁷ See for this, and an account of the funeral, Thackeray, *History of the Earl of Chatham*, ii. 381 ff.

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On June 7 and 8 the corpse lay in state in the Painted Chamber at Westminster, and on the 9th it was borne through Westminster Hall and the adjacent streets to the abbey. The funeral procession must have struck all who saw it as rather that of a peer than that of a great public character. Comment was aroused by the absence of the king and of every one connected with the court. George III. could not bring himself even now to forget Chatham's political attitude during the last year. The honour shown to his memory as the victorious war minister and the Great Commoner proceeded from Parliament alone, and more particularly from the House of Commons, and was expressed in the form of very considerable votes of money to his family. A grant of £20,000 was made for the purpose of discharging the debts incurred by the late earl, and an annuity of £4000 was settled upon the heirs to whom his title should descend.

There are several portraits and numerous statues of Chatham. The earliest portrait, by William Hoare, was painted at the time of his alliance with Cobham and Prince Frederick. It represents him as a slender young man, but the features and the expression are very much the same as in the later portrait by Richard Brompton, reproduced at the beginning of this work, which represents him as the earl and well reproduces

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the energy and dignity which characterised his appearance. Statues of Chatham have been erected in St. Stephen's Hall, Westminster, in the Guild Hall (with an inscription by Burke), and in several American towns. The old Blackfriars Bridge originally bore the name of Pitt Bridge, and the square at its northern extremity that of Chatham Square, but both these names have vanished.

At the beginning of this biography I compared Chatham to a landmark with two sides weather-worn to different colours. The fitness of the comparison will hardly be denied; and it suggests an explanation of the many contradictions with which his life abounds, nay, of which it is composed. He still belonged to the old times, stood with both feet on the old soil, whilst with his whole soul he aspired after the new age, yet without the power to become part of it. He represented in the House of Commons the rotten borough of Old Sarum, and had striven to make it the base of his political operations; yet he desired and demanded that the real will of the nation should find its expression in Parliament; distinguished by his skill in party intrigue and founding his power on party alliances, he yet desired to destroy the party system and to make pure patriotism the motive power in the conduct of public affairs. He could not find words to express his devotion to the king and undertook to rule the country as the king's minister; yet he enthusiastically supported the rights and the supremacy of a free Parliament. He violently opposed the rising power of the press, and yet he objected to all infringement of the liberty of the subject. In the growth of capitalism he saw a serious danger to morality and to the rights of the people; nevertheless, he was always in close alliance with the great capitalists. He was an ardent supporter of the old rights of the mother-country over her colonies, and yet he desired to see the colonists recognised as free citizens and their communities as autonomous organisations. He loved patriarchal simplicity and the peace of rural life, and yet he had a taste for pomp and parade which often led him to extravagance, and he was never so much in his element as when absorbed in important and engrossing affairs of state. In his foreign policy, too, we have contradictions of the same nature. He was imbued with the theories of the old coalition

policy of the war of the Spanish succession, yet he showed a constant and vain desire to break with them, to oppose an independent England to the Bourbon alliance. As he was preparing actually to make the venture, death prevented him.

Chatham's greatness did not lie in counsel, in his home or his foreign policy; it lay entirely in action. It was when the decision had been taken, when he was placed in authority, and the time had come to act, that he showed what he was. Then he faced all, even the greatest, difficulties, and overcame them by his audacious energy and his tenacity. Hence, with all his faults and failings, he is the great historical personage, the powerful minister, who at a dangerous crisis led England to victory, and also helped by his success to give a new direction to German development. One of his fellow-combatants, the hero of the American war which was just beginning, Admiral G. B. Rodney, wrote after Chatham's death to his widow: ¹—

'Your Ladyship may be assured that no man living bears a more sincere and respectful affection for the memory of that great and glorious minister, who, to all succeeding ages, will be quoted as an illustrious example, how one great man, by his superior ability, could raise his drooping country from the abyss of despair to the highest pinnacle of glory, and render her honoured, respected, revered, and dreaded by the whole universe. Can his memory be ever blotted from the minds of those who sincerely love their country? From mine it never can; the love I bore him living can end but with my life, the happiest period of which will be, to remember that I had paid my duty to the memory of one of the greatest men Britain ever produced.'

¹ December 2, 1779.—Chatham MSS.

THE END

APPENDICES

I

AUTHORITIES¹

(a) CHATHAM BIOGRAPHIES AND MONOGRAPHS. Although a century and a quarter have passed since Chatham's death, and numerous sources of every kind of information have long been accessible, no sufficiently careful and complete biography of him has yet appeared—and it is this want which I have attempted to supply. The accounts of the great man's life already in existence are by no means valueless to the student. The History in two volumes by FRANCIS THACKERAY,² which appeared—after some smaller accounts of the great man's career—as the first authoritative biography, is in reality a mere sketch of the life, which has been swelled out to a great size by the transcription at full length of numerous documents. It is, indeed, practically a collection of documents with connecting text, and as such presents a rich store of material, much of which, however, was already in print elsewhere. It displays no profound comprehension of the events narrated, and the tone throughout is exaggeratedly panegyrical. As a basis for further research the work is of great service. In the form of a criticism of it LORD MACAULAY³ wrote two essays upon Chatham, which, though they are not correct in every particular, give a much more faithful and intelligent, as well as more artistic representation of the man and his development. They reduce Thackeray's panegyrics to the amount of praise rightly

¹ It is not my intention to enumerate here all the sources from which the information contained in these volumes has been derived. My authorities have been duly mentioned in the text or in the notes. My purpose now is to give some account of the most important of them, and thereby disclose the foundations upon which the whole work has arisen.

² Francis Thackeray, *A History of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham*. London, 1827; 2 vols.

³ Lord Macaulay, *Critical and Historical Essays*, p. 288 ff., and p. 744 ff. London, 1899.

due. To any one whose aim it is to be quickly and, on the whole, correctly informed, these essays are to be warmly recommended. WALFORD DAVIS GREEN has recently presented us, in the *Heroes of the Nations* series, with a well-written and beautifully printed biography, which, although intended for the general reader, is not destitute of value for the student. Its size precludes exhaustive treatment, but it is based upon a wide acquaintance with original documents, and shows an intelligent grasp of the problems to be solved. In this work, also, many extracts are inserted in the text, but in such a manner as rather to enliven than to impede the recital. They do not, however, always assist in producing a correct impression; on the contrary, being deprived of their original connection, they often acquire a wrong meaning. More care in this matter would have been advisable. In my monograph, *William Pitt (Chatham) und Graf Bute*, I made an attempt to solve one of the problems in the life of Pitt. The little work treats of the relations between the two men named in its title, men who, by German historians in particular, have been too generally regarded as enemies. I have shown that the relation between them was, more often than not, friendly. To this conclusion I have in the main adhered in the present work; and my increased knowledge of the history of the period has enabled me to throw more light on the circumstances which led me to it, and on their causes; consequently my earlier work may be regarded as in most respects superseded by its successor. An article on the *Chatham Correspondence* in the *Quarterly Review*, No. 66, which gives the career of the great statesman in broad outline, contains some information from good sources regarding his private life, and offers ingenious explanations of some of the questions which that life suggests, but touches only slightly upon political matters.

(b) STATE RECORDS. Chief in importance amongst these are the reports of the foreign ambassadors to their courts, which recount everything in chronological order—events in London, the news that arrives there, the rumours that arise, the changes of public opinion, etc.—and thereby fill up many a gap in the English chronicles of events, nay, even in the state documents, and also make it possible to determine the exact dates of events. This latter merit was of special importance to me, since, for the purpose of ascertaining the hidden connection between circumstances and also the motives of actions, I devoted much attention to the chronological sequence of events and to the dates of arrival of news. Of chief service to me were the *Reports of the Prussian Ambassadors*, preserved in the Record Office (*Staatsarchiv*) in

Berlin. These contain abundance of material, which is of first-rate value, because the representatives of Prussia at that time were remarkably well informed. Their statements are, naturally, not to be unquestioningly accepted, especially when reasons for actions and events are given. Then they are doubtless at times mistaken, and we are safer in accepting the English account of the matter. It is, moreover, always necessary to note with which political party the ambassadors are on the more intimate terms, since their announcements of the events occurring, and of the opinions and intentions prevailing in this party, can lay claim to greater authenticity than their opinions concerning the opposition. The Prussian ambassadors were, as it happens, intimate for a much longer period with Pitt and his friends, whether in or out of office, than with any other party; and in consequence of this the reports have been of great value to me; although it has always been necessary to bear in mind that to them, too, Pitt could never reveal his inmost thoughts, his final aims, especially when the matter in question happened to be his relations with Prussia.

I have also acquired much information from documents preserved in the *Public Record Office* in London. These, of course, offer the richest store of material; and they are admirably arranged. The printed indexes make it easy to find the volumes which contain the papers of which one is in search; and the excellent binding and the distinct writing sometimes make this written matter almost as easy to read as printed documents. The collections are by no means always complete, since in the days in question numbers of state papers remained in the private possession of the officials. Some of these came to light at a later period in volumes of correspondence, others were lost altogether. But the gaps are in no case such as cannot be fairly well supplied from material to be found either in the Public Record Office or elsewhere. I have always found it possible to establish the necessary connection. Of chief value to me were: the *Foreign Office Records*, which, arranged according to countries, contain the correspondence with the British ambassador or envoy, and give a reliable idea of the official foreign policy; the *Colonial Office Records*, from which full information regarding the relations of the mother-country with her colonies and the events of the colonial wars is to be gathered; and the *Admiralty Records*, which provide authentic information on the subject of naval equipments and naval operations. A separate and very interesting series of documents is the so-called *Confidential Miscellaneous*, which contains translations of all intercepted letters. It is, practically, a large collection of communications from the governments of different countries to

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their representatives in London, and from the representatives to their governments; and as many of them treat of the occurrences in London with which I had to deal, they provided me with much welcome supplementary information. They also helped to explain the actions of the English government by showing what the English ministers knew of the intentions of the foreign governments.

(c) THE CHATHAM MSS. The whole correspondence of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, and of William Pitt, his son, was collected by the executors of John Pitt, the second Earl of Chatham, and deposited, if I am rightly informed, in the Public Record Office. It is sometimes called the *Pringle Collection*, after one of the executors, Lieutenant-General Pringle, the husband of Chatham's granddaughter. Those of Chatham's papers which seemed to be of most historical importance were separated from the rest, and were published in the thirties under the title *Correspondence of William Pitt, Earl of Chatham*. These and all the rest, composing several hundred packets, of which about a hundred belong to the elder Pitt, are still in the Public Record Office. All the letters except those published, which have been kept separate, are arranged alphabetically under the names of the correspondents and entered in a printed index, so that consultation is rendered remarkably easy, in spite of the enormous quantity of material. Besides letters there are numbers of other documents—rough drafts, memoranda, anonymous communications, state papers of all kinds, accounts, etc.—which are arranged in separate packets according to their contents and character. Amongst these I found much important material, both for the history of Pitt's private life and for that of public events.

This enormous collection, which one would imagine to be sufficient to throw light upon all the dark points in Chatham's life, has, unfortunately, two defects which materially detract from its value, and in consequence of which much still remains unexplained. In the first place, almost all the letters belonging to the period before 1754, and thus covering by far the larger part of his life, have been lost, so that for this whole period we are dependent entirely upon other sources of information; in the second place, the collection contains a comparatively small number of Pitt's own letters,—he was either not in the general habit of writing rough drafts, or did not preserve them. Hence the student of these documents is sometimes obliged rather to divine Pitt's actions, opinions, and intentions from the utterances of others than to learn them directly; still there is much which can

be established with tolerable certainty. Fortunately the letters received by Lady Chatham, both before and after her marriage, are contained in the collection, and a large number of them are, naturally, from her husband. This made it possible to establish all the facts connected with Pitt's marriage, and to learn many details of his family life; but almost nothing regarding political matters is to be gleaned from these letters, since Lady Chatham, although keenly alive to all that concerned her husband's reputation, neither understood nor wished to understand anything of politics. The most valuable documents, including the greater number of Pitt's own letters, are to be found in the printed *Chatham Correspondence*; the mass of remaining matter would have been of little use to me if the packets containing the business and other documents, to the importance of which I have already referred, had not formed part of it. But the printed correspondence, too, offers us in the first of its four volumes only very little, and little of importance, belonging to the period before 1754; and its last volume contains much that is of comparatively little importance.

The *Chatham MSS.*, as I have throughout my work entitled the collection, are now easily accessible. I have to thank Mr. Hubert Hall for obtaining permission for me to consult them.

(d) THE NEWCASTLE PAPERS. The extensive correspondence carried on by Thomas Holles, Duke of Newcastle, during the course of his long political life, is preserved in hundreds of folio volumes, in the library of the British Museum, and is placed at the disposal of readers there. It is remarkably complete. We have not only all the original letters addressed to the duke, but also first drafts and fair copies of his own letters, so that the collection provides us with a trustworthy record of his whole career, public and private. On account of the relations, sometimes friendly, sometimes hostile, which existed between him and William Pitt for so many years, and of the important part which Newcastle himself played during almost the whole of the period covered by the letters, this correspondence was necessarily a most valuable source of information to me. But in this case, too, a critical attitude was demanded; it was always necessary to ask how great or how slight the probability was that the duke, in the position which he occupied in the government and towards Pitt, should know the truth, and how great or how slight, in consideration of his own interests, that he should tell it. It was necessary to keep in view his assiduous endeavour to represent his own actions to the best advantage, and to conceal his most private and not always very honourable ideas. In as far as they concern positive facts,

deeds, and events, his statements may be relied upon, for concerning these he was most skilful in obtaining accurate information ; and his communications regarding the affairs of his party, that of the old Whigs, are also absolutely trustworthy ; but he was, in spite of his high position, by no means always well informed regarding the policy of those of his colleagues who were in charge of foreign affairs—Carteret, Harrington, Cumberland and Fox, Pitt, Bute—consequently caution must be exercised in gathering information on this point from the *Newcastle Papers*. The same mistrust which the men in question showed of the duke must be shown by us in regard to what we read of them in his correspondence.

(c) COLLECTIONS OF PRINTED DOCUMENTS. Reports upon the collections of historically valuable manuscripts in existence throughout the British Islands are published at regular intervals by the *Historical Manuscripts Commission* ; and to each of these is attached a lengthy appendix consisting of complete documents, extracts, and registers of contents. These *Reports of the Hist. MSS. Comm.* with their *Appendices* have already grown into a stately series of folio volumes, and constitute a rich mine of information regarding events and personages in English history, the more valuable because research is facilitated by excellent indexes. The historian also learns from them where further supplies of material serviceable for his work are to be found, although it is often difficult, and sometimes impossible, to obtain permission to use this material. Report No. 13 was of special value to me. It contains the *Fortescue or Dropmore MSS.*, a collection originally belonging to Lord Grenville of Dropmore, whose wife was Ann, daughter of young Thomas Pitt, first Lord Camelford. She was the last of the Boconnock branch of the family, as her brother, who predeceased her, died childless. These MSS., as we saw in the early chapters of the first volume, contain a quantity of information concerning the lives of Thomas and Robert Pitt, the early years of our William Pitt, and the Pitt family in general.

The other printed original records which have been of most service to me are : 1. *The Letters of Horace Walpole*, which form a supplement to his *Memoirs* and give many useful pieces of information. 2. *The Letters of Lord Chesterfield*, which are the utterances of a keen observer, but one who generally observed from a distance, and on which, consequently, too high a value must not be placed. 3. *The Grenville Papers*, a work of very special importance to me, since it contains the records of the Grenville family, with which Pitt was most intimately connected throughout his life. From these papers we glean information concerning

an earlier period of Pitt's youth than the Chatham MSS. cover. This gives them special value. And they also contain trustworthy information regarding the political faction headed by Lord Temple and George Grenville. In fact, without them it would be impossible to form a correct idea of the proceedings of that young patriot-party which had such an influence on Pitt's life, and of the changing relations of the three divisions into which it broke up.

4. *The Correspondence of the Duke of Bedford* is another collection of documents which are indispensable to a biographer of Chatham. From it we learn not only the aims and doings of the Bedford faction, into contact with which Pitt so constantly came, but, from the reports sent regularly to the duke during his absences, interesting facts of many different kinds. Those relating to Pitt, though not to be accepted without careful examination, often throw light upon his attitude and actions. 5. *The Correspondence of Lord North with George III.* is of use only for the last years of Chatham's life; and its value to his biographer is insignificant compared with that of the books previously mentioned. 6. *The Mitchell Papers*, a publication which contains the correspondence of the ambassador who represented England for so many years at the court of Prussia, did not provide me with much material, as its important contents could be derived directly from the public records; and Mitchell was too constantly absent from England to be an authority on the subject of home politics. 7. *Die Politische Korrespondenz Friedrichs des Grossen* has been of great value to me in my researches into the relations between England and Prussia in Chatham's day. (Here also I have to record my indebtedness to excellent indexes.) But, as the reports of the ambassadors are given only occasionally and fragmentarily, the work did not provide me with all the information necessary.

(f) BIOGRAPHIES. It is a prevalent custom in England to construct biographies of eminent personages in the following manner. Quantities of letters and extracts from letters or other documents are welded, with the assistance of a certain amount of connecting literary matter, into a continuous narrative, frequently with very insufficient observance of the chronological order of events. We have made acquaintance with a work of this species in Thackeray's *History of the Earl of Chatham*. It is a hybrid species, the cultivation of which is of no benefit to science; for as a collection of documents such a work is very incomplete, the selection, as a rule, being made in a somewhat arbitrary and uncritical manner, whilst as a biography it has also serious defects: the bearing of one thing upon another is not sufficiently inquired into, the signifi-

cance of the documents is not made sufficiently apparent, and there is a disproportion in the treatment of the different periods of the life, produced by undue regard to the quantity of material on hand. Nevertheless we must be grateful that in this manner many otherwise inaccessible sources of information are to a certain extent thrown open to us. To make a proper, methodical use of these, and to supply the deficiencies from other sources, is the task of the historian. Biographies of the kind described are: 1. *Phillimore's Life of Lord Lyttelton*, which gives us some very valuable information concerning those early years during which there was a very close intimacy between Pitt and Lyttelton, and also a certain amount of later information. 2. *Harris's Life of the Earl of Hardwicke*, which possesses in remarkably full measure all the faults just denounced. It connects its documents without an attempt to criticise them; but, thanks to the eminence of the statesman whose career is thus recorded, the documents themselves are often very valuable. Many of them are also to be found amongst the Newcastle Papers, as Hardwicke carried on a constant correspondence with the duke. 3. *Albemarle's Life of the Marquis of Rockingham*, from which the best supply of information relative to the doings of the party of the old Whigs from about the year 1761 onwards is to be gathered. Here, too, we come upon many documents which are also among the Newcastle Papers. Rockingham was, in a manner, the successor of the old duke. 4. *Fitzmaurice's Life of the Earl of Shelburne* begins for us about the year 1762, and provides important material relating to the time when Shelburne and Chatham were closely connected, that is to say, to the period of the latter's third ministry. Certain subjects are treated with fatiguing minuteness, and much space is consequently wasted. A book which is more of the true biography, without any excessive preponderance of documentary matter, is 5. *Ballantyne's Life of Lord Carteret*, which must, however, as a source of information, be approached with caution.

(g) DIARIES AND MEMOIRS. For the history of Governor Thomas Pitt the *Diary of William Hedges* is of the greatest value. The third volume of the book which bears this name consists chiefly of 'documentary contributions to a biography' of the said Thomas Pitt, collected by one of the editors, Colonel Henry Yule, and there are memoranda concerning him here and there throughout the diary in the first volume. *The Diaries of Bubb Dodington* and of *Richard Glover* give much information on the subject of party politics and political intrigue. But of supreme importance are the *Memoirs of Horace Walpole*, afterwards Lord Orford, which cover

the last years of the reign of George II. and the earlier part of that of George III.—1745 to 1772. An astonishing amount of historical material is collected in this work. Home and foreign politics, historical events and court gossip, the proceedings of Parliament, family news, the intrigues of the day—everything is to be found in it, often narrated at great length. And the trustworthiness of the writer is very remarkable. No more in his case than in any other can every statement be unquestioningly accepted; it is always necessary to ask how well informed he was likely to be regarding the matter in hand; but it is always his intention to be truthful, so that we may safely rely upon what he tells of affairs of which he had personal knowledge. I have frequently tested his statements by comparing them with what we know from other sources to be correct, and have almost invariably found them confirmed. He undoubtedly retails a great deal of unimportant gossip, which is not always to be believed. Specially deserving of commendation is the impartiality which Walpole displayed in that age of party spirit. We may search his pages long without finding either consciously unjust verdicts or extravagant exaggerations. His Memoirs are, naturally, a very defective source of information regarding matters with which he was not concerned—foreign events in particular; but his records of parliamentary proceedings are invaluable. Regarding these he was always thoroughly well informed; and as publication of the debates was, at that time, prohibited, it happens that we are often indebted to him alone for what we know regarding them. He gives us not only the matter of the speeches, but descriptions of the important debates, enlivened by anecdotes which often materially assist our comprehension of the political situation. The Memoirs are weaker in their dates than in anything else. Dates are, indeed, frequently inserted; but as these often do not agree with each other, it is necessary to test them by reference to other authorities; and they are sometimes altogether wanting at very important parts—a defect which is the more apt to lead to chronological confusion because the narrative takes sudden leaps, backwards as well as forwards. I had, however, in the Ambassadors' Reports an excellent chronological framework within which the narratives of the Memoirs could be arranged.

Two works remain to be added to this list: *The Memoirs of Earl Waldegrave*, which afford assistance during only a short period, and which I consulted chiefly for the events occurring at the court of George, the heir-apparent; and *The Memoirs of the Duke of Grafton*, an important source of information regarding the period after the great war. Inserted in the latter, which, written

as they are from memory, are not always entirely trustworthy, and demand verification, are numerous letters, including some from Chatham; and these are, naturally, of greater value as first-hand evidence.

(h) The PROCEEDINGS OF PARLIAMENT, up to the year 1803, are recounted in the *Parliamentary History* of William Cobbett, a work which is compiled from earlier records, and which has its continuation in Debrett's *Parliamentary Debates*. It was not necessary for me to refer very frequently to Cobbett, as Thackeray gives a most complete account of Chatham's parliamentary activity, and reprints his speeches at full length.

(i) The HISTORICAL WORKS of most assistance to me were: Lord Mahon, *History of England*, during the period between 1713 and 1783; W. E. H. Lecky, *A History of England in the Eighteenth Century*, more important as a record of the progress of civilisation than of political events; M. Brosch, *Geschichte Englands*, too much epitomised for my purpose; Coxe's three large works: *Sir Robert Walpole*, *Horace Walpole*, and *The Pelham Administration*, all rich stores of historical information; Adolphus, *History of England under George III.*, of which I have used the first two volumes.

II

DOCUMENTS¹

1. MR. PITT'S LETTER ON SUPERSTITION. Addressed to the People of England. Printed in the year 1783, in the *London Journal*.

GENTLEMEN,—Whoever takes a view of the world, will find that what the greatest part of mankind have agreed to call religion has been only some outward exercise, esteemed sufficient to work a reconciliation with God. It has moved them to build temples, slay victims, offer up sacrifices, to fast and feast, to petition and thank, to laugh and cry, to sing and sigh by turns; but it has not yet been found sufficient to induce them to break off an amour, to make restitution of ill-gotten wealth, or to bring the passions and appetites under a reasonable subjection. Differ as much as they may in opinion concerning what they ought to believe, or after what manner they are to serve God, as they call it, yet they all agree in gratifying their appetites. The same passions reign eternally in all countries and in all ages: Jew and Mahometan, the Christian and the Pagan, the Tartar and the Indian, all kinds of men, who differ in almost every thing else, universally agree with regard to their passions: if there be any difference among them it is this, that the more superstitious they are, always the more vicious; and the more they believe, the less they practise. This is a melancholy consideration to a good mind; it is a most terrible truth; and certainly, above all things, worth our while to inquire into. We

¹ My work is not intended to be a collection of documents, consequently I can give only a few specimens of the vast number of those which I have consulted. I have selected not only documents of peculiar interest to the student of history, but also some which may interest general readers. A few of my specimens are already in print, but as even these are not easily accessible, I considered it advisable to include them.

will, therefore, probe the wound and search it to the bottom; we will lay the axe to the root of the tree, and shew you the true reason why men go on in sinning and repenting, repenting and sinning again, through the whole course of their lives: and the reason is, because they have been taught, most wickedly taught, that religion and virtue are two things absolutely distinct; that the deficiency of the one might be supplied by the sufficiency of the other; and that what you want in virtue you must make up in religion. But this religion, so dishonourable to God and so pernicious to men, is worse than atheism; for atheism, though it takes away one great motive to support virtue in distress, yet it furnishes no man with arguments to be vicious; but superstition, or what the world means by religion, is the greatest possible encouragement to vice, by setting up something as religion, which shall atone and commute for the want of virtue. This is establishing iniquity by a law, the highest law; by authority, the highest authority; that of God himself. We complain of the vices of the world, and of the wickedness of men, without searching into the true cause. It is not because they are wicked by nature, for that is both false and impious; but because, to serve the purposes of their pretended soul-savers, they have been carefully taught that they are wicked by nature and cannot help continuing so. It would have been impossible for men to have been both religious and vicious, had religion been made to consist wherein alone it does consist, and had they been always taught, that true religion is the practice of virtue in obedience to the will of God, who presides over all things, and will finally make it every man's happiness to do his duty.

This single opinion in religion, that things are so well made by the Deity that virtue is its own reward, and that happiness will ever arise from acting according to the reason of things, or that God, ever wise and good, will provide some extraordinary happiness for those who suffer for virtue's sake, is enough to support a man under all difficulties, to keep him steady to his duty, and to enable him to stand as firm as a rock amidst all the charms of pleasure, profit, and honour. But this religion of reason, which all men are capable of, has been neglected and condemned, and another set up, the natural consequences of which have puzzled men's understandings and debauched their morals more than all the lewd poets and atheistical philosophers that ever infested the world; for, instead of being taught that religion consists in action, or obedience to the eternal moral law of God, we have been most gravely and venerably told that it consists in the belief of certain opinions which we could form no ideas of,

or which were contrary to the clear perceptions of our minds, or which had no tendency to make us either wiser or better, or, which is much worse, had a manifest tendency to make us wicked and immoral. And this belief, this impious belief, arising from imposition on one side, and from want of examination on the other, has been called by the sacred name of religion; whereas religion consists in knowledge and obedience.—We know there is a God, and we know his will, which is, that we should do all the good we can; and we are assured, from his perfections, that we shall find our own good in so doing. And what would we have more? Are we, after so much inquiry, and in an age full of liberty, children still? And cannot we be quiet, unless we have holy romances, sacred fables, and traditionary tales, to amuse us in an idle hour, and give rest to our souls, when our follies and vices will not suffer us to rest?

You have been taught, indeed, that right belief, or orthodoxy, will, like charity, cover a multitude of sins; but be not deceived; belief of, or mere assent to, the truth of propositions upon evidence is not a virtue, nor unbelief a vice: faith is not a voluntary act; it does not depend upon the will: every man must believe, or disbelieve, or doubt, whether he will or not, according as evidence appears to him: so that he who believes right is never the better, nor is he who believes wrong ever the worse. Faith, then, being absolutely involuntary, can never become a duty. Divine faith is justly called the gift of God, as being above all human abilities. If, therefore, men, however dignified or distinguished, command us to believe, they are guilty of the highest folly and absurdity, because it is out of our power; but, if they command us to believe, and annex rewards to belief and severe penalties to unbelief, then are they most wicked and immoral, because they annex rewards and punishments to what is involuntary, and therefore neither rewardable nor punishable. It appears, then, very plainly unreasonable and unjust to command us to believe any doctrine, good or bad, wise or unwise; but when men command us to believe opinions which have not only no tendency to promote virtue, but which are allowed to commute or atone for the want of it, then are they arrived at the utmost reach of impiety; then is their iniquity full; then have they finished the misery, and completed the destruction, of poor mortal men. By betraying the interest of virtue, they have undermined and sapped the foundation of all human happiness; and how treacherously and dreadfully have they betrayed it! A gift well applied—the chattering of some unintelligible sounds called creeds—an unfeigned assent and consent to whatever the Church enjoins—

religious worships and consecrated feasts—repenting on a death-bed—pardons rightly sued out and absolutions authoritatively given—have done more toward making and continuing men vicious than all their natural passions and infidelity put together; for infidelity can only take away the supernatural rewards of virtue; but these superstitious opinions and practices have not only turned the scene, and made men lose sight of the natural rewards of it, but have induced them to think that, were there no hereafter, vice would be preferable to virtue, and that they still increase in happiness as they increase in wickedness: and this they have been taught in several religious discourses and sermons, delivered by men whose orthodoxy was never doubted; particularly by a late reverend prelate—I mean Bishop Atterbury—in his sermon on these words—‘If in this life only be hope, then are we, of all men, most miserable’; where vice and faith ride most lovingly and triumphantly together. But these church-doctrines, of the natural excellency of vice, the efficacy of a right belief, the dignity of atonements and propitiations, have, besides depriving us of the native beauty and charms of honesty, and thus cruelly stabbing virtue to the heart, raised and diffused among men a certain unnatural passion, which we shall call religious hatred; a hatred constant, deep-rooted, and immortal. All other passions rise and fall, die and revive again; but this of religious and pious hatred rises and grows every day stronger upon the mind as we grow more religious; because we hate for God’s sake, for our soul’s sake, and for the sake of those poor souls, too, who have the misfortune not to believe as we do. And can we, in so good a cause, hate too much? The more thoroughly we hate, the better we are; and the more mischief we do the bodies and estates of those infidels and heretics, the more do we shew our love to God. This is *religious zeal*, and this has been called divinity, but remember that the only true divinity is HUMANITY.

2. THE DUCHESS OF QUEENSBERRY TO PITT. Ambresbury,
March 11, 1741. Chatham MSS.

SIR,—I am extremely sorry to find you are so good a casuist; ’tis a talent I mortally detest—when it makes against me—but I think you quite mistook me, or what’s more probable, I must have misexplained myself, for I know I meant to put you in mind that you had promised, because I was well assured of your being

a sort of man incapable to take the liberty with yourself to break your word ; and I am still so much of that opinion that I am now fully convinced that you never did promise or intend to meet the Prince here ; and that I ought to beg pardon for a very false assertion, which I accordingly do. But to reward such contrition, I do think Mr. Pitt should come at some other time, and that because he may be morally sure to be wellcome ; but much may be said on both sides and so the less the better ; nothing against his certain welcome, but much against proposing an unpleasant party to him, for undoubtedly he cannot come to a more melancholy place at present ; every thing looks exceeding brown and the kindest thing I can say of the Plantation as I pass, is to remember—that *was a Holly* and so on, for nothing is there now. The Duke bears it like a man, contemplates on his loss and on the best ways to retrieve it. I too act extreamly in character, for I am not certain whether I am most angry or sorry for being disappointed. I pout extreamly and have not got to the top of the hill yet. This man and this woman I find agree extreamly in their very sincere regard for Mr. Pitt, for it has not yet been a matter of dispute the which of them has the greatest regard for him when ever it is. I fancy the Duke will not give it up, and I am very sure I will not, for I am with great truth his

Most faithfull Humble Servant, Qu.

3. A SATIRICAL POEM ON PITT, OF THE YEAR 1746. 'The Unembarrassed Countenance.' Printed in London for Henry Carpenter of Fleet Street. Library of the British Museum.

I

To a certain old Chapel well known in the Town,
The Inside quite rotten, the Outside near down,
A Fellow got in who cou'd talk and cou'd prate,
I'll tell you his Story, and sing you his Fate.

Derry down, etc.

II

At first he seem'd modest and wondrous wise,
He flatter'd all others in order to rise :
Till out of Compassion he got a small Place,
Then full on his Master he turned his A . . . se.

Derry down, etc.

III

He bellow'd and roar'd at the Troops of *Hanover*,
 And swore they were Rascals who ever went over :
 That no Man was honest who gave them a Vote,
 And all that were for them should hang by the Throat.
Derry down, etc.

IV

He always affected to make the House ring
 'Gainst *Hanover* Troops and a *Hanover* K . . . g :
 He applauded the way to keep Englishmen free,
 By digging *Hanover* quite into the Sea.
Derry down, etc.

V

By flaming so loudly he got him a Name,
 Tho' many believ'd it wou'd cost him a Shame :
 But Nature had given him, ne'er to be harass'd
 An unfeeling Heart, and a Front unembarrass'd.
Derry down, etc.

VI

When from an old Woman, by standing his Ground,
 He had got the Possession of ten thousand Pound,
 He said that he car'd not what others might call him,
 He would shew himself now the true Son of Sir *Balaam*.¹
Derry down, etc.

VII

Poor *Harry* whom er'st he had dirtily spatter'd,
 He now crouch'd and cring'd to, commended and flatter'd ;
 Since honest Men here were asham'd of his Face,
 That in *Ireland* at least he might get him a Place.
Derry down, etc.

VIII

But *Harry* resentful first bid him be hush,
 Then proclaim it aloud that he never cou'd blush ;
 Recant his Invectives, and then in a trice
 He wou'd shew the best Title to an *Irish* Vice.
Derry down, etc.

¹ See Pope, vol. ii. epistle 3, ver. 361, etc.

IX

Young *Balaam* ne'er boggled but turn'd his Coat,
 Determin'd to share in whate'er cou'd be got:
 Said I scorn all those who cry impudent Fellow,
 As my Front is of Brass, I'll be painted in Yellow.¹
Derry down, etc.

X

Since Yellow's the Colour that best suits his Face,
 And *Balaam* aspires at an eminent Place,
 May he soon at *Cheapside* stand fix'd by the Legs,
 His Front well adorn'd all daub'd o'er with Eggs.
Derry down, etc.

XI

Whilst *Balaam* was poor he was full of Renown,
 But now that he's rich he's the Jest of the Town;
 Then let all Men learn by his foul Disgrace
 That Honesty's better by far than a Place.
Derry down, etc.

4. LETTERS FROM PITT TO HIS SISTER ANN. Drafts in the
 Chatham MSS.

(a) June 19, 1751. *Wednesday morning.*

DEAR SISTER!—As you had been so good to tell me in your note of Monday that you would write to me again soon *in a manner capable, you hoped, of effacing every impression of any thing painful that may have passed from me to you*, I did not expect such a letter as I found late last night, and which I have now before me to answer: without any compliment to you, I find myself in point of writing unequal enough to the task; nor have I the least desire to sharpen my pen. I have well weighed your letter, and deeply examined your picture of me, for some years past; and indeed, Sister, I still find something within, that firmly assures me I am not that thing which your interpretations of my life (if I can ever be brought to think them all your own) would represent me to be. I have infirmities of temper, blemishes, and faults, if you please,

¹ A list of the names of those who voted for the Hanover troops two years ago was printed in yellow characters.

of nature, without end ; but the Eye that can't be deceived must judge between us, whether that friendship, which was my very existence for so many years, could ever have received the least flaw, but from umbrages and causes which the quickest sensibility and tenderest jealousy of friendship alone, at first, suggested. It is needless to mark the unhappy epoque, so fatal to a harmony between sister and brother unexampled almost all that time, the loss of which has embitter'd much of my life and will always be an affliction to me. But I will avoid running into vain retrospects and unseasonable effusions of heart, in order to hasten to some particular points of your letter, upon which it is necessary for me to trouble you with a few words. *Absolute* deference and *blind submission to my will*, you tell me I have often declared to you in the strongest and most mortifying terms cou'd alone satisfy me. I must here beseech you coolly to reconsider these precise terms, with their epithets ; and I will venture to make the appeal to the sacred testimony of your breast, whether there be not exaggeration in them. I have often, too often reproached you, and from warmth of temper, in strong and plain terms, that I found no longer the same consent of minds and agreement of sentiments : and I have certainly declared to you that I could not be satisfy'd with you, and I could no longer find in you *any degree of deference towards me*. I was never so drunk with presumption as to expect *absolute* deference and *blind submission to my will*. A degree of deference to me and to my situation, I frankly own, I did not think too much for me to expect from you, with all the high opinion I really have of your parts. What I expected was too much (as perhaps might be). In our former days friendship had led me into the error. That error is at an end, and you may rest assured, that I can never be so unreasonable as to expect from you, now, anything like deference to me or my opinions. I come next to the small pecuniary assistance which you accepted from me, and which was exactly as you state it, two hundred pounds a year. I declare, upon my honour, I never gave the least foundation for those exagérations which you say have been spread concerning it. I also declare as solemnly, before God and man, that no consideration cou'd ever have extorted from my lips the least mention of the trifling assistance you accepted from me, but the cruel reports, industriously propagated, and circulating from various quarters round to me, of the state you was left to live in. As to the repayment of this wretched money, allow me, dear Sister, to entreat you to think no more of it. The bare thought of it may surely suffice for your own dignity and for my humiliation, without taxing your present income, merely to mortify me : the demonstration

of a blow is, in honour, a blow, and let me conjure you to rest it here. When I want and you abound, I promise you to afford you a better and abler triumph over me, by asking the assistance of your purse. I will now trouble you no farther than to repeat my sincere wishes for your welfare and to rejoice that you have so ample matter for the best of happiness, *springing from a heart and mind* (to use your own words) entirely devoted to gratitude and duty.

(b) June 20, 1751. *Pay Office.*

'DEAR SISTER!—I am this moment returned out of the Country and find another letter from you. I am extremely sorry that any expressions in mine to you should make you think it necessary to trouble yourself to write again, that you might convey upon paper to me, what you would avoid saying in conversation, as disagreeable and painful. I believe I may venture to refer you to the whole tenor of my letter to convince yourself that I had no desire to irritate; and I assure you very sincerely that the expression, which seems to have had some of that effect, did not in the least flow from a thought that you was capable of intending to represent falsely. I only took the liberty to put it to your candid recollection, whether the very cause you mention, *strong feelings* and emotions of mind attending them, with regard to conversations of a disagreeable kind, might not have led to some exaggerations of them to your own self. I verily believe this cause, and this alone may have had some of this effect: for sure I am, that I never could wish, much less exact that the object of my whole heart and of my highest opinion and confidence, thro the best part of my days, could be capable of such vileness as *absolute* deference and *blind submission to my will*. All I wished and what I but late quite despaired of, I took the liberty to recall to you in my last letter. As to the late conversation you have thought necessary (since your letter of yesterday) to recollect, I am ready to take shame before you, and all mankind, if you please, for having lost my temper, upon any provocation, so far as to use expressions, as foolish as they are angry: that you *had a bad head* will easily pass for the first: and a worse heart for the last. This you made me angry enough to say: but this I never was, nor I hope shall be, angry enough to think: and this, Sister, I am sure you know. As to the other word, which I am sorry I used because it offended you, I will again beg to appeal to your recollection, whether it was not apply'd to your forbidding *me ever to talk to you of every thing that interested you*: and as to *shaping your life in some degree to mine*, which I believe were my very words, let me ask

you, if you don't know that they were said in answer to your telling me that *I had in several conversations directly explained to you that to satisfy me you must live with me as my slave?* So much, dear Sister, for the several points of your letter; which I am sorry to find it necessary to say so many words upon. I will be with you by nine to-morrow, as that hour seems most convenient to you: is it impossible I may still find you so obliging as not to think any more of repaying what I certainly never lent you, in any other sense than that of giving me a right to your purse, whenever I should want it, and which you must forego some convenience to repay?

5. PITT TO HIS FIANCÉE, HESTER GRENVILLE. Undated, but all written in October 1754. Chatham MSS.

(a) Mr. Pitt presents his most humble compliments to Lady Hester Grenville: his ill star still overrules: Lady Brook is engaged and Miss Hamilton not able to leave Lady Archibald who goes to day to lie at Chiswick for some nights. He most humbly recommends himself to Lady Hester's pardon for all the trouble he gives her, and to her pity for his extreme disappointment. He shall never dare name South Lodge to her Ladyship again: but if she would be so good to make her own party and name some day, the stars wou'd be kept in better order.

(b) *Thursday morning.*

I trust that my dearest Lady Hester is above being inquired after. I had talked too much of business and infinitely too little to my Love. A ride has repaired me pretty well and I am dressing for the day; which I will hate every hour of till 3. Adieu.

(c) I am still not quite well. The worst of my little disorder is that I cannot banquet, for such your delicious chicken is, in Argyle Street. Doctor Wilmot thinks the attack bilious, apprehends little from it, has ordered me an emetick. Will my kindest Lady Hester visit my sister this Evening and early? 'twill be charity as well as love.

(d) The sight of my loved Lady Hester gave me a much better night than I might have expected. I am going to ride, and hope to tell the sweet and only comfort of my life, that I am better for it when I see her. I propose to have that delight, about 3 o'clock.

(e) Shall I have the joy of hearing that my sweet love is better, that she is quite well, of all, but an excuse against Hodyheassen (?)

I am not worse : I must do a great deal this morning, see Legge, go to Newcastle House, and make reparation to poor Sir George. Riding shall not be forgot, if it does not rain. This will find you in your Roxana's Tent. Had you been there, the master of the world had never left it.

(f) I fear this note, late as it is for my anxious Impatience, may be too early in my loved Lady Hester's apartment. What joy will it be to hear she has slept well, and that she has waked free from every complaint : if so, may I tell myself that she does not disapprove my *complaint* that Friday is so long in moving out of the way of the Sweet Day that follows it.

(g) How shall I pass so long a morning without seeing the adored, tender object my eyes saw escape from them into her loved Indian room last night. It was, at that moment, hardly loved by me. I long for a sweet reconciliation with it, with an impatience you alone can mate and I feel. I am better this morning. What shall I be when I see my lovely loved Lady Hester? hear the sweet language that her tender heart graces her lips with, and snatch the still sweeter and inexpressible bliss that for ever inhabits there? I hope to have measured that immense space from Whitehall to Argyle Buildings by two o'clock.

(h) May this note find my loved Lady Hester without the smallest remains of pain in her shoulder! Did not we tire her last night, her Brothers and her yet more troublesome Inmate? I hope, as much as I talked to them, to find voice enough to tell my adored Life, by and by, that every day and hour adds to my tenderest and most happy sentiments. I am as well as rhubarb will let me be, and hope to be better to-morrow for it.

(i) Mr. Pitt hopes Lady Hester Grenville will pardon his disobedience in begging leave to assure her Ladyship, under his hand, how infinitely he is obliged to her for the honour of her inquiries. He is, upon the whole, not better, as he thinks himself, tho' he is now and then told that he mends a little. He hopes Lady Hester is in perfect health.

(k) . . . he continues far from well and hopes to get to Sun-bridge by the first of June. Saturday. Wickham.

(l) . . . and let me think I am not so far from your thoughts, as the Pay Office from Argyle Street.

(m) I am going to ride and hope to return better, if the man so happy to talk to you of his health as a subject interesting to

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you, can be truly said not to be quite well. I am not quite well is the truth, which you ordered me to write: but I, as truly, hope and trust, that my disorder is transient and that perhaps, in consequence, I may be the better for it. I long for two o'clock with an impatience too happy to belong to illness. A dinner with my loveliest Lady Hester, and her sweet society the rest of the day will give me health by giving every other comfort and felicity.

6. LETTER FROM 'A FRIEND' TO PITT. February 7, 1757.
Chatham MSS.

[The King has promised] that the guilty should be punished. Mr. Bing's . . . sentence has been pronounced against him and 99 out of 100 are satisfied of the justice of it. You cannot wonder then, that after H. M.'s promise the Public should be extremely uneasy and dissatisfied that the sentence is not put in execution. The man that attempts to prevail on H. M. to forfeit his word and pardon Mr. Byng, must be no friend to H. M.—It is impossible H. M. can have any such near his Person—any one of the least degree of understanding must foresee the consequences. I really shudder at the thoughts of them.—A distrust already begins to shew itself amongst the merchants and other people of eminence in the City. And they declare publickly that should H. M. be prevailed on to pardon Mr. B. they will never give the least credit to any thing that shall hereafter come from the throne.—Nay some are for going so far—and I believe it is in agitation both amongst the merchants and Citizens (and I know the warm friends of the Government) in case a pardon takes place to address H. M. to revise his answer to the address of the City of London. It is impossible to express the dissatisfaction that prevails amongst all ranks.—You would be better judge, if you could go incognito into the City or would send somebody you can trust, to attend the principal coffee houses and public places and make their report to you.

Many things begin to be whispered (which I don't credit because I think they come from some designing man), one in particular—that Mr. Bing's whole conduct was concern'd merely to ruin the old ministry, and that he was assured of protection, that his family declared that you was to white-wash him, and that now you and your friends were come into power he should be pardoned—is known to many.

As a whisper spreads, it gets into a murmur, and from that breaks out in a clamour. Here are two sets of people that wish nothing more, than that the Admiral may be pardoned, and perhaps plead for it. The views of one in doing it is the supplanting of you and your friends, the other, of rendering H. M. odious. Their pens are ready, and no sooner shall the pardon be signed, than the most bitter invectives will appear in print.—But, for God's sake, does Mr. Bing deserve so well of his Country as to run the hazard of embroiling the nation on his account? Has he not in his appeal to the public declared he sought not mercy but Justice? Can anyone dispute the justice of his sentence, however the Members of the Court Martial may have embrangled it by their representations in his favour? . . .

. . . No man can pretend to say that Mr. Bing deserves so well of his Country, as to endanger the peace of it, for the sake of saving him—I hope there is no one so base to his Country as to attempt it. Let me conjure you, as you tender the welfare of your King and Country, to prevent his Maj. being prevailed on to forfeit his word to his People. . . .

7. DIPLOMATIC INTELLIGENCE FROM FRANCE OF THE YEAR 1757. Chatham MSS.

(a) *Memoire concernant les principales Operations, projetées par la Cour de France pour la prochaine Campagne.*

Les Projets de la Cour de France pour la Campagne prochaine se reduisent aux Articles suivans.

1. Il est certain, que la Cour de Vienne, qui se propose de faire les plus grands Efforts pour le recouvrement de la Silésie, continue d'insister, avec chaleur, sur la Prestation du Corps Auxiliaire, de 24,000 Hommes, stipulé par le Traité de Versailles; la Commission, dont est chargé le Comte d'Etrées, est principalement relative à l'Emploi et à la Marche de ce Corps, dont on voudrait, que l'Imperatrice Reine fit Usage, pour penetrer en Saxe et forcer l'Armée Prussienne à evacuer cet Electorat, et à se replier sur la Lusace, et les Marches de Brandenbourg.

2. Il est également décidé, que la France ne se bornera point à fournir le Contingent stipulé par le Traité de Versailles, mais qu'indépendamment de cette Demarche, Elle assemblera une Armée de 60,000 Combattans sur le Bas Rhin, pour entreprendre

une puissante Diversion contre le País d'Hanovre, et pour penetrer dans cet Electorat par le Duché de Cleves, et les autres Etats, que Sa Maj. Pruss. possède du Coté de la Westphalie.

Comme l'on prevoit, qu'il est essentiel, pour assurer la Retraite d'une pareille Armée, de s'emparer de la Ville de Wesel, l'on se prepare non seulement à en former le siège, à l'Ouverture de la prochaine Campagne; mais, comme l'on se flatte aussi, que les Cours d'Hanovre et de Berlin, qui ne paroissent avoir nulle connoissance de ce Projet, ne prendront aucunes Mesures pour en empêcher la Réussite, l'on est persuadé, qu'on aura bon Marché de cette Place, qu'on regarde comme la clé et le principal Boulevard de l'Electorat d'Hanovre. Le Ministere de France en est instruit, que cette Place se trouve pourvue d'une Artillerie considerable, qu'on evalue à plus de deux cent Pièces de Canons, ainsi que d'un très grand Nombre de toutes Sortes de Munitions de Guerre, espère en outre d'en tirer tous les secours, dont on aura Besoin pour attaquer l'Electorat d'Hanovre et pour assieger les Places, qui servent à sa Defense. On est, donc, déterminé à se presenter sur les Frontieres du Duché de Cleves, au commencement du Mois de Mars; et comme l'on espere de n'éprouver aucune Resistance dans les Operations de cette Entreprise, on compte de se rendre Maître de Wesel vers la Fin d'Avril, de penetrer, immédiatement après, dans l'Electorat d'Hanovre, et de laisser un Corps de Troupes en Garnison dans cette Place, pour tenir de Landgrave de Hesse Cassel en Respect, et assurer la Retraite de l'Armée.

Les Avantages, que le Ministere de France se promet d'une pareille Diversion, sont en grand Nombre; et consistent, *en premier Lieu*, en ce qu'il espere non seulement de trouver à *Stade* des Sommes très considerables, qui, jointes aux Contributions enormes, qu'on se propose de lever dans cet Electorat, mettront S. Maj. très Chrét. en Etat de pouvoir faire Face amplement à tous les Fraix de la présente Guerre, et la dedommageront, en même Tems, de ceux que lui a déjà occasionnés la Levée de Bouclier, à laquelle la Grande Bretagne l'a forcée dans le Cours de l'Année passée.

Aussi est on déterminé en France à ne garder nuls Menagemens à l'Egard des Contributions, qu'on levera dans cet Electorat, et à les percevoir avec la plus grande Rigueur. Je sai même, que les Auteurs de ce Projet ont soutenu ouvertement dans le Conseil, qu'il falloit en agir avec cet Electorat, avec la même Severité, avec laquelle Louis xiv. avait traité le Palatinat, afin de convaincre, à jamais, le Corps Germanique, qu'on n'offensoit pas impunément la France, et de lui faire sentir tout le Poids de sa puissance. A

qui d'autres ont ajouté encore, que c'étoit-là le vrai moment de se venger, d'une Façon exemplaire, de toutes les Vexations, que la Grande Bretagne avait exercés sur Mer envers les Sujets de la France, au Commencement de la presente Guerre. Enfin que c'étoit une Reparation, qu'exigeoit la Dignité de S. M. tr. chr., et qu'Elle devait à ses Sujets, pour les venger, et les indemniser de l'Oppression, qu'ils avaient éprouvée.

En second Lieu, on se flatte, qu'une pareille Diversion découragera entierement le Landgrave de Hesse Cassel, et les autres Alliés, que la Grande Bretagne peut avoir dans l'Empire; et les forcera, sinon à se jeter dans les Bras de la France, au moins à se reduire à la Neutralité la plus stricte et la plus scrupuleuse.

En troisième Lieu, on est persuadé, que la Perte d'Hanovre encouragera tous les Alliés cachés, que la France peut avoir dans l'Empire, à lever le Masque, et à éclater, ouvertement, et sans contrainte, tant contre le Roy d'Angleterre, que contre S. M. Pruss. Il m'est revenu de fort bon lieu, qu'indépendamment des Princes de l'Empire, dont je viens de faire Mention, on fonde des grandes Esperances sur la Suède; et que l'on croit savoir, qu'Elle ne manquerait pas, en pareil cas, de revendiquer les Duchés de Bremen et de Verden; et de joindre, pour cet Effet, à l'Armée française, les troupes qu'Elle a actuellement dans le Duché de Pomeranie; après quoi Elle dirigeroit ses Forces contre S. Maj. Pruss.

En quatrième Lieu, on est convaincu en France, que, si cette Operation se terminait heureusement, et d'une Maniere conforme aux Esperances, qu'on a conçues à cet égard, le Parti, que la Maison d'Hanovre peut avoir dans l'Empire, se dissoudrait totalement; et qu'un Siècle entier ne suffirait pas pour rétablir Son credit et Sa consideration en Allemagne.

En cinquième Lieu, le Ministere de France a fait entrevoir à différentes Personnes, qu'il avoit Lieu de presumer, que la Réussite des Negotiations, qu'il avait entamées avec l'Electeur Palatin, et celui de Cologne, pour entraîner ces deux Princes dans son parti, dependroit uniquement du Succès de la Diversion susmentionnée.

(b) *Memoire sur la Force actuelle de la France par Terre et les Services auxquels elle est employée dans l'Année 1757.*

L'Armée Franç., au commencement des Troubles presents, ne consistoit qu'en 157,347 Hommes, non compris la Milice et les Invalides. Elle étoit composée de la maniere suivante :—

874 PITT, EARL OF CHATHAM

Infanterie Française,	98,330
Artillerie,	4,110
Infant. Etrangere,	25,589
Maison du Roy, Cavall.,	3,210
Cavall. Franç.,	14,520
„ Etrang.,	960
Dragons,	7,680
Hussars,	800
Troupes legeres,	2,158
	<hr/>
	153,757

Au Mois d'Août 1755, on fit une Augmentation de 4 Comp. de 45 Hommes chacune, dans chaque Bataillon du Regiment du Roy, et de 4 Comp. de 40 Hommes chacune, dans chaque Bataillon ordinaire de l'Infant. Franç.; ce qui faisait en tout 29,620 Hommes.

Environ le même Tems une augmentation se fit dans les Dragons, qui porta chaque Regiment à 4 Escadr. de 640 Hommes, montant en tout à 2560 Hommes.

Au Mois Decembre de la même Année 1755, une Augmentation se fit pareillement dans la Cavall., de 10 Hommes par Comp., en tout 5560 Hommes.

Les Volontaires Royaux et le Corps de Fischer furent aussi augmentés; nous ne savons pas au juste de combien; mais, selon nos Avis, cette Augmentation allait à 680 Hommes, ou environ.

Toutes ces différentes Augmentations montent à 38,420 Hommes; et par consequent l'Armée franç. (sans compter la Milice et les Invalides, que je mets au delà 67,000) est composée de 196,000 Hommes. Ils ont, à la verité, levé deux nouveaux Régiments dans le Pais de Liège; mais, malgré tout cela, leurs Troupes réglées sont au dessous de 200,000 Hommes.

Les Isles de *Minorque* et de *Corse*, avec les Colonies en Amerique, occupent au moins 25,000 Hommes; ils ont fait embarquer, au Printems, 3 à 4000 Hommes pour differents services aux deux Indes; l'Armée de M. le Maréchal d'Estrées, si les Regimens etoient complets, irait à 92,000 Hommes; celle du Mar. de Richelieu est de 32,665. Il faut aussi compter un Corps de 6 ou 7000 Hommes, qu'ils sont obligés de tenir en Garnison à Toulon, Marseilles, Cette, Antibes, etc., à portée de cette Partie de leur Cote.

Selon ce Calcul, donc, voilà 160,000 Hommes de Troupes réglées employées; il restera environ 40,000 Hommes pour toutes les Garnisons depuis *Sedan* jusqu'aux Frontieres de la

Suisse, de même que pour celles du *Roussillon* et de *Guienne*, sans parler de la *Flandre* et de la *Cote*.

Nous comptons environ 20,000 Hommes placés depuis St. Valery jusqu'à Bergue, de façon que nous avons tout Lieu de croire, qu'il ne peut pas y avoir 10,000 Hommes de plus, depuis St. Valery jusqu'à Bourdeaux.

C'est aux Experts à juger, si, avec une aussi grande Etendue de Cote et de Frontiere, avec tant de Places importantes à garder, il est probable, que la France risque un Corps de Troupes dans une Expedition aussi dangereuse, que celle d'invasion les Royaumes de S. M.; et cela dans un Temps, où Elle a tant de peine à trouver l'Argent nécessaire pour toutes les Entreprises, dans lesquelles Elle s'est embarquée en Allemagne, et quand Elle a un si petit Nombre de Vaisseaux de Guerre équipés dans ses Ports, pour escorter les Bâtimens de Transport.

Je conviens, qu'on peut suppléer, au Defaut de Troupes réglées, par des Milices dans plusieurs Places; mais la France ne confiera pas la Garde de *Toulon*, de *Brest*, de *Calais* et de *Dunkerque*, non plus que celle de *Nieuport* et d'*Ostende* à des Milices seules; de maniere qu'en se donnant la Peine de calculer ce que la France a déjà fait sortir du Royaume, l'on trouvera, que 267,000 Hommes (le Total de toute sa Force, Milices et Invalides compris) sont bientôt employés dans un Pais, qui envoie au dehors des Armées de 150,000 Hommes, et se trouve obligé de fournir les Garnisons, qui en exigent 70,000 Hommes.

Ils n'employeront pas, sans Doute, ni *Milices* ni *Invalides* pour invader l'Angleterre; mais à moins de cela, je ne vois pas, comment ils seraient en Etat de se passer d'un Corps assez considerable pour nous donner un Moment d'Inquietude outre toutes les Raisons alleguées ci-dessus, si même ils avoient un Corps prêt à agir (ce qui leur couteroit plus de deux Mois à fournir), ils n'oseroient jamais se risquer dans un Pais où le Blé est rare, et où un Delai de peu de Jours pourroit les faire mourir de Faim. Aussi long Tems, donc, que l'Angleterre peut assembler un Corps de 10 à 12,000 Hommes, et un bon Corps de Cavall. (Arme qu'il leur est impossible d'amener avec eux), il paroît presque impraticable qu'ils puissent nous invader avec le moindre Succès; car, si ils amènent plus de 10,000 Hommes, ou de la Cavall., il leur faudroit 3 à 400 gros Vaisseaux pour les transporter avec tout leur Attirail.

Toutes ces Reflexions me tranquilisent, pour cet Eté du moins, sur le Danger d'une Invasion de la Part de la France, mais je les soumets avec toute Humilité au Jugement de mes Superieurs, beaucoup mieux instruits et plus éclairés que moi.

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Nous comptons environ 20,000 Hommes placés depuis St. Valery jusqu'à Bergue, de façon que nous avons tout Lieu de croire, qu'il ne peut pas y avoir 10,000 Hommes de plus, depuis St. Valery jusqu'à Bourdeaux.

C'est aux Experts à juger, si, avec une aussi grande Etendue de Cote et de Frontiere, avec tant de Places importantes à garder, il est probable, que la France risque un Corps de Troupes dans une Expedition aussi dangereuse, que celle d'invalider les Royaumes de S. M.; et cela dans un Temps, ou Elle a tant de peine à trouver l'Argent necessaire pour toutes les Entreprises, dans lesquelles Elle s'est embarquée en Allemagne, et quand Elle a un si petit Nombre de Vaisseaux de Guerre équipés dans ses Ports, pour escorter les Bâtimens de Transport.

Je conviens, qu'on peut suppléer, au Defaut de Troupes réglées, par des Milices dans plusieurs Places; mais la France ne confiera pas la Garde de *Toulon*, de *Brest*, de *Calais* et de *Dunquerque*, non plus que celle de *Nieuport* et d'*Ostende* à des Milices seules; de maniere qu'en se donnant la Peine de calculer ce que la France a déjà fait sortir du Royaume, l'on trouvera, que 267,000 Hommes (le Total de toute sa Force, Milices et Invalides compris) sont bientôt employés dans un Païs, qui envoie au dehors des Armées de 150,000 Hommes, et se trouve obligé de fournir les Garnisons, qui en exigent 70,000 Hommes.

Ils n'employeront pas, sans Doute, ni *Milices* ni *Invalides* pour invader l'Angleterre; mais à moins de cela, je ne vois pas, comment ils seraient en Etat de se passer d'un Corps assez considerable pour nous donner un Moment d'Inquietude outre toutes les Raisons alleguées ci-dessus, si même ils avoient un Corps prêt à agir (ce qui leur coûteroit plus de deux Mois à fournir), ils n'oseroient jamais se risquer dans un Païs où le Blé est rare, et où un Delai de peu de Jours pourroit les faire mourir de Faim. Aussi long Tems, donc, que l'Angleterre peut assembler un Corps de 10 à 12,000 Hommes, et un bon Corps de Cavall. (Arme qu'il leur est impossible d'amener avec eux), il paroît presque impraticable qu'ils puissent nous invader avec le moindre Succès; car, si ils amènent plus de 10,000 Hommes, ou de la Cavall., il leur faudroit 3 à 400 gros Vaisseaux pour les transporter avec tout leur Attirail.

Toutes ces Reflexions me tranquilisent, pour cet Eté du moins, sur le Danger d'une Invasion de la Part de la France, mais je les soumets avec toute Humilité au Jugement de mes Superieurs, beaucoup mieux instruits et plus éclairés que moi.

8. SECRET INSTRUCTIONS FOR LIEUTENANT-GENERAL MORDAUNT.
August 1757. Chatham MSS.

1. You shall, immediately upon the receipt of these our instructions, repair to the Isle of Wight, where we have appointed ships to carry you and the forces under your command to the coast of France; And so soon as the said forces shall be embarked, you shall accordingly proceed without loss of time, under convoy of a number of our ships of war, commanded by . . . Sir Edw. Hawke. . . .

The said Adm. or the Commander in Chief of our said ships for the time being, being instructed to co-operate with you, and to be aiding and assisting in all such enterprizes as, by these our Instructions, you shall be directed to undertake for our service.

2. . . . and of urgent necessity to make some expedition, that will cause a diversion and engage the Enemy to employ in their own defence a considerable part of their forces destined to invade and oppress the liberties of Germany; and if possible to make some effectual impression on the Enemy, as, by shaking their credit, impairing their naval force and disturbing their dangerous plan of operations, may give lustre to our arms and add life and strength to the common cause. . . . Our will and pleasure is, that you do, in the most vigorous and effectual manner, attempt, as far as shall be found practicable, a descent with the forces under your command, on the French coast, at or near Rochefort, in order, if practicable, to attack, and force that place; and to burn and destroy, to the utmost of your power, all Docks, Magazines, Arsenals, and Shipping, that shall be found there; and make such other efforts, as you shall judge most proper for annoying the Enemy.

3. After the attempt on Rochefort shall either have failed or succeeded, and in case the circumstances of our forces and fleet, as also the season of the year, shall, with prospect of success, still admit of further operations, you are to consider Port l'Orient and Bourdeaux as the most important objects of our arms on the coast of France, next to Rochefort. And our will and pleasure accordingly is, that you do proceed successively to an attempt on both, or either of those places, as it shall be judged practicable, or on any other Place, that shall be thought most advisable, from Bourdeaux homewards . . . in order to carry and spread as much as possible, a warm alarm along the maritime Provinces of France.

4. [After making himself master of any place, he is not to keep possession of it, but only to destroy all works, defences, magazines, arsenals, and naval stores, and then proceed to other operations.]

9. LETTERS FROM LORD BUTE TO PITT. Written in 1757 and 1758. Chatham MSS.

(a) *August 25, 1757.*

MY DEAR FRIEND,—I enter heartily into the base unworthy manner, that you have been treated in, tho' no perfidy in that quarter will ever surprise me; yet I own I am amaz'd at the impudence of the assertion. I regret extremely not having had my share in the tragedy. I confess I am anxious about your situation; it is my noblest best friend's fortune is at stake; it is mine; nay 'tis that of a greater Person than either of us, of one who knows, who feels your danger, and still looks upon it as His own; I say I am anxious, my friend, but that is all, far from desponding, I look on all that happens now, as the last efforts of a long adverse fortune. We have hitherto had the whole chapter of accidents against us, the time must be at hand for better things. Is there a man of the whole opposite party, that would not abandon his colours, to stand as near the hope of England as we do; victory is before us, our enemys know it and tremble. Long may you continue, my dear Pitt, in an office, that your parts and good heart adorns; may you be found there at that critical minute, that sooner or later we are sure (if alive) to meet with; this is the hope, nay the real comfort of Him, who will ever share your adversitys and rejoice in your happiness. I ever . . .

(b) *The middle of July 1758.*

MY WORTHY FRIEND,—I need not tell you, that both your letters and the intelligence we have had here, for some days past, have given great allarm. What a dreadful change of scene. This intricate tragedy seems to be near the denouement, and I am affraid not very likely to end agreeably for us. The time perhaps approaches, when peace will be infamous and near impossible; such a war as we are likely to wage, indeed my Friend the very existence of this country depends in my opinion on a single event; how far distant that may be Heaven only knows. I cannot help thinking the King has great reason to complain of

Prussia. P. Henry seems for months to have been raising contribut when he might to (*lacuna*) Soubise on the Borders of Hesse. How wise an article was that you at first inserted in the treaty of a Prussian aid of 10,000 men. I wish too late, that had never been yielded. Long determined to wonder no more at any action of that contemptible being, I read this last attempt without emotion. Have I not said truth, can we make war with such counsellors. What a noble service for a British army, and yet this trifle is mounted on the shoulders of the optimates of these times, and will for ought I know, make a peace (that concedes $\frac{1}{2}$ America) popular. I lament the scenes my worthy friend must often meet with. You have however the invaluable comfort of doing some good and endeavouring much more; this is sufficient in the worst of times to support a generous mind. I know it must have a full effect on you. May it preserve both your health and spirits for the sake of this poor country [and?] this virtuous prince.

10. REPORT BY JOHN VEYSEY ON QUEBEC AND THE RIVER ST. LAWRENCE. Dated October 4, 1758. Chatham MSS.

I was at sea in a ship called the *Nugent* (of and from Bristol) bound to Boston, James Beach Master—June 25th we sailed from Kingroad and July 2^d we unhappily fell in with two French men of war and a 'Letter of Marque,' all from Rochelle for Quebec, to whom we were forced to surrender. After they had plundered the ship of what little they thought proper, they refusing any ransom set her on fire and took our crew with them for Quebec. We were then in about the lat. 44° and long. 11° west from London. They put me with only one English man more on board the 'Letter of Marque,' and we soon after happened to part with the other ships. August the 5th foll. we past through the streights of Belle Isle, where the French ships almost always now pass to escape the English fleet which have been always off Louisburg since the surrender of that place. August 9th we saw the island Anticosti and entered the river St. Lawrence to the northward of it. This channel is wide and nothing dangerous in it except some islands and one shoal which lie near the mainland of Terra Labrador. And as we had a contrary wind most of the way to Quebec, so that we were near a month before we got there, I had the more time to take observations of this great river, as I was never confin'd on board, nor deny'd the liberty of writing. The island Anticosti is rocky

and appears to be of no value, nor could I see a harbour in it fit for a boat. At the upper end of the island Anticosti the river is very wide and all clear and open, the tides very little except in the very strong freshes. We herefrom steared due west till we came near a place called isle Barnabas. It's near the south shore. Here are the first settlements of note the French have in the river. There are about 40 dwellings, the land pretty good: it's called Remoqui. 3 leagues farther W. b. S. are islands call'd the Bec. They are about 4 or 5 miles from the south shore. Under the SE. point of these islands is good anchoring in 10 or 12 fathom of water. I was lying there 9 or 10 days and on shore several times with the French a shooting. This the French say is 50 leagues from Quebec, and I believe 'tis about that distance. Most French ships pass to northward of them and I past that way twice. The tides here are not strong and quite regular. The river here is about 8 leagues from side to side. About 8 leagues WSW. from hence are islands called the Isles au Bask. These islands are near the south shore and all ships pass to northward of them. In the course are several places of anchorage from 16 to 22 fathom of water, near the south shore (near the north side is very deep water). The French have likewise here some more habitations of no great consequence. About 5 leagues farther up is the Isle Verd near the south shore and a small sandy island called Isle Rouge nearest the north shore, off which are great shoals, as likewise some off Isle Verd. It's proper to keep nearest Isle Verd in passing. The tides here are strong, and very foul ground, so that 'tis hard to find a place to anchor in safety except off the east point of Isle Verd. About 8 leagues SW. b. W. from Isle Verd is Pelerin (3 or 4 rocky islands near the south shore) and a large low island called Leuere nearest the north side; the properest channel is between them. The tides here are likewise pretty strong as at the Isle Verd. Here is good anchoring in from 6 to 18 fathom water and fine sand. From Pelerin to another place higher up called Camerisca is about 3 or 4 leagues. Here are more islands near the south side; here is good anchoring and a fine bottom. About 5 leagues from hence is the Isle Coudre; it's near the north shore (about a league) and thro' this narrow passage all ships are obliged to pass, for there is no passing to the southward of this island without very great danger. There is a good road of anchorage about the middle of this passage, and where most French ships generally stop. The tides here are very strong, almost as strong as in the Bristol Channel; the Ebb and Flood regular, except in the freshes, which are often strong in the winter and spring of the year. On

this Isle Coudre are pilots whom most French ships take. The signal to get them is by firing two guns and hoisting a large French Ensign (if in the day time). From this place to Quebec is the greatest difficulty of the whole river, on account of the shoals in the way. Yet not so difficult but ships might easily get there, even without their French pilots, by having boats ahead to sound. The French call it 20 leagues from Isle Coudre to Quebec, but I believe 'tis not so much. From Coudre to the Island Orleans is 10 or 12 leagues and several shoals in the way. The tides too are strong. From the lower end of Isle Orleans to Quebec is about 7 or 8 leagues and no dangers in the way. There is 8 or 10 fathom water very near the land. Here is all along a narrow river of little more than a league over. This Island Orleans is the most pleasant place in the whole river St. Lawrence. It's well situated, lies almost level and is good land; there are numbers of small houses on it and several churches, but 'tis now thin of people.

[Hereupon follows an account of the writer's stay in Quebec, of the fortifications, and of the proceedings of the enemy. Pitt is informed of the departure of the troops for Crown Point and of the ships of war in the direction of the estuary.]

N.B.—There are 3 things which make it difficult and dangerous in going to Quebec: 1st, that the winds blow much oftener down the river than up; 2^d, that when the wind blows up the river 'tis often very foggy; 3^d, that the tides are much stronger in some places than in others, so that it may be very difficult to go there by the single help of the best and truest chart without being in some measure acquainted with the land, so as to be certain where they are.

11. INSTRUCTIONS, ETC., FOR THE ATTACK ON MARTINIQUE.

October 16, 1758. Colonial Office Records, America and West Indies. Public Record Office.

(a) *Pitt to Major-General Hopson.*

SIR,—I inclose herewith the secret instructions, which the King has been pleased to sign for your guidance and direction, in addition to which, I am to inform you, that Capt. Hughes is directed, immediately on his arrival at Portsmouth, if all the transport vessels shall, as it is hoped, be then ready, or as soon after as possible, to dispatch, in concert with you, under proper

convoy, to Plymouth such part thereof, as shall be sufficient to receive the two regmts. to be embarked at that place, and it is the King's pleasure, that you do give the necessary directions for the said two regmts. to be put on board with all possible expedition, in order that the same may be, in every respect, ready, on any signal or order from Capt. Hughes to join him without loss of time, on his arrival, with the rest of the fleet, off Portsmouth.—I am also to inform you, that Capt. Hughes is directed, when you shall have made such progress in your voyage as shall be judged expedient, to dispatch, in concert with you, a ship to Capt. Moore, or the Commander in Chief of H. M.'s ships at the Leeward Islands (who has been ordered to repair to Carlisle Bay in Barbadoes) with a duplicate of the King's instructions [and other necessary information].

Letters to the Governors of Barbadoes and the Leeward Islands accompany these instructions.

(b) Secret Instructions for General Hopson.

[He is to go to Portsmouth, where the 3rd, the 61st, the 64th, and the 65th regiments of infantry are assembled, is to superintend their embarkation, and proceed with them under the convoy of Captain Hughes' squadron to Plymouth, where the 4th and 63rd regiments are to embark.]

And so soon as the two last mentioned Regmts. shall be so embarked at Plymouth, you are to continue your voyage under the same convoy, to our island of Barbadoes, where, it is hoped, you will find our trusty and well-beloved John Moore, Esq., or the Commander in Chief, for the time being, of our ships at the Leeward Isls., who will be instructed to co-operate with you, and to be aiding and assisting in all such enterprizes, as, by these our instructions, you shall be directed to undertake for our service.

2. . . . Our will and pleasure is, that, so soon as you shall have joined, off Barbadoes, the squadron . . . or such part thereof as the Commander in Chief shall judge requisite for the service, you do without anchoring off Barbadoes, or making any stay which shall not be of most absolute necessity, proceed to the Island of Martinique, where, as immediately as may be, you are to attack in concert with the Commander in Chief of our ships, the Forts, Batteries, and Town of Port St. Pierre and to use your utmost endeavours to make yourself master of the said place, and you are also to exert all possible efforts to reduce, and make yourself master of the citadel and town of Port Royal, together with all ships, forts, and batteries thereunto belonging, and you are like-

wise . . . to endeavour to possess yourself of such other maritime places or posts on the Island of Martinique as shall be found most effectually to conduce to distress and reduce the said Island, whether by famine or otherwise.

3. [The conquered places and posts are to be garrisoned, and information is then to be sent home regarding the number of troops still required.]

4. [He is to procure natives from Barbadoes and the Leeward Islands to perform all such services as would be too exhausting for the European troops. These natives are to follow him to Martinique. The attack is not to be delayed by this.]

5. [If he succeeds, he may, if he thinks fit, send 1000 of the men at his disposal to North America, after communicating with General Amherst. If he does not succeed, and if it is not possible to attack other islands, he is to return to England with ships and troops, leaving, however, 2000 men out of the six battalions under his command, who are to be sent to recruit the forces under General Amherst.]

6. [Good understanding between army and naval officers. Mutual assistance.]

(c) *Private Instructions for Robert Hughes, Esq.*

. . . You are, immediately upon the receipt of these Instructions, to repair to Spithead, where we have ordered a squadron consisting of 6 sh. of the line, 4 bomb vessels, and such a number of frigates as shall be directed by our Commissioners for executing the office of our High. Adm. of Gr. Britain, to rendezvous together with a sufficient number of transport vessels for 6 Rgmts. of foot and also vessels with Artil. and Stores, which squadron, transports, and other vessels you are to take under your command.

12. (a) PITT TO THE LORDS OF THE ADMIRALTY. February 22, 1759. Chatham MSS.

MY LORDS,—The King having received intelligence, that naval preparations are making with the utmost application at Toulon, Brest, Rochfort, and the other ports of France, I am commanded to signify to Y. Lordships H. Maj.'s pleasure, that you do forthwith give the necessary directions, for causing all the serviceable ships of the line to be completed and got ready for the sea with the utmost expedition, and that Y. Ls do also give the strictest orders

for accelerating, with most particular diligence and dispatch, the fitting, and refitting, repairing and compleating all the ships in the several docks and yards, in order that the same may be ready for the sea as soon as shall be possible.

(b) CABINET MEETING AT THE ADMIRALTY. May 11, 1759.
Chatham MSS.

Present: Lord Keeper, Lord President, Duke of Bedford, Duke of Newcastle, Earl of Holderness, Earl of Hardwicke, Lord Ligonier, Lord Anson, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Secretary Pitt.

It appearing to their Lordships, that upwards of 10,000 men are now actually mustered on board the King's frigates and sloops of War, their Lordships are humbly of opinion, that 1600 men be forthwith taken from the frigates and sloops, in order to compleat immediately the full complements of the 24 ships of the Line, now stated to their Lordships to be, in all other respects, ready for the Sea; and that the said 24 ships of the Line do forthwith repair, under the command of Sir Edw. Hawke, to Torbay, or such other station as shall be judged most expedient for H. M.'s service; and that the remainder of H. M.'s ships of the Line be prepared and fitted for the sea with all possible expedition.

13. FROM THE REPORTS OF THE PRUSSIAN AMBASSADOR. Berlin
Record Office.

(a) *February 20, 1759.*

Que l'escadre de l'amm. Saunders, qui est destinée pour l'Amérique septentrionale et qui doit se joindre aux vaisseaux que l'amm. Boscawen a laissé tant à Halifax, qu'à Louisbourg, a fait voile vendredi dernier, et qu'elle est composée de 9 vaiss. de l. et 6 freg. ainsi que de quelques brûlots.

L'amm. Holmes qui doit se joindre à cette escadre a également fait voile avec 6 vaiss. de l., 4 freg. et environ 60 transp. Il reste en outre un grand nombre de vaiss. de l. et de freg. en rade tant à Portsmouth qu'à Plymouth, dont la destination n'est pas encore décidée; mais nous savons d'origine et de science certaine, que la distribution des forces navales pour la campagne prochaine est faite de façon, qu'après qu'on aura formé les différentes escadres, qu'on veut employer au dehors, et qui seront toutes très considérables, il restera à la disposition de l'amirauté pour les besoins qui

pourront se présenter par la suite 41 vaiss. de l. dont la plupart de la première force et 43 à 44 freg., tout armés et équipés, outre un grand nombre d'armateurs, que le Gouvernement peut prendre à sa paye dans l'occasion. V.M. sentira par là que l'Angleterre à la faveur d'une flotte aussi immense a non seulement rien à craindre pour son Interieur, mais qu'elle a même en reserve des forces dont l'aspect doit certainement en imposer à toutes les puissances qui sont jalouses de son influence sur mer et qui pourraient pencher à se lier avec la France.

(b) May 18, 1759. [*Letters from France report that flat-bottomed boats are being collected at and in the neighbourhood of Havre. A sharp look-out is being kept.*]

Afin donc que l'Ammiral Hawke qui ainsi, que nous avons déjà eu l'honneur de le rapporter, sera stationné à Torbay, puisse être instruit avec célérité de tous les mouvements, que les Français pourront faire vers les côtes de ce pays, l'on a formé trois chaines de fregattes, dont la première s'étend depuis Torbay jusqu'au Nord de l'Ecosse, et l'autre le long des côtes de l'Irlande, tandis qu'il y a une troisième qui mesure l'intervalle qu'il y a entre ce point et la port de Brest, de manière, que moyennant les signaux qu'on a établis entre ces différents cordons, l'amm. Hawke pourra se porter avec son escadre partout où le besoin l'exigera. Il est à observer d'ailleurs, que le même vent dont l'escadre de Brest a besoin pour sa sortie de ce port, sert aussi à l'amm. Hawke pour la sortie de la baye où il se trouve stationné.

(c) June 8, 1759 : [*Newcastle's intrigues against Pitt, whom the war has made too powerful.*]

Il a prévu que le rétablissement de la paix était seul capable de lui rendre l'influence et le credit . . . que c'est dans cette idée, que ce ministre a d'abord commencé de repandre par ses propos et de persuader à ses créatures, que le fardeau de la guerre était devenu trop lourd . . . et que la nation succomberait certainement, si l'on n'y mettait ordre . . . Un emprunt considérable levé dans le même temps sous les auspices de la trésorerie, à des conditions onéreuses et présentées dans un mauvais jour, n'a pas peu contribué à indisposer ceux, qui n'avaient participés par leurs souscriptions, et à occasionner une baisse précipitée dans ces mêmes fonds, qui, quoi qu'elle ne provient nullement d'une disette réelle d'espèces, mais seulement d'une operation mal dirigée, a cependant

porté un très grand préjudice au crédit de l'état dans l'Etranger et repandû l'alarme dans l'intérieur.

Les partisans du Duc de Cumberland et de l'ancien ministère ont, ainsi qu'il était aisé de prévoir, saisi cette occasion avec avidité pour attaquer la réputation du Sr. Pitt. . . . Ces clameurs [against Pitt] se sont répandus avec une rapidité singulière pendant la dernière maladie du Sr. Pitt, qui lui ne permettait point de paraître pour les combattre, et ont tellement ébranlé les esprits faibles, qu'on a soupçonné pendant quelques instants, que le Duc de Newcastle pourrait bien s'être réuni avec ce même parti; pour opprimer le Sr. Pitt . . .

[This suspicion proved incorrect. Pitt recovers. Succeeds] après quelques petites altercations qu'il y a eu entre lui et le Duc de Newcastle, à fermer la bouche à ce dernier et à ses partisans. . . . [Even if the campaign proved successful, they (the opposition) would have another opportunity,] vraisemblablement au commencement de cet hiver, lorsqu'il s'agissait de lever de nouveau fonds pour les besoins de la prochaine campagne. . . . [Secret separate action by the King to be feared owing to Newcastle's influence.]

Les lamentations dont le ministère d'Hannover, qui est intimement lié avec ce duc, ne cesse de faire usage pour inquiéter et attendrir le roy sur le sort de ses Etats d'Allemagne . . . il ne se présente qu'un seul expédient à l'esprit, qui puisse efficacement remplir ce but, ce serait que V. M. daignât écrire le plutôt le mieux une lettre au Roy d'Angleterre [suggesting that, with the aim of restoring peace, a congress should be held]. Une pareille démarche à laquelle . . . on se prêterait ici avec plaisir, empêcherait non seulement des ouvertures de paix précipitées et mal digérées, mais elle barrerait aussi le chemin à toute négociation clandestine, en établissant un congrès formel, qui s'ouvrirait d'un commun accord avec V. M. et qui serait, Sire, une preuve manifeste de la continuation de votre intimité avec l'Angleterre.

P. Scr.—Je supplie et conjure V. M. de faire à cette dépêche l'attention la plus sérieuse et de vouloir bien être persuadé, que la démarche qui y est proposée est indispensablement nécessaire pour le bien de la cause commune et de ses intérêts en particulier. . . .

(d) *July 6, 1759. [The letter on the subject of the congress has arrived. Newcastle and Pitt are differently impressed by it.]*

Ce dernier a été comblé de cette démarche et a senti d'abord tous les avantages qui ne sauraient manquer de revenir, soit pour

rendre infructueux le manège du duc de Newcastle, soit pour encourager la nation au soutien de la guerre et se laver du reproche d'en être le promoteur. Le Duc de Newcastle qui ne manque pas d'une certaine pénétration a bien prévu qu'une lettre de cette espèce ne lui laissait plus les moyens d'imaginer aucun prétexte qui pût justifier auprès de la nation une négociation secrète ou séparée et que doresnavant il faudrait charrier droit.

14. ORDERS REGARDING THE CAPTURE OF MARTINIQUE, ETC.
1761. Colonial Office Records, America and West
Indies. Public Record Office.

(a) *Pitt to Dalrymple (English Governor of Guadeloupe), February 14, 1761.*

The King having been pleased to direct me to send his orders to Gen. Amherst . . . to the following effect, viz.: [He was ordered to send 2000 men, under commanders of his own choosing, in transport ships with a suitable convoy to Guadeloupe, to take possession of Dominique and also of St. Lucia], if the latter be judged practicable and expedient.

[On account of the many circumstances on which the successful execution of the order was dependent], it was the King's pleasure, that Gen. Amherst should carry the orders for taking possession of Dominique into execution, only in the case, that the above several circumstances shall (as it is greatly wished) happen so luckily, that the troops destined as above for Dominique, may arrive at Guadeloupe pretty early in May. . . .

I am now to inform you, that the above orders were dispatched to Gen. Amherst on the 7th of the last month; and I am to signify to you H. M.'s pleasure, that you should forthwith use your utmost endeavours to procure the best intelligence, you can by any means obtain of the present state and situation of the said islands of Dominique and St. Lucia, and that you should hold yourself in readiness, in case the troops above mentioned shall come to Guadeloupe, to co-operate in the execution of the same, with such part of the troops now in Guadeloupe, as may, consistently with the secure possession of the said island, be found applicable to the above service, namely, the taking possession, before the Hurricane Months, of the island of Dominique, of the Island of St. Lucia also, if the latter be judged practicable and expedient.

(b) *Pitt to Lord Rollo (commander of a squadron in the West Indies), August 5, 1761.*

. . . I am now commanded by the King to inform Y. L., in the greatest confidence, that H. M. has come to a resolution to attempt, with the utmost vigor, the reduction of the isl. of Martinique by a body of troops from North America, and that you may expect Maj. Gen. Monckton . . . with the forces destined for this most important enterprise, to arrive in your parts towards the end of October. It is, therefore, H. M.'s pleasure, that Y. L. should, with the utmost secrecy, make all timely preparations for co-operating with Maj. Gen. Monckton or the Commander in Chief of the troops above mentioned with as large a number of the men, under your command, as can be spared consistently with the security of the island of Dominique, and Y. L. will concert with Sir James Douglas, or the Commander in Chief of H. M.'s ships at the Leeward Islands, and with the Gov. of Guadeloupe, the proper time and place for such troops, as you shall be able to furnish, to join the forces under the command of Maj. Gen. Monckton, in order to proceed with him against Martinique, in the execution of which service . . .

(c) *Pitt to Colonel Rufane, or the commanding officer of the four regiments embarked at Belleisle. To be opened 50 leagues WSW. of Belleisle. September 21, 1761.*

SIR,—I am commanded by the King to acquaint you, that the four regiments embarked at Belleisle . . . are to proceed agreeable to the directions of the commanding officer of H. M.'s ships appointed to convoy them, to the West Indies, in order to join a body of forces from North America under the command of M. Gen. Monckton. [He is further directed to place himself under Monckton's orders, and to deliver to him a letter enclosed.]

(d) *Pitt to General Monckton (commander of the expedition). September 21, 1761.*

[He is ordered to take command of the four regiments and to conduct with vigour and expedition], which, if it succeeds, it is not doubted, will be followed with the immediate reduction of the neutral islands of St. Lucia, and St. Vincent, and of all the French Islands in those parts.

15. INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE RESIDENT AT ST. PETERSBURG,
THOMAS WROUGHTON. February 2, 1762. Foreign Office
Records, Russia. Public Record Office. (Draft.)

1st, After the receipt of these our instructions, together with our letters of credence (whereby you are appointed to be our Resident at the Court of our good brother the Emperor of Russia) to both their Imp. Majesties, together with the copies of the same, which will be delivered to you, and of cyphers for your correspondence, you will repair immediately, and with all possible diligence, to Petersburg, and having demanded audiences of the Emperor and Empress, in the manner which you find to be practised there by the ministers of other crowns of an equal rank with that which we have conferred upon you, you shall present our said credential letters to those princes respectively and shall add to the assurances therein given all such farther declarations of our most affectionate esteem for their persons and earnest desire of cultivating the strictest friendship, and confidential intercourse with them, as may tend to convince them of the reality of our dispositions and sentiments.

2^d, Whereas we have thought fit to give new letters of credence to our trusty and well beloved Robert Keith, Esq., appointing him to be an Envoy Extraord. and Plenipot. at the present Russian Court, and have ordered him to communicate those instructions we have given him upon this occasion, to speak and to act in concert with you in the execution of our commands, it is our pleasure, that you should on your part observe the same direction with respect to our said minister, that so by your united endeavours and mutual communications you may be enabled more effectually to promote our royal service, in every step which you shall judge conducive to the advancement of the greatness of our Kingdoms.

7th (to be the 7th) in the room of the 7th in the book. We do in a particular manner enjoin and charge you not only in general to be attentive to what concerns the trade and commerce of our subjects, but to exert yourself as soon as you shall find proper opportunitys for setting on foot any transactions of that kind, in conjunction with the Sieur Keith our said minister, whom we have instructed fully therein, in procuring the renewal of the commercial treaty between the two Courts lately expired, with the addition of any such farther advantageous concessions as may appear obtainable in a conjuncture which we have reason

to hope may be favourable to our views, in which however it will be necessary that you should act with great prudence and discretion.

16. DRAFT OF A LETTER FROM PITT TO COUNT WORONTZOW (late Russian Ambassador in London). 1764. Chatham MSS.

MONSIEUR,—Si j'ai remis jusqu'ici à répondre à la lettre dont vous m'avez honoré, il y a quelque temps, ce n'est certainement par faute d'avoir été vivement touché de ce qu'il y a d'infiniment flatteur pour moi dans les sentiments de bonté et d'amitié que vous me permettez d'espérer de votre part. Après avoir premièrement attendu que quelque ami passant à la Haye pût vous remettre une lettre, j'ai ensuite appris, Monsieur, votre voyage, dont je ne vous ai su de retour que depuis peu par Monsieur Michel; ce ministre intègre et habile, que nous avons le regret de voir partir aussi, et qui a bien voulu se charger de vous rendre celle-ci. Et par où commencerai-je, Monsieur le Comte, en vous épanchant le cœur d'une pareille portion du monde? Sera-ce par cette parti que tout bon Anglais deplore sans cesse, ou bien par qu'on ne saurait assez admirer? Mais bien par vous offrir avec chaleur mille felicitations sur le role glorieux que soutient la Russie et applaudir [votre Impératrice qui montre] tant de sagesse à reserrer les nœuds en l'union entière et confidente avec Sa Majesté Prussienne d'un côté, pendant que de l'autre Elle a soin que le trône de Pologne soit rempli par un Roi qui soit dans l'indépendance de Versailles et de Vienne. Voilà des vues dignes d'un Génie né pour un si puissant Empire, et qui font envisager la Cour de Petersbourg avec celle de Berlin comme l'asyle de l'Europe contre l'ambition liguée de Bourbon et d'Autriche. Que ne puis-je, Monsieur le Comte, vous rien dire encore de notre reveil d'une létargie honteuse qui sera dans peu funeste. Votre départ était de trop mauvais augure pour que depuis cette facheuse époque j'ai pû me flatter que les choses prissent bientôt un aspect plus consolant, . . . et Dieu sait quand elles se dissiperont. Quoiqu'il en arrive, et quelque part que votre étoile pourra vous conduire, je vous supplie, Monsieur, d'être persuadé que dans un coin d'une Isle presque oubliée en Europe vous avez toujours un serviteur qui vous est si vraiment et invariablement attaché et qui ne perdra jamais le souvenir de vos bontés si flatteuses pour lui, ni de ce zèle constant qui vous avez toujours manifesté pour l'union intime de nos Cours et pour l'établissement

de l'unique système solide, qui puisse assurer la tranquillité publique et l'indépendance de l'Europe.

17. CONWAY TO MITCHELL IN BERLIN. August 8, 1766. Foreign Office Records, Prussia. Public Record Office.

SIR,—I have it in command from H. Maj. to inform you, that H. Maj. being convinced that nothing can tend so effectually to secure the continuation of the present general tranquillity as the forming such a firm and solid system in the North, as may prove a counterbalance to the great and formidable Alliance framed by the H. of Bourbon, on the basis of her Family Compact, and considering a connection of Gr. Britain with the two great Crowns of Russia and Prussia as the natural foundation of such a system, has been pleased to appoint Mr. Stanley his ambassador extraord. to the Court of Petersburg; who will be instructed to act in conjunction with you, and in order to that will have H. M.'s commands to pass through Berlin, there to confer fully and freely with you on the most effectual means of bringing this great and salutary plan to the desired conclusion. And that he may be enabled to do it more effectually, will have credentials to H. Prussian Maj., so as, in concurrence with you, to settle the proper measures to be pursued in the progress of this affair, in which the intimate knowledge you possess of the state of that Court where you reside, and of the dispositions and views of H. Pruss. Maj. will be of the most essential service. But as you are thoroughly acquainted with the coldness that has lately reigned between the Courts of London and Berlin, and have been witness to the extreme backwardness H. Pruss. Maj. has shewn towards any ideas of a more intimate connection with this Court, you will not wonder that H. Maj. previous to the sending Mr. Stanley over, and to beginning any actual negotiation, is desirous to know whether this most friendly step taken by H. M. is view'd with pleasure by the King of Prussia.

After opening therefore, in the most confidential manner, the plan proposed by H. M., and thereby giving H. Pr. M. the strongest proof of H. M.'s inclination to act on terms of the most cordial union; you will, as soon as may be, report to me, for H. M.'s information, in what manner these overtures have been received, and will accompany the same with such intelligence or observations as appear to you material for throwing the

fullest lights on this interesting and important business, as may be a direction for the further prosecuting it with effect.

To you, Sir, who are so entirely master of all that relates to this subject, it will be little necessary to add any more. You are in general at least informed of the obstructions which the treaty of alliance with Russia, so long since proposed, has met with, and if by means of this mode of negociation, and in this new form, that object can be attained, you, Sir, who will be a chief instrument in promoting it, will deserve, and undoubtedly obtain the highest approbation and applause.

18. EXTRACT FROM THE PRUSSIAN AMBASSADOR'S REPORT OF
SEPTEMBER 4, 1767. Berlin Public Record Office.

Il parait, que la Cour a presentement tourné toutes ses vues sur la prochaine election du Parlement, et qu'elle emploiera le verd et le sec pour ne faire élire què des gens tout à fait dévoués au favori. Les amis, parents et clients de ce dernier, pour la plus part Écossais, s'offrent déjà publiquement aux Electeurs, et quoi- qu'ils trouveront par ci par là des obstacles pour parvenir à leur fondement, et que la nouvelle election sera peut-être une des plus contestées, et des plus mémorables de ce siècle, on peut pourtant prévoir, qu'ils ne seront pas tous rejettés, car bien que le vuide qui se fait sentir dans les coffres du Roi, ne permettent point au Ld. Bute, de repandre beaucoup d'argent parmi les Electeurs, les places, les titres, les pensions, les expectatives, les avancements dans l'armée, dans la Marine, et nombre d'autres graces, qui ne content rien au Roi, et dont il peut disposer souverainement, lui assurent un succès presque immanquable des susdites vues. J'ai appris par un assez bon canal que Milord Holland a donné ce conseil au Roi, dans la conférence du 22 Juillet, et qu'il a ajouté qu'une expérience de 40 ans lui avait appris, que c'était là le remède le plus seur et le plus spécifique, pour terrasser toute opposition quelconque, et qu'avec des mesures du Roi, il n'avait besoin de donner de bonnes paroles à qui que ce fut, pour rester ou entrer dans le Ministère, vu que chaque gentilhomme de sa chambre serait alors capable d'en faire les fonctions. Il faudra voir jusqu'ou ces conseils se verifient, toutes fois il est sur que le Roi et le Lord Bute les ont adoptés, et que depuis ce moment à toute negociation en tout pourparler avec les chefs de l'opposition, ont cessés entièrement. . . .

19. TRADUCTION DU DISCOURS ATTRIBUÉ AU LORD CHATHAM, QU'IL A ADRESSÉ AU ROI. July 1769. Berlin Public Record Office.

J'emploie ces premiers moments de ma faible convalescence, pour témoigner au meilleur des Princes mon attachement, et mon inviolable fidélité, et je suis bien aise que l'état de ma santé me permette de m'en acquitter dans un temps, où les factions renaissent comme les têtes de l'Hidre; et dechainent leurs langues malignes jusqu'au pied du trône même.—Quand il plut à V. M. de requérir mon faible avis, pour l'aider à former une admin., je lui recommandai alors toutes les personnes que je crois revêtues des meilleures qualités et des meilleures intentions de son Royaume¹ (excepté un seul, qui a été éloigné ensuite du service de S. M. [on the margin : Le Ld Shelburne]), personnes qui ont bien mérité de la Patrie, et dont l'approbation a été confirmée par les témoignages les plus authentiques. Je suis persuadé, Sire, sur la connaissance que j'ai de l'intégrité et de la fermeté de V. M., qu'Elle n'ôtera pas sa protection et son secours à de tels ministres; et qu'Elle ne permettra pas, qu'une faction qui n'est assujettée à aucun principe, insulte et foule aux pieds toute autorité légitime; faction qui n'est liée entre elle que par des vues particulières de se rendre maître de l'autorité, en troublant la paix, et en insultant la dignité de la Couronne. Les clameurs actuelles qui ne sont fondées sur aucune apparence de vérité, et de griefs réels, doivent tomber dans le néant; ne prenez pas le change, Grand Roi, sur les pétitions, et les plaintes de gens à projet, obtenues par adresse d'une multitude, innocente mais abusée; qui en demandant justice, ne s'aperçoivent pas, qu'ils mettent par cette démarche V. M. au dessus des uns et des autres, et établissent ainsi un pouvoir étranger à la constitution, et qui tend à renverser cette liberté qu'ils s'efforcent de défendre et de maintenir.

J'ai été informé à différentes reprises pendant ma retraite que plusieurs de ces chefs de faction cherchaient à fomenter la discorde, et à susciter des jalousies injustes entre les deux nations, qui composent le Royaume de la Grande Bretagne; ces avis m'ont affecté bien sensiblement, étant fermement persuadé, qu'aucune

¹ On lit dans la remarque: ce noble personnage dans la plupart de ses discours a fait de fréquentes allusions à la Bible; à cette occasion il semble qu'il a eû devant les yeux le passage suivant de St. Jean: De tous ceux que tu m'a donné, je n'en ai perdu qu'un seul, savoir le fils de perdition. (Note by the ambassador.)

force étrangère ne pourra nous nuire de la moment que nous serons amis parmi nous ; union qui avec le secours de l'être suprême, a été la cause de nos glorieux succès dans la dernière guerre ; union que j'ai toujours cherché à fortifier, et à cimenter autant que ma faible capacité me l'a permis ; ceux qui s'efforcent aujourd'hui de la rompre, portent un poignard sous l'habit de patriote, pour le plonger jusques au fond du cœur de leur Patrie.

Je puis maintenant repeter à V. M. avec vérité, et avec sincérité, ces mêmes assurances que j'eus l'honneur de lui faire par lettre, quand j'obtins sa permission Royale, de retirer mon nom de l'Admin. ; je n'ai point été porté à faire cette démarche par aucun mécontentement quelconque des mesures prises par les Ministres de V. M. ; elle fut occasionnée par mes souffrances et la faiblesse de mon corps. Telle était la nature de mon infirmité, que j'étais incapable, de remplir les devoirs de l'emploi important, que V. M. m'avait gracieusement accordé, et dont je ne pouvais avec honneur recevoir les émoluments qui y sont attachés. Comme je suis maintenant sur le point de me retirer dans une partie fort reculée du Royaume, je saisis cette occasion d'assurer V. M. que si Dieu, qui est la source première de tous biens, me faisait la grace de me rendre un jour ma première santé et ma vigueur, ma plus grande et unique ambition serait de les consacrer au service du meilleur des Rois ; en m'efforçant de maintenir la Constitution de ce Royaume, dans toute son étendue, en soutenant la dignité de la Couronne, et en donnant à une légale autorité toute sa force legitime.

20. FROM THE PRUSSIAN AMBASSADOR'S REPORT OF APRIL 10, 1778. Berlin Public Record Office.

Lord Chatham reparut ces jours en Parlement, et s'y déclara absolument contre l'indépendance des Colonies, disant qu'il fallait plutôt tout sacrifier que de se soumettre aux volontés de la maison de Bourbon ; il condamna la pusillanimité du Ministère, qui aurait dû déclarer incessamment la guerre à la France. Le Duc de Richmond lui répondit avec aigreur, et prétendit qu'il valait mieux accorder l'indépendance, que l'Angleterre était trop épuisée d'hommes et d'argent pour risquer une guerre contre la maison de Bourbon et l'Amérique.

Lord Chatham se leva pour répliquer lorsque par trop d'agitation d'esprit ou par la chaleur excessive, causée par la multitude

des curieux, il tomba à la renverse et fut évanoui pendant une heure ; on le crut mort, cependant il en revint, mais si faible qu'il a été obligé de rester deux jours dans les appartements du clerc de la Chambre ; il est entièrement retabli, et on assure, que la semaine prochaine il reparaitra au Parlement. Sa Majesté Britann. a été infiniment touchée de l'accident arrivé à ce grand homme, au point qu'Elle a daigné envoyer quatre messages pour savoir des nouvelles de sa santé.

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